PATERSON and THE OWNERS OF 27 PURDOM ROAD WEMBLEY DOWNS SURVEY-STRATA PLAN 30555
[2019] WASAT 40
•27 JUNE 2019
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: STRATA TITLES ACT 1985 (WA)
CITATION: PATERSON and THE OWNERS OF 27 PURDOM ROAD WEMBLEY DOWNS SURVEY-STRATA PLAN 30555 [2019] WASAT 40
MEMBER: MR S WILLEY, MEMBER
HEARD: 2 APRIL 2019
DELIVERED : 27 JUNE 2019
FILE NO/S: CC 2446 of 2018
BETWEEN: ASHLEY PATERSON
ELIZABETH CHESTER
Applicants
AND
THE OWNERS OF 27 PURDOM ROAD WEMBLEY DOWNS SURVEY-STRATA PLAN 30555
First Respondent
PHILLIP PETER JOHN COLE
Second Respondent
Catchwords:
Strata titles - Strata company - Survey-strata lot - Common property - Proposal to effect alterations to common property - Consent of the strata company - Unreasonable refusal to consent - Jurisdiction of the Tribunal - Town planning - Development approval - Landowner consent - Failure to obtain landowner consent - Tribunal is a creature of statute
Legislation:
City of Stirling Local Planning Scheme No. 3
Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015 (WA), reg 8(1)(c), reg 10(4), cl 1, cl 62, Sch 2
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27
Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), s 3(1), s 3AC(1), s 3AC(2), s 3AC(3), s 3D, s17(1), s 18(1), s 19(2), s 20(3), s 32(1), s32(2), s 35(1)(b), s 35(1)(c), s 42(2), s42(8), s 53C, s 53C(2)(b), s 85, s 95, s 103F, Pt 2, Div 2, Sch 1, Sch 2
Result:
Application for review allowed
Summary of Tribunal's decision:
The applicants own Lot 1 on Survey-Strata Plan 30555. They seek the Strata Company's consent to effect alterations to the common property driveway (CP Lot 3) that is, in practical terms, only available for use by the other lot on SurveyStrata Plan 30555 (being Lot 2 which is owned the second respondent).
The proposed alterations to the common property form part of the applicants' plans to erect a new dwelling on Lot 1 which will be re-orientated to obtain pedestrian and vehicle access from CP Lot 3. So far as those plans relate to works on CP Lot 3 the consent of the Strata Company is required. On account of the second respondent's dissent, the Strata Company refused to allow the proposed alterations.
Section 85 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) allows a proprietor to apply to the Tribunal on the basis that a strata company has unreasonably refused to consent to alterations being made to common property. Whilst the Strata Company is the first respondent to these proceedings, it played no active role. The second respondent was the contradictor.
The question for the Tribunal was whether the Strata Company's failure to consent to the proposed alterations to the common property was, in all of the circumstances, unreasonable. Having regard to the range of concerns raised by the second respondent, which included both temporary and ongoing impacts that would arise if the alterations proceeded, the Tribunal found that the Strata Company's decision was unreasonable.
Ultimately, the Tribunal was persuaded that the proposed alterations to common property - which may be regarded as a joint asset of the proprietors - would have minimal impacts on the second respondent in an overall sense and would not result in any change to the function and operation of CP Lot 3. That is, CP Lot 3 would still be available for use as a driveway by the second respondent, his family and any visitors. The only ongoing consequence would be that the common property driveway would be available for use by the applicants. The Tribunal therefore intervened under s 85 of the ST Act on the basis that the Strata Company's refusal to consent to the proposed alterations was unreasonable.
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicants | : | Mr HH Jackson and Mr RA Payne |
| First Respondent | : | No appearance |
| Second Respondent | : | Mr CS Williams |
Solicitors:
| Applicants | : | Richard Payne & Associates |
| First Respondent | : | N/A |
| Second Respondent | : | Solomon Brothers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Bakker and City of Nedlands [2005] WASAT 106
Burns and The Owners of Observation Rise Strata Plan 24414 [2006] WASAT 17
Ethnic Interpreters and Translators Pty Ltd v Sabri-Matanagh [2015] WASCA 186
Falconer v Pederson [1974] VR 185
Gawor and The Owners of Dawesville Caravan Park Old Coast Road Mandurah, Strata Plan No 14644 [2009] WASAT 170
Glenbrook Nominees Pty Ltd and City of Perth [2009] WASAT 3; (2009) 61 SR (WA) 266
Hopkins and Clayton [2007] WASAT 255
Jeblon Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council (1982) 48 LGRA 113
Laffin and Renouf [2016] WASAT 48; 89 SR (WA) 296
Maber & Anor and The Owners of Strata Plan 11391 [2007] WASAT 99 (S)
Maber and The Owners of Strata Plan 11391 [2007] WASAT 99
Maludra Pty Ltd and The Owners of Windsor Towers Strata Plan 80 [2017] WASAT 112
Optus Mobile Pty Ltd v City of Swan [2017] WASC 251; (2017) 227 LGERA 368
Pacesetter Homes Pty Ltd v State Planning Commission (1993) 84 LGERA 71
Sisto and The Owners of Glenway Gardens Apartments [2005] WASAT 282
Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Jorgensen [2016] WASCA 77
The Match Group v Metropolitan South West Joint Development Assessment Panel [2014] WASCA 50; (2014) 200 LGERA 227
The Owners of Mandurah Terrace Apartments Strata Plan 17133 and Russell [2009] WASAT 1
Tipene v The Owners of Strata Plan 9485 [2015] WASC 30
Van Der Feltz v City of Stirling [2009] WASC 142; (2009) 167 LGERA 236
Wong v Reid [2016] WASC 59
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
The applicants (Mr Ashley Paterson and Ms Elizabeth Chester) propose to effect alterations to the common property of Survey-Strata Plan 30555 (the Strata Plan). In order to effect alterations to the common property, the applicants need the consent of the strata company named The Owners of 27 Purdom Road Wembley Downs Survey-Strata Plan 30555 (the Strata Company or first respondent). The Strata Plan comprises Lot 1, Lot 2 and a common property lot (CP Lot 3 or the common property).
The Strata Company did not consent to the applicants' proposal to effect alterations to the common property. The applicants have therefore applied to the Tribunal pursuant to s 85 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) to review the Strata Company's decision to refuse to consent to the proposal to effect alterations to the common property.
