Parsons v Police - [2008] SASC 339

Supreme Court of South Australia
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
PARSONS v POLICE
[2008] SASC 339
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Sulan (ex tempore)
20 November 2008
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION RECORDED ON PLEA OF GUILTY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - DANGEROUS DRIVING
Appeal against conviction and sentence - appellant pleaded guilty in Magistrates Court to two counts of driving whilst disqualified and one count of aggravated dangerous driving to escape police pursuit - factor of aggravation that appellant disqualified from driving at time of police pursuit - appellant sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment - whether plea of guilty to aggravated dangerous driving to escape police pursuit is a bar to conviction for driving whilst disqualified.
Held: Where the offence of driving whilst disqualified is alleged as an aggravating factor in offence of dangerous driving to escape police pursuit autrefois convict prevents conviction for that offence - conviction for driving whilst disqualified set aside - appellant re-sentenced.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 18A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AC; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 91; Road Traffic Act 1961 s 45, referred to.
Arthur v Police [2008] SASC 213, applied.
R v Cameron (2002) 209 CLR 339; R v Carr (2008) 101 SASR 13; R v Harris; R v Simmonds (1992) 59 SASR 300; R v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442; R v Slater (1984) 36 SASR 524; Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656, discussed.

PARSONS v POLICE
[2008] SASC 339
Magistrates Appeal

SULAN J: This is an appeal against sentence. The defendant was charged with three separate sets of offences committed in 2007.
On 18 January 2007 the defendant drove a motor vehicle whilst he was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence contrary to s 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA). The penalty for that offence includes a licence disqualification for two years. He also drove an unregistered and uninsured vehicle.
He pleaded guilty to those offences at the Christies Beach Magistrates Court on 15 June 2007. The matter was transferred to the Adelaide Magistrates Court. On 15 March 2007 the defendant drove a vehicle whilst he was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence. He also drove a motor vehicle in a culpably negligent manner or recklessly or at a speed dangerous to the public while attempting to escape police pursuit, contrary to s19AC of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
The maximum penalty for that offence is five years imprisonment or disqualification for a minimum period of two years because the offence was an aggravated offence. That matter was transferred to the Adelaide Magistrates Court. On 3 September 2007 he pleaded guilty to those offences.
In the case of Arthur v Police [2008] SASC 213, the appellant had been charged with driving without due care contrary to s45 of the Road Traffic Act1961 (SA) and driving a motor vehicle on a road whilst there was present in his blood a concentration of .08 grams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.
The offence of driving without due care in Arthur was aggravated by the appellant having driven whilst there was an excess of alcohol in his blood. A further circumstance of aggravation which had not been alleged, as such, was that the appellant drove while his licence was suspended. Gray J noted at [10] as follows:
The Solicitor-General acknowledged that there was substance to the latter complaints and accepted that the convictions on counts two and three should be set aside. At the same time counsel for the defendant agreed that the respondent should be granted leave to amend count one to include a further circumstance of aggravation - that the defendant drove while his licence was suspended. In these circumstances it was accepted by both parties that this Court should allow the appeal, set aside the convictions on the second and third counts, set aside the sentence imposed on the first count and re-sentence the defendant on that count and in so doing should have regard to further evidence tendered on the appeal’.
His Honour further said at [39]:
The Solictor-General further accepted that in cases where an aggravated due care offence is aggravated by blood alcohol (meaning that the blood alcohol concentration is .08 grams of alcohol or more in 100 millilitres of blood), and the offender has been charged with a separate excess blood alcohol offence which is a category 2 or 3 offence committed as part of the same course of events, the elements of the offence separately charged are necessarily wholly included within the aggravated due care offence. In these circumstances it was correctly acknowledged that a plea of autrefois convict is available in the present case in relation to the excess blood alcohol offence separately charged.
In the present case, as the circumstance of aggravation was that the defendant was driving whilst disqualified, the magistrate should not have accepted the plea of driving whilst disqualified on 15 March 2007.
