Pattemore and Repatriation Commission
[2005] AATA 737
•3 August 2005
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 737
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2004/205
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION )
Re LINDSAY PATTEMORE Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr KS Levy, Member
Dr KP Kennedy, MemberDate3 August 2005
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
.....................[Sgd].......................
KS Levy
Presiding Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – Veteran’s Entitlement Act 1986 - Application for acceptance of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder – war caused injury- severe stressor – dysthymia – application of “Deledio” – decision affirmed.
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 ss 5D, 68, 120, 120A, 196B
Byrnes and Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564
Repatriation Commission v Gosewinckel (2000) 59 ALD 690Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2003) 70 ALD 622
Repatriation Commission v Hancock [2003] FCA 711
Fogarty v Repatriation Commission (2003) FCAFC 136Lamont and Repatriation Commission [2005] AATA 149
Repatriation Commission and Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Repatriation Commission v Stares (1996) 41 ALD 212
Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408
Repatriation Commission v Webb (1998) 51 ALD 575
Repatriation Commission v Hill [2002] FCAFC 192
East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517
Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364
Gilbert v Repatriation Commission (1989) 86 ALR 713
Repatriation Commission v Tuite (1993) 39 FCR 540
Guy v Repatriation Commission [2005] FCA 562
Stoddart v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 334
Lees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331
Re Slattery and Repatriation Commission (1998) 52 ALD 90
White v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 663
Re Hillier and Repatriation Commission [2004] AATA 897
Repatriation Commission v Law (1980) 31 ALR 140REASONS FOR DECISION
3 August 2005 Dr KS Levy, Member
Dr KP Kennedy, Member
Introduction
1. The applicant, Lindsay Pattemore, lodged a claim for acceptance of a condition of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs on 1 April 2003 on the basis that this condition was related to his service in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). That application was determined on 24 June 2003 by a delegate of the Repatriation Commission who concluded that the condition was not related to the applicant’s defence service. After seeking a review of that decision, the Veterans’ Review Board affirmed the decision of the Repatriation Commission on 17 December 2003. The applicant then lodged an application for review of the original decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 19 March 2004. That application is made under section 29(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
2. The applicant’s claim is that he suffered post traumatic stress disorder as a result of service with the RAAF and, in particular, he points to stressful experiences he had at the Indonesian Airport in Jakarta and also on a flight (or flights) to or from Vung Tau in South Vietnam. Those claims are said to be war-caused under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (the Act). In essence, the applicant argues that his experiences were those of a “severe stressor” and that within two years of those experiences, he developed the condition of PTSD.
3. It is noted that this application has previously been the subject of a decision of Deputy President DP Breen of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 17 March 2000 (T4, Folio 2 of the “T” Documents), which determined that in relation to a claim for qualifying service made by the applicant under section 35B of the Act, the Tribunal determined by consent, that pursuant to section 57A of the Act, the applicant had made: “... one (ie one only) authorised flight to Vietnam (southern region)”. The respondent argued in the hearing of this matter that that fact is also open for determination.
4. The applicant was represented by Mr E George of Counsel, instructed by Ms H Taylor of Sciacca’s Lawyers and Consultants. The respondent was represented by its Advocate, Mr J Kelly.
5. The following documents were admitted into evidence:
§Exhibit 1 Statement of the applicant dated 3 June 2004;
§Exhibit 2 Statement of service accompanying Sciacca’s fax cover sheet dated 6 August 2004;
§Exhibit 3 The applicant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions dated 27 April 2005;
§Exhibit 4 Documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
§Exhibit 5 Report by Dr P Mulholland, psychiatrist, dated 30 July 2004
§Exhibit 6 Letter from the applicant dated 5 February 1999
§Exhibit 7 Claim for income support qualifying service dated 4 September 1998
§Exhibit 8 Extract of book entitled “Unit of the Royal Australian Air Force – A Concise History; Volume 3 Bomber Units” pages 7 – 13
§Exhibit 9 Instrument of Allotment by Minister for Defence, Industry, Science and Personnel dated 23 December 1997
§Exhibit 10 Statutory Declaration by Mr Edward Smallman
§Exhibit 11 Statement of service of the applicant with letter from Department of Defence confirming it is a true copy
§Exhibit 12 Report by WriteWay Research Service Pty Ltd dated 8 June 2005
6. Oral evidence was provided by the applicant in person and telephone evidence was received on his behalf by his treating psychiatrist, Dr Balkin. The respondent led telephone evidence from Squadron Leader E Smallman (Rtd), Air Commodore J Radford (Rtd), Wing Commander R Bateson (Rtd), Wing Commander G Leo (Rtd) and Ms W Zietek. The respondent also called evidence in person from Squadron Leader P McNeile (Rtd) and Dr P Mulholland, Psychiatrist.
7. All of the material presented to the hearing, both documentary exhibits and oral evidence, have been carefully considered in determining this matter.
Background
8. The applicant is currently 58 years of age, having been born on 24 May 1947. Prior to joining the Air Force he had been an electrical apprentice at Proserpine for 2 years.
9. He served with the RAAF for a six year period of engagement. He enlisted on 22 August 1966 and was discharged on 21 August 1972. He undertook recruit training from 22 August 1966 until he was posted to the Technical School at Wagga for training as an electrical serviceman on 14 November 1966. He graduated from that training on 22 February 1967 as an aircraftsman. He continued that training and graduated as an electrical serviceman on 20 September 1967. He was then posted to 37 Squadron at Richmond on 25 September 1967. Almost twelve months later, he was posted back to the RAAF School of Technical Training at Wagga on 2 September 1968 and remained there until he graduated as an electrical fitter on 11 March 1969. From there, he was posted back to 37 Squadron (37 Sqn) at Richmond on 14 March 1969. He was subsequently posted to 1 Operational Conversion Unit (1 OCU) at Amberley on 11 January 1971 and then to 2 Squadron (2 Sqn) at Amberley on 9 June 1971. He was posted to the Base Squadron at Amberley on 17 August 1972, four days prior to his discharge on 21 August 1972.