The applicants own Lot 1 (Certificate of Title Volume 2065 Folio 851) on the Strata Plan. On 4 July 2018 the City of Stirling (City) issued a planning approval allowing the existing dwelling on Lot 1 to be demolished and replaced with a two-storey dwelling (the Planning Approval).
At present, Lot 1 and Lot 2 (being Lot 2 - Certificate of Title Volume 2065 Folio 851) have separate vehicle and pedestrian access. The existing dwelling on Lot 1 has its own crossover to Purdom Road. Lot 2, which is a rear lot, can only be accessed via CP Lot 3. The Planning Approval, if implemented, will result in Lot 1's crossover being removed and vehicle and pedestrian access to the new dwelling will be via the common property.
The Planning Approval also includes proposed alterations to CP Lot 3 which is to be raised to meet the level of the new dwelling on Lot 1. Lot 2 will continue to obtain access via CP Lot 3. The applicants propose to meet the cost of the alterations to CP Lot 3.
At present CP Lot 3 is, in a practical sense, only available for use by Lot 2 which is owned by the second respondent (Mr Phillip Peter John Cole). This is primarily due to the difference in height between Lot 1 and CP Lot 3.
Despite being common property, CP Lot 3 looks and presents as if it were Lot 2's driveway. The second respondent has, to date, largely enjoyed informal exclusive use of CP Lot 3.
Having obtained the Planning Approval, it was pointed out to the applicants (by the second respondent) that to the extent that the proposed works related to CP Lot 3, the consent of the Strata Company was required. The Strata Company scheduled an extraordinary general meeting on 4 November 2018. At the meeting, the applicants sought the Strata Company's consent to effect alterations to the common property. Before the meeting, the second respondent also proposed a resolution granting Lot 2 exclusive use of CP Lot 3. On account of the second respondent's dissent, the first respondent did not pass the resolution allowing works to be effected to CP Lot 3.
The Strata Company's refusal to consent to the proposal alterations is the subject of these proceedings. While the Strata Company is the first respondent, it did not participate in the proceedings. The second respondent was the contradictor.
Statutory scheme
For the purposes of the ST Act a 'parcel' means the land comprised in a strata or survey-strata plan: s 3(1) of the ST Act.
A 'survey-strata scheme' is the manner of division of a parcel into lots or lots and common property under a survey-strata plan and the manner of the allocation of unit entitlements and the rights and obligations (as conferred or authorised by the ST Act), between themselves, of proprietors, others having proprietary interests in, or the occupants of the lots and the strata company: s 3(1) of the ST Act.
A 'two-lot scheme' means, relevantly, a survey-strata scheme in which there are not more than 2 lots, not including lots designated as common property lots: s 3(1) of the ST Act.
A 'single tier strata scheme' is a strata scheme in which no lot or part of a lot is above or below another lot: s 3(1) of the ST Act.
The common property of a survey-strata scheme is any 'lot or lots shown on a survey-strata plan to be common property': s 3(1) of the ST Act.
Upon the registration of a survey-strata plan the proprietors of lots constitute the strata company: s 32(1) of the ST Act. The strata company created under s 32(1) is a body corporate: s 32(2) of the ST Act.
One of the duties of a strata company is to control and manage the common property for the benefit of all the proprietors: s 35(1)(b) of the ST Act. The common property is to be kept in good and serviceable repair, be properly maintained and, where necessary, renewed and replaced: s 35(1)(c) of the ST Act.
Division 4 of Pt IV of the ST Act relates to insurance. Section 53C(1)(b) of the ST Act provides that for a single tier strata scheme a strata company is required to 'effect and maintain insurance' in relation to common property. However, a strata company may resolve that the requirement to insure common property is not to apply: s 53C(2)(b) of the ST Act.
There is, at times, no clear dividing line between works which are undertaken as part of the control and management of common property, and works which constitute improvements that go beyond mere control and maintenance: Sisto and The Owners of Glenway Gardens Apartments [2005] WASAT 282 at [25].
The ST Act does not contain any express provision which deals with alterations or modifications to common property. However, s 85 of the ST Act provides that a proprietor may apply to the Tribunal to review the refusal of a strata company to consent to a proposal by a proprietor to affect alterations to the common property on the basis that the strata company's decision was 'unreasonable'.
As was observed by Member Aitken (as he then was) in Laffin and Renouf [2016] WASAT 48; 89 SR (WA) 296 (Laffin) at [21], the ST Act is silent on the manner in which a strata company can give its consent for the purposes of s 85.
Division 2 of Pt II of the ST Act relates to common property. Common property is to be held by proprietors as tenants in common in shares proportional to their unit entitlements: s 17(1) of the ST Act.
Within Div 2 there are number of provisions that enable a strata company to deal with common property. By way of examples, s 18(1) allows for common property to be acquired, s 19(2) provides for the transfer or lease of common property and s 20(3) relates to the creation of easements and covenants on common property. In each instance, in the case of a twolot scheme, a unanimous resolution of the strata company is required.
Similarly, for a strata company for a two-lot scheme to make a by-law (or amend or repeal any by-law in effect) conferring exclusive use and enjoyment or, or special privileges in relation to, common property, the strata company's resolution must also be unanimous: s 42(8) of the ST Act.
Section 3AC(1) of the ST Act provides that a 'resolution without dissent' is a resolution passed at a duly convened meeting of the strata company at which no vote is cast against the resolution by a person entitled to vote. Voting requirements are set out in the by-laws contained in Sch 1 to the ST Act (read together with s 3D of the ST Act). A person entitled to vote is taken to vote against the resolution if they signify in writing that they disagree with the resolution within 28 days of the meeting: s 3AC(2) of the ST Act. The written record of the person's vote must then be served on the strata company or on the other proprietors: s 3AC(3) of the ST Act.
It is therefore clear (and it is not in contest) that in order for the applicants to be able to undertake the relevant works, the unanimous consent of the proprietors who constitute the Strata Company is required: Maber and The Owners of Strata Plan 11391 [2007] WASAT 99 at [29] and [30] (Judge Chaney); Wong v Reid [2016] WASC 59 at [22] (Beech J) and Laffin at [34]. If that consent is not forthcoming, the Tribunal can, on application, intervene under s 85 of the ST Act if it is satisfied that the strata company 'unreasonably' refused to provide that consent.