That was not a ground of appeal when the matter was initially argued before me. I invited counsel for the defendant to amend the grounds of appeal to include an appeal against conviction as to that count of driving whilst under suspension. I adjourned the matter for counsel to obtain instructions and for counsel for the respondent to consider the matter.
Today I granted permission to the defendant to amend the grounds of appeal to add a ground that the defendant appeals against the conviction imposed in relation to the charge of driving whilst disqualified on 15 March 2007, on the basis that the plea to aggravated dangerous driving raises a plea in bar to the charge of driving while disqualified.
I will deal with the original grounds of appeal later in these reasons.
The offence of driving whilst disqualified is subsumed into the offence of aggravated dangerous driving. I therefore allow the appeal on that count and set aside that conviction.
The defendant has also pleaded guilty to a number of offences of breaching bail which occurred between 2 July 2007 and 16 June 2008 whilst he was on the drug court program. He was accepted into that program on 3 September 2007. On 16 June 2008 his participation in that program was terminated because he had failed to comply with the conditions of the program. He pleaded guilty to the offences of breach of bail on 15 August 2008 and he was sentenced in the Adelaide Magistrates Court for all the offences on 22 August 2008.
As to the offence of dangerous driving to escape police pursuit, contrary to s19AC of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act, the maximum penalty for an aggravated offence is imprisonment for five years.
As to the offence of driving an unregistered and uninsured motor vehicle, the maximum penalty is $2500 and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of not more than 12 months.
In the case of driving an unregistered motor vehicle, the maximum penalty is twice the registration fee or $750 whichever is the greater and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of not more than 12 months.
It follows that as a result of the error that has been identified and the fact that the magistrate imposed one sentence in respect of the two charges of driving while disqualified and the count of aggravated dangerous driving, the sentence must be set aside. I am required to re-sentence the defendant.
In re-sentencing the defendant, it is convenient to deal with a number of other grounds of appeal.
The grounds of appeal are:
1.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to have adequate regard to the time the appellant spent in custody.
2.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to have adequate regard to the time the appellant spent on Home Detention Bail.
3.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to give an adequate reduction as a result of the appellant’s guilty plea.
4.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to have adequate regard to the appellant’s rehabilitation.
5.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to have adequate regard to the appellant’s progress in reducing his consumption of Amphetamines.
6.The learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to suspend the sentence of imprisonment.
7.The sentence is manifestly excessive.
The Magistrate, having referred to the defendant having commenced on the drug court program, noted that he had been released on home detention bail but that he had breached the conditions of his bail in that on occasions he was found to have a positive alcohol reading. On other occasions he left the premises. He also cut the electronic bracelet from his wrist.
It is agreed that there were four significant breaches of bail which are the subject of charges to which the defendant had pleaded guilty and been sentenced. There were also 43 occasions upon which the defendant left the premises, returning late, or left without a leave pass, in contravention of his bail conditions. He is not to be sentenced for those breaches. Nevertheless, they form part of the background of the defendant’s conduct. As to breach of bail offences to which the defendant pleaded guilty, the Magistrate recorded a conviction without penalty. The defendant does not appeal those orders.
It is accepted that the defendant found the conditions of the drug program difficult to comply with and his participation in that program was terminated on 16 June 2008.
The defendant had served seven months in custody prior to sentence and he spent approximately seven months on home detention bail. He has now served a further three months in custody since being sentenced by the Magistrate.
The Magistrate imposed one sentence pursuant to s18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) in respect of the offences of driving whilst disqualified and dangerous driving. She reduced the sentence by seven months to take account of time spent in custody and allowed a discount of one month for the defendant’s early plea of guilty. She gave no credit to the defendant for periods he had spent on home detention.
There appears to be doubt about whether the Magistrate dealt with the offences of driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle, however, the endorsement on the file suggests that she convicted the defendant of those offences without imposing an additional penalty. In granting a reduction of one month on a sentence of 18 months imprisonment the magistrate therefore allowed approximately a six per cent reduction on account of the plea of guilty.
It is convenient to set out the history of the offending and the events which led to the defendant appearing before the Magistrate on 22 August 2008 when he was sentenced.
