SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
PATRICK v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2025] SASCA 108
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice Stanley)
25 September 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO COURTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION - REVIEW OF DECISIONS - OTHER STATES AND TERRITORIES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION - EXEMPT DOCUMENTS - CABINET AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DOCUMENTS
Appeal against a decision of the President of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘Tribunal’), affirming a decision of the Ombudsman to refuse access to documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) (‘FOI Act’).
The applicant sought documents relating to the Northern Water Supply Project from the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (‘Department’) under the FOI Act. The Department identified 18 documents in response to the application. The Department determined that the documents were exempt from release under cl 1(1)(a) and cl 1(1)(e) of the FOI Act on the grounds that they were prepared specifically for submission to Cabinet and/or would disclose information concerning deliberations or decisions of Cabinet.
The applicant sought an internal review by the Department and then an external review by the Ombudsman. Both affirmed the Department’s decision in substance. The applicant then sought review of the Ombudsman’s decision by the Tribunal. This appeal concerns the Tribunal’s order affirming the Ombudsman’s decision, in relation to documents 6, 14 and 15.
The grounds of appeal complain that the President erred in finding Documents 6, 14 and 15 to be exempt from disclosure on the basis that:
1.Document 15, as an attachment to a document submitted to a Cabinet taskforce meeting, had been specifically prepared for submission to Cabinet, pursuant to cl 1(1)(a);
2.Document 15 contained matter that would, if disclosed, disclose information concerning a deliberation or decision of Cabinet in the sense in which that expression is used in cl 1(1)(e);
3.Document 6, as an attachment to a document submitted to a Cabinet taskforce meeting, had been specifically prepared for submission to Cabinet, pursuant to cl 1(1)(a);
4.Document 6 contained matter that would, if disclosed, disclose information concerning a deliberation or decision of Cabinet in the sense in which that expression is used in cl 1(1)(e); and
5.Document 14 contained matter that would, if disclosed, disclose information concerning a deliberation or decision of Cabinet in the sense in which that expression is used in cl 1(1)(e).
Held (by the Court), dismissing the appeal:
1.The word ‘concerning’ in cl 1(1)(e) of the FOI Act extends the reach of the exemption beyond documents the disclosure of which would disclose the actual deliberations or decisions of Cabinet.
2.Documents disclosing information that is the subject matter of Cabinet deliberations may be exempt if it is identifiable as the subject matter of Cabinet deliberations.
3.Identification may be made on the face of the document or by reference to publicly available extrinsic information which, when…
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- Case
- [2025] SASCA 108
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were the proper construction of clause 1(1)(e) of Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), which exempts documents "concerning any deliberation or decision of Cabinet," and the application of this clause, along with clause 1(1)(a), to the specific documents in contention. The Court was required to determine the scope of the exemption and whether the documents, or information within them, qualified as being "concerning any deliberation or decision of Cabinet."
The Court applied established principles of statutory construction, emphasising that interpretation must begin and end with the statutory text, considered in its context. It found that the word "concerning" in clause 1(1)(e) extended the exemption beyond documents that directly disclosed Cabinet deliberations or decisions. Information that informed Cabinet deliberations was capable of being covered by the exemption, provided it could be identified as the subject matter of those deliberations. This identification could be made from the face of the document or from publicly available extrinsic information. The Court also considered the Infrastructure SA Assurance Framework as relevant context for characterising the documents.
The Court concluded that while the choice of the word "concerning" broadened the exemption, the mere submission of a document to Cabinet was insufficient to render its contents exempt. The information had to be identifiable as the subject matter of Cabinet deliberations. The Court then proceeded to apply this construction to the remaining documents in contention.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 3A sets out the principles relevant to the administration of the Act, which are to assist in its construction:3A—Principles of administration(1) It is the intention of the Parliament—(a) that this Act should be interpreted and applied so as to further the objects of this Act; and(b) that a person or body exercising an administrative discretion conferred by this Act exercise the discretion, as far as possible, in a way that favours the disclosure of information of a kind that can be disclosed without infringing the right to privacy of individuals.(2) Agencies are to give effect to this Act in a way that—(a) assists members of the public and Members of Parliament to exercise rights given by this Act; and(b) ensures that applications under this Act are dealt with promptly and efficiently. Section 12 provides that a person has a legally enforceable right to be given access to an agency’s documents in accordance with the Act. Section 13 sets out requirements of an application to access an agency’s documents. Section 19 requires that on receiving an application for access to documents, an agency is to determine whether to grant access to the documents sought, or to refuse access. Section 20 provides that the agency may withhold a document if it is an exempt document. Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the categories of documents which are exempt from disclosure. As discussed earlier, this appeal primarily concerns the interpretation and application of cll 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(e) of Schedule 1, set out earlier.The appealThe construction of cl 1(1)(e) The first question for determination relates to the proper construction of cl 1(1)(e) and, in particular, of the phrase, ‘information concerning any deliberation or decision of Cabinet’. This is, primarily, a question of scope. It became apparent during the course of argument that there was little, if anything, between the parties on the question of construction. The respondent submitted, and it may be the case, that the applicant’s submissions on construction had changed from those made before the Tribunal. In any event, it is necessary for this Court to indicate its view of the scope of the exemption in order to explain its conclusions on the application of the exemptions to the remaining documents in contention. The general principles governing statutory construction are well established. Section 14 of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) provides that the interpretation that best achieves the purpose or object of the act is to be preferred against any other interpretation. In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, the High Court said:[11]This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text. So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself. (Footnote omitted)[11] (2012) 250 CLR 503 at [39].