Pathak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pathak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] FCA 683

Citation: Pathak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 683
Appeal from: Pathak v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2778
Parties: LALITA KANDEL PATHAK AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 36 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 21 May 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Migration Review Tribunal had indicated before hearing that it wished to make decision at hearing – whether Tribunal refused to adjourn to allow applicant more time to obtain further evidence on new issue that emerged during hearing because of its doubts that applicant could satisfy a different criterion for visa – where Tribunal made decision orally at hearing affirming delegate’s decision but provided written reasons 11 days later –Tribunal did not decide issue that it used as its reason to refuse adjournment– whether Tribunal exercised power to adjourn a review under s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) unreasonably – where Tribunal gave its decision immediately despite ascertaining during hearing its earlier identification of issues erroneous – whether Tribunal took an irrelevant consideration into account by basing its decision on a doubt, but not a finding, about applicant – where Tribunal gave written reasons 11 days after having refused to adjourn it, made oral decision at hearing to affirm delegate’s decision in circumstances where applicant could have provided information in that period on ground of Tribunal’s adverse decision
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Chava v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 313
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Pathak v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2778
Date of hearing: 21 May 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Newman
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 36 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

LALITA KANDEL PATHAK AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for extension of time be allowed.

2.The appeal be treated as instituted instanter.

3.The appeal be allowed.

4.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 November 2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:

(1)the decision of the second respondent made on 10 May 2013, to affirm the first respondent’s decision not to grant the applicants student (Temporary) (Class TU) visas, be quashed;

(2)a writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applicants’ application for review according to law;

(3)       the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

5.The first respondent pay…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 683
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pathak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the applicants, citizens of Nepal, seeking a review of the refusal of their student visa application by the Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had indicated its intention to make a decision at the hearing and provided the applicants with a letter outlining the information required. However, during the hearing, it became apparent that the financial requirements applicable to the applicants' circumstances had not been correctly identified. The Tribunal refused to adjourn the hearing to allow the applicants to obtain further evidence, leading to the applicants challenging the Tribunal's decision.

The key legal issues in the case revolved around whether the Tribunal unreasonably exercised its power to adjourn the review and whether it took an irrelevant consideration into account in making its decision. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn was unreasonable given that the correct financial requirements only became apparent during the hearing. They also contended that the Tribunal based its decision on a doubt, rather than a finding, about the applicants' genuineness as students, which was an irrelevant consideration.

The court found that the Tribunal had unreasonably exercised its power to adjourn the review, as the correct financial requirements were only fully appreciated during the hearing. The court emphasised that the Tribunal was not obliged to afford every opportunity to an applicant to present their best possible case, but it could decide that "enough is enough" in appropriate cases. However, in this instance, the Tribunal had not expressed any disbelief or doubt as to the truth of the applicants' statements regarding their cousin's financial support. The court held that the Tribunal should have considered the substantial justice and merits of the case and what was fair and just, as required by sections 353(2)(b) and 357A(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the Tribunal's decision, and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to hear and determine the applicants' application for review according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicants' costs, and the applicants were granted an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time be allowed.

2. The appeal be treated as instituted instanter.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 November 2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:

(1) the decision of the second respondent made on 10 May 2013, to affirm the first respondent’s decision not to grant the applicants student (Temporary) (Class TU) visas, be quashed;

(2) a writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applicants’ application for review according to law;

(3) the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs.

6. On or before 28 May 2015, the appellants file and serve a notice of appeal in the form attached to the affidavit of the appellants’ solicitor, sworn 12 January 2014.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In addition, the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) prescribed a number of requirements for the grant of a student visa, including cl 573.223(1), that required the Minister to be satisfied that the visa applicant “is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student …”. There were a number of criteria applicable to the grant of such a visa, including certain financial requirements set out in Sch 5A and, in particular, cl 5A508, the relevance of which became apparent only at the hearing before the Tribunal, the subject of this appeal, in circumstances I shall shortly explain.Background The applicants are citizens of Nepal. Mrs Pathak had applied for a student visa on 1 December 2010. Her husband’s and child’s claims to a visa were dependent on the success of her application. The initial application was refused by the delegate and, on 15 March 2011, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for a review. They were assisted by a registered migration agent. The Tribunal’s initial review miscarried and a consent order resulted in the matter being remitted to the Tribunal to hear and determine according to law. Mrs Pathak had completed a number of courses in the interim, between her original application and the May 2013 hearing before the Tribunal. In April 2012 immediately before the earlier hearing, she had submitted a letter of offer for her to study a Bachelor of Business at Holmes Institute, commencing on 8 April 2012, but the Tribunal did not consider that letter, causing the review to miscarry. She also provided at that time, some financial information, including a certificate of deposit of nearly $150,000 with the Commonwealth Bank by her cousin as evidencing that this sum was immediately available to him. She also provided a guarantee by her cousin dated 13 April 2012 promising to provide financial support for her of up to $100,000. On 17 April 2013, the Tribunal wrote to the applicants, inviting them to a hearing, pursuant to s 360 of the Act. The letter conveying the invitation stated:Additionally, the Tribunal invites you to provide the following:Ÿ3. Current evidence that you satisfy English language, financial capacity and ‘Other’ requirements in any of the alternative ways applicable for your assessment level set out in Schedule 5A for the purposes of cl.572.223(2)(a)(i) ...….The Tribunal invites you to provide the above information by 3 May 2013, and the Tribunal will seek to make a decision at the conclusion of the hearing. The Tribunal notes that a delegate of the Minister first requested some of this information from you on 2 December 2010. If you are unable to provide this information by the hearing date, the Tribunal will require good reason to grant additional time. (emphasis in the original) Mrs Pathak submitted information through her new migration agent, to the Tribunal in response to its invitation letter of 17 April 2013. Mrs Pathak included another copy of the same Commonwealth Bank certificate and other material, including a new guarantee signed by her cousin for up to $65,000 dated 2 May 2013. He had bought a house in Australia after April 2012.The 10 May 2013 hearing before the Tribunal

