Partington (aka Bande) & Cade (Extension of time)
[2009] FamCAFC 78
•15 May 2009
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| PARTINGTON (AKA BANDE) & CADE (EXTENSION OF TIME) | [2009] FamCAFC 78 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – Where Applicant Mother sought an extension of time in which to file an appeal against the refusal of a stay of the trial Judge’s orders pending the outcome of her appeal – Whether strict compliance with the rules would work an injustice – Where Appellant Mother failed to comply with Court orders – Where nothing to suggest substantive appeal not brought bona fide – Where grounds of proposed stay appeal not entirely without merit – Where some explanation for delay – Where prejudice to Respondent Father not substantial as substantive appeal to be adjourned – Application granted FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – ADJOURNMENT – Where Appellant Mother sought adjournment of appeal against parenting orders – Where pending Application for the Court to provide transcript at its cost – Where Appellant Mother only recently engaged counsel – Where nothing to suggest appeal not brought bona fide – Application granted – Substantive appeal adjourned FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – PROVISION OF TRANSCRIPT – Where Appellant Mother sought the Court provide the transcript of the trial at its cost – Where the Rules require the Appellant to provide transcript – Whether transcript necessary to prosecution of appeal – Whether Appellant unable to afford transcript – Application adjourned – Order that the Appellant Mother be provided with an audio recording of the trial so that she can determine which parts of the transcript, if any, are necessary to prosecute the appeal FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS – Where Applicant Mother sought the appeals be heard in Sydney rather than Melbourne – Where Applicant Mother currently living with children on the South Coast of New South Wales – Where Applicant Mother’s counsel in Sydney – Where Respondent Father and ICL participate in appeals by video to Melbourne – No substantial prejudice to Respondent Father and ICL to hearing appeals in Sydney rather than Melbourne – Application granted FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Costs reserved to the hearing of the appeals |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 94 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 1.14, r 22.02, r 22.03, r 22.11 |
| Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 Joshua & Joshua (1997) FLC 92-767 McMahon & McMahon (1976) FLC 90-038 Tormsen & Tormsen (1993) FLC 92-392 |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Partington (aka Bande) |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Cade |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Mollross |
| FILE NUMBER: | HBF | 1989 | of | 2004 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | SA | 100 | of | 2008 |
| SA | 38 | of | 2009 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 15 May 2009 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Bryant CJ, Warnick & Boland JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 5 May 2009 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 31 October 2008 9 December 2009 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2008] FamCA 945 [2008] FamCA 1203 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: | Ms Goodchild |
| ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Cade appeared in person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Turnbull |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ogilvie Jennings |
Orders made 5 May 2009
The time in which the wife may appeal the refusal by the Honourable Justice Benjamin on 9 December 2008 to grant a stay of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Burr on 31 October 2008 be extended to 4.00pm on 8 May 2009.
The wife be granted leave to amend the grounds of appeal in relation to the orders of the Honourable Justice Burr made 31 October 2008, such amended grounds to be filed and served on the other parties on or before 22 May 2009.
The appeal against the refusal by the Honourable Justice Benjamin to grant a stay and the substantive appeal against the orders of the Honourable Justice Burr be listed during the June sittings of the Full Court at Sydney on a date to be notified to the parties by the Appeal Registrar as soon as practicable.
If the appellant wife wishes to apply to the Court for the Court to provide to the parties any relevant transcript at its expense then she must as soon as practicable, upon provision to her of the CD-ROM file of the transcript and no later than 22 May 2009 file and serve upon the respondent husband and the independent children’s lawyer an Application and an Affidavit setting out:
(a)passages of the proceedings she wishes to have transcribed by reference to the date and time of the evidence;
(b)an explanation of the relevance of each passage of evidence to particular grounds of appeal;
(c)the reasons why the Court should provide the transcript, including the issue of whether the wife has the financial capacity to meet the cost of the transcript.
Upon an Application being filed in accordance with paragraph 4, it is to be listed before the Honourable Justice Boland for determination, or if her Honour is unavailable, it is to be listed before another member of the Appeal Division.