On 18 January 2007 the defendant was observed by police officers driving a vehicle on Main South Road Morphett Vale. The vehicle was unregistered and uninsured. When the police stopped the vehicle they ascertained that the defendant had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence on 29 March 2006 for three years. The defendant was charged with offences of driving whilst disqualified and driving an unregistered and an uninsured vehicle.
On 15 March 2007 at about 9.50 pm the defendant was observed by police on Elizabeth Road at Morphett Vale driving a motor vehicle. Police attempted to stop the vehicle by activating the dome lights. The defendant drove away at speeds estimated at greater than 100 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. The vehicle was observed driving on the incorrect side of the road around a roundabout. Police pursued the vehicle which eventually stopped. The defendant decamped but was caught by police about 200 metres from where he abandoned the vehicle. At the time he was unlicensed.
He was charged with driving a motor vehicle whilst disqualified and driving a vehicle in a manner dangerous to the pubic, an offence which is aggravated by him having been disqualified from driving. I note that that offence was committed some two months after he had been stopped and charged with the offence of driving whilst disqualified.
I have dealt with the appeal against conviction in respect of the offence of driving whilst disqualified on 15 March 2007.
On 15 June 2007 the defendant pleaded guilty in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court to the offences committed on 18 January and he was remanded to the Adelaide Magistrates Court. No plea was taken in respect of the offences committed on 15 March 2007.
He appeared in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 3 September 2007 when he pleaded guilty to the offences committed on 15 March 2007. He was referred to the drug court program. At the time he had spent some time in custody.
On 15 April, when on home detention bail, he removed his bracelet without permission, he having been bailed on 30 March 2007. He voluntarily handed himself into the police on 5 June 2007.
Whilst on the drug program the defendant struggled to comply with the conditions imposed. On 28 November 2007 he entered into a bail agreement, a condition of which required him not to consume alcohol or drugs and obey the directions of his drug court program supervisor. On 23 January 2008 he tested positive to an alcotest. Again on 2 February 2008 he tested positive to an alcotest.
On 3 February 2008 he left home without permission and he was away from the premises for approximately 12 hours. On 13 February 2008 he was again bailed.
On 28 March 2008 he again returned a positive alcotest.
The appellant had issues during his time on the program. He cut off his bracelet on at least two occasions, he tested positive for cannabis on four occasions, positive for amphetamines on four occasions, positive to opiates on three occasions and positive to morphine on one occasion. His counsel submitted that that was because he was taking the morphine for pain relief. He also damaged property at Anglicare. He was terminated finally from the program on 16 June 2008.
The matter was listed before the Magistrate on 22 August 2008 when he was sentenced.
The defendant has numerous previous traffic convictions commencing in 1996 when he was convicted of driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle.
In 1997 he was twice convicted of driving whilst disqualified. The following year he drove without due care. In 2003 he was convicted of dangerous driving and driving under disqualification. In 2004 he was convicted of driving whilst disqualified. In 2006 he was again convicted of driving at a speed dangerous to the public. His licence was disqualified for three years on 29 March 2006.
The defendant was examined by a neuropsychologist, Mr John Bell, who reported that there is no evidence of significant brain injury. His intellectual functioning was within the average range. It was noted that the defendant had a significant drug problem.
In sentencing the defendant the Magistrate referred to the circumstances of the offending. She noted that the defendant had been disqualified from driving until 28 March 2009. She referred to him having participated in the drug program. She referred to Mr Bell’s report and noted that the defendant had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Syndrome. She referred to the offending. She referred to the maximum penalty of five years for driving in a manner dangerous to the public and two years for driving whilst disqualified. She referred to the seriousness of the driving offence and that it placed other road users in danger.
