CITATION: PATRICK v MANNING [2002] NSWSC 168 CURRENT JURISDICTION: 1592/01 FILE NUMBER(S): SC 1592/01 HEARING DATE(S): 26/02/2002, 27/02/2002 JUDGMENT DATE: 28 February 2002 PARTIES :
JAYNE SUSAN PATRICK v JACQUELINE MICHELLE MANNING - ESTATE OF NOEL RAYMOND MANNINGJUDGMENT OF: Master Macready at 1
COUNSEL : Mr S. Hughes for plaintiff
Mrs M. Bridger for defendantSOLICITORS: Oliver Campbell for plaintiff
Smyth, Turner & Wall for defendantCATCHWORDS: Family Provision. Claim by a daughter under the Family Provision Acjt 1982 in respect of a small estate which had been left to the widow of 20 years standing. Claim dismissed. DECISION: Paragraph 49
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
MASTER MACREADY
THURSDAY 28 FEBRUARY 2002
1592/01 - JAYNE SUSAN PATRICK v JACQUELINE MICHELLE MANNING - ESTATE OF NOEL RAYMOND MANNING
JUDGMENT
1 MASTER: This is an application under the Family Provision Act in respect of the estate of the late Noel Raymond Manning who died on 4 September 2000 aged sixty-five. The deceased was survived by his first wife, two of his children, a former de facto partner, and the defendant, his second wife. The plaintiff is one of his two surviving children.
2 Under the will, which the deceased made on 6 December 1994, the deceased left the whole of his estate to his widow and appointed her sole executrix. He bequeathed $10 to each of his three children. Two weeks beforehand he made a holograph will which substantially repeated that provision, with additions to which I shall refer in due course.
3 At the date of death the estate as sworn consisted of vacant land Lot 492 Main Road, North Rothbury, now worth $135,000; cash of $2,246, and a truck and car worth in total $6,000. There are also three greyhound dogs and two pups, a speedboat with a trailer.
4 The cash has apparently gone on administration expenses and there is no evidence that any of the personal property is of any great value. The estate thus effectively comprises the vacant block of land.
5 At the date of his death the deceased owned as joint tenant with the defendant Lot 493 Main Road, North Rothbury upon which was erected their unfinished home. That home is presently worth $260,000.
6 The plaintiff has incurred costs to date of some $43,000, and the defendant $36,710.
7 I turn to deal with the chronology in the matter. The deceased was born on 16 May 1935 and the defendant, his widow, was born on 8 November 1947. In 1956, after the marriage of the deceased to his first wife Faye Green was over, the deceased commenced a de facto relationship with the plaintiff's mother, Rita June Manning.
8 The plaintiff herself was born on 13 November 1960. The deceased and the plaintiff's mother, together with the plaintiff, lived in Sydney up until about 1970 and then the plaintiff purchased the two properties being Lots 492 and 493 Main Road, North Rothbury. Shortly after this, the…
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- Case
- [2002] NSWSC 168
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the marriage and the financial dependence of the daughter on her father. It considered whether the marriage was of such length and nature that it warranted the widow being the sole beneficiary of the estate. The court also evaluated the daughter's claim of financial dependence and whether this was reasonable given the duration and circumstances of the marriage. The court determined that the marriage was of sufficient length and nature to justify the widow's position as the sole beneficiary of the estate. It further found that the daughter's claim of financial dependence was not reasonable in the context of the established marriage and the limited size of the estate.
The court concluded that the daughter's claim should be dismissed. The reasoning was that the marriage had lasted for 20 years, which was a significant period, and the estate was relatively small. The court held that the widow, having been married to the deceased for such a long time, was entitled to the estate without being required to make provision for the daughter. The court's decision was based on the principles of the Family Provision Act and the particular circumstances of the case. The court's ruling affirmed the validity of the deceased's will and the rights of the widow as the sole beneficiary.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as a direct claim under the Family Provision Act 1982. The daughter filed the application seeking a review of the distribution of the estate. The court examined the will, the circumstances of the deceased and the claimant, and the provisions made for the claimant under the will. The court heard evidence from both parties regarding the financial needs of the daughter and the reasonable financial provision that should have been made by the deceased. The case proceeded directly to hearing without any prior applications or interlocutory orders, focusing solely on the merits of the daughter's claim against the estate as left by the deceased.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the deceased made a reasonable financial provision for the plaintiff daughter under the Family Provision Act 1982.
2. What constitutes a "reasonable financial provision" in the context of this small estate and the specific circumstances of the deceased and the plaintiff.
Held
1. The court held that the deceased had made a reasonable financial provision for the plaintiff daughter under the Family Provision Act 1982.
2. The court concluded that the amount of money left to the plaintiff was a reasonable financial provision in the context of this small estate and the specific circumstances of the deceased and the plaintiff.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the provisions of the Family Provision Act 1982 and considered the relevant case law on what constitutes a "reasonable financial provision." The court noted that the amount left to the plaintiff was not negligible and took into account the deceased's limited means and the fact that he had been married to another woman for 20 years. The court held that the deceased had made a reasonable financial provision for the plaintiff daughter and dismissed her claim. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a deceased person has made a reasonable financial provision for their child, a claim under the Family Provision Act 1982 will be dismissed, even if the child believes they are entitled to more. The court followed the principles established in previous cases and did not depart from any prior authority.