Strata by-laws
By s 42(2) of the ST Act the provisions of Sch 1 and Sch 2 to the ST Act are deemed to be the by-laws of the Strata Company. However, the bylaws may be amended, repealed or added to. The Strata Company's by-laws have been amended by instrument G255658 which was registered on 13 August 1996. The applicants' statement of issues, facts and contentions refers to a number of by-laws (including by-laws introduced by G255658).
A number of by-laws relate to use of the common property. I generally consider the by-laws to be of only limited relevance in these proceedings. Whilst I refer to some of the by-laws below, this is not a case relating to the unreasonable use of common property nor is it an argument that the by-laws have been breached. To the extent that the bylaws reinforce that common property is a common asset, and not the property of any individual proprietor, that point is noted and will be discussed later in these reasons.
However, there are three by-laws which I will note. The first is bylaw 3 of Sch 2 which relevantly provides that absent the approval of the Strata Company, a proprietor shall not use any portion of the common property for his own purposes as a garden. The second is by-law 16 of Sch 1 (introduced with G255658) which provides that the insurance premiums for the Strata Company are to be annual levies. The third is by-law 17 of Sch 1 (also introduced with G255658) which makes the proprietor of Lot 2 responsible for the repair, maintenance and upkeep of the common property driveway.
The Strata Plan was converted to a survey-strata scheme by application N809657 which was registered on 16 January 2018. The conversion to a survey-strata scheme did not amend the applicable by-laws.
The issues
The applicants submit that there are two issues that require resolution. The first is whether the proposal is one that will 'effect alterations to common property'. The second is whether the first respondent's refusal to consent to the proposal was 'unreasonable': s 85 of the ST Act.
The second respondent says there is but one issue. That issue is whether the second respondent's refusal was 'unreasonable'.
While ultimately nothing turns on this question, I agree with the applicants that there are two issues. In order for s 85 of the ST Act to be properly engaged there must either be a proposal to 'effect alterations' or to 'carry out repairs' to the common property. Whilst it does not appear to be a contested point, it is an issue that goes to jurisdiction and therefore, in my view, is a question that I must address.
If there is a proposal to, in this instance, effect alterations to CP Lot 3 then the next question is whether the second respondent's refusal to consent was unreasonable. That is the ultimate issue in these proceedings.
Therefore, these reasons will address the following issues:
1.Whether there is a proposal to effect alterations to CP Lot 3; and
2.Whether the second respondent's refusal to consent to those alterations was unreasonable.
The evidence
The applicants called three witnesses. These witnesses were a registered builder (Mr Andrew Cunnold), the building designer and draftsman (Mr Tomasz Trzcinski) and one of the applicants (Mr Paterson).
The second respondent gave evidence.
I have also had the benefit of a site view at the commencement of the hearing (although no evidence was taken during the site view).
The common property
The land that is the subject of the Strata Plan (being Lot 1, Lot 2 and CP Lot 3) slopes down from south to north and also from east to west. CP Lot 3 runs along the western boundary of the Strata Plan. In practical terms, CP Lot 3 is substantially lower than the existing dwelling on Lot 1.
The parties agree that CP Lot 3 is:
(a)26.67 metres long;
(b)for the first 17.49 metres (commencing from Purdom Road) is 2.99 metres wide;
(c)for the next 3.82 metres, is 5.49 metres wide;
(d)for the next 3.87 metres, is 6.35 metres wide; and
(e)7.39 metres wide as it meets Lot 2. CP Lot 3 truncates Lot 1 for the final 1.49 metres closest to Lot 2 to open up to an eventual width of 7.39 metres.
CP Lot 3 is brick-paved. It is apparent that some of the bricks on the western edge of CP Lot 3 have separated to some extent for a length of approximately 10 metres. The applicants say that this section of the driveway is inadequately retained and has 'failed'. The second respondent disputes this.
As CP Lot 3 widens towards Lot 2 there is a limestone wall (which forms part of the CP Lot 3). A garden bed has been placed in the area between the limestone wall and the boundary fence of Lot 1. There are plantings in the garden bed including, but not limited to, three olive trees. The applicants say the effect of the plantings in the garden bed is that CP Lot 3 Lot is partially obstructed. The second respondent does not agree but does note that the plantings were present when both the applicants and the second respondent purchased their respective lots.
The proposed works
Section 85 of the ST Act is only concerned with alterations to common property. Therefore, to the extent that the proposed alterations to common property are to be undertaken in conjunction with the proposed construction of a dwelling on Lot 1, the works on Lot 1 are not an issue before me. I am only concerned with the proposed alterations to CP Lot 3. I will discuss the Planning Approval below.
With respect to the proposed alterations to CP Lot 3, the Planning Approval shows that the finished floor level of the new garage will be RL 31.828. The finished floor level of the approved new dwelling will be RL 32.000. The portion of CP Lot 3 that is immediately adjacent to the garage (and proposed new entrance) to the approved dwelling on Lot 1 are substantially lower than RL 31.828. The Proposed Driveway Remediation and Upgrade Works 27 Purdom Road (Works Plan) (page 73 and 74 of the applicants' bundle, Exhibit 3) outlines that CP Lot 3 will need to be raised by up to 900 millimetres in this section in order to meet RL 31.828.
Moving from north to south (as one moves away from Purdom Road) the Works Plan identifies that the level of CP Lot 3 needs to be progressively raised. For example, closest to Purdom Road the level is proposed to be raised by 50 millimetres, then adjacent to the existing house on Lot 1 the level is to be raised 320 millimetres and then 480 millimetres.
In the portion where CP Lot 3 widens to 5.49 metres there are two sets of level changes shown on the Works Plan.
One set of level changes is on the eastern side where CP Lot 3 is to rise to meet to the level of the approved garage entrance (RL 31.828). There is another set of level changes shown on the western side. On the eastern side the levels are proposed to be raised between 900 millimetres and 340 millimetres in the portion where CP Lot 3 meets Lot 2. On the western side, the levels will be raised by 500 millimetres and 340 millimetres as CP Lot 3 meets Lot 2. The detailed level changes are shown on the Works Plan which is Attachment 1 of these reasons.
The applicants explain that the proposed alterations to CP Lot 3 will:
(a)allow, amongst other things, vehicular access from CP Lot 3 and the approved garage on Lot 1; and
(b)'create a suitable, gradual, slope [up] from Purdom Road'.