All questions of costs be reserved.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Partington (aka Bande) & Cade (Extension of Time) is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
Appeal Number: SA 100 of 2008; SA 38 of 2009
File Number: HBF 1989 of 2004
| Ms Partington (aka Bande) |
Appellant
And
| Mr Cade |
Respondent
And
Ms Mollross
Independent children’s lawyer
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
After a six day trial, Burr J made orders refusing to allow Ms Bande (formerly Partington) (“the mother”) to relocate the home of her two daughters then aged nine and seven years respectively from Tasmania to B, a small town located approximately 140 kms from Sydney on the south coast of New South Wales. The children’s father, Mr Cade, (“the father”) had opposed the relocation. The trial Judge found that the children spending unsupervised time with the father would expose them to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse. His Honour also found that the children had a close emotional attachment to their father, and as it was in their best interests to maintain that relationship, that they spend supervised time with him. The mother filed an appeal against the trial Judge’s orders as well as a number of applications in the appeal. The appeal and the applications were listed before us for hearing on 5 May 2008.
In her applications the mother sought, inter alia, orders that:
·the substantive appeal be adjourned, and the venue for the appeal be changed from Melbourne to Sydney;
·the Court provide, at its cost, the transcript of the proceedings before the trial Judge; and
·the time for filing an appeal against orders made by Benjamin J refusing to stay the trial Judge’s orders be extended, and that stay appeal be heard in Sydney.
The father opposed all of the mother’s applications, and sought that we should proceed to hear and determine the appeal against the trial Judge’s orders.
At the trial the independent children’s lawyer (“the ICL”) appointed for the children F and C had supported the mother’s application to relocate from Tasmania. The ICL did not oppose the mother’s application for an adjournment, nor did counsel for the ICL proffer any substantial opposition to the mother’s application to extend time in which to appeal the stay judgment.
We made orders granting an extension of time in which the mother may file an appeal against the stay judgment, made orders concerning the transcript application, and listed the mother’s appeal (and the stay appeal when filed) in the June sittings of the Court to be held in Sydney. These are our reasons for those orders.
Background
It aids understanding of our reasons if we provide some brief historical material which we have extracted from the trial Judge’s reasons.
The father, who was aged 32 years at the date of the trial, was living in Tasmania. The mother, also aged 32 years at the date of the trial, had moved from Tasmania and was living in B on the South Coast of NSW.
The parties commenced cohabitation in 1995. At that time they were both engaged in tertiary studies in Wollongong, NSW. They moved to Tasmania in 1999, but returned to Wollongong later that year.
The parties’ elder child, F, was born in December 1999 and their younger child, C, was born in April 2001. The parties married in Wollongong in September 2000.
In 2001 the parties again moved to Tasmania where they purchased a house at D.
In 2002 the father commenced full time employment as a telesales consultant.
In 2003 the parties purchased a property in L, Tasmania and later that year purchased an adjoining block of land on which they subsequently built a house with the assistance of Mr Bande.
The mother asserted separation occurred in December 2004. At that time the mother moved to Sydney with the children and lived with her sister. The father asserted separation occurred in April 2005. The parties divorced in February 2007.
Following the issue of a recovery order in January 2005 the mother returned with the children to L. Subsequently, in February 2005, orders were made for the children to spend time with the father each alternate week and in the other week overnight on Thursday evenings.
The mother asserted in July 2005 the child F made disclosures of sexual abuse by the father. The mother took F to be examined by a doctor and a report was made to the relevant state child welfare department. On 28 July 2005 the child was interviewed by the police. A second interview took place in December 2005.
In August 2005 the orders for the father to spend time with the children were suspended, and in lieu an order was made for telephone communication and supervised time at the Hobart Children’s Contact Service (“the CCS”).
In 2005 the mother commenced a relationship with Mr Bande and they were married in March 2007. They have one child, Z, who was born in March 2008.