10. An apparent inconsistency appears on the applicant’s Statement of Service shown in Exhibits 2 and 11. That inconsistency relates to the Certificate of Discharge forwarded with the Department’s letter of 23 March 2005 which indicates “Honours and Awards: Nil”. However, Exhibits 2 and 11 which provide an official Statement of Service, show:
“Honours and Awards: Australian Active Service Medal 1945-75 with Clasp ‘VIETNAM’
Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal
Returned from Active Service Badge”
11. In addition, the applicant’s postings do not reveal a posting to Vietnam, notwithstanding his award of the Vietnam Medal and Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal. The letter dated 11 April 2005 from Ms Susan King, Assistant Team Leader, Personnel Records – Canberra in the Department of Defence states that the Statement is a true copy of the official document. However, it also states:
“A search of Mr Pattemore’s Service file has failed to reveal any evidence to support his alleged service in Vietnam whilst posted to 37 Squadron.”
12. This inconsistency might be partially explained by the WriteWay Research Service Report dated 8 November 1999 conducted by Mr John Tilbrook. In paragraph 4 of that report, the author refers to correspondence from the Department of Defence advising that the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal by the Air Force Honours and Awards Section in Canberra, “….was only made on the basis of the Veteran’s own written explanation in applying for the award that he did serve in Vietnam”. The report also states that the award was made on the basis of “good faith” by the RAAF in response to the applicant’s claim of service in Vietnam. There seems to be no further evidence of the award of the Vietnam Medal or Return from Active Service Badge as shown on the official Statement of Service.
13. In Exhibit 6, which is a letter from the applicant dated 5 February 1999 and seeking a review of his application for qualifying service, he states:
“….When it was all over there was no distinction between us when the medals, etc. were handed out. I have received both the 2 Sqn Bravery Medal plus the medal from the Vietnamese Government…..In later years the Australian Government recognised this by presenting me with the Vietnam Logistics Medal…”
14. There is no further reference to the Bravery Medal or the medal from the Vietnamese Government.
15. This inconsistency also highlights the core issue of contention in this matter - the applicant’s alleged service in Vietnam where there is no record held by the RAAF to attest to that service.
16. The applicant has been recognised as having PTSD but it has been regarded as a non-service-related disability. In the “T” Documents, it is shown that the applicant is eligible for treatment for his disorder although it is regarded as “Non-service related”.
§ Operational Service
17. As referred to earlier, this Tribunal decided on 17 March 2000, by consent, and based on a statutory declaration by Edward John Smallman, that the applicant made one return flight to Vietnam during the period of his service. This was said to be during Mr Smallman’s period of service at 37 Squadron from 1970 to 1971.
18. In an official extract of the member’s Record of Service dated 27 October 1998 (T4, Folio 1), it refers to the applicant’s service with the RAAF and shows the following:
“Overseas Service: Nil”
19. The submissions by the applicant’s counsel refer to evidence of crew lists no longer being in existence and a statement by Squadron Leader Smallman (Rtd) having a recollection that Mr Pattemore did accompany at least one flight to Vietnam.
20. While the issue of operational service by Mr Pattemore is a question to be determined by the Tribunal, the claims which relate his claimed condition of PTSD to operational service are based on the following four incidents –
(a)an incident at Jakarta International Airport during a stopover where it is claimed that he and other crew of a RAAF flight were threatened by Indonesian soldiers who were armed with rifles;
(b)at least one flight travelling from South Vietnam to Richmond RAAF Base with wounded soldiers;
(c)being shot at by ground fire in Vietnam; and
(d)risk of mortar fire when landing and takeoff at airstrips in Vietnam.
Issues For Determination
§ What is the diagnosis to be accepted for Mr Pattemore’s condition?
§ Did Mr Pattemore travel to Vietnam during the Vietnam War?
§ Is the accepted diagnosis a “war-caused” disease within section 9 of the Act?
Legislative Framework
21. Where an applicant has operational service or eligible defence service, eligibility for disability pensions must be assessed in terms of the Act. To satisfy the legislative requirements that a member of the defence force had “eligible defence service” a person’s service must be continuous full-time service and it must be rendered on or after 7 December 1972 and before the commencement of the Military Compensation Act 1994 (see section 68(1) of the Act).
22. To demonstrate that an injury or disease is “war-caused”, there must be a link between the injury or disease and the applicant’s war service, as provided for by section 9 of the Act:
“9 War-caused injuries or diseases
(1)Subject to this section and section 9A, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused disease, if:
(a)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran;
…..
(e) the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran:
(i)was suffered or contracted while the veteran was rendering eligible war service, but did not arise out of that service; or
(ii)was suffered or contracted before the commencement of the period, or last period, of eligible war service rendered by the veteran, but not while the veteran was rendering eligible war service;
and, in the opinion of the Commission, the injury or disease was contributed to in a material degree by, or was aggravated by, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran, being service rendered after the veteran suffered that injury or contracted that disease;
but not otherwise.”