In order to effect the alterations, the garden bed and associated plantings will need to be removed.
The applicants also propose to widen part of the driveway to be used for access by up to 1 metre for approximately 21.3 metres. However, the applicants have provided no details as to how Lot 2 would have an entitlement to use a portion of a driveway that was located on Lot 1.
I will refer to the totality of these works to CP Lot 3 as the 'Proposal'.
Issue 1: Does the Proposal seek to effect alterations to the common property?
Issue 1 can be dealt with shortly.
It is not in contest that the Proposal is a proposal to effect alterations to the common property for the purposes of s 85 of the ST Act. Having regard to the extent of works proposed, I am also satisfied that the Proposal is a proposal to effect alterations to the common property for the purposes of s 85 of the ST Act.
The Planning Approval
I am mindful that the jurisdiction I am exercising arises under the ST Act. However, I find it necessary to make a few short comments about the Planning Approval granted by the City.
The Planning Approval relates to both Lot 1 and CP Lot 3. Indeed, the applicants' case is that the Proposal is needed in order to comply with the Planning Approval. That is because condition 2 of the Planning Approval requires the development 'to comply in all respects with the attached approved plans'. Conditions 3 and 4 specifically relate to works on the crossover and the driveway on CP Lot 3.
The applicants put forward an application for development approval that involved works on both Lot 1 as well as CP Lot 3. The approved plans necessitate changes to the level of CP Lot 3 by up 0.9 metres and include the following notation 'common drive to be widened and replaced'. Although the application for development approval was not in evidence, it is common ground that the second respondent did not consent to the making of the application for works on CP Lot 3.
The City issued the Planning Approval with an advice note that advised the applicants that the consent of co-owners of the common property may be required under the ST Act. My concern is that the requirement for consent of co-owners of the common property does not arise only under the ST Act.
Landowner consent to the making of a development application is a fundamental aspect of planning law: Pacesetter Homes Pty Ltd v State Planning Commission (1993) 84 LGERA 71 at 81 and 84-85; Glenbrook Nominees Pty Ltd and City of Perth [2009] WASAT 3; (2009) 61 SR (WA) 266 at [77].
Schedule 2 to the Planning and Development (Local Planning Scheme) Regulations 2015 (WA) (LPS Regulations) includes a set of provisions which are deemed to apply to all local planning schemes in Western Australia (the deemed provisions) including LPS 3.
Clause 62 of the deemed provisions sets out the requirements for the making of an application for development approval. Clause 62(1)(b) provides that the application form must be 'signed by the owner of the land on which the proposed development is to be located'.
In this instance one landowner (Lot 1) has put forward an application to inter alia undertake works on common property. The plain purpose of the application is to obtain approval for those works. On the making of the application for development approval, cl 62 of the deemed provisions is engaged and the requirement for landowner consent is triggered.
I should also add that there is no room for an argument that the works within CP Lot 3 do not constitute 'development' in a town planning sense. The approved plans show driveway works and condition 4 expressly relates to the driveway (CP Lot 3). Therefore, the Planning Approval by its terms includes and relates to CP Lot 3 as well as Lot 1.
The point being that CP Lot 3 is not owned solely by the applicants. In Jeblon Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council (1982) 48 LGRA 113 Cripps J, at 120, rejected an argument that an application relating to common property could be made by just one proprietor.
The granting of a development approval which purports to authorise works on common property is not without significance or consequence. It is not difficult to imagine that the granting of a development approval to undertake works on common property would be used as leverage in subsequent discussions with other proprietors of lots. A development approval might be taken by less informed proprietors of other lots to be a fait accompli that the proposed works in the common property are authorised and provide their subsequent consent accordingly.
In fact, that is what has happened here. Without being critical of the applicants, they have relied on the Planning Approval in their dealings with the second respondent and in support of arguments before me as to why the Proposal is necessary. The applicants have presented their case on the basis that the Proposal is a necessary part of - and is required to comply with - the Planning Approval. That argument is available to the applicants because the City granted the Planning Approval.
In the context of applications proposing works on what is common property, planning authorities need to be alert to the question of landowner consent for the purposes of the deemed provisions. It is no answer to simply avoid the issue by including an advice note advising of the requirements of the ST Act.
As I have said, my jurisdiction arises only under the ST Act. The Planning Approval is not before me. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and only has jurisdiction to deal with the reviewable decision that is before it: The Match Group v Metropolitan South West Joint Development Assessment Panel [2014] WASCA 50; (2014) 200 LGERA 227 (Pullin, Newnes and Murphy JJA).
Issue 2: Was the second respondent's refusal to consent to the Proposal unreasonable?
Relevant principles
In Maber & Anor and The Owners of Strata Plan 11391 [2007] WASAT 99 (S) (Maber) (Member Hawkins) the Tribunal noted, at [26], that:
There is no guidance under the ST Act as to what amounts to unreasonable refusal. All lot owners have a proprietary interest in common property as tenants in common. There is a requirement under s 35(1)(b) of the ST Act that common property be managed for the benefit of all proprietors. What amounts to unreasonable refusal will depend on the facts of each case. It must, however, be judged in its legislative context. In this case, the respondents' refusal must be judged against the legislative context that for a proprietor to succeed in having a by law passed to allow an alteration to common property under s 42(8) of the ST Act requires a resolution without dissent and therefore the level of support or dissent is a factor to be taken into account. Therefore, as long as the reasons for refusal by the respondent are cogent when judged in this context, this Tribunal should be slow to find there has been an unreasonable refusal.
Maber was a decision made pursuant to s 95 of the ST Act in relation to a refusal to pass a bylaw. Nevertheless, the analysis and commentary on the question of what is unreasonable is apposite to applications made under s 85 of the ST Act.
The Tribunal's decision in Hopkins and Clayton [2007] WASAT 255 (Hopkins) was a decision made pursuant to s 85 of the ST Act. In Hopkins (in the context of an application to erect a patio on common property) the Tribunal made the following observations at [28]-[32]:
28In considering the reasonableness of the refusal to approve Mr Hopkins' application, the Tribunal must take into account the interests of both parties. A balance has to be struck between the interests of Mr Clayton and the interests of Mr Hopkins. It is ideal for the interests to be harmonised but that is not always possible.