In January 2006 criminal charges were laid against the father arising from the alleged sexual abuse of F. These charges were withdrawn in December 2006.
In December 2006 the mother and the children moved from Tasmania to B on the South Coast of NSW and the children commenced attending B Public School in January 2007.
In February 2007, the mother was ordered by the Court to return to Tasmania on or before 7 March 2007 and she travelled to Hobart on 5 March 2007, but returned to New South Wales later that month.
The mother’s interim application to relocate from Tasmania to New South Wales was heard in July 2007 and dismissed. She returned from New South Wales with the children for the hearing.
During the proceedings orders were made for an expert report to be prepared by Dr R Adler and also for the preparation of a family report.
In November 2007 the father consented to the mother taking the children to New South Wales for a holiday. The mother did not return to Tasmania on 26 January 2008 as agreed, and she remained living in New South Wales at the commencement of the hearing before the trial Judge in April 2008. On 14 May 2008 the trial Judge made orders permitting the children to live with the mother in B pending determination of the proceedings.
The trial Judge published his reasons for judgment and made orders on 31 October 2008. Pursuant to the orders the mother’s application to relocate with the children to New South Wales was refused, and the mother was ordered, at her expense, to return with the children to Hobart no later than 28 December 2008. His Honour’s orders provide, in broad terms, that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, and that they live with her. The orders further provide for supervised contact at the Wollongong Children’s Contact Centre until the mother’s return to Tasmania, and on their return to Tasmania, the father is to spend time with the children at the CCS each alternate weekend for a period of six months, and thereafter spend supervised time with the children outside the CCS. The supervised “outside” time is to be reviewed and a further report prepared by Dr Alder or another expert to ascertain whether the time the father is to spend with the children should become unsupervised.
On 9 December 2008 Benjamin J heard and determined the mother’s application for a stay of the trial Judge’s orders. His Honour refused to stay the trial Judge’s orders. No appeal from this order was filed by the mother in the time provided by the rules from this order. At the time the stay application was determined the mother had filed a Notice of Appeal against the trial Judge’s orders, but had not served the Notice on the father or the ICL. No copy of the Notice of Appeal was provided by the mother to Benjamin J at the stay application.
At the date of the hearing before us the mother had not complied with the trial Judge’s orders, and a contempt application had been filed by the father. The contempt proceedings were listed for hearing in Hobart before Benjamin J on 11 May 2009.
Relevant statute law and rules
Section 94 of the Act provides for appeals to the Family Court from courts other than the Federal Magistrates Court. Section 94(1A) provides as follows:
An appeal under subsection (1) or (1AA) shall be instituted within the time prescribed by the standard Rules of Court or within such further time as is allowed in accordance with the standard Rules of Court.
Sections 94(2D), (2E) and (2F) are also relevant. They provide:
(2D) Applications of a procedural nature, including applications:
(a)for an extension of time within which to institute an appeal under subsection (1) or (1AA); or
…
may be heard and determined by a Judge of the Appeal Division or other Judge if there is no Judge of the Appeal Division available, or by a Full Court of the Family Court.
(2E)The standard Rules of Court may make provision enabling applications of a kind mentioned in subsection (2D) to be dealt with, subject to conditions prescribed by the standard Rules of Court, without an oral hearing.
(2F)No appeal lies under this section from an order or decision made under subsection (2B) or (2D).
Chapter 22 of the Family Law Rules 2004 deals with appeals.
Rule 22.02 sets out how an appeal is to be commenced, namely by filing a Notice of Appeal.
Rule 22.03 provides that a Notice of Appeal must be filed within 28 days after the order appealed from is made. Rule 22.11 provides that the filing of an appeal does not operate as a stay of the operation or enforcement of the order in respect of which the appeal is filed.
Rule 1.14 deals with shortening or extending of time. It provides as follows:
(1) A party may apply to the court to shorten or extend a time that is fixed under these Rules or by a procedural order.
(2) A party may make an application under subrule (1) for an order extending a time to be made even though the time fixed by the rule or order has passed.