23. Section 6C defines the term “operational service” used in section 9. That term refers to a member of the defence force who has rendered continuous full-time service in an operational area where that person was “allotted for duty” to that operational area (see section 6C(1)). The term “allotted for duty” is referred to in section 5B(2). Schedule 2 to the Act amplifies the areas where members of the defence force could be allotted for duty. Item 8 of Schedule 2 includes Vietnam (southern zone) between the period 31 July 1962 to and including 11 January 1973.
24. If a person has recognised “operational service”, then eligibility for pension will arise where that person has been incapacitated because of a “war-caused injury or a war-caused disease” (section 13(1)(b)). Once an injury or disease is shown to be “war-caused” then liability shifts to the Commonwealth to compensate a veteran by way of pension (section 13(1)(d)).
25. To establish the link between an injury or disease and war service, the standard of proof set out in section 120 of the Act must be satisfied. That section provides:
“120 Standard of proof
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…..
(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
(4)Except in making a determination to which subsection (1) or (2) applies, the Commission shall, in making any determination or decision in respect of a matter arising under this Act or the regulations, including the assessment or re-assessment of the rate of a pension granted under Part II or Part IV, decide the matter to its reasonable satisfaction.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120B.:
26. Where a claim is lodged for pension under the Act after 1 June 1994, section 120A applies. This provides as follows:
“120A Reasonableness of hypothesis to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles
(1)This section applies to any of the following claims made on or after 1 June 1994:
(a)a claim under Part II that relates to the operational service rendered by a veteran;
(b) a claim under Part IV that relates to:
(i)the peacekeeping service rendered by a member of a Peacekeeping Force; or
(ii) the hazardous service rendered by a member of the Forces.
Note 1: Subsections 120(1), (2) and (3) are relevant to these claims.
Note 2: For peacekeeping service, member of a Peacekeeping Force, hazardous service and member of the Forces see subsection 5Q(1A).
(2)If the Repatriation Medical Authority has given notice under section 196G that it intends to carry out an investigation in respect of a particular kind of injury, disease or death, the Commission is not to determine a claim in respect of the incapacity of a person from an injury or disease of that kind, or in respect of a death of that kind, unless or until the Authority:
(a)has determined a Statement of Principles under subsection 196B(2) in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death; or
(b)has declared that it does not propose to make such a Statement of Principles.
(3)For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.
(4)Subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a claim in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease, or the death, of a person if the Authority has neither determined a Statement of Principles under subsection 196B(2), nor declared that it does not propose to make such a Statement of Principles, in respect of:
(a) the kind of injury suffered by the person; or
(b) the kind of disease contracted by the person; or
(c) the kind of death met by the person;
as the case may be.”
27. Section 120A requires that there must be a reasonable hypothesis assessed in terms of Statements of Principles (SoP), where these have been issued by the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA) under section 196B(2) or (11) of the Act. In this case, the following SoP is relevant to the conditions alleged:
§ Instrument No 58 of 1998 – Depressive Disorder
28. The standard of proof in relation to a claim for operational service is that of a reasonable hypothesis (section 120(1) and (3)). The test to be applied here is as has been set out by the High Court in Byrnes and Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at 571:
“The claim will succeed unless: (a) one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or (b) the truth of another fact in the material, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis.”
29. The standard of proof relevant to all other matters such as determination of diagnosis or determining incidents during eligible defence service, or the assessment of pension, is that of “reasonable satisfaction”, as set out in section 120(4). In identifying the legal principles which are relevant to the standards of proof prescribed under the Act, the following is instructive (see Repatriation Commission v Gosewinckel (2000) 59 ALD 690 and 691):
“The standard of proof for determining whether a veteran was suffering a morbid condition was the reasonable satisfaction standard in s 120(4), not the reasonable hypothesis standard in s 120(1) and (3). The reasonable hypothesis standard was to be used to decide whether an injury, disease or death of a veteran was war caused. All other matters were to be dealt with by the reasonable satisfaction standard in s 120 (4)….” [Emphasis added].
30. The “reasonable satisfaction” standard has been regarded as equivalent to the civil standard of proof, or proof on the balance of probabilities (see Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2003) 70 ALD 622; Repatriation Commission v Hancock [2003] FCA 711 and Fogarty v Repatriation Commission (2003) FCAFC 136.
EVIDENCE
31. The first witness was Edward John Smallman who gave evidence by telephone. In a Statutory Declaration dated 31 March 1999 ( Exhibit 10), he had stated that in 1970-1971 the applicant had worked under his supervision as an Electrical Fitter in No 37 Squadron. In that declaration he further stated that he recalled the applicant having accompanied at least one of the medical evacuation (“Medevac”) recovery flights from Vietnam.
32. During his evidence in chief , Mr Smallman ( ex Sqn Leader) confirmed the content of the Statutory Declaration. He said that it was normal procedure for some ground technicians to travel on the aircraft as ‘‘Supercrew’’ to assist the flight engineer should problems occur.
33. The applicant indicated that during his time at Richmond Air Base, about four aircraft each week travelled from Richmond to Butterworth and Vietnam and in Vietnam, they sometimes returned as Medevac flights. He claimed that on one such flight he was seated at the rear of the aircraft with no screen between him and the wounded. He noted that the wounds were covered with bandages but blood was visible on some of the bandages and he was upset by the appearance. During later cross examination he added that he moved among the wounded to assist the nurses and to talk to the wounded. The flight from Vietnam to Butterworth would take about 2 - 4 hours and from Butterworth to Richmond about 8 - 10 hours.
