Paton v Pericic

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PATON & ANOR v PERICIC [2008] FMCA 1504
BANKRUPTCY – Application for review to set aside sequestration order – application to set aside bankruptcy notice – s.41(7) deemed extension of time considered.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic)
Bankruptcy Rules 2006, rule 4.06
Re Brink (1980) 30 ALR 433
Totev v Sfar (2008) FCAFC 35
Applicants: DENNIS PATON AND SHIRLEY MAY PATON
Respondent: CHERYL PERICIC
File Number: MLG 560 of 2008
Judgment of: Hartnett FM
Hearing date: 28 July 2008
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 11 November 2008

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr T. Connard
Solicitors for the Applicants: Barry Kenna and Co
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J.A. Ribbands
Solicitors for the Respondent: T.F. Grundy Lawyer

ORDERS

  1. That compliance with rule 4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules 2006 be dispensed with.

  2. That the application for review of the sequestration order of Registrar Luxton made on 19 June 2008 be dismissed.

  3. That the decision and orders of Registrar Luxton on 19 June 2008 be affirmed.

  4. That the Applicants costs be paid out of the estate of the bankrupt in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
MELBOURNE

MLG 560 of 2008

DENNIS PATON AND SHIRLEY MAY PATON

Applicants

And

CHERYL PERICIC

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 19 June 2008, a sequestration order was made against the estate of the debtor Ms Pericic by Registrar Luxton.  In a separate proceeding and on the same date, the debtor's application to set aside the bankruptcy notice on which the sequestration order was founded was dismissed.  By application for review filed 25 June 2008, Ms Pericic sought review of both decisions.  The application for review before the court is in the nature of a hearing de novo.

  2. There proceeded before the court on the date of hearing in essence two applications, the first being a creditors' petition in which Mr Connard appeared on behalf of the applicant creditors, and being number MLG 560 of 2008, and a related matter in which the applicant creditors are the respondent to an application to extend time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice.  The matters are wholly interrelated. On the hearing of this matter, counsel for Ms Pericic sought and obtained leave to rely upon an affidavit sworn by her dated 21 July 2008.  Such affidavit was not before Registrar Luxton at the time of the making of his orders on 19 June 2008. 

History

  1. On 21 September 2007 and at VCAT, in effect a default judgment was obtained against the debtor in the creditors' counter-claim filed in an action brought against the creditors by the debtor which was dismissed on 20 August 2007.  The judgment obtained by the creditors in their counter-claim was, on 15 January 2008, registered in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria at Ringwood and it is that judgment which the bankruptcy notice issued on 5 March 2008 was founded.  Ms Pericic's application for review to VCAT of the…

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Details
Case
[2008] FMCA 1504
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Paton v Pericic, the issue before the court was whether the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) precluded the respondent, Pericic, from pursuing a claim in the County Court for damages that arose from a lease dispute previously handled by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). The court needed to determine whether Pericic’s previous dismissal by VCAT constituted a legal barrier preventing her from bringing the claim in County Court, or if it was merely a choice made by Pericic. Additionally, the court examined whether Pericic's application to set aside a bankruptcy notice complied with the requirements of section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

The court concluded that the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) did not prohibit Pericic from bringing her claim in the County Court, as the dismissal by VCAT was not a legal barrier but rather a strategic choice. The court further found that Pericic's affidavit in support of her application to set aside the bankruptcy notice did not meet the criteria set out in section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. The affidavit failed to demonstrate a real or effective counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand, and thus, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was not bona fide. Consequently, there could be no deemed extension of time for compliance with the notice. Based on these findings, the court dismissed the application for review of the sequestration order and affirmed the decision and orders of the Registrar.

The court ordered that compliance with rule 4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules 2006 be dispensed with, that the application for review of the sequestration order be dismissed, and that the decision and orders of Registrar Luxton on 19 June 2008 be affirmed. Furthermore, the court ordered that the applicants’ costs be paid out of the estate of the bankrupt in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

That compliance with rule 4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules 2006 be dispensed with.

2.

That the application for review of the sequestration order of Registrar Luxton made on 19 June 2008 be dismissed.

3.

That the decision and orders of Registrar Luxton on 19 June 2008 be affirmed.

4.

That the Applicants costs be paid out of the estate of the bankrupt in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The court was taken to section 89 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) subsection (4). That provides as follows:(4) Subject to section 23(4) (key money and goodwill payments prohibited), a retail tenancy dispute other than–(a) an application for relief against forfeiture; or (b) a claim under Part 9 (Unconscionable Conduct)–is not justiciable before any other tribunal or a court or person acting judicially within the meaning of the Evidence Act 1958. Ms Pericic argues that she had a claim before VCAT and that her proceedings were dismissed because of the misconduct or mishandling of those proceedings by a person who acted on her behalf, not being a legal practitioner. Ms Pericic felt all her avenues had been exhausted before VCAT. Her application was effectively dismissed by way of self‑executing orders. It is not sufficient for the debtor to issue proceedings in the County Court on the basis that she felt all her avenues were exhausted in VCAT. That is not a legal barrier. VCAT clearly has jurisdiction to hear what was most recently promoted in the County Court proceedings as an unconscionability argument arising out of the lease. The Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) sets out that VCAT has such jurisdiction. The respondent says in paragraph 4 of her affidavit sworn 21 July 2008 that she decided not to reapply to VCAT but to pursue the respondents for damages in the County Court. In paragraph 5 she recites the nature of her general claim against the applicants, and in the final sentence says:I also formed the view that VCAT members would take a dim view of any further application I may have made to VCAT due to the problems experienced with the application dismissed by Senior Member Cremean.That does not evidence a legal barrier but rather a choice made by the respondent. The claim for damages she has made in the County Court is a claim in relation to which VCAT has jurisdiction. As to the arguments concerning s.41(7) of the Act Counsel for the applicants argued that following the bankruptcy notice being issued, the 21-day period for compliance commenced and on the last day, being 8 May, an affidavit was filed by the debtor accompanied by an application to set aside the bankruptcy notice in proceedings numbered 527 of 2008. That application was intended to constitute an application under section 41(7) of the Act. In order to obtain the deemed extension, the debtor was required to file an affidavit that demonstrated two things: (1) that there was a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand and (2) that it could not have been raised in any other proceeding where the judgment was obtained. The authorities are clear that a deemed extension is not granted where those matters are not established. Whilst the court should adopt a benevolent construction of the material the affidavit filed needs to contain evidence which goes to establish that there is a real or effective counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand, and if it does not, then the affidavit does not comply with the requirements of section 41(7) of the Act. Where the affidavit fails to provide the necessary material as the affidavits do in this matter then the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice must fail and correspondingly there can be no deemed extension of time for compliance with the notice. The application was not a bona fide application. This leads to the making of orders on the creditors’ petition.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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