Patterson & Patterson

[2008] FamCA 1035

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PATTERSON & PATTERSON [2008] FamCA 1035

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

APPLICANT: Mr Patterson

RESPONDENT: Ms Patterson

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mary Alex

FILE NUMBER: SYF 2583 of 2006

DATE DELIVERED: 1 February 2008

PLACE DELIVERED: Parramatta

PLACE HEARD: Sydney

JUDGMENT OF: STEVENSON J

HEARING DATE: 30, 31 October 2007, 2 November 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Snelling

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Harry Freedman,
Milne Berry Berger

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Foster

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Michael Kinchington,
Bob Rosic & Kinchington

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Clifford

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales

Orders

I make the following orders:

1. That the parties do all things necessary to:

   1.1constitute the husband the sole registered proprietor of the property situate at and known as A (“Property A”)

   1.2constitute the husband the sole registered proprietor of the property at E (“Property E”)

   1.3effect the transfer to the husband of the whole of the wife’s right title to and interest in the property situate at and known as D (“Property D”)

   1.4constitute the wife the sole registered proprietor of the property situate at and known as C (“Property C”)

   1.5effect the transfer to the wife of the whole of the husband’s right title to and interest in the property situate at and known as B (“Property B”)

2. That, simultaneously with the execution by the parties of all documents necessary to give full force and effect to order 1 hereof, and no later than 6 weeks from the date of these orders, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $97,000.

3. That the husband indemnify the wife and keep her indemnified against all liabilities for any mortgages secured on the titles to Property A, Property B, Property C, Property D and Property E.

4. That, otherwise, each of the parties be declared to be solely entitled to all items of property and superannuation currently in his and her respective possession.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Patterson & Patterson is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA

FILE NUMBER: SYF 2583 of 2006

MR PATTERSON

Applicant

And

MS PATTERSON

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE PROCEEDINGS

1. Mr Patterson (“the husband”) and Ms Patterson (“the wife”) were initially in dispute as to parenting orders and settlement of their property.  They reached an agreement as to arrangements for the care of their children on the first day of the hearing and I made parenting orders by consent on 2 November 2007.  There thus remained the issue of property settlement for me to determine. 

2. The parenting orders of 2 November 2007 related to the parties’ two children:

   N born in December 1992 (15) and

   S born in December 1994 (13).

   The consent orders provided that they live primarily with their father and spend time with their mother on alternate weekends and during school holidays, while the mother continues to live at Newcastle.  There is provision for the children to spend additional time with their mother when she returns to live in Sydney, as is her intention.

BACKGROUND

1. The husband, who is now 51, and the wife, who is now 47, began to live together in 1986 and married in April 1989.  They separated under one roof on 6 September 2005.  The wife lived with her mother in Newcastle from about April 2006.  There was a dispute as to the circumstances in which she began to live permanently away from the former matrimonial home in Sydney.  The husband and the children have lived continuously in this property since the separation.

2. Before the commencement of cohabitation the husband acquired a property at P by way of an inheritance from his father.  He and the wife lived together in this home and in her rented flat in Sydney until 1987.  At this point the husband sold the P property for $90,000.

3. In August 1987 the husband purchased the former matrimonial home, Property A, in his sole name for $127,000.  He borrowed $80,000 from the Westpac Bank and the balance came from the proceeds of sale of the P property.  He retained about $40,000 from the sale proceeds to fund renovations to Property A. 

4. Both parties were in full time employment when they began to live together in 1986.  The husband is a project manager and the wife works as an accounts clerk. 

5. In December 1987 the husband left the paid workforce for six months and carried out the first stage of the renovations. The wife continued in full time employment and worked on the renovations at weekends.  She made the mortgage payments and purchased a small swimming pool for $5,500, which the husband installed at the former matrimonial home.

6. In about 1989 the wife was retrenched and received a severance payment of about $10,000.  She used this money, together with $3,000 of her savings, to start the second stage of the renovations to Property A.

7. In May 1990 the husband increased the mortgage to $110,000 and used the money to fund further renovations.  He again left the paid workforce for approximately six months and carried out renovations and improvements to the home.  Again, the wife paid the mortgage and assisted with the work on the house at weekends.