34. The applicant also described one flight on which the aircraft was required to land at Jakarta to offload some Indonesian students. He said that the aircraft was directed to the end of the airstrip and the engines were turned off. After the students were taken off the plane, the applicant saw a car arrive beside the aircraft and people were hanging out of the car with weapons. Those on the plane were allegedly told that no one was to leave the aircraft or they would be shot. He thinks that they were probably on the ground for about half an hour. He believed that the pilot probably knew more but he did not discuss the incident with the pilot at any stage.
35. While watching a TV programme early in 2003 which referred to a request to Government to give land to establish a retreat for Vietnam Veterans, the applicant said that he became very emotional and the next morning he was a “mess” and did not know what had happened to him. He went to see his General Practitioner who referred him to a Psychiatrist. He was diagnosed as having PTSD. Later when he saw another Psychiatrist at the request of the Repatriation Department (Dr Mulholland), he was told that he did not have PTSD.
In the applicant’s written statement ( Exhibit 1 ), dated 3 June 2004, he stated that one of his normal duties as part of 37 Squadron was to accompany flights to Vietnam or Butterworth to repair aircraft in service. He claimed to have done several flights to Vietnam. He said that often he was on the ground in Vietnam for up to 24 hours. In a letter dated 5 February 1999, in which the applicant sought review of his qualifying service (Exhibit 6), the applicant said that trips to the war zone were quite frequent and that he was away for a week or more at a time. He also stated that he was posted to 2 Sqn (1OCU). for a full time posting to Vietnam.
37. When cross examined about his alleged service in Vietnam, the applicant agreed that he had not served with 2 Sqn which had been based in Vietnam. He had always been with 37 Squadron based at Richmond. In his application for a service pension (Exhibit 6), he also stated that he had served with 2 Sqn in Vietnam (which by his oral evidence was not correct).
38. The next witness, Mr Gordon Leo, gave evidence by telephone. He stated that he had been Engineering Officer with 37 Sqn from 1966 to 1969. He had been in charge of electrical fitters. He could recall only two flights to Vietnam for ground staff and those trips he had made himself. He said that he had no knowledge of Supernumerary Crew (“Supercrew”) having travelled beyond Butterworth. ‘‘Supercrew’’ often travelled between Richmond and Butterworth to enable connection between aircrew and ground crew and Butterworth was also popular for duty free shopping. These trips were a privilege and those in this situation were not expected nor was it appropriate to work at their trade. The aircraft were relatively new with few problems and any problems that did occur could be handled by the flight engineer. ‘‘Supercrew’’ did not travel on Medevac aircraft.
39. When cross examined, Mr Leo said that he had 50-60 under his control in 37 Sqn. No repairs had been required on planes in Vietnam to his knowledge and he had not been required to send any repair team to Vietnam to service aircraft. In reply to a question from the Tribunal, Mr Leo said that if required, personnel from 38 Sqn based in Vietnam could have given some advice in the event of unexpected problems.
40. A further witness to give evidence by telephone was Mr Roger Bateson. He had served twice as a Squadron Leader in 37 Sqn. The initial period had been for less than 2 years in 1966 and later as Commanding Officer from 1971 to 1973. He said that to his knowledge, there would never be supernumerary crew on a scheduled Medevac flight. During cross examination he said any repairs in Vietnam were usually done by the flight engineer. If major work such as an engine change was required, then a crew would be flown up to Vietnam.
41. The first medical witness was Dr Anthony Balkin who gave evidence by telephone. Dr Balkin had prepared a written report dated 2 June 2003. In that report, Dr Balkin reported that the applicant had told him that he had been a maintenance electrician in the Vietnam War from 1968-1970 and that he was required to fly on regular routes between Australia, Butterworth and Vietnam. He told Dr Balkin that he was required to fly these routes between one and five times a month. Dr Balkin recorded that the applicant was exposed to a number of life threatening experiences to which he responded with feelings of intense fear, horror and helplessness.
42. During his evidence in chief, Dr Balkin referred to the Jakarta incident in which he had recorded that the plane had been held for two hours and that the rifles were pointed at the applicant. There had been no explanation from the pilot and the applicant had found this incident to have been most stressful. In relation to the Medevac flight, Dr Balkin had recorded that the applicant had seen and smelt most shocking wounds. The applicant had also told Dr Balkin that he had been shot at with ground to air fire in Vietnam.
43. In reply to a question from the Tribunal, Dr Balkin said that he regarded the Jakarta incident as the most important in the causation of PTSD but the experience on the aircraft had been a supporting factor.
44. Evidence was also given by telephone by RAAF Nursing Officer and former Flight Lieutenant W. Zietek, who had completed seven Medevac trips from Australia to Vietnam and back between 1967 and 1969. She stated that all wounds were bandaged and no wounds were visible. In addition, the injured were either in pyjamas or uniform and were also covered with blankets. The patients were looked after entirely by the nurses and flight crew did not mingle with patients. No conversation was possible because of the noise of the aircraft. Also, no passengers were carried on these flights as the only other personnel on board were the flight crew.
45. The second specialist Psychiatrist to give evidence was Dr Peter Mulholland who gave evidence in person. Dr Mulholland had examined the applicant initially on 12 July 2004. Dr Mulholland confirmed that he still held to the views expressed in his written report of 30 July 2004. Dr Mulholland said that the applicant told him that the Jakarta incident had been the more severe incident and that he was not concerned about the flight from Vietnam.
46. In the written report Dr Mulholland stated that the applicant had told him that he had travelled to Vietnam five or six times for aircraft electrical maintenance and service. He also told Dr Mulholland that the periods that he had been on the ground in Vietnam had ranged from 10 hours to a maximum of 48 hours. In his report, Dr Mulholland noted that he had obtained a different history to that reported by Dr Balkin. Dr Mulholland was of the view that the applicant had not been exposed to any life threatening experiences.
