FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pathak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 683
Citation: Pathak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 683 Appeal from: Pathak v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2778 Parties: LALITA KANDEL PATHAK AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 36 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 21 May 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Migration Review Tribunal had indicated before hearing that it wished to make decision at hearing – whether Tribunal refused to adjourn to allow applicant more time to obtain further evidence on new issue that emerged during hearing because of its doubts that applicant could satisfy a different criterion for visa – where Tribunal made decision orally at hearing affirming delegate’s decision but provided written reasons 11 days later –Tribunal did not decide issue that it used as its reason to refuse adjournment– whether Tribunal exercised power to adjourn a review under s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) unreasonably – where Tribunal gave its decision immediately despite ascertaining during hearing its earlier identification of issues erroneous – whether Tribunal took an irrelevant consideration into account by basing its decision on a doubt, but not a finding, about applicant – where Tribunal gave written reasons 11 days after having refused to adjourn it, made oral decision at hearing to affirm delegate’s decision in circumstances where applicant could have provided information in that period on ground of Tribunal’s adverse decision Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)Cases cited: Chava v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 313
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Pathak v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2778Date of hearing: 21 May 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Newman Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 36 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: LALITA KANDEL PATHAK AND OTHERS NAMED IN THE SCHEDULE
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second RespondentJUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MAY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for extension of time be allowed.
2.The appeal be treated as instituted instanter.
3.The appeal be allowed.
4.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 November 2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:
(1)the decision of the second respondent made on 10 May 2013, to affirm the first respondent’s decision not to grant the applicants student (Temporary) (Class TU) visas, be quashed;
(2)a writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applicants’ application for review according to law;
(3) the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.
5.The first respondent pay…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 683
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues in the case revolved around whether the Tribunal unreasonably exercised its power to adjourn the review and whether it took an irrelevant consideration into account in making its decision. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn was unreasonable given that the correct financial requirements only became apparent during the hearing. They also contended that the Tribunal based its decision on a doubt, rather than a finding, about the applicants' genuineness as students, which was an irrelevant consideration.
The court found that the Tribunal had unreasonably exercised its power to adjourn the review, as the correct financial requirements were only fully appreciated during the hearing. The court emphasised that the Tribunal was not obliged to afford every opportunity to an applicant to present their best possible case, but it could decide that "enough is enough" in appropriate cases. However, in this instance, the Tribunal had not expressed any disbelief or doubt as to the truth of the applicants' statements regarding their cousin's financial support. The court held that the Tribunal should have considered the substantial justice and merits of the case and what was fair and just, as required by sections 353(2)(b) and 357A(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The court allowed the appeal, quashed the Tribunal's decision, and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to hear and determine the applicants' application for review according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicants' costs, and the applicants were granted an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for extension of time be allowed.
2. The appeal be treated as instituted instanter.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 28 November 2014 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that:
(1) the decision of the second respondent made on 10 May 2013, to affirm the first respondent’s decision not to grant the applicants student (Temporary) (Class TU) visas, be quashed;
(2) a writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to hear and determine the applicants’ application for review according to law;
(3) the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.
5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs.
6. On or before 28 May 2015, the appellants file and serve a notice of appeal in the form attached to the affidavit of the appellants’ solicitor, sworn 12 January 2014.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Both parties in effect adopted the arguments that they had made to the trial judge, with which he dealt in the manner I have described.Consideration The statutory scheme applicable to the Tribunal’s task in Pt 5 of the Act was extensively analysed in Li 249 CLR 332. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ pointed to a number of indicia within Pt 5 that were important to the consideration of the manner in which the Tribunal ought approach the exercise of its powers under s 363(1) of the Act, including, relevantly, its power to adjourn the review from time to time under s 363(1)(b). Importantly s 357A(3) required the Tribunal, in applying Div 5 of Pt 5, to “act in a way that is fair and just”. That may have been a supplementation of the more precatory words of s 353(2)(b) that required the Tribunal, in reviewing a decision, to act “according to substantial justice and the merits of the case”. The Tribunal had to invite Mrs Pathak to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review (s 360(1)). The Tribunal also had power to ask her to provide information or documents, as it did. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ discussed the constructions of ss 353, 357A, 360 and 363(1)(b) at some length in Li 249 CLR at 358-368 [51]–[80]. Their Honours said that the Tribunal is not under an obligation to afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case and to improve upon the evidence and that, in appropriate cases, the Tribunal can decide that “enough is enough”. They said that the purpose of s 360(1) was to provide an applicant for review the opportunity to present evidence and arguments “relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. Those issues were clarified during the hearing by the calculation that the Tribunal made with Mrs Pathak of the amount she needed for financial support. Although it had invited her, on 17 April 2013, to provide “current” evidence that she satisfied, among other things, financial capacity requirements in Sch 5A, the Tribunal recognised in its reasons at [17] that that invitation “was predicated on [Mrs Pathak] having to meet the various requirements of cl 572.223, rather than cl 573.223, because at the time of the previously constituted Tribunal’s decision in April 2013 [Mrs Pathak] had been enrolled in a diploma level course”. In other words, the Tribunal’s own approach to the issues that would be presented for review at the hearing had been predicated on the basis of what was, by the time of the actual hearing, out of date or unresponsive material in that changed scenario. No doubt that is why, during the course of the hearing, the Tribunal had gone through calculating with Mrs Pathak what was necessary, and also why the level of guarantee provided by her cousin turned out to be inadequate. In my opinion, the Tribunal’s decision record revealed that the quantification of the precise amount that Mrs Pathak needed to satisfy the relevant requirements in Sch 5A was only fully appreciated by it and her during the course of the hearing. Whatever assistance she may have gained from her migration agent in preparing for the hearing, the Tribunal itself went through the calculation with her during her evidence. It then became apparent that there was an immediate disparity between what her cousin had recently provided by way of a reduced guarantee on 2 May 2013 and what Mrs Pathak was required to provide.