Paskins v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd (No 2)

The case of Paskins v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) involved the plaintiff, who successfully sued for injuries sustained in the course of his employment. The defendants were the employer, Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd, and a third party who was ultimately held responsible for the injuries. The primary dispute centred around the apportionment of liability between the defendants and the assessment of damages. Additionally, the plaintiff sought an order for costs against the second defendant, encompassing not only the costs incurred in pursuing the second defendant but also those incurred in pursuing the first defendant, arguing that this would circumvent the effect of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).

The legal issues before the court included whether the plaintiff could obtain an order for costs against the second defendant that would cover the costs incurred in pursuing the first defendant and whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover costs from the second defendant for an application that was partially successful. The court had to consider the general principle that costs follow the event, as well as the specific statutory constraints imposed by the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld). Moreover, the court examined whether the fees of two counsel engaged by the plaintiff should be regarded as necessary and proper costs.

In its reasoning, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against both defendants, with specific amounts awarded to the plaintiff. The second defendant was ordered to indemnify the first defendant against the plaintiff’s claim and to pay the plaintiff’s costs on a standard basis. However, the court ruled that there would be no order as to costs between the plaintiff and the first defendant due to the statutory constraints. The second defendant was also required to indemnify the first defendant for costs incurred in defence of the plaintiff’s claim and in respect of claims for contribution and indemnity between the defendants. Finally, the court allowed the fees of two counsel to be regarded as necessary and proper costs, limited to fees for trial, otherwise to be in the discretion of the assessor.