8. In December 1992 the husband increased the mortgage to $116,000 to complete the renovations before the birth of the parties’ first child, N, in December 1992.  The wife was out of the paid workforce for approximately nine months following N’s birth and then she returned to part-time employment.  After the child S’s birth, in December 1994, the wife devoted her time to caring for the children and carrying out the role of principal homemaker until 1998.

9. According to the wife, with no denial from the husband, he elected to make interest-only payments on the mortgage for an unspecified period between 1989 and 1994.  The Westpac Bank then demanded payments of both principal and interest, together with a lump sum of $3,000.  The wife cashed in a superannuation policy and made the required payment of $3,000 to the bank. 

10. In 2001 the husband borrowed $150,000 from the Westpac Bank, using Property A as security.  The parties then purchased jointly an investment property, Property B for $150,000.  They jointly purchased a second investment property, Property C, in May 2002 for $166,000.  At the same time a third investment property, Property D was purchased jointly for $172,500.

11. The fourth investment property, Property E, was purchased in the sole name of the husband in August 2002.  All of the money used to purchase the four investment properties was advanced by the Westpac Bank and secured by a mortgage on the title to Property A.  The mortgage debt to the Westpac Bank was then in the vicinity of $770,000.

12. The parties separated under one roof on 6 September 2005.  On 13 April 2006 the wife left the former matrimonial home and travelled to visit an elderly aunt who was ill.  She was away from the family home until May 2006.  During this period she attended the funeral of a relative and visited her mother at Newcastle.

13. On 6 May 2006 the wife informed the husband that she intended to return to the former matrimonial home on 8 May 2006.  She had previously returned to the property, in the absence of the husband and the children, and removed certain chattels and some of her own belongings.  On 6 May 2006 the husband changed the locks on the home.  He telephoned the wife from a police station and, in the presence of a constable, he informed her that the locks have been changed and the she was not to return to the house.  The wife claimed that she was excluded from the home and forced to live elsewhere.  The husband claimed that he believed that the wife had voluntarily left the home on a permanent basis, so he took steps to ensure that a calm atmosphere prevailed for the children.  In my view, it will not assist with the resolution of the property dispute if I attempt to make findings as to whose evidence should be preferred on this issue.

14. The wife lived with her mother in Newcastle until October 2006, when she moved into the home of her sister in the same area.  Her intention is to return to Sydney when she receives funds from the property settlement. 

15. On 26 June 2006 orders were made by consent, which provided for the children to spend time with their mother for half of all school holidays and at other agreed times.  In recent times, there has been some improvement in the parties’ ability to negotiate for the children to spend time with their mother.   In reality, the children will very soon determine for themselves what time they spend with each of their parents. 

16. Also on 26 June 2006 an order was made, by consent, for the sale of a parcel of shares and for the wife to receive the net proceeds.  She received $4,600 in August 2006 and spent this money on car repairs and registration, food and clothing. These orders were expressed to be “by way of partial property settlement”. 

17. On 3 July 2006 further interim orders were made by consent.  These orders provided for the transfer of the Property C investment property to the wife and its subsequent sale.

18. It was common ground that the purpose of these orders was to provide liquid funds to the wife.  Property C remains unsold, a circumstance for which each party sought to blame to the other.  It seems to me that there is now no useful purpose served by my attempting to apportion blame between them for the fact that this property has not yet been sold.

19. During 2006 the wife completed a course in business management.  She received Centrelink benefits until January 2007, when she started part-time work.  She recommenced full time employment in February 2007 but her job terminated in August 2007.  She has since worked only each Friday and earns $150 per week. 