29The [ST Act] recognises that each proprietor has an undivided share, in proportion to his lot entitlement, in common property. Being an owner of common property, each proprietor is entitled to be involved in any decision affecting the common property.
30The involvement of owners in matters affecting common property can be affected through various means … [including] an application to alter common property (s 85 ST Act).
31Section 85 of the ST Act empowers the Tribunal to consider the reasons for refusal of the strata company and to determine whether such reasons were reasonable or not. The Tribunal must be slow to intervene in the way in which proprietors manage a strata company and make decisions regarding the use of common property. The strata company has autonomy to make decisions in a manner that it believes, serve the interests of the complex. At the same time, however, Parliament clothed the Tribunal with the power to consider the merit of decisions of a strata company when it comes to making alterations to common property, in order to protect an individual proprietor against the unreasonable refusal by a strata company.
32The ST Act does not define what is meant by ''unreasonable''. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary defines ''unreasonable'' as ''not agreeable to or willing to listen to reason'' and ''not based on or in accordance with reason or sound judgment''[.]
The decision of Burns and The Owners of Observation Rise Strata Plan 24414 [2006] WASAT 17 (Burns) related to a strata company's refusal to allow an air-conditioner to be installed on the balcony of an apartment (not common property). The application was therefore made under s 103F of the ST Act. The Tribunal found that the strata company's decision was unreasonable in that the overall impact of the placement of the unit would be far less intrusive than the 'unbearable heat and discomfort' that the applicant would experience: at [34].
The Tribunal found that it was 'completely reasonable for Ms Burns to be given approval to install an air-conditioner in an attempt to ameliorate the impact of the heat on the bedroom': at [35].
In Burns at [34], the Tribunal found that it must evaluate and balance the reasons for refusing consent against the justification for approval set out by the applicant.
In The Owners of Mandurah Terrace Apartments Strata Plan 17133 and Russell [2009] WASAT 1 (Senior Member Raymond) (Russell) the issue was, again, an air-conditioning unit on common property. The Tribunal made the following observations on the operation of s 85 of the ST Act:
59In dealing with whether or not a strata company has unreasonably refused to do that which it allegedly should have done, the Tribunal has consistently taken an approach that the management of a strata company is best left to the strata company and that the Tribunal should not too readily impose its own views of what is unreasonable. See, for example, Hopkins and Clayton [2007] WASAT 255. At the same time, the legislature has intended that there be a practicable means of breaking deadlocks between the members of a strata company who are co-owners of the common property, live often in close proximity, and who should desire to live in harmony with each other.
60The Tribunal has fulfilled that role in circumstances where resolutions proposed to a strata company have failed whether due to the dissent of a single lot owner, or of a majority of lot owners, by examining the rationale for dissent to ascertain whether there is a sensible basis for dissent. This necessarily means that the Tribunal is drawn into a balancing of interests and views and must inevitably reach a subjective view of whether the decision is unreasonable. If that balance is delicately poised it will not be possible to conclude that the decision is unreasonable. It is possible for persons acting reasonably to come to opposite conclusions on the same set of facts.
61In effect, this is to apply the ordinary dictionary definition of 'unreasonable'… It is not the standard of reasonableness required by what is known as Wednesbury unreasonableness as adopted in the administrative law governing proper exercise of governmental power: Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229. So it is not necessary that a decision be regarded as so unreasonable that no sensible lot owner or number of lot owners could have come to that conclusion.
Russell was cited with approval by the Tribunal in Maludra Pty Ltd and The Owners of Windsor Towers Strata Plan 80 [2017] WASAT 112 at [221] (Maludra). Maludra concerned, in part, a proposal to change windows on balconies to sliding doors.
In Gawor and The Owners of Dawesville Caravan Park Old Coast Road Mandurah, Strata Plan No 14644 [2009] WASAT 170 the Tribunal, at [69], made the following general observation of the limited role in which the Tribunal plays in relation to the management of strata companies.
The scope for intervention by the Tribunal in the day-to-day internal management decisions of a strata company and its council is, under the ST Act, generally quite specific; usually quite limited; and often only available as a last resort[.]
Parties' submissions
The submissions of both parties focused, unsurprisingly, on the second respondent's refusal to consent to the Proposal and the reasonableness or otherwise of that decision.
The applicants' submissions
The applicants' case centred on three propositions. The first is that the approved dwelling on Lot 1 is designed in accordance with sound principles and is consistent with relevant policy. The second is the fact of the Planning Approval. The third is that it is necessary for CP Lot 3 to be raised in order to carry out the Planning Approval.
The applicants raise two further issues. The first is that the existing driveway is inadequately retained. The second is that the Planning Approval requires the existing crossover to Lot 1, which will be made redundant if the Planning Approval is acted upon, to be removed.
The second respondent's submissions
The second respondent submits that he declined to consent to the Proposal because the associated works will cause both temporary and permanent impacts.
Temporary impacts
The temporary impacts involve the inconvenience that will arise at the time the Proposal is implemented. The applicants' builder (Mr Cunnold) considers that the period of disruption while the proposed driveway works are undertaken will be between five to ten days. During this time, vehicular access to Lot 2 will be disrupted and there may be times when arrangements need to be put in place to allow the second respondent's vehicles (or those visiting the second respondent) to be parked in front of Lot 1 (including overnight). A close family relative of the second respondent (and frequent visitor) relies of vehicle access as they have a 'leg disability' which prevents them from walking up and down CP Lot 3.
In his closing submissions, counsel for the second respondent, Mr CS Williams, described this temporary inconvenience as 'significant' when one considers the 'day-to-day realities of life' such as going to the shops with a young child through a building site and then returning with shopping. The disruption is beyond what might reasonably be expected in suburbia '[w]hen a neighbour builds, we can't access the street by car. That doesn't happen in the ordinary course in suburbia': ts 60, 2 April 2019.
The second respondent describes the applicants' offer to 'try and work with' him as nothing more than a 'motherhood statement of intent': ts 62, 2 April 2019.
Ongoing impacts
The second respondent submits that the Proposal will 'irreparably prejudice' the second respondent, his partner and visitors. The Proposal will involve increasing the height of CP Lot 3 as it slopes up to meet the new garage approved on Lot 1. This may cause both 'damage and inconvenience' to vehicles travelling on CP Lot 3 between Lot 2 and Purdom Road (and vice versa) as well as 'inconvenience to anyone walking over that boundary'. There was also a concern that the works may result in drainage issues in that water may pool on CP Lot 3 and drain back on to Lot 2 during periods of rain.