47. Dr Mulholland did not agree with the diagnosis of PTSD. He believed that the applicant had a clinical picture consistent with a long standing dysthymic disorder with associated irritability. Dr Mulholland emphasized that the applicant does not meet the requirements for Criterion A of a DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD.
48. Evidence was given by telephone by former Commanding Officer John Radford. He had been CO between December 1969 and November 1971. He said that only occasionally were supernumerary crew carried on flights to Vietnam. If a flight became unserviceable, then the next flight would carry a maintenance crew. Normally Medevac flights would not carry ‘‘Supercrew’’. In his time as CO, no Indonesian students were carried on any flight. The supernumerary crew were given that title so that they would not be offloaded and officially were regarded as being on duty.
49. On cross examination Mr Radford said that if maintenance crew were required, then that would have to be approved by CO but others down the line would determine who was to go. He indicated that the Hercules planes were relatively new aircraft and required little servicing in the field . If necessary, the flight engineer could usually fix the problem. There was hardly ever a maintenance problem in the war zone which would keep the plane on the ground. In reply to a question from the Tribunal, Mr Radford said that an Electrician would not be taken on a plane with a problem – a technician would only be taken to the site of a problem, if and when required.
50. The final witness was Mr Patrick McNeile of Writeway Research Services who had provided a research report on the RAAF Service Claims made by Mr Pattemore, at the request of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. He confirmed that when the applicant had later transferred to 2 Sqn , that Sqn was then based in Australia and not in Vietnam. He also indicated that Personnel Occurrence Reports (POR’s) were available as permanent records and these reports contained the names of all supernumerary crew The name of the applicant did not appear on any of the POR’s . When cross examined, he confirmed that all POR reports were intact.
Consideration Of The Issues
51. The Tribunal has reached a decision in this matter taking account of all the oral evidence and documentary exhibits, the statutory law and the relevant case law.
§ Diagnosis
52. While it is not the Tribunal’s role to determine a diagnosis, it can determine a diagnosis which is the most appropriate diagnosis based on the medical, psychological or psychiatric evidence. The Tribunal is also required to consider whether any psychiatric problems involved in the diagnosis determined were war caused (Benjamin and Repatriation Commission (2003) 7 ALD 622).
53. In relation to the diagnosis to be accepted, the applicant has based his case on the diagnosis of PTSD which had been made by Dr Balkin. Dr Balkin in turn had based his diagnosis on the history given to him by the applicant. The Tribunal is not confident however that the applicant has given a correct and consistent version of the events which are alleged to have occurred. We know that the applicant, when applying for the service pension had stated that he had served in Vietnam with 2 Sqn, which he admitted in evidence was not true. In relation to the incident in Jakarta, he had at various times stated that the plane was held for periods of two hours, on another occasion for one hour and in his evidence in chief it was for only ½ hour. In relation to trips to Vietnam, the applicant told the Veterans’ Review Board that he had made about 15 trips to Vietnam over 4 years to service aircraft and that in these situations he could be in Vietnam for up to 48 hours. In his letter to Veterans Affairs dated 5 February 1999, the applicant stated that his service involved many trips to Vietnam and that on these occasions he could be away for a week or more at a time. In his statement of 3 June 2004 he stated that often when servicing planes he was on the ground in Vietnam for up to 24 hours.
54. The Tribunal finds it very difficult to accept the truth of these claims concerning time spent in Vietnam. This is not only because of the inconsistencies but also because other personnel from 37 Sqn who gave evidence indicated that it was very uncommon or even rare for the relatively new Hercules aircraft to require servicing in Vietnam which could not be handled by the flight engineer. Then there is the fact that while all ‘Supercrew’ have been recorded on the PORs, the name of Lindsay Pattemore does not appear on any of the reports. It is not credible to accept that someone could make the number of trips claimed and not be recorded at any time.
55. We come to the question then as to whether the applicant had had operational service in Vietnam. In March 2000, Deputy President Breen had determined that the applicant had rendered qualifying service pursuant to Section 57A of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 by virtue of one (ie one only) authorized flight to Vietnam. That Consent Decision had been based on a Statutory Declaration of Edward John Smallman dated 31 March 1999. While in no way questioning the integrity of Mr Smallman , we note that he had relied on a memory going back almost thirty years and he had been unable to give any specific details. There are aspects of his statement which are inconsistent with other evidence given at the Tribunal hearing and it is more than likely that his recollection of events had been wrong. It is also noted that the applicant had in one statement accepted that Edward Smallman had accompanied him on one flight to Vietnam but the statutory Declaration did not make that claim and Mr Smallman in his evidence said that he had never been to Vietnam himself. On the basis of the information now available, this Tribunal can find no evidence to support the previous decision that the applicant did have operational service, even for the one day.
56. In relation to the claim that the diagnosis is PTSD, the Tribunal has noted the evidence of the applicant and the evidence of the two Psychiatrists. The Tribunal does not accept the diagnosis of Dr Balkin for it has been based on incorrect facts. Dr Balkin said that the applicant had served in the Vietnam War from 1968-1970. He said that the applicant was required to fly to Butterworth and Vietnam one to five times a month. Both these statements are wrong. He said that the applicant was exposed to a number of threatening experiences during his service to which he responded with feelings of intense fear, horror and helplessness. This statement was incorrect.
