Parmar, D.S. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs

Case

[1986] FCA 567

23 Oct 1986

No judgment structure available for this case.

’ 561

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

IN THE FEDERAC COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

)

VICTORIA

D STRICT

REGISTRY

)

V. No. G 349 of 1986

)

GENERAL DIVISION

)

DHANBIR SINGH PARMAR

(also known

as DENNIS PARMAR

also known as

DENNIS SINGH)

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

m:

NORTHROP J.

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1986

W: MELBOURNE

M TEMPORE REASONS

FOR JUDGMENT

There I s

motion

a

before

the

Court

that

Interlocutory orders be made restraining the respondent from enforcing an order of deportation against the applicant, Mr. Parmar, and for an order that the applicant be released from the detention centre at Maribyrnong. I shall deal first with

the question of whether

an Interlocutory order should be

made.

The facts of this case are somewhat unusual.

Mr.

Parmar is an Indlan of the Sikh persuaslon.

He first entered

Australia on 16 March 1983 pursuant to a temporary entry permit for one month. He dld not comply with the terms of

that entry permit and remained in Australia until December

1985 when he was apprehended and was deported

in January 1986

pursuant to the provisions

of the

Misration Act 1958 ("the

Act").

He arrived back

in Australia on 20 April 1986 on

transit to Fiji and

was granted a temporary entry permit for

24 hours to enable him to stay in Australia until he could

catch the ongoing flight to Fiji. Again, he ignored the conditions of that entry permit and remained in Australia

until he was apprehended on

28 August 1986.

A deportation order was made on 24 September 1986. On 3 October 1986 an application was made to this Court for

an order of review under the

Administrative

Decisions

(Judicial

Review) Act

1977.

The

decisions sought to

be

reviewed in that application were

the decisions that the

applicant be refused

a temporary entry permit,

that the

applicant be refused resident

status and that the applicant

be deported.

The directions hearing fixed

by the application was

31 October 1986.

One makes a comment that it is strange that

there was such a long delay between the time of the issue of the application on 3 October 1986 and the first directions hearing when regard is had to the fact of the existence of

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the deportation order which, under 5 . 2 0 of the Act, has to be

executed. I read that subsection:-

"20. (1) Where the Minister

(in this case a

delegate) has made an order for the deportation of a Person. that person shall, unless the Minister revokes the order, be deported accordingly."

One would have thought that the existence of the deportation order was such as to warrant immediate steps for at least the preparation and application for interlocutory relief, pending the execution of that deportation order, until this

application could be heard. Yesterday, 22 October,

the

deportee, the applicant, was notified that

he

would

be

deported at 11.00 p.m. today and as a result the present

motion was taken

out and notice given to the Australian

Government Solicitor on behalf of the respondent.

To some extent, the speed at which the matter has come on has made it more difficult to resolve the questions, but this is a case where the reasons for the decisions have

been given pursuant to

s.13 of

the Administrative Decisions

(Judicial

Review) Act 1977

and it is on

those reasons,

together with affidavits filed on

behalf of the applicant,

and affidavit by Mr. Parmar and an affidavlt by Filomena Basile, which form the basis of the present application for a stay.

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Before going further, reference should be made

to

what I described earlier as the unusual features of this case. Under 5.16 of the Mlqratlon Act, a person who enters

Australia and is not

an Australian citizen and who, at

the

time of entry, is or was a person belng a person who has been

deported

from

Australia

shall, notwlthstanding s.10, be

deemed to be a prohibited non-citizen unless he is the holder

of an entry permit endorsed with a statement that the person

granting that permit recognises him to be a person referred to in this sub-section. There was no such endorsement on the 24 hour temporary entry permit given to the applicant when he entered Australia on 20 April 1986. As a result of 5.16, at all times since then the applicant has been a prohibited non-citizen.

In

the reasons for decision

under 9.13

of the

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, findings on material questions of fact are set out. I do not propose to deal with all of those, but it is clear that there was a statement to the effect that the applicant had a romantic

relationship in Australia

with Mrs. Filomena Basile, an

Australian citizen; that it ensued for three months and

that

Mrs. Basile was his fiancee and that

they

had planned

to

marry on 20 September 1986. There are also statements in the reasons to the effect that during a conversation with Mrs. Basile on the morning of the day that the applicant was

apprehended,

she

claimed

she had never slept with

the

applicant and later

on that day during an interview at

the

offices of the Migratl.on

Department again statements are

said

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to have been made by her that they were not cohabitatlng, but

were plannlng to

get married.

In glving the reasons why the deportation order was

made, the person making the decision

referred

to the fact

that the applicant was a prohibited non-cltizen by virtue of Sub-Section 16(l)(c)(v) of the Act, which I mentioned earlier, and hls earlier history of being deported as

recently as January of

this year and that he accepted there

was a relatlonship with

Mrs. Basile, but made no reference to

the fact that they were living together in cohabitation.

The

affidavit by Mrs. Basile

refers

to

the

conversation of the morning of the day that the applicant was apprehended but does not say anything about what was said on

that occasion, but

in

relation

to

the

meeting

at the

Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs later that day, she says that she told officers of the department that she and the applicant were living in a de facto relationship and

were to be married on

20 September 1986.

The essential basis upon which

the application for

interlocutory relief is sought is that there is a conflict of evidence between what Mrs. Basile says and the facts found by

the

person

making

the

decision

based

upon reports of

interviews by officers of the department. This turns on the very narrow point of whether there was a statement to the

effect that the applicant

and Mrs. Basile were cohabitating

or not.

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As far as an application for an entry permit

that

is not a temporary entry permit is concerned, s.6A of the