The second respondent is also concerned that the change in appearance of the driveway from the existing bricks (to a new concrete driveway) will result in an 'odd change in look' from CP Lot 3 to Lot 2.
Lot 1's proposed use of CP Lot 3 was also a concern for the second respondent. This is because the Proposal will result in the applicants being able to use CP Lot 3 in a manner that is not currently possible given the height difference between the two lots.
The second respondent also considers that the applicants' use of CP Lot 3 will be prejudicial to him, his partner, his daughter and visitors because it will result in increased traffic over the common property which will result in 'great inconveniences' where one or more than one vehicle is attempting to use CP Lot 3; decreased privacy; disturbance from headlights as vehicles turn into the garage on Lot 1 at night; and fewer opportunities to enjoy their entitlement to use CP Lot 3, for example, by allowing the second respondent's young daughter to ride her bike safely up and down the (common property) driveway.
The second respondent also points to the prejudice that will arise on account of by-law 17 which makes the owner of Lot 2 'responsible for the repair, maintenance and upkeep of the driveway'.
The second respondent also submits that the Proposal will result in a significant reduction in Lot 2's value arising from the 'loss of amenity that would be occasioned' by works associated with the Proposal.
Not surprisingly, the second respondent also made submissions as to the weight that can be given to the Planning Approval and any implication that may be inferred that the City's approval should be construed as an endorsement of the design of the proposed dwelling on Lot 1. Mr Williams submitted that all that the Planning Approval means is that the applicants' proposed design was given an 'affirmative answer' by the City: ts 66, 2 April 2019.
There were also submissions as to whether the existing crossover to Lot 1 was, in reality, a 'redundant crossover' as that term is understood in the context of the City's policy. The crossover will only become redundant because of the design proposed by the applicants: ts 67, 2 April 2019.
The loss of the garden bed is a further concern. The second respondent gave evidence that he liked the garden bed and trees (in that they provided a level of amenity) and did not want them removed.
The second respondent was also concerned that the Proposal may impact on Lot 2's letterbox. However, this issue was not pressed during oral submissions at the final hearing.
Mr Williams also made the following closing submissions which appear to me to lie at the heart of this case:
Now, we don't shy away from the fact that the second respondent has a very clear preference that the driveway allow vehicular access only to Lot 2 and not provide one single line vehicular access to both lots. I don't think anybody has been left in any doubt that that's the second respondent's position. There seems to be a great forensic effort to winkle out the various communications and other documents that that's actually what's on the second respondent's mind. It's been put very squarely before, after, and during these proceedings, that that's where the second respondent's thinking is, and the reasons for that have been articulated.
(ts 69, 2 April 2019)
What this second respondent has been faced with is a very significant change to the status quo. [Being a] material physical alteration to the common property to allow it to be used in a way which [physically] it is incapable of now.
(ts 70, 2 April 2019)
This is a very significant alteration to the common property. This is a very significant alteration to the status quo. It is there for the advantage of the applicants so that they can redevelop Lot 1 in a particular manner which they are not compelled to do but they desire to do. They want to put a swimming pool where the driveway is. That's their desire, and so be it, but the reason why a development is being proposed that sees vehicular access via the common property is because that's what the Applicants want … and it is something that will impose by temporary inconveniences a long term detriment upon the second respondent.
(ts 71, 2 April 2019)
Analysis and disposition
This proceeding arises in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction: Laffin at [21]-[33]; see also Corboy J's analysis in Tipene v The Owners of Strata Plan 9485 [2015] WASC 30 at [138] and [139]. The hearing is de novo and the purpose of the review is to make the correct and preferable decision: s 27 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).
I commence my analysis by noting the comments of Member Hawkins (as her Honour then was) in Maber where she stated at [30] that:
The common property must be managed for the benefit of all proprietors. This is a good governance provision. It requires a balancing of interests to assess whether the applicants' proposal in the context of the scheme is for the benefit of all.
I am also mindful of and agree with the analysis of (then) Senior Member Raymond in Russell in that what in effect I am required to do, in the context of an application involving common property is to resolve an impasse between the co-owners of CP Lot 3 by reviewing the basis of the second respondent's dissent. If I find that the second respondent's position is reasonable, then I should not intervene. In other words if, in the end, I find this is a matter over which reasonable minds may differ, I should uphold the Strata Company's decision.
I also agree with Russell (at [60]) that the exercise under s 85 of the ST Act necessarily means that I must undertake an assessment that balances the interests and views of each proprietor and reach my own view of whether the decision the subject of the review is 'unreasonable' for the purpose of s 85 of the ST Act.
In making a decision pursuant to s 85, the ST Act is to be read and construed in accordance with the ordinary principles of construction: Ethnic Interpreters and Translators Pty Ltd v Sabri-Matanagh [2015] WASCA 186 at [63]-[65] (Buss JA, Mitchell J and Newnes AJA); Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Jorgensen [2016] WASCA 77 at [95] (Buss P, Murphy JA and Mitchell JA).
The general rule is that words in a statute must be taken to have been used in their ordinary sense: Van Der Feltz v City of Stirling [2009] WASC 142; (2009) 167 LGERA 236 at [90] (Murphy J). Dictionaries may assist in ascertaining the commonly accepted meaning of words. However, it remains important 'to interpret the phrase as used in its context, assisted as it may be, but not necessarily bound by, one of a variety of dictionary definitions': Optus Mobile Pty Ltd v City of Swan [2017] WASC 251; (2017) 227 LGERA 368 at [39] (Banks-Smith J); Falconer v Pederson [1974] VR 185 at 187 (Anderson J).
Consistent with Russell (at [61]) I find that the word 'unreasonable' in s 85 takes its ordinary and plain meaning. It is common ground that the second respondent's decision does not need to be legally 'unreasonable' (in the sense outlined in the seminal case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229) before I can intervene.
The Australian Oxford Dictionary (2nd Edition) Oxford University Press, Melbourne (2004) (AOD) defines the adjective 'unreasonable' to mean:
1. 'going beyond the limits of what is reasonable or equitable'. 2. 'not guided by or listening to reason' (page 1415).