57. Dr Balkin recorded that on one occasion when leaving Vietnam the applicant’s plane had been shot at from ground to air fire. Nowhere else does such a claim appear in any statement made available to the Tribunal nor was such a claim made by the applicant in his evidence to the Tribunal. Dr Balkin also said that when returning from Vietnam, on many occasions the applicant was exposed to the sight and smell of shocking wounds. Again such appearances do not accord with the evidence of the former Medevac nursing sister and are hard to accept when one has regard to the fact that the injured servicemen would have received appropriate medical attention before embarking on the flight from Vietnam. Again, nowhere else has such a description been provided as that included in the report of Dr Balkin.
58. Having regard to the preceding comments it is not surprising that Dr Mulholland reported that he had obtained a different history to Dr Balkin and that in his opinion the applicant does not meet the requirements for Criterion A of DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD. The Tribunal also notes that Dr Mulholland opined that the applicant had not been exposed to any life threatening experiences in relation to his service. Dr Mulholland diagnosed a dysthymic disorder for which the relevant Statement of Principles is that for Depressive Disorder.
59. The Tribunal as noted above and for the reasons given, does not accept the opinion of Dr Balkin and believes that the opinion of Dr Mulholland is the more appropriate. Even if the Tribunal were to accept that the applicant had given an accurate history of past events and the Tribunal were to base the decision on past operational service, the applicant would not meet the criteria in the Statement of Principles relating to Depressive Disorder for it is almost 30 years since the events now claimed to be responsible for his present condition had occurred as he had first sought psychiatric opinion in the year 2000.
Findings of Fact
60. The Tribunal finds that:
(a)The applicant had service with 37 Squadron in the period 1970 – 1971 during the Vietnam War.
(b)The medals issued to Mr Pattemore were provided by the Medals Section of the RAAF on the basis of his claimed service and not recorded operational service.
(c)In light of the evidence presented and the inconsistency of accounts provided by the applicant, operational service is not accepted for any claimed trip from Australia to Vietnam as previously conceded by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.
(d)Flights were not constituted by a team containing each of the technical trades to repair aircraft before return to Richmond via Butterworth. This finding is based on the number of witnesses, including former commanding officers who attested to the general practice and staff crew establishment on flights during that time, as well as the fact that the aircraft were almost new in 1969 and that evidence indicates little repair work was then required.
(e)The flight to the Indonesian International Airport involved some restriction of movement, but that it took place over half an hour. Owing to inconsistent evidence to medical practitioners and to the Tribunal, it is not accepted that it was a life-threatening event, as the applicant had reported it to be a matter which was “joked about” immediately afterwards (on the evidence of Dr Mulholland’s report).
(f)Landing in a United States Base in South Vietnam could have been a stressful event as it could have been at risk of mortar fire. However, given the size and defences around such establishments, the probability of death or serious injury would be expected to be quite low. It is not an event that meets the standard set out in the SoP for Dysthymia.
(g)The aircraft in which he was travelling was not shot at by ground fire as it was not mentioned to Dr Mulholland or to the Tribunal in the course of the hearing.
(h)Travelling with wounded service personnel in the circumstances described by the applicant did not occur, but even if it had occurred, it would not amount to a “severe psychosocial stressor”.
§ Assessment – Dysthymia
Preliminary Considerations
61. It should be noted at the outset that the incident which occurred at the International Airport at Jakarta did not occur on operational service. Therefore, unless it can be shown that that incident was a severe psychosocial stressor which could have resulted in dysthymia within 2 years, and that subsequent service such as a flight to Vietnam could have constituted an aggravation to that condition, then that incident would not be compensable. In addition, that incident occurred before 7 December 1972 and therefore would not be regarded as eligible defence service in terms of section 68(1) of the Act. This incident therefore would not appear to be compensable as a “war caused injury” or as a “defence caused injury”.
62. Indeed, given the findings of fact above, none of he incidents claimed are compensable as there is no recognised operational service and none of the service is “eligible defence service” after 7 December 1972.
63. A further preliminary issue relates to the question of whether an injury or illness exists. Sections 120(1) and (3) deal with a reasonable hypothesis and, as occurred in Byrnes’ case (supra), it proceeded on the basis that an injury or disease had occurred. In this case, a diagnosis was in dispute. The Tribunal must therefore be satisfied to its reasonable satisfaction under section 120(4), that is, on the balance of probabilities, as to the kind of injury or disease from which the applicant suffers. The authority for the approach required is Repatriation Commission v Hancock [2003] FCA 711, where Selway J set out two pre-conditions which must be satisfied:
(a) that Mr Pattemore was a veteran; and
(b)that in order to determine whether SoPs apply, the kind of injury or disease which is the basis of Mr Pattemore’s claim, must be identified (see sections 120A(2) and (4) of the Act).
64. The Tribunal has not accepted that the applicant had one day’s operational service. He is therefore not regarded as “a veteran”. However, after considering the expert evidence, the diagnosis of dysthymia is accepted for the applicant. This condition is a derivative condition of Depressive Disorder and is accepted as falling within the scope of the symptoms of that wider term. It is also accepted as a “disease” within the definition provided in section 5D(1) of the Act. Therefore, one of the pre-conditions in Hancock’s case is not satisfied i.e. that he was a “veteran”.
65. However, in the event that the Tribunal is wrong in that conclusion, the claim has assessed the eligibility of the applicant in terms of the relevant SoP for operational service. Section 120A applies to that assessment as the application has been brought after 1 June 1994. The claim must therefore be assessed under section 120A(3) of the Act and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant SoP.
66. To determine the assessment of dysthymia for this applicant and whether it is “war caused”, four steps are required as set out by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Repatriation Commission and Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82. The relevant steps are:
“1. The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2. If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the authority under s 196B(2) or (11)…….
3. If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the ‘template’ to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors, which the authority has determined to be the minimum, which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be ‘reasonable’ and the claim will fail.