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

First, it appeared to be determined to give a decision immediately on the day of the hearing, as appeared from its invitation letter of 17 April 2013. And it remained fixed on doing so notwithstanding that as the hearing progressed, it became apparent that the pre-hearing preparation by the Tribunal and its identification of the issues in its letter of 17 April 2013 to Mrs Pathak and her advisors had occurred on an erroneous basis. The Tribunal’s 17 April 2013 letter had emphasised the need for Mrs Pathak to provide current evidence, but as the Tribunal acknowledged at [17] of its decision that letter had been predicated on the wrong clause in the Regulations for her actual situation. And, it said at [33], immediately before adjourning briefly to allow Mrs Pathak and her husband to discuss what else they might wish to say:The Tribunal indicated that [Mrs Pathak] had not given evidence in accordance with her Schedule 5A financial capacity requirements and the Tribunal was ready to make a decision. (emphasis added) Secondly, the Tribunal refused the adjournment because it said that Mrs Pathak had known for a long time about the need to satisfy the Sch 5A financial capacity requirements. However, as was clear and understandable, given the Byzantine complexity of those requirements, the actual consequence of the requirements as they applied to her current circumstances only became apparent to both the Tribunal and her during the course of the hearing. Thirdly, the Tribunal said it did not wish “to falsely raise her expectations of a successful outcome by granting an extension of time to provide additional financial information” based on its doubt, but not a finding, about whether she was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student. The Tribunal’s reasons demonstrated that although Mrs Pathak needed to satisfy the Sch 5A requirements $94,600, she and her cousin had proceeded before the hearing on the by now demonstrably erroneous premise that a guarantee of $65,000 would be sufficient. The Tribunal did not express any disbelief or doubt as to the truth of Mrs Pathak’s statement to it that her cousin would provide the increased level of financial support if required and she could have him commit to that amount if need be. Moreover, he had had a very large sum on deposit as at 12 April 2012, but that was not the relevant date. His financial circumstances, as Mrs Pathak had said, had changed since then but the Tribunal made no finding that that had affected his expressed willingness or ability to support his cousin as she asserted. The Tribunal’s 17 April 2013 letter told her emphatically that she had to have current evidence. It explained the problem with the 12 April 2012 certificate to her in the hearing and said that she needed to provide additional financial information based on the new calculation of $94,600 for the period of the three months before 1 December 2010. On the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal, it could reasonably have expected Mrs Pathak to be able to collect an updated guarantee and the necessary financial information from her cousin promptly. If the absence of that material were then cured, the Tribunal could have considered the substantial justice and merits of the case and what was fair and just, as ss 353(2)(b) and 357A(3) required.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both parties in effect adopted the arguments that they had made to the trial judge, with which he dealt in the manner I have described.Consideration The statutory scheme applicable to the Tribunal’s task in Pt 5 of the Act was extensively analysed in Li 249 CLR 332. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ pointed to a number of indicia within Pt 5 that were important to the consideration of the manner in which the Tribunal ought approach the exercise of its powers under s 363(1) of the Act, including, relevantly, its power to adjourn the review from time to time under s 363(1)(b). Importantly s 357A(3) required the Tribunal, in applying Div 5 of Pt 5, to “act in a way that is fair and just”. That may have been a supplementation of the more precatory words of s 353(2)(b) that required the Tribunal, in reviewing a decision, to act “according to substantial justice and the merits of the case”. The Tribunal had to invite Mrs Pathak to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review (s 360(1)). The Tribunal also had power to ask her to provide information or documents, as it did. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ discussed the constructions of ss 353, 357A, 360 and 363(1)(b) at some length in Li 249 CLR at 358-368 [51]–[80]. Their Honours said that the Tribunal is not under an obligation to afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case and to improve upon the evidence and that, in appropriate cases, the Tribunal can decide that “enough is enough”. They said that the purpose of s 360(1) was to provide an applicant for review the opportunity to present evidence and arguments “relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. Those issues were clarified during the hearing by the calculation that the Tribunal made with Mrs Pathak of the amount she needed for financial support. Although it had invited her, on 17 April 2013, to provide “current” evidence that she satisfied, among other things, financial capacity requirements in Sch 5A, the Tribunal recognised in its reasons at [17] that that invitation “was predicated on [Mrs Pathak] having to meet the various requirements of cl 572.223, rather than cl 573.223, because at the time of the previously constituted Tribunal’s decision in April 2013 [Mrs Pathak] had been enrolled in a diploma level course”. In other words, the Tribunal’s own approach to the issues that would be presented for review at the hearing had been predicated on the basis of what was, by the time of the actual hearing, out of date or unresponsive material in that changed scenario. No doubt that is why, during the course of the hearing, the Tribunal had gone through calculating with Mrs Pathak what was necessary, and also why the level of guarantee provided by her cousin turned out to be inadequate. In my opinion, the Tribunal’s decision record revealed that the quantification of the precise amount that Mrs Pathak needed to satisfy the relevant requirements in Sch 5A was only fully appreciated by it and her during the course of the hearing. Whatever assistance she may have gained from her migration agent in preparing for the hearing, the Tribunal itself went through the calculation with her during her evidence. It then became apparent that there was an immediate disparity between what her cousin had recently provided by way of a reduced guarantee on 2 May 2013 and what Mrs Pathak was required to provide.