APPROACH TO THESE PROCEEDINGS

1. According to guidelines established through a series of leading decisions, the Court is required to determine the following matters on the evidence:

   ·    firstly, the assets, liabilities and financial resources of the parties to the marriage are to be determined

   ·    secondly, all relevant contributions of each of the parties, within the meaning of paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 79(4) must be identified and weighed against each other

   ·    thirdly, the matters in paragraphs (d) to (g) of section 79(4), particularly paragraph (e) which takes up by reference the provisions of section 75(2) must be considered and a determination made as to what, if any, alteration should be made to the entitlements of the parties earlier assessed on account of contribution

   ·    finally, an order under section 79 must not be made unless the Court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

THE ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

1. In final submissions a balance sheet was tendered on behalf of each of the parties (exhibits 10 and 11).  From these documents it can be gleaned that there was agreement as follows:

Non-Superannuation Assets
1.	Property A	$1,100,000
2.	Property C	$190,000
3.	Property D	$190,000
4.	Property E	$220,000
5.	Property B	$220,000
6.	Barina motor vehicle (W)	$2,000
7.	Savings (H)	$4,073
8.	Savings (W)	$203
9.	Jewellery (W)	$3,000
10.	Proceeds of Sale of Shares (W)	$4,600
11.	2 original paintings (W)	$7,500
12.	2 Limited Edition prints (W)	$2,000

1. The disputed matters as to non-superannuation assets seemed to be as follows:

   ·The value of the husband’s Subaru motor vehicle

   ·The value of household contents, including tools, compact discs, computer games and a radio controlled boat and plane

   ·The value of the husband’s shares

   ·Whether the paintings were on loan from the wife’s mother or the property of the parties.

2. In the balance sheet tendered on behalf of the husband during submissions (exhibit 11) a value of $16,000 is attributed to his motor vehicle.  He assigned a value of $17,000 to the car in his Financial Statement sworn on 23 October 2007.  There was no explanation why the value of the Subaru had decreased by $1,000 between 23 October 2007 and 2 November 2007.  I will thus include the Subaru motor vehicle as an asset with a value of $17,000.

3. The husband assigned a value of $10,000 to the contents of the former matrimonial home.  He included the value of tools, compact discs, computer games and a radio controlled boat and plane in this figure.  The wife maintained that the following findings should be made as to the value of these chattels:

   ·Household contents $15,000

   ·Tools $10,000

   ·Compact discs $10,000

   ·Computer games $7,500

   ·Radio controlled boat and plane $3,030

   There was no evidence from either party as to the value of the household contents or the specified chattels.

4. The husband’s evidence was that his tools are about 15 years old.  He said that he paid a total of $600 to $700 for the radio-controlled boat and plane.  Further, he said that there are 600 to 650 compact discs in the former matrimonial home.  It may be that some of these compact discs and computer games belong to the children.

5. There was no evidence to support the wife’s contention as to the value of these chattels.  There is no basis at all upon which I could find that the tools, compact discs, computer games and radio-controlled boat and plane have a value of $30,030.

6. The evidence does not indicate what items from the former matrimonial home are in the possession of the wife, nor the value of any such chattels.  The exception is the two paintings, the ownership of which is disputed.

7. Since there is uncertainty about the value of household contents in the possession of each of the parties, I propose to omit these items from the list of assets.  I am reinforced in this conclusion by the fact that the children will live primarily with the husband and a number of these chattels are likely to be used principally by them.

8. There was no evidence as to the nature or value of any shares currently held by the husband.  Certainly, there was no evidence to support the wife’s contention that he presently has $5,000 worth of shares.  In the balance sheet submitted on his behalf, the husband estimated the value of his shares at $600.  I will treat this figure as an admission against interest and include shares to the value of $600 in the list of assets.

9. The wife maintained that the two paintings were “on loan” to the parties from her mother. The husband contended that they were a gift to mark their engagement. When confronted with a receipt for the purchase of one of the paintings in November 1987, the wife conceded that it was an engagement present from her mother. She then admitted that the paintings were an engagement and wedding gift from her mother.  The paintings should thus be included in the list of assets.

Superannuation Assets

1. It was agreed that the parties have the following superannuation assets:

1.	The husband’s account in the self-managed Fund	$72,900
2.	The wife’s account in the Self-Managed Fund	$10,000
3.	State Super Fund (H)	$18,500
4.	Colonial Mutual Fund (H)	$8,630
5.	Super Site Fund (W)	$7,849

Liabilities

1. It was agreed that the mortgage on Property A has a payout figure of $798,434.  Otherwise, the balance sheet submitted on behalf of each of the parties refers to “debts” of the husband at $5,491 and the wife at $182. 