4. The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.”
67. In dealing with Step 1 of Deledio, there must be material which can establish an hypothesis connecting the applicant’s dysthymia with facts relating to his service. An hypothesis is a proposition which may seem logical, without acceptance of its truth, but it is to be regarded as a starting point for further enquiry. “A hypothesis is no more than a supposition of conjectural explanation of an ultimate fact” (Repatriation Commission v Stares (1996) 41 ALD 212 at 217.
68. The Tribunal must have regard to the requirement to make its determination “after consideration of all of the material”. This was first referred to in Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 and Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564, when the High Court said a reasonable hypothesis is raised when “….the material point to some fact or facts which support the hypothesis”. The term “consideration of all of the material” was further clarified in Repatriation Commission v Webb (1998) 51 ALD 575 where it was held that the overall hypotheses requires consideration of each sequential part of the hypothesis and whether facts point to each part of the hypothesis being reasonable. If each part is reasonable, the overall hypothesis may be reasonable.
69. The Tribunal is of the view that an hypothesis could be made connecting the applicant’s condition with the circumstances of his service, only if it can be shown that the incident at Jakarta International Airport resulted in dysthymia within 2 years of that incident and that the subsequent events were an aggravation of that pre-existing condition. With respect to the claimed Vietnam service, an hypothesis could be raised also in respect of the claimed facts and the applicant’s present condition.
70. In relation to Step 2 of Deledio, an SoP exists for the condition of Dysthymia and has been issued by the RMA. The relevant Instrument is No 58 of 1998. – Depressive Disorder.
71. Step 3 of Deledio requires an assessment of whether the hypothesis raised in Step 1 is a reasonable one. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act makes it clear that a reasonable hypothesis is not the existence of a mere possibility, but that the intention of the legislation is that a pension will be payable only where the evidence provides “….some positive inference in favour of a connection between the injury, disease or death and the veteran’s or member’s particular service” (at page 107).
72. The approach to be adopted in assessing this question was set out by the High Court in Byrnes and Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at 571 as follows:
“The position may be summarised as follows:
(1)First, sub-s (3) of s 120 is applied: Do all or some of the facts raised by the material before the Commission give rise to a reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran’s injury with the war service? The hypothesis will not be reasonable if it is contrary to known scientific facts or is obviously fanciful or untenable. If the hypothesis is not reasonable the claim fails. Proof of facts is not in issue at this point.
(2)If a reasonable hypothesis is established sub-s (1) of s 120 is applied. The claim will succeed unless:
(a)one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or
(b)the truth of another fact in the material, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis.” (Emphasis added)
73. In determining whether the hypothesis is reasonable, the material before the Tribunal must fit the template in the SoP for Dysthymia. That is, the material before the Tribunal must demonstrate the elements of Dysthymia as defined in clause 2(b)(ii) and clause 5 of the SoP (Repatriation Commission v Hill [2002] FCAFC 192). In that case, the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder was not in dispute and the Court there approached the assessment this way:
“The correct issue was, assuming [the applicant] suffered from PTSD as defined in cl 4 of the SoP, did the material raise or point to his “experiencing a stressor”, as defined, during his operational service?”
74. The Tribunal has adopted the approach in Hill’s case in assessing the reasonableness of this hypothesis. The relevant factors in the SoP which contribute to this assessment are as follows:
§ SoP Instrument No 58 of 1998 – Depressive Disorder
Kind of injury, disease or death
2. (a) ….
(b) For the purposes of this Statement of Principles, “depressive disorder” is defined as:
(A) the presence of major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder or depression not otherwise specified where:
(i) major depressive disorder is either a single episode or recurrent episode as defined in DSM-IV; and
(ii) dysthymic disorder, as defined in DSM-IV, is a chronic mood disturbance, of at least two years duration, involving depressed mood, or loss of interest or pleasure, with manifestation of the symptoms used to diagnose major depression such as neurovegative signs, social withdrawal, cognitive impairment and suicidal ideation; and
(iii) depression not otherwise specified, such as minor depressive disorder and recurrent brief depressive disorder, as defined in DSM-IV, includes disorders with depressive features that do not meet the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for other specific mood disorders,
attracting ICD-9-CM code 296.2, 296.3, 300.4 or 311.
Factors that must be related to service
4. Subject to clause 6, at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to any relevant service rendered by the person.
Factors
5. The factors that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting depressive disorder or death from depressive disorder with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service are:
(a) being a prisoner of war before the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or
(b) experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor or stressors within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or
(c) having a clinically significant psychiatric condition within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or
(d) having a major illness or injury within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or
(e) suffering from chronic pain of at least six months duration at the time of the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or
(f) experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor or stressors within the two years immediately before the clinical worsening of depressive disorder; or
(g) having a major illness or injury within the two years immediately before the clinical worsening of depressive disorder; or
(h) having a clinically significant psychiatric condition within the two years immediately before the clinical worsening of depressive disorder; or
(j) suffering from chronic pain of at least six months duration at the time of the clinical worsening of depressive disorder; or
(k) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for depressive disorder.
Factors that apply only to material contribution or aggravation
6. Paragraphs 5(f) to 5(k) apply only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, depressive disorder where the person’s depressive disorder was suffered or contracted before or during (but not arising out of) the person’s relevant service; paragraph 8(1)(e), 9(1)(e), 70(5)(d) or 70(5A)(d) of the Act refers.
Other definitions
8. For the purposes of this Statement of Principles:
……
“severe psychosocial stressor” means an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual, for example, being shot at, death or serious injury of a close friend or relative, assault (including sexual assault), severe illness or injury, experiencing a loss such as divorce or separation, loss of employment, major financial problems or legal problems;
….”