The AOD defines 'reasonable' to mean:
1. 'having sound judgement …'. 2. 'in accordance with reason; not absurd' (page 1075).
The question of what is unreasonable decision or otherwise, for the purposes of s 85 of the ST Act, will depend on the circumstances of each case. That is particularly so in the context of the ST Act which governs and regulates a wide range of strata developments; from very large complexes with multiple strata titles (and many owners) being located within the same building (or multiple buildings) through to two-lot survey strata schemes which look and appear as separate fee simple lots. The question of what is unreasonable in any given context is impossible to reduce to a set of rigid principles.
In the context of the ST Act, in evaluating the position of the second respondent, if I find that if his position is one which entails 'sound judgment' in the circumstances then it is a decision that I will not disturb. Likewise, as I indicated above at [96], if it is simply a matter over which reasonable minds may differ, I will uphold that decision. However, if I find that the second respondent's position '[goes] beyond the limits of what is reasonable' then I should intervene pursuant to s 85 of the ST Act.
For the following reasons, I have concluded that the second respondent's decision to refuse to consent to the Proposal was, in all of the circumstances, 'unreasonable' and that I should intervene pursuant to s 85 of the ST Act. However, before I set out the basis on which I have reached the view that the second respondent's decision is unreasonable, I will first explain that there are some aspects of the applicants' case with which I do not agree.
Aspects of the applicants' case which I do not accept
I do not accept that applicants' argument that the Proposal is a necessary incident of the Planning Approval and therefore in order to comply with the approval conditions, the works are necessary. The Planning Approval is not the basis of, nor justification for, the Proposal. The Proposal as a consequence of the applicants' design for a new dwelling on Lot 1 which seeks to utilise CP Lot 3 and the City has approved the design put forward for approval by the applicants.
The applicants' submissions to the effect that there is some requirement to undertake the Proposal arising from the Planning Approval is something of a gloss. In reality, the applicants want to undertake the Proposal because it will enable them to construct the dwelling that they put forward and which the City ultimately approved. In resolving this matter, I am not persuaded that there is an imperative to undertake the Proposal arising from the fact of the Planning Approval. The Planning Approval relates to a design chosen by the applicants.
I also do not accept the applicants' argument that the existing driveway has 'failed'. The driveway might be said to be showing signs of fatigue and wear but it is not 'failing' in the sense that there is any current need for the driveway to be fixed. To the extent that the applicants' case implied that the Proposal is needed to due to the current state of the driveway, I do not agree.
However, notwithstanding that I do not accept those elements of the applicants' submissions, I have reached the view that the second respondent's decision not to consent to the Proposal is unreasonable and should be set aside. My reasons follow.
Temporary inconvenience
I accept that there will be temporary disruptions occasioned on the second respondent, his family and visitors by the Proposal. These disruptions will occur while the proposed driveway works are undertaken and that period - in an overall sense - will be for between five to ten days. During that time, there will be noise, dust, vibration and other issues associated with the works. There will be periods when vehicle access will not be available to the dwelling on Lot 2 via the driveway and arrangements will need to be made for the parking of vehicles during that period. Mr Cunnold's evidence - which was not challenged or contradicted - was that at no time will pedestrian access to Lot 2 be cut-off: ts 33, 2 April 2019.
I find the various concerns raised by the second respondent - insofar as they relate to temporary inconvenience - to be largely trivial in nature. That is not to say that there will not be inconvenience to the second respondent and his family arising from the Proposal. It is plainly the case that there will be. However, at some point in the life of the Strata Plan, works will be required on the driveway and that will necessarily result in some inconvenience to the second respondent.
Occasional inconvenience caused by close neighbours is an incident of urban living. The fact that the proposed works relate to, in part, common property on a strata plan, should not give an adjoining neighbour an effective veto power that unreasonably prevents another neighbour from pursuing improvements of their property.
I therefore find that the second respondent's reasons for resisting the Proposal based on temporary inconvenience are 'unreasonable'.
Ongoing impacts
The overall effect of the Proposal is to change the levels of CP Lot 3 so as to enable it to be utilised by Lot 1 (as well to continue to be used by Lot 2). I note that the Proposal will result in CP Lot 3 performing the same role that it currently does. That is, CP Lot 3 will continue to enable pedestrians and vehicles to access and egress from Lot 2 to Purdom Road (and vice versa). I accept the submissions of Mr HH Jackson, counsel for the applicants, that properly supervised, children should still be able to use the driveway to play and to ride a bicycle on CP Lot 3.
All that will change is that the access way will be shared between Lot 1 and Lot 2. There will be changes to the height and gradient of CP Lot 3 but these changes do not impact Lot 2. The level of CP Lot 3 as it meets the boundary of Lot 2 will be unaltered.
Whilst the second respondent questioned Mr Cunnold about the levels and the prospect of some pooling of water near the boundary to Lot 2, I accept Mr Cunnold's evidence that what are shown on the plans are spot levels and that the driveway will be constructed with a 'comfortable slope' that will meet the garage level of the proposed dwelling on Lot 1 and the existing level at the boundary of Lot 2: ts 31, 2 April 2019. I am satisfied that there will be no pooling of water on CP Lot 3 (and back on to Lot 2).
On the question of the garden bed and trees on CP Lot 3, I agree that these are pleasant and contribute to the amenity of Lot 2. The garden bed existed when both the current proprietors of Lot 1 and Lot 2 purchased their lots. However that fact is neither here nor there. The garden bed is located on a thin strip of land between the existing retaining wall on CP Lot 3 and the boundary fence to Lot 1. It is a clever use of what might be described as an incidental space.
I do not consider that the existence of that garden bed and the associated plantings are of such significance that they should be determinative of this matter. The fact is that while the garden bed will need to be removed, it does not mean the plantings need to be lost. For example, it may be possible to relocate the olive trees to either Lot 1 or Lot 2 (or even located on CP Lot 3 if an appropriate location can be agreed). The point being that the amenity that these plants provide may not need to be completely lost.
In relation to the changes to the appearance of the driveway, I find that the changes in colour and finish anticipated by the Proposal will have minimal effect on how the dwelling on Lot 2 will be perceived from Purdom Road.