(3) A party who makes an application under subrule (1) for an extension of time may be ordered to pay any other party’s costs in relation to the application.
Relevant legal principles – application for leave to appeal out of time
The relevant principles to be applied by a trial Judge in deciding whether it is appropriate to extend time for lodging an appeal are set out in Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479. The granting of leave is not automatic but involves the exercise of discretion. The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the Court to do justice between the parties. In determining whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the leave.
The exercise of discretion also involves an assessment of prospects of a successful appeal.
The principles which relate to an application for an extension of time in which to institute an appeal have been referred to in a number of cases in this Court, including McMahon & McMahon (1976) FLC 90-038 at 75,144, Tormsen & Tormsen (1993) FLC 92-392 at 80,017 and Joshua & Joshua (1997) FLC 92-767.
Evidence in this application
The mother relied on three affidavits in support of her application for an extension of time:
(i)the mother’s affidavit filed 28 April 2009 (being her affidavit filed in support of the application);
(ii)the mother’s affidavit sworn 24 April 2009 (being an affidavit relied on in the contempt proceedings); and
(iii)the mother’s affidavit filed 30 April 2009.
We pause to note here that no proposed grounds of appeal in respect of the stay appeal were annexed to any of the mother’s affidavits. The mother’s counsel orally articulated the proposed grounds as follows:
·Benjamin J fell into error in relying on findings of the trial Judge that the mother had failed to act responsibly as a parent in that she had failed to comply with orders of the Court (it was submitted that in her appeal against the substantive judgment the mother has asserted that the trial Judge placed excessive weight on the mother’s failure to comply with orders in the circumstances of the case);
·Benjamin J erred in the exercise of his discretion in not giving weight to the effect on the children of the refusal of the stay – namely that they would be required to leave B where they were well settled and had resided for approximately the last twelve months and return to Tasmania with a possibility of a return to B if the mother’s appeal was successful;
·the application for a stay was made without reference to the mother’s grounds of appeal against the trial Judge’s orders; and
·the finding that the mother’s appeal was not brought bona fide was not supported by the evidence.
In her affidavit sworn in support of the application the mother deposed that she did not file an appeal against the stay judgment “because I did not think it would be heard in time” (paragraph 6) and because she did not have legal representation. She said she had not had legal representation since 31 October 2008 and was not able to afford such representation.
In the same affidavit the mother referred to outstanding costs from the proceedings before the trial Judge of $75,000.00, and her attempts to obtain pro bono or other legal assistance. She deposed to her current counsel, Ms Goodchild, acting for her from April 2009 after arrangements had been put in place by a community legal centre. The mother also deposed to meeting Ms Goodchild on 20 April 2009 and receiving advice from her.
We received without objection a copy of the mother’s affidavit sworn 24 April 2009 and relied upon in the contempt proceedings. In that affidavit, the mother asserted Mr Bande had been unable to obtain employment in Tasmania. She annexed correspondence addressed to Mr Bande by councils and other prospective employers in response to his employment applications. She further deposed to searching for rental properties in Tasmania, and various alleged shortcomings with the L property which she asserted rendered it unsuitable for occupation by herself and the children. The mother also annexed quotations she had obtained for removal of her furniture and household effects to Tasmania, and the costs of transportation for the family’s two cars and a trailer on the Spirit of Tasmania. The mother asserted that she and Mr Bande could not afford the costs associated with moving to Tasmania. She further asserted that without employment she and Mr Bande would be unable to support themselves and the children in Tasmania.
At paragraph 14 of her affidavit, the mother deposed to taking the children on one occasion to the Children’s Contact Centre operated by Centacare at Wollongong for the purpose of supervised contact to the father and said that although the children were presented by her at the Centre, members of the contact centre staff returned the children to her after about 15 to 20 minutes. She asserted the children did not want to see the father.
In her affidavit filed 30 April 2009, the mother deposed to residing with her husband Mr Bande, their child aged 14 months (whom she is breastfeeding) and the children of the marriage on the south coast of New South Wales. She deposed to her stepson residing with the family on most weekends.