75. The third step in the Deledio process requires the Tribunal to make a relatively macro-level of assessment of the applicant’s story and to determine whether it fits the template set out in the SoP. Findings of fact are not made on the basis of Step 3. At this point, however, if the applicant’s story does not fit within the template of SoP Instrument No 58 of 1998, then the hypothesis will not be reasonable (see section 120(3)). In those circumstances, the claim would be unsuccessful.
76. To be reasonable in terms of Hill’s case, a hypothesis must reveal a credible proposition and one that is not too remote or too improbable. It must be “….more that a possibility, not fanciful or unreal, consistent with the known facts. It is a hypothesis pointed to by the facts, even though not proved on the balance of probabilities” (East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517 at 532-533. A hypothesis therefore is merely a possibility, but to be a reasonable hypothesis, it must “….be pointed to or supported, and not merely left open as a possibility by the material before the decision maker” (Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364).
77. In a practical sense, the evidence must “point to” or “support” the hypothesis and not merely be “left open” on the evidence as a possibility (Gilbert v Repatriation Commission (1989) 86 ALR 713). It must also show more than just a temporal connection with military service (Repatriation Commission v Tuite (1993) 39 FCR 540). The High Court in Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 affirmed this approach or the “points to” test. It said this test in s.120(3) will manifest a reasonable hypothesis in circumstances where “….there is sufficient factual material to point to a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury etc with the operational service”.
78. Taking the applicant’s account of the incident at Jakarta International Airport, and particularly on the basis that Indonesian soldiers held himself and other members of the crew at gunpoint for up to two hours, there would be a sufficient connection between that incident and the development of Dysthymia. As he was a relatively young man trained as a tradesman and not as a combat soldier, that incident of itself could constitute “experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor” within the meaning of the SoP. His own psychiatrist attested to the fact that a man of his age could well have obtained a condition of Dysthymic Disorder in those circumstances. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that incident raises a reasonable hypothesis linking his claimed condition of Dysthymia with relevant defence service as the applicant’s version of events does not satisfy factor 5 (b) - that clinical onset of Dysthymia occurred within 2 years of the alleged psychosocial stressor.
79. The question of whether a condition of Dysthymia following the incident in Jakarta International Airport provides the basis of a pre-existing disease which might have been aggravated by operational service of one flight of one day in and out of Vung Tau is a critical question. At the outset, the time required for clinical onset is not satisfied. Also, the circumstances described surrounding claimed stress by travelling on a flight with wounded servicemen, must be open to serious doubt. The applicant was travelling on a flight with the RAAF where wounded soldiers had been stabilised and were cared for by trained medical staff. That flight was travelling in an atmosphere of support and camaraderie. There was no suggestion of any threat to the applicant either of the magnitude described in the SoP Instrument dealing with threat or serious injury to himself or others; nor could it be reasonably perceived that there was any sense of fear, helplessness or horror for the applicant in these circumstances.
80. In this respect, the Tribunal was referred to Lamont and Repatriation Commission [2005] AATA 149 in which the Tribunal was urged to follow that decision as authority that travelling with wounded personnel would be a severe stressor. However, the Tribunal does not accept that the facts in this case are of the same order as in Lamont which involved witnessing a young Vietnamese who had been shot and lying on the ground in a village in which the applicant in that case passed by in close proximity. In the present case, any wounded personnel had been hospitalised, their conditions stabilised and were monitored by nursing staff on the flight. No wounds were evident on the basis of the medical evidence provided to the Tribunal.
81. Counsel for the applicant also argued that the Tribunal should follow Guy v Repatriation Commission [2005] FCA 562 in finding in favour of the applicant. In that case the Federal Court of Australia found that the Tribunal had made an error of law by finding that despite accepting the applicant’s version of events, then questioned whether that version of events did in fact evoke the emotions which the applicant attributed to the incident which the Tribunal had accepted. The Court in that case held that the correct approach is to question whether the event put forward by the applicant might, or could possibly, evoke the relevant emotions. In other words, the Court said that the focus of the analysis “….is rather on the type and nature of the danger, namely, whether it can be characterised as being capable of evoking the relevant emotions”. In the present case however, the Tribunal has examined the type and nature of the situation described by the applicant but cannot reasonably place any interpretation on this incident which could characterise it in the way in which the applicant has endeavoured to do and cannot envisage it being capable of evoking the emotions required by the SoP.
82. On that basis, after considering the relevant material in assessing Step 3 of the Deledio process, the Tribunal finds that it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis which connects the condition of Dysthymia with the circumstances of his service in the RAAF. It is therefore unnecessary for the Tribunal to consider step 4 of Deledio.
83. Clearly, the Tribunal has found that the applicant’s circumstances do not bring his claim within the preconditions required for him to be a “veteran” within the provisions of the legislation. However, the Tribunal has considered the position that even if the facts could allow the applicant to be regarded as a veteran, it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis. Therefore, while the Tribunal has found that Mr Pattemore has Dysthymia, it has also found that he does not suffer from a “war caused disease” or an aggravation of a previous psychiatric condition.
84. For these reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
I certify that the 84 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr KS Levy and Dr KP Kennedy, Members
Signed: Jeff Mills
Legal Research OfficerDate/s of Hearing 23 June 2005
Date of Decision 3 August 2005
Counsel for the Applicant Mr E George
Solicitor for the Applicant Sciacca’s Lawyers
For the Respondent Mr J Kelly, Departmental Advocate
0
23
0