At page 47 of the applicants' bundle (Exhibit 3) there is photograph which shows the existing driveway as viewed from the road reserve (but not the road surface) on Purdom Road. That photograph (and others) shows the bricks of the driveway and a brown wooden fence on Lot 2. However, as the driveway rises to meet Lot 2 the bricks become more difficult to see due to the change in levels. The impact on how Lot 2 will be viewed from the public realm will be absolutely minimal.
However, while it will not be visible from the public realm, I do accept that there will be a change in materiality and finish between the bricks around the curtilage of Lot 2 and the new driveway. While there will be a change in the colour and finish of the driveway between CP Lot 3 and Lot 2, I do not regard those changes as significant. It is not necessary, in my view, for CP Lot 3 to exactly match the finish of the paved curtilage of Lot 2.
I note here that the second respondent accepted in evidence that he himself has expressed a desire to upgrade the driveway to an aggregate finish: ts 49, 2 April 2019. Furthermore, there were some initial discussions between the parties that the works on the driveway (CP Lot 3) would be held in abeyance to a 'mutually acceptable time': ts 49, 2 April 2019. Those discussions, it seems, have since stalled.
I therefore do not regard it as particularly significant that the applicants have decided to press on and seek to undertake works to the driveway at a time convenient to them and at their cost.
I do not regard the potential issue of vehicle headlights shining into Lot 2 to be a significant issue. If that truly turns out to be an issue there are options. Curtains on windows or even polite discussions between the owners may help.
The second respondent's concerns about impacts on his property value are speculative and are not supportive by any evidence. I give no weight to those concerns.
The central issue
That brings me to the issue which I consider lies at the heart of this case. When everything else is stripped back, the Proposal is an attempt by the applicants to alter CP Lot 3 so that they have capacity to use the common property which is part of the Strata Plan in the same way that Lot 2 does.
It is true that the current height differential between Lot 1 and CP Lot 3 makes it difficult for Lot 1 to be able to use the common property. That is why the applicants are seeking to pay for the alterations to CP Lot 3 so as to enable it to be available for their use. That is entirely reasonable. However, it is not the reasonableness of the applicants that is the question before me. The question before me is whether the refusal by the second respondent to consent to those alterations was 'unreasonable'.
The second respondent's closing submissions reveal the basis for his dissent:
Now, we don't shy away from the fact that the second respondent has a very clear preference that the driveway allow vehicular access only to lot 2 and not provide one single line vehicular access to both lots.
The second respondent's position - as was articulated by his counsel - is that because he currently has, in a de facto sense, exclusive use of CP Lot 3 any proposal to affect alterations to allow the applicants to be able to use the common property will be 'prejudicial' to him.
I do understand the basis for the second respondent's position. He currently has an arrangement that allows him exclusive use of common property. He currently enjoys an advantage in that the joint property of the Strata Plan can only be really be utilised by him. He wants to protect that advantage. That is entirely understandable. However, whilst understandable, I do not consider it to be reasonable.
I find that the second respondent's refusal to agree to the alterations is unreasonable when one considers the nature of common property.
The starting point is that CP Lot 3 is not owned by the second respondent. To the extent that CP3 may be regarded as an asset - it is not solely his asset. It is an asset that he shares with Lot 1. That is not an insignificant point. CP Lot 3 is an asset for Lot 1 and the applicants have the same rights to use and enjoy CP Lot 3 as the second respondent.
As a single tier strata scheme, it is also the case that CP Lot 3 is an asset that the applicants are jointly responsible to insure under s 53C of the ST Act (there is no evidence before me of a strata company resolution under s 53C(2)(b) not to insure the common property). Bylaw 16 of Sch 1 requires that insurance premiums of the Strata Company be paid as annual levies.
It is also relevant that the applicants do not seek to change the functionality of CP Lot 3 by way of the alterations that comprise the Proposal. As I have stated, CP Lot 3 will continue to perform its current function of providing access and egress. The only difference will be that Lot 1 will also have access to, and be able to utilise, CP Lot 3.
If the effect of the alterations would be to cause any tangible or significant adverse impact on the second respondent, I would not intervene under s 85 of the ST Act. It is also the case that if the applicants required the second respondent to contribute to the cost of the Proposal, a decision to refuse to agree to such alterations under such circumstances would not be unreasonable.
However, the changes to the heights and slope of CP Lot 3 that comprise the Proposal could not be said, in any tangible way, to be prejudicial to the second respondent. As I have outlined, the alterations will also not change the functionality of CP Lot 3 in any way. For completeness, I also note that a change in the status quo does not, of itself, amount to prejudice to the second respondent.
Finally, even though I am not bound by previous Tribunal decisions (see for example Bakker and City of Nedlands [2005] WASAT 106 at [25]-[26]), I should set out that I do not take Member Hawkins' comments at [30] in Maber to mean that the Tribunal should only intervene (in this instance) under s 85 of the ST Act where proposed alterations to common property could be said to benefit all proprietors. Taken in the context of the reasoning in Maber as a whole, Member Hawkins was, in my view, simply reiterating that common property is a joint asset and that good governance demands that it be managed for the benefit of all proprietors.
I consider that it is appropriate for the Tribunal to intervene under s 85 of the ST Act where it can be demonstrated that while proposed alterations may not be said to benefit all proprietors, the alterations do not, in any meaningful way, prejudice any proprietors. In my view, that is the case here.
Ultimately, the second respondent opposes the Proposal on the basis that he does not want the applicants to be able to use CP Lot 3. Overall, given the nature of common property, I find that position to be unreasonable and I therefore intervene under s 85 of the ST Act.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, I note that if the Proposal is implemented, by-law 17 (which makes Lot 2 solely responsible for the repair, maintenance and upkeep of the driveway) may need to be reviewed by the Strata Company. As I have also explained at [49] of these reasons, if the proposed driveway is to be widened, the applicants should take steps to formalise those arrangements. That again is a matter for the Strata Company to consider.
Orders
1.The application for review is allowed.
2.The consent of the first respondent to effect the alterations to the common property shown on The Proposed Driveway Remediation & Upgrade Works, 27 Purdom Road, Wembley Downs (shown at pages 73 and 74 of the applicants' bundle (Exhibit 3) and attached to these reasons) is hereby provided.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MR S WILLEY, MEMBER
27 JUNE 2019
Attachment 1 Proposed Driveway Remediation & Upgrade Works, 27 Purdom Road, Wembley Downs
3
17
4