The Magistrate then said:
A period of imprisonment of 18 months would be appropriate for the two charges of driving disqualified and driving in a manner dangerous to the public. I note you have spent seven months in custody and I would reduce the period of 18 months imprisonment to a period of 11 months imprisonment allowing for time in custody. I must then turn to the question of your guilty pleas. I note the circumstances in each case when you were apprehended. You have pleaded guilty to the charges but to a large extent given you were caught red-handed and there was really not much you could argue about. However I reduce the period of 11 months imprisonment to 10 months allowing for your guilty plea. As regards your disqualification, you must be further disqualified by the court. The minimum period of disqualification would be two years. Allowing for your history in particular with regard to driving matters you will be disqualified from driving for a period of five years. I consider you are a significant danger not only to yourself but to members of the public and a penalty should be imposed which attempts to keep you off the road for as long as possible. You have therefore got 10 months imprisonment to serve from now and a disqualification period of five months. As to the breaches of bail, you will be convicted without further penalty.
I can only endorse her Honour’s remarks in respect of keeping the defendant off the road.
Grounds 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal are that the learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to have adequate regard to the time the appellant spent in custody and erred in failing to have adequate regard to the time the appellant spent on home detention.
The defendant spent approximately seven months and three weeks in custody. He also spent approximately seven months on home detention bail. The Magistrate had regard to the period he had spent in custody.
The defendant complains that she failed to give him credit for the total time spent in custody and that she should have given him credit for the period he spent on home detention bail.
In R v Carr (2008) 101 SASR 13 at [34], Anderson J, with whom the Chief Justice and Bleby J agreed, observed:
Although it is a matter of discretion as to whether a judge will take into account time spent in home detention, if a judge does take that into account, then when there is a long period of home detention, as in this case, it is desirable in my view for the judge to give some indication of how that period has been taken into account in arriving at the sentence. This is particularly important where home detention conditions are only likely to have been imposed because of the serious charges, which, in the end are not proceeded with.
The learned Magistrate has made no reference to why she chose not to give any consideration to time spent on home detention when imposing the sentence.
It is understandable why she may have given the defendant no credit for time spent on home detention bail. Much of the time was spent when the defendant was on the drug program. He breached the conditions on numerous occasions and it may well be that in those circumstances little credit ought to have been given for the periods he spent on home detention bail. Nevertheless, it would have been preferable if the Magistrate had indicated why she gave no credit for time spent on home detention bail. I consider that some, albeit a small amount of credit, should be given.
Ground 3 is that the learned sentencing Magistrate erred in failing to give an adequate reduction as a result of the appellant’s guilty plea. The Magistrate appears to have dealt with time in custody before determining what reduction should be applied for the plea of guilty.
The total head sentence is the appropriate period from which to make a deduction for a plea. In this case that sentence was 18 months imprisonment. The Magistrate gave a one month reduction which, as I have said, is about a six per cent reduction. The Magistrate seems to have determined that a small reduction was justified because the defendant was caught red-handed.

The period of reduction for a plea of guilty has been the subject of discussion in numerous cases.
In the case of R v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442, at 451, King CJ said:
The conditions under which justice is administered change and the emphasis to be placed upon the various purposes to be achieved in shaping sentences changes accordingly. There are features of the current conditions which emphasise the need for practical encouragement for guilty persons to admit their guilt. Legal aid for as many as possible of those charged with serious offences should be a high social priority, and, indeed, it is not too much to say that its availability to persons having a genuine defence to criminal charges is indispensable to the proper administration of justice. The consequences of the general availability of legal aid must, however, be recognized and coped with. It must be recognised that guilty persons can put forward false stories and be defended without cost to themselves. The result is the depletion of funds available for legal aid and congestion and delay in the criminal courts. It is not, generally speaking, for the solicitor assigned or the legal aid authority to judge the truth of the assisted person’s story, and it is only in the exceptional case that it can be proper to refuse or discontinue assistance because of the strength of the prosecution’s case. If a plea of guilty, as distinct from remorse evidenced by such a plea, cannot be regarded as a factor in mitigation of penalty, there is no incentive, other than the demands of honesty, for an offender to admit his guilt, and experience indicates that the demands of honesty have but little influence on many of those who appear in the docks of criminal courts. In most cases, if the offender has nothing to gain by admitting his guilt, he will see no reason for doing so. I am impressed by the strong practical reasons for recognising a willingness to co-operate in the administration of justice by pleading guilty as conduct possessing a degree of merit, quite apart from remorse, which can be taken into account in assessing the sentence.
