Parra v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Parra v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs 2000 [FCA] 85

MIGRATION – Refugee application – Applicant claimed fear of persecution on account of her political opinion and political activities – Claim rejected by Tribunal – No challenge to that decision – Application for review on basis that Tribunal failed to give effect to an alternative case raised by the material before the Tribunal: fear of persecution on account of membership of a particular social group – Claim of rape of applicant on account of husband’s political activities – Whether wives of political activists may constitute a “particular social group” – Whether family constituted by applicant, her husband and their two children may be a “particular social group” – Effect on this matter of Tribunal not being satisfied about husband’s alleged political activities – Effect of Tribunal not being satisfied that State would refuse protection.

Migration Act 1958, s476

GANET VIBLIANA GRANJA PARRA, JOHANNA ANDREA BASANTES GRANJA and CHRISTIAN ALEJANDRO BASANTES GRANJA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N1171 of 1999

WILCOX J
SYDNEY
11 FEBRUARY 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1171 of 1999

BETWEEN:

GANET VIBLIANA GRANJA PARRA, JOHANNA ANDREA BASANTES GRANJA and CHRISTIAN ALEJANDRO BASANTES GRANJA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 FEBRUARY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The first applicant, Ganet Vibliana Granja Parra, pay the costs of the application incurred by the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1171 of 1999

BETWEEN:

GANET VIBLIANA GRANJA PARRA, JOHANNA ANDREA BASANTES GRANJA and CHRISTIAN ALEJANDRO BASANTES GRANJA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX J

DATE:

11 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. WILCOX J:  This is an application by Ganet Vibliana Granja Parra, made on behalf of herself and her children, Johanna Andrea Basantes Granja and Christian Alejandro Basantes Granja, to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision not to grant them protection visas. The Tribunal decided that none of the three visa applicants was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol.

    The facts

  2. The applicants are citizens of Ecuador.  The first applicant’s husband is said to be an indigenous Ecuadorian and the first applicant claims he attended meetings relating to the rights and conditions of indigenous Ecuadorians.  She says that, in 1994, he was arrested and held for some hours.  Later, according to the first applicant, her husband was involved in opposing pressure from powerful people, whose identity she does not know, to engage indigenous Ecuadorians in illegal drug crop cultivation.  As a result of his stand, she says, in November 1995, three…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an application for review of a decision made by the Tribunal, rejecting the applicants' claims for protection visas. The applicants, Ganet Vibliana Granja Parra and her family, argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider an alternative case for their protection, specifically that they might be persecuted on account of their membership in a particular social group. The applicants contended that the Tribunal's decision to reject their claims was flawed because they did not limit their consideration to the case as articulated by the applicants but rather should have considered all material before them. The applicants specifically argued that the Tribunal should have considered their fear of persecution on account of their husband's political activities.

The legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in failing to consider the applicants' alternative case for protection based on their membership in a particular social group. The applicants argued that the Tribunal should have considered whether wives of political activists could constitute a "particular social group" for the purposes of the Convention, or whether the family constituted by the applicants could be considered a "particular social group." The applicants' counsel also argued that the Tribunal should have considered the applicants' fear of persecution on account of their husband's political activities, regardless of whether the Tribunal was satisfied about the husband's alleged political activities.

The court found that the Tribunal did not err in failing to consider the applicants' alternative case for protection. The court found that the applicants' proposed "particular social group" was not sufficiently defined and would be too broad to be considered a "particular social group" for the purposes of the Convention. The court also found that the Tribunal was not required to consider the applicants' fear of persecution on account of their husband's political activities because the Tribunal was not satisfied about the husband's alleged political activities. The court held that the Tribunal's decision to reject the applicants' claims for protection visas was not flawed and dismissed the applicants' application for review.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the first applicant, Ganet Vibliana Granja Parra, pay the costs of the application incurred by the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The first applicant, Ganet Vibliana Granja Parra, pay the costs of the application incurred by the respondent, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal member treated his view about the husband’s evidence as entirely destructive of the first applicant’s case of fear of persecution because of political opinion. No complaint is made of that reasoning. However, the applicants contend the Tribunal erred in using that conclusion as a sufficient reason for affirming the decision to refuse the application for protection visas. They argue the evidence demonstrated the existence of an alternative basis for granting protection visas and the Tribunal erred in law in failing to consider that basis. Their counsel, Mr Ben Zipser, draws attention to statements of Merkel J in Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 160 ALR 24 at 56:“… the RRT is not to limit its determination to the ‘case’ articulated by an applicant if the evidence and material which it accepts, or does not reject, raises a case on a basis not articulated by the applicant. That obligation arises by reason of the nature of the inquisitorial process and is not dependent upon whether the applicant is or is not represented …… the RRT is required to determine the substantive issues raised by the material and evidence before it.” [Original emphasis] Mr Zipser argues the material before the Tribunal in the present case disclosed a well-founded fear of persecution of the first applicant by reason of her membership of a particular social group. He points out the first applicant claimed to have been raped by three men as a reprisal for her husband’s opposition to their illegal activities and she claimed a fear of similar persecution if she returned to Ecuador.Identification of the “particular social group” During the course of argument, I asked Mr Zipser to identify the relevant “particular social group”. He said it consisted of wives of men against whom reprisal action might be taken by criminals. However, this cannot be regarded as a “particular social group” for the purposes of the Convention. Why should the category be limited to wives, as distinct from mothers, daughters, sisters and other close relatives? Given that any man might come into conflict with criminals, how would it be possible to know who was within the described group? By way of alternative submission, Mr Zipser suggested the relevant social group might be the family constituted by the husband and the three applicants, being a family a member of which was involved in confronting criminals. He referred to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [1999] FCA 1134 in which a Full Court (Einfeld, Moore and Branson JJ) said:“24. In the context of family members being persecuted for reason of one family member having refused to join the mafia … the first question for an Australian decision-maker would be whether, independently of the persecution being experienced by the family members, the family was recognised within society as a group, or as part of a group, set apart from the rest of society.It may be that such a case might be found in a society in which the recruitment activities of the mafia were publicly known, and in which the retaliatory actions of the mafia against persons who rebuffed invitations to join it were so notorious, that the families of those persons had become recognised in the society as together constituting a particular social group … If an applicant in such circumstances had a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of being a member of the particular social group constituted by the families of persons who had rebuffed invitations to join the mafia, it would be illogical and wrong, in our view, to engage in the further refinement of asking whether the applicant was fearful of being persecuted by reason of a personal link with an individual who had rebuffed the mafia or by reason of his or her membership of the social group.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J

Full text does not contain this section.