2. There was no evidence as to the time or circumstances in which these “debts” were incurred.  For that reason, I do not intend to include these “debts” in the list of liabilities used to determine the value of the net pool of property.

Financial Resources

1. There was no suggestion that either party possesses a financial resource.  I thus find that there are no financial resources. 

2. Accordingly, I find that the assets are as follows:

   Non-Superannuation Assets

1.	Property A	$1,100,000
2.	Property C	$190,000
3.	Property D	$190,000
4.	Property E	$220,000
5.	Property B	$220,000
6.	Barina motor vehicle (W)	$2,000
7.	Subaru motor vehicle (H)	$17,000
8.	Savings (H)	$4,073
9.	Savings (W)	$203
10.	Jewellery (W)	$3,000
11.	Proceeds of Sale of Shares (W)	$4,600
12.	Shares (H)	$600
13.	2 original paintings	$7,500
14.	2 Limited Edition prints	$2,000
Sub-total	$1,960,976
Superannuation assets
15.	Husband’s interest in Self-Managed Fund	$72,900
16.	Wife’s interest in Self-Managed Fund	$10,000
17.	State Super Fund (H)	$18,500
18.	Colonial Mutual Fund (H)	$8,630
19.	Super Site Fund (W)	$7,849
Sub-total	$117,879
TOTAL:	$2,078,855

Liabilities

1. Mortgage on Property A $798,434

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PARTIES

1. At the commencement of cohabitation, late in 1986, the husband owned an unencumbered property at P.  He purchased this property for $68,000 in 1984, using funds which were derived from an inheritance from his father.  The husband sold the P property in 1987 for $90,000.  The sale price would thus seem to be a reliable indication of the value of the property at the commencement of cohabitation a few months earlier.

2. When they began to live together each of the parties had about $2,000 in cash savings and a motor vehicle, as well as furniture.  The husband gave an unqualified opinion that his furniture had a higher value than that of the wife.  In any event it was the wife’s evidence, which I accept, that her parents provided furniture and household contents to the parties after they began to live together.

3. The husband began to contribute to a superannuation fund before the commencement of cohabitation.  It does not seem to me to be significant that he had a benefit of approximately $2,000 over 20 years ago.

4. The husband engaged in paid employment throughout the relationship with the exception of the two periods, each of six months, when he worked on renovations to the former matrimonial home.  Otherwise, he made his income available to service mortgage loans and for the support and benefit of the family.

5. The wife also engaged in paid employment for most of the relationship.  She spent nine months caring full time for the parties’ daughter N from late 1992 until about August 1993, when she returned to part-time employment.  After S was born in December 1994 the wife devoted her time to the care of the two children and to her role as homemaker.  From 1998 she gradually returned to the paid workforce, in a series of temporary placements as an accounts clerk.  For a period of about six years the wife also kept the books of account for a service company via which the husband was employed.

6. While the husband was working on the renovations to the former matrimonial home in 1988 and 1990, the wife was in full time employment.  She made all of the mortgage repayments between 1987 and 1992.  As well, she contributed $3,000 of her savings and a $10,000 redundancy payment to the costs of the renovations.  She also paid $5,500 for a spa unit which the husband installed at the former matrimonial home.

7. The husband contributed the proceeds of sale of his property at P amounting to about $90,000, to the acquisition and renovation of the former matrimonial home.  This significant contribution by the husband seemed to be his only lump sum payment into the finances of the family.

8. Each of the parties carried out physical work on the renovations to the former matrimonial home, to the extent which their availability permitted.  The wife opportunity to contribute to this work was limited by her continuing in full time paid employment.  She alleged, and the husband did not deny, that her family helped with the renovations.  In particular, it seems that her sister regularly provided physical assistance with the renovations on weekends. 