The mother asserted that from December 2006 until the trial Judge’s orders she remained living in New South Wales and that she travelled to Tasmania on several occasions “to attend Court and provide contact for the father with the children” (paragraph 3). Mr Bande did not generally accompany her to Tasmania.
The mother further deposed that :
· on 28 November 2008 she filed a Notice of Appeal against the trial Judge’s orders;
· on 28 November 2008 she filed an application seeking a transfer of the proceedings to New South Wales;
· on 4 December 2008 she filed an application for a stay of the trial Judge’s orders pending the hearing of the appeal. This application was heard and determined by Benjamin J on 9 December 2008;
· on 5 December 2008 she filed an amended Notice of Appeal;
· on 18 December 2008 in accordance with directions made by the Appeal Registrar she filed a pre-argument statement;
· on 20 January 2009 the mother requested that the procedural hearing fixed for 4 February 2009 be adjourned, and that she was told it was unnecessary for her to attend;
· on 16 February 2009 the mother was advised by the Appeal Registrar that the date for filing the appeal book was 27 March 2009;
· on 13 March 2009 the mother filed an application in which she sought an order that the Court provide the transcript of the proceedings before the trial Judge free of charge. The mother was subsequently advised to assist the Court with this application she should file her appeal book save for the inclusion of transcript. Subsequently the mother was advised by the Appeal Registrar that her applications and the appeal were listed for 5 May 2009. The mother subsequently filed her appeal book;
· she had not complied with orders to return the children to Tasmania by no later than 28 December 2008, that on 13 January 2009 the father filed an application seeking, inter alia, an order for the return of the children to Tasmania, but on 28 January 2009 he filed an amended application “deleting the order seeking the children be returned to Tasmania” (paragraph 34);
· on 9 February 2009 the ICL wrote to the mother and enclosed a copy of a contempt application filed by the father together with an affidavit in support. She deposed she had not been served with the original application. The letter advised the mother the matter was before the Court on 10 February 2009. The mother emailed the Hobart Registry and advised she was unable to attend;
· on 17 February 2009 she received a letter from the ICL advising she was required to attend Court at Parramatta on 17 February 2009. Later than afternoon the mother was arrested pursuant to a warrant, charged and bailed to appear before the Court at Parramatta on 17 March 2009;
· that she entered into Consent Orders on 25 March 2009 (no details of the orders are provided by the mother);
· that the contempt proceedings were listed before the Court in Tasmania on 28 April 2008 “and that I and Ms Goodchild [the mother’s counsel] were ordered to appear in person in Hobart”. She said she was unable to travel to Hobart and Ms Goodchild arranged for counsel to appear on her behalf. The Court ordered that the mother appear in person on 11 May 2009 and if she failed to appear a warrant issue for her arrest.
Discussion
Will strict compliance with the rules work an injustice on the applicant?
We considered when making the order to extend time the crucial question which required our consideration was whether refusal of the application would work an injustice. In arriving at our determination to extend time we considered the following matters.
(a) History of the proceedings
We took into account the history of the proceedings. In particular we considered insofar as the mother’s appeal against the substantive orders was concerned that the mother had prosecuted that appeal diligently – although not legally represented she had prepared and filed her appeal books, (albeit without the provision of transcript).
(b) The conduct of the parties
The failure of the mother to comply with Court orders was of significant concern to us, and was a substantial factor we took into account adverse to the mother in the exercise of our discretion. However we were aware that the contempt proceedings instituted by the father had not been finalised, and the mother had material on which she intended to rely to demonstrate reasonable excuse.
(c) The nature of the litigation
The proceedings before the Court in the substantive proceedings involved issues relating to sexual abuse of the elder child. The trial Judge has determined there is an unacceptable risk of abuse of the children if their time with the father is not supervised. There was nothing which led us to consider that the mother’s appeal against the substantive orders was brought on other than a proper basis and was bona fide.
