FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Paszkiewicz v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 390
File number: VID 481 of 2018 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 22 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where visa cancelled on character grounds – where a delegate of the Minister decided to refuse to revoke the cancellation decision – where the Tribunal affirmed the non-revocation decision – whether the Tribunal failed to respond to a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476A, 499, 500, 501, 501CA Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593
Buadromo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1592
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389
Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116
Date of hearing: 1 November 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 44 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms GA Costello Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 481 of 2018 BETWEEN: BARTLOMIEJ PASZKIEWICZ
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
4.In the absence of any agreement:
(a)within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);
(b)within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and
(c)in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOSHINSKY J:
The applicant has applied for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) not to revoke a cancellation of the applicant’s visa on…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 390
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider several claims and pieces of evidence, which he contended would have affected the decision. These included the impact on his minor children, his relationship with his aunt, and the hardship it would cause his mother. The applicant asserted that these omissions constituted a failure to provide procedural fairness and a failure to carry out the statutory task. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was legally sound and whether it appropriately considered the relevant arguments and evidence.
The court examined the principles established in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, which hold that a failure to address a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying on established facts can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the primary considerations set out in Direction 65, particularly the protection of the Australian community and the best interests of minor children. The court found that the Tribunal adequately addressed the applicant’s claims and evidence, and that the decision was consistent with the statutory requirements. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
4. In the absence of any agreement:
(a) within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);
(b) within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and
(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The material before the Court on the hearing of the application comprised a Court Book and an affidavit of Patrick O’Connor, the solicitor for the applicant, annexing the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal.Consideration The applicant contends, in each of his three grounds, that the Tribunal failed to take into account a claim or evidence and thereby failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness or failed to carry out the required statutory task. The applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to take into account the following claims or evidence (setting these out in the order addressed in oral submissions):(a)in relation to the best interests of the applicant’s minor children:(i)a contention that the applicant would be better able to provide financial support for the children if he remained in Australia (and evidence relating to this contention); and(ii)a contention that the children would not be able to have any contact with the applicant’s extended family if the cancellation decision were not revoked (and evidence relating to this contention);(b)in relation to the strength, nature and duration of the applicant’s ties in Australia, the applicant’s relationship with his aunt; and(c)a contention that the applicant’s departure from Australia would have a harsh impact on his mother. The statutory scheme applicable to the decision of the Tribunal included, in particular, ss 501 and 501CA of the Migration Act. The applicant’s visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) on the basis that he had a substantial criminal record. No issue arises in relation to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa under that provision. Section 501CA deals with revocation of a decision to cancel a person’s visa under s 501(3A). Section 501CA(3) provides that, as soon as practicable after making the cancellation decision, the Minister must: (a) give the person a written notice that sets out the cancellation decision and particulars of the “relevant information” (an expression defined in s 501CA(2)); and (b) invite the person to make representations to the Minister, within the period and in the manner ascertained in accordance with the regulations, about revocation of the cancellation decision. Section 501CA(4) provides that the Minister may revoke the cancellation decision if: (a) the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and (b) the Minister is satisfied that the person passes the character test or “that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked”. In the present case, a delegate of the Minister (rather than the Minister personally) made the decision under s 501CA(4) not to revoke the cancellation decision. Accordingly, it was open to the applicant to apply to the Tribunal for review of the non-revocation decision: see s 500(1)(ba). In conducting the review of the non-revocation decision, the Tribunal was required to comply with Direction 65: see s 499(2A). The applicant relies on the principles discussed in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 and NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 (NABE (No 2)). In NABE (No 2), the Full Court of this Court said, at [55], that where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on “a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” (quoting Dranichnikov at [24]), that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. The Full Court stated that the constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction may be seen as a failure to carry out the review required by the Act. (See also NABE (No 2) at [58], [61] and [63]). The principle discussed in Dranichnikov and NABE (No 2) has been applied in the context of s 501CA(4): see Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116 at [17], [25] and [30] per Rangiah J with whom Reeves J generally agreed (at [3]). I accept that the principle is applicable to the review conducted by the Tribunal in the present case. I did not understand counsel for the respondent to contest this.