1. There was no dispute that the wife was the primary carer of the children before the separation.  Unfortunately, her relationship with N became conflicted and tense during the latter part of cohabitation.  There is no dispute that the husband has been the children’s primary carer since the wife left the former matrimonial home.  The wife has paid no child support, as she took the opportunity during 2006 to complete a business course which will assist her future employment prospects.  There have been periods since the separation when she has had full-time work but paid no child support.

2. The most significant issue in the assessment of the contributions of the parties is the weight to be given to the husband’s introduction of the P property at the commencement of cohabitation.  On his behalf it was submitted that there should be a finding as to contribution of 65% in his favour as at the date of separation, having regard to this fact.  On behalf of the wife it was submitted that the appropriate finding is 52.5% to the husband and 47.5% to herself.

3. On behalf of the husband it was contended that the post-separation contributions favour him, such as to warrant a further adjustment of 5%.  He relied on his care of the children, without financial assistance from the wife.  He also relied on his servicing of the mortgage on the former matrimonial home, which covered the debts incurred when the investment properties were purchased. 

4. In final submissions counsel for the husband conceded that contributions should be found to be equal during the period of cohabitation.  In my view this was an appropriate concession. 

5. There is no doubt that the husband’s contribution of the unencumbered P property was significant and should carry considerable weight.  On the other hand, this contribution should not be permitted to overshadow the significant contributions made by the wife in the course of 19 years of cohabitation.

6. Ultimately, I have come to the view that the husband’s contribution of the P property provided the springboard or underpinning of the parties’ acquisition of their present real estate assets.  Their joint efforts, however, enabled them to carry out substantial renovations to the matrimonial home and to acquire their real estate investments.  Their joint incomes supported the family.

7. The husband made no contribution to the acquisition of the two paintings, which were obviously gifts from the wife’s mother.  In my view, this fact is of little to no significance in the overall assessment of the weight to be given to the contributions of each of the parties.  These paintings have a value equal to 0.006% of the value of the net non-superannuation pool. 

8. It was submitted that the wife made no contribution to the husband’s superannuation benefit of approximately $18,000, which was acquired after the separation, and this fund thus should be omitted from the list of assets.  I had difficulty with this submission, the evidentiary basis of which was not identified, and I have included this fund in the list of superannuation assets.  The evidence does not enable me to make findings as to the period when the husband contributed to this fund.

9. I do not accept that the husband is entitled to any contribution finding in his favour in respect of the period between separation and hearing.  He received the whole of the rental income from the investment properties and had the benefit of occupation of the former matrimonial home.  It would seem that Property C did not generate a rental income for a period after July 2006.

10. Having regard to all of these matters, I find that contribution should be assessed as at the date of hearing, at 65% to the husband and 35% to the wife.

SECTION 75(2) FACTORS 

1. I will refer only to those factors set out in section 75(2) which seem to me to be relevant to these proceedings.  At the outset, I record that it was conceded on behalf of the husband that the section 75(2) factors warrant an adjustment in favour of the wife.  On the basis of a contribution finding of 70% to himself and 30% to the wife, it was submitted on behalf of the husband that an adjustment of 10% in her favour was warranted.  The wife sought an adjustment of 5% in her favour, on the basis of contribution findings of 52.5% to the husband and 47.5% to herself.

   Section 75(2)(a):     the age and state of health of each of the parties

2. The husband is now 51 years old and the wife is 47.  There was no evidence that either party suffers from any health problems.

   Section 75(2)(b):       the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment

3. The husband receives a salary package which amounts to approximately $120,000 per annum.  The wife expects to earn about $40,000 gross per annum when she returns to live in Sydney.  As was properly conceded on behalf of the husband, the disparity in the income earning potential of the parties is a matter which clearly favours the wife.

   Section 75(2)(c):     whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years

4. The children will live primarily with the husband but they will spend time with their mother.  They are teenagers, thus the husband’s responsibility to care for them is of relatively limited duration.  It may well be that they will opt to spend more time with their mother, once she establishes a home in Sydney in close proximity to their schools.

   Section 75(2)(g):     where the parties have separated or the marriage has been dissolved, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable

5. Prior to the separation the parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle.  They lived in a comparatively affluent and pleasant suburb of Sydney. Not unreasonably, the wife wishes to retain a similar lifestyle once these proceedings are concluded.  In any event, the parenting orders made by consent are predicated on her living within 20 kilometres of the child’s school.