Unfortunately, the trial Judge who had the greatest familiarity with the matter was not reasonably available, and in those circumstances Benjamin J in hearing the stay application was placed in a difficult position. His Honour, very properly, placed significant weight on the reasons for judgment of the trial Judge. His Honour was hampered in his consideration of the stay application because the mother, who was self represented, had not provided him with a copy of her Notice of Appeal.
(d) Consequence for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time
We considered that absent an extension of time the mother would be deprived of an opportunity to challenge the refusal of a stay of the trial Judge’s orders pending the hearing of her appeal.
We also took into account the prejudice which may be occasioned to the father by the extension of time. We were satisfied that the prejudice to the father was not substantial as it was necessary for the substantive appeal to be adjourned to afford the mother the opportunity to listen to the CD-ROM of the proceedings, and if necessary, to make application to the Court for provision of parts of the transcript to properly and efficiently conduct her appeal. We also provided in our orders that the stay appeal would be heard at the same time as the substantive appeal.
(e) The prospects of success of the appeal
We gave significant weight to the proposed grounds of appeal as orally explained to us by the mother’s counsel. Whilst we could not determine the likely success or otherwise of the stay appeal, we were satisfied, having regard to Benjamin J’s reasons, that the grounds were not entirely without merit.
(f) Can hardship or injustice to the respondent be compensated by an order for costs
In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the Court when dealing with an application to extend time to place quite significant weight on this factor. This however was not such a case. The father was unrepresented and was not prejudiced by costs thrown away by the adjournment. The substantive appeal could not proceed on 5 May 2009 absent the determination of the mother’s applications which we have summarised above, all of which were brought promptly after the filing of the appeal.
(g) Delay by the mother and explanation for the delay
We accept the mother did not have the benefit of legal representation until shortly prior to the hearing before us. That, we considered, could not of itself be determinative of the application. We accept that the mother gave some explanation for the delay including her concern that a stay appeal could not be heard and determined before January 2009.
Conclusions – extension of time
In Gallo v Dawson (supra) McHugh J noted at 480:
The grant of an extension of time under this rule is not automatic. The object of the rule is to ensure that those Rules which fix times for doing acts do not become instruments of injustice. The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the court or justice to do justice between the parties…
We determined to grant the application for the extension of time to challenge the refusal of the stay essentially because we considered that the mother’s proposed grounds of appeal were not entirely hopeless, and the prejudice she would suffer if the extension was refused outweighed any prejudice likely to be suffered by the father. We also took into account the mother should be afforded the opportunity to agitate before the Court her arguments directed to the adverse impact the refusal of the stay could have on the children.
HEARING THE APPEALS IN THE SYDNEY SITTINGS
The mother sought that the appeals should be heard in Sydney rather than Melbourne. She has now obtained legal representation from a member of the Sydney Bar. The father and the ICL would have participated by video from Hobart if the appeal venue remained as Melbourne, and not surprisingly they did not object to participating by video between Hobart and Sydney. It was likely the matter could be accommodated in the June sittings scheduled for Sydney – thus affording the parties a slightly earlier hearing date than the next Melbourne sittings. We accordingly made orders for the appeals to be heard in Sydney.
TRANSCIPT
No objection was raised by the mother’s counsel to the direction we proposed, namely that the Court would provide a CD-ROM to the mother of the sound recording of the trial. In the event that the mother (or her counsel) determined that parts of the transcript were relevant to prosecute her substantive appeal, then application could be made before Boland J, or if she is not reasonably available, another member of the appeal division, for the provision of such transcript as may be found by the Court to be essential to the prosecution of the appeal. The Court providing such transcript will however be dependent upon the mother satisfying the Court that she lacks the financial capacity to procure the transcript, and that the transcript identified is necessary for her to be able to agitate a ground or grounds of her appeal.
COSTS
We determined that it was premature to consider the issue of costs of the mother’s applications, and reserved costs to the hearing of the appeals.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court
Associate:
Date: 15 May 2009