SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Parole Board Queensland v McQueen [2022] QCA 230
PARTIES:
PAROLE BOARD QUEENSLAND
(appellant)
v
ALLAN DAVID McQUEEN
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 10613 of 2022
SC No 10230 of 2020DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2022] QSC 27 (Brown J)DELIVERED ON:
22 November 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 October 2022
JUDGES:
McMurdo and Flanagan JJA and Freeburn J
ORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. Pursuant to s 49(1)(d) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), the appellant indemnify the respondent in relation to costs properly incurred in the appeal on a party and party basis, from the time the costs application was made.
CATCHWORDS:
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – INTERPERATION ACTS AND PROVISIONS – REQUIREMENT TO GIVE REASONS –where the appellant, a prisoner, was convicted of murder – where the parole board indefinitely suspended the prisoner’s parole – where the parole board’s statement of reasons stated that there was confidential information relevant to the parole board’s decision – where the parole board did not explain or release the confidential information to the prisoner – where the prisoner, the respondent, applied for the parole board’s decisions to be set aside – where the decisions of the parole board were set aside on the basis that the parole board failed to comply with the requirements of ss 208(1) and 208(4) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) to advise the prisoner of the reason for a decision to suspend parole – where the appellant appeals the order to set aside its decisions – where the parole board submits it had a discretion to not release the confidential information pursuant to s 341(3) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) – whether s 341(3) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) qualifies the obligation of the parole board to give a prisoner an information notice advising the reason for the decision
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE – COSTS – where the respondent, a prisoner, had their parole indefinitely suspended – where the appellant is the parole board – where the parole board appealed an order which set aside its decision – where the questions of statutory construction raised by the appeal are important – where the appellant consents to indemnify the respondent’s costs of appeal
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27B
Corrective Services Act2006 (Qld), s 15(3), s 208(1), s 208(4), s 208B, s 208C(1), s 341(3)
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20(2)(b), s 49Central and Northern Queensland Regional Parole Board v Finn[2018] QCA 47, cited
Chalkley v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board[2016] QSC 236, approved
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, followedCOUNSEL:
S R McLeod KC for the appellant
A D Scott and A R Hughes, for the respondentSOLICITORS:
G R Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the appellant
Jahnke Lawyers for the respondent
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- Case
- [2022] QCA 230
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal considered whether s 341(3) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) qualified the obligation of the Board under ss 208(1) and (4) of the Act to give an information notice which advises the reason for the decision. The Board argued that s 341(3) provided a discretion to not release confidential information, and that this qualified the obligation to provide an information notice. However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the correct construction of the Act was to read s 208 together with s 341 to provide a harmonious construction between the provisions. Section 341 prohibited disclosure of confidential information generally but provided an exception to that prohibition in the circumstances outlined in s 341(3). Disclosure of the confidential information would constitute disclosure for the purposes of the Act, namely, to comply with the Board's obligations to provide an information notice complying with s 208 of the Act. The Court of Appeal held that there was no qualification made to s 208 to exclude the disclosure of confidential information in the information notice where such exceptions were in contemplation by the legislature and made in other provisions of the Act.
The appeal was dismissed, and the Parole Board was ordered to indemnify the respondent in relation to costs properly incurred in the appeal on a party and party basis, from the time the costs application was made.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. Pursuant to s 49(1)(d) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), the appellant indemnify the respondent in relation to costs properly incurred in the appeal on a party and party basis, from the time the costs application was made.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In rejecting the appellant’s contention, Brown J reasoned as follows:[7]“In the circumstances above, I do not consider that the proper construction of the Act is to read s 208 together with s 341 to provide a discretion in the respondent to reduce the reasons provided in the information notice where the respondent’s reasoning relied upon confidential information. Nor does it render s 341 of the Act without meaning when read with s 208 of the Act unless it is construed as providing such a discretion as contended by the respondent. Disclosure of the confidential information would constitute disclosure for the purposes of the Act, namely, to comply with the respondent’s obligations to provide an information notice complying with s 208 of the Act. It does not provide a “caveat” to the obligation to provide the information notice. To construe the Act as providing for an informed person to make disclosure in the circumstances in s 341(3) of the Act once the circumstances in any of (a) – (e) is established, provides a harmonious construction between the provisions. Section 208 of the Act provides for disclosure to be made where it is necessary to provide the reasons required in an information notice.Section 341 prohibits disclosure of confidential information generally but provides an exception to that prohibition in the circumstances outlined in s 341(3) of the Act. That protects the informed person making such a disclosure from being liable for a penalty under s 341(2). No qualification was made to s 208 to exclude the disclosure of confidential information in the information notice where such exceptions were in contemplation by the legislature and made in other provisions of the Act or limit the reasons that are required to be provided, such as is the case in s 15 of the Act.”Her Honour explained the significance of s 15 as follows:[8]“Section 15(1) of the Act provides for an information notice to be provided to a prisoner after a review of the prisoner’s security classification under s 13 of the Act. “[I]nformation notice” includes the reasons for decision. If the prisoner’s classification is increased the prisoner must also be informed that if dissatisfied with the decision the prisoner might ask for a reconsideration of the decision within seven days after being provided with an information notice. Section 15(3) of the Act expressly states that s 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act does not apply to an information notice given under that section.”The requirement for the provision of an information notice under s 15 is to be distinguished from the like requirement under s 208(1) in that s 15(3) expressly excludes the application of s 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act.[7]Judgment, [110], [111].[8]Judgment, [87].Consideration The issue raised in this appeal is one of statutory construction and in particular whether s 341(3) should be construed as qualifying the appellant’s obligation under ss 208(1) and (4) to give an information notice which advises the reason for the decision. As explained by Kiefel CJ and Keane J in R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507, [32] – [37] while construing a statute commences with a consideration of the words of the provision itself it is necessary to have regard to the context for the provision which is to be understood in its widest sense.