   Section 75(2)(na):   whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years

6. The future child support situation is unknown, as the wife’s financial position once she resettles in Sydney cannot be predicted with any accuracy.  If she does succeed in earning an income of around $40,000 per annum, it seems likely that she will be liable to pay periodic child support. 

   Section 75(2)(o):     any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account

7. Because of the husband’s larger income, he will accrue more superannuation than will the wife in future years.  He thus has a greater opportunity to make provision for his retirement than does the wife.

8. Each of the parties sought a splitting order, in respect of the husband’s account in the self-managed superannuation fund, in their competing applications.  The written submissions filed on behalf of the wife, however, did not press this part of her response and made reference only to her retaining her own superannuation.

9. It seems to me that the wife’s present, pressing need is for liquid funds to rehouse herself in Sydney.  She said that she expects to spend $500,000 to $700,000 to purchase a modest home in the vicinity of the children’s schools and that she will be able to service a small mortgage.  A splitting order in respect of the husband’s superannuation will not assist her to reaccommodate herself.  I do not propose to make such an order but, certainly, I will have regard to the husband’s greater retirement security in assessing the adjustment in the wife’s favour on account of section 75(2) factors.

10. There was no evidence as to the selling costs or capital gains tax liability in respect of the investment properties.  The best I can do to achieve a just result, in the absence of this evidence, is to distribute the four properties between the parties in specie, having regard to the agreed values.  Property E is in the sole name of the husband and Property C has been transferred to the wife.  I see no reason to disturb this arrangement.  The values of the properties then dictate that the wife takes Property B and the husband Property D.

11. Having regard to all of these matters, I find that an adjustment of 7.5% of the net pool of property, including both superannuation and non-superannuation assets, should be made in favour of the wife.

RESULT

1. The result is that I find that the net pool of property should be divided as to 57.5% to the husband and 42.5% to the wife, which means that their respective entitlements are $736,242 and $544,179.  This result can be achieved without an order for sale of Property A, which the husband wishes to retain.  That being so, he will take on the whole of the mortgage which is secured on the title to that property.

2. It will be necessary for the husband to make a payment to the wife in order for him to retain Property A.  It will be his choice whether he raises this money, by a refinance, a sale of one or both of his investment properties or a combination thereof.

3. The husband will take the following assets:

1.	Property A	$1,100,000
2.	Property E	$220,000
3.	Property D	$190,000
4.	Savings	$4,073
5.	Shares	$600
6.	Subaru motor vehicle	$17,000
7.	Account in self-managed superannuation fund	$72,900
8.	State Super fund	$18,500
9.	Colonial Super fund	$8,630
$1,631,703
Less mortgage	$798,434
$833,269

which exceeds his entitlement by $97,027. 

1. The wife will take the following assets:

1.	Proeprty C	$190,000
2.	Property B	$220,000
3.	Barina motor vehicle	$2,000
4.	Savings	$203
5.	Jewellery	$3,000
6.	Proceeds of sale of shares	$4,600
7.	Paintings	$9,500
8.	Account in self-managed superannuation fund	$10,000
9.	Super Site fund	$7,849
$447,152

This figure falls $97,027 short of her entitlement.  It will thus be necessary for the husband to pay $97,027 to the wife, a sum which I will round off to $97,000.

1. This outcome will leave the husband and the children in the former matrimonial home.  He will have several options to arrange his finances, so as to be left with a mortgage which he can service with his level of income.  The wife will have assets, which she can liquidate, and a cash payment from the husband which she can use to purchase a home for herself.  I regard this result as just and equitable.

2. The evidence does not enable me to make any orders as to the distribution of the contents of the former matrimonial home.  I am not aware of the nature of these chattels, nor of which items are presently in the possession of each party.  I hope that they will now cooperate in bringing about a fair distribution of the contents of the home which they previously shared.

I certify that the preceding seventy two (72) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Stevenson

Associate:     

Date:              1 February 2008