In R v Slater (1984) 36 SASR 524, at 525-526, King CJ agreed that people who confirm their guilt are entitled, generally speaking, to substantial credit for their plea. He observed:
The consideration as to the strength of the case is pertinent rather to the significance of the plea of guilty as an indication of a desire to turn over a new leaf than to the policy considerations relating to overcoming congestion and delay.
King CJ did regard policy consideration of the length of criminal lists as a factor to which the court will have regard. He said at 526:
I think that it is important, if the practical ends discussed in Shannon are to be served, that sentencing judges should make significant reductions in sentences in recognition of the co-operation in the administration of justice which the plea of guilty manifests and should explain that they are doing so. I think that it is important, too, that the reduction should be graduated according to the stage at which the plea of guilty is entered and should thereby reflect the degree of co-operation in the administration of justice which the offender has shown.
In Rv Harris and Simmonds, (1992) 59 SASR 300 he returned to the subject. He said at 302:
It is very important, I think also, that the extent of the discount which is given on this account should be made clear by the sentencing judge. This Court of Criminal Appeal has said on earlier occasions in relation to the discount for a plea of guilty, that it not only ought to be given, but that the judge should indicate so far as possible, and wherever possible, the extent of the discount which he is making for the plea of guilty. If the discount given for a plea of guilty is to operate as a real incentive for guilty persons to plead guilty, it is necessary that they, and their advisors, have a clear idea of the sort of discount which will be made on that account.
The rationale for reducing a sentence on account of a plea of guilty has been discussed in the High Court in Cameron v The Queen, (2002) 259 CLR 339, Gaudron, Callinan and Gummow JJ said at [11]:
It is well established that the fact that an accused person has pleaded guilty is a matter properly to be taken into account in mitigation of his or her sentence.
In Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656, the Court said at [22]:
… a plea of guilty is ordinarily to be taken into account in mitigation; first, because it is usually evidence of some remorse on the part of the offender, and second, on the pragmatic ground that the community is spared the expense of a contested trial.
The extent of the mitigation may vary depending on the circumstances of the case. It should at once be noted that remorse is not necessarily the only subjective matter revealed by a plea of guilty. A plea may also indicate acceptance of responsibility, and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice. Although a plea of guilty may be taken into account in mitigation, a convicted person must not be penalised for having insisted on his other her rights to trial.
In Cameron, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ said at [12]:
The distinction between allowing a reduction for a plea of guilty and not penalising a convicted person for not pleading guilty is not without its subtleties, but it is, nonetheless, a real distinction, albeit one the rationale for which may need some refinement in expression if the distinction is to be seen as non-discriminatory.
The amount of the discount for a plea of guilty is within the discretion of the sentencing judge. The factors to which a court will have regard include when the plea was entered, whether the defendant has assisted in the administration of justice by pleading at an early stage and to what degree the plea of guilty exhibits true contrition, whether the defendant is, by his plea, acknowledging his offending, and whether the plea is an indication of a genuine desire to reform.
The Magistrates Court is a very busy Court. Magistrates are under pressure to clear the lists. The less often it is necessary to recall a matter and the greater the time saved are both factors which should be recognised by the court in determining a reduction for a plea of guilty. An early plea should attract a significant reduction.
In this case the defendant pleaded at an early stage. By his plea he demonstrated a desire to change his lifestyle and his offending history. Clearly this was recognised because he applied for, and was accepted into, the Drug Court Program, which demonstrates a genuine desire on his part to change his life. As it turned out that failed. Nevertheless, he was entitled to a significant reduction for his plea of guilty at an early stage and for saving the court’s time in so doing.
I am required to re-sentence the defendant, I make no further comment about the Magistrate’s approach in respect of the reduction for a plea of guilty.
Grounds 4 and 5 of the grounds of appeal complain that the Magistrate gave inadequate regard to the defendant’s rehabilitation and the fact that he has reduced his dependence upon amphetamines. The Magistrate noted the defendant’s history, and she had regard to the defendant’s attempt to reduce his dependency on drugs. There is no error in her approach.
Ground 6 complains that the Magistrate erred in failing to suspend the sentence of imprisonment. The Magistrate does not appear to have specifically stated that she considered the question of suspension. It is accepted that counsel sought a suspended sentence. In not dealing with that application, if it was not for the fact that I am re-sentencing the defendant, this Court would be left in a position in which it would have been difficult to determine to what factors the Magistrate had regard in concluding that good reason did not exist to suspend the sentence. It is desirable that magistrates indicate when counsel have submitted that a suspended sentence should be given, why the court has concluded that good reason does not exist to suspend the sentence.
I can understand why the Magistrate might have determined that good reason did not exist, having regard to the appalling history of offending of this defendant, but she did not articulate her reasons.
In determining whether to suspend the sentence in re-sentencing this defendant, I have taken into account other factors, including the fact that he has spent a further three months in custody, and that it was accepted that in entering into the Drug Court Program he genuinely desired to change his lifestyle. In re‑sentencing the defendant I have had regard to all the matters to which I have referred. I have also had regard to the submissions of his counsel and in particular the submission that he has a relationship with a young woman who is opposed to drug taking, who has a good, stable job, and who can bring some stability to the defendant’s life if he chooses to try and maintain a stable life.
The offence of dangerous driving is serious offending. The offence of attempting to avoid police in a high speed pursuit has become prevalent. Those who commit offences of this nature place themselves, their passengers, the public and the police, in particular, at risk of serious injury. It is necessary for the court to clearly indicate that offending of this nature is likely to result in a lengthy term of imprisonment. General deterrence is of particular significance for this type of offending. Those who drive motor vehicles must be aware that if they drive in the manner or a similar manner to which the defendant in this case drove, the court will impose a severe punishment.
I have had regard to the personal circumstances to which I have referred, I intend to impose one overall sentence in respect of the one offence of driving whilst under suspension and the offence of dangerous driving.
I consider, as the learned Magistrate did, that a starting point of 18 months imprisonment is an appropriate starting point for the offending. I reduce that sentence to 14 months imprisonment having regard to the plea of guilty.
I take into account that the defendant has spent seven months and two weeks in custody, I make a further small reduction of two weeks for the period that the defendant spent on home detention bail. I reduce the sentence by eight months to six months imprisonment.
I also have regard to the fact that the defendant has spent a further three months in custody since he was sentenced on 22 August. I must reduce the six months imprisonment to three months imprisonment as of today.
In respect of the offences of driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle I record convictions without penalty.
I consider that the defendant should be suspended from driving a motor vehicle for a lengthy period. His driving record is appalling, and it is appropriate that his licence be suspended for a considerable time. The Magistrate was correct in imposing a licence disqualification of five years and I impose a licence disqualification of five years. That licence disqualification is to date from 22 August 2008.
As I have said the defendant has now been in custody for a considerable period of time. I have given consideration as to whether to suspend the sentence. Given the defendant’s prior convictions, I could understand why a sentencing judge or sentencing magistrate may consider that good reason does not exist to suspend the sentence.
In this case, however, I am taking into account the fact that the defendant has spent some ten months in custody and there are three months left for him to serve. The question is whether good reason exists to suspend that three month sentence.
The defendant has satisfied me that because he now has a relationship which he wants to continue, and he is really desirous of getting his life in to order, and that he should to be given a further opportunity in which to do that. In the circumstances, I conclude that good reason does exist to suspend the balance of the sentence.
The sentence of three months imprisonment will be suspended upon the defendant entering into a bond in the sum of $100 to be of good behaviour for two years. During that period he is to be under the supervision of a Community Corrections Officer and obey that Community Corrections officer’s directions as to his place of residence and any treatment that he should undertake in respect of his drug dependence.
In respect of driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle there will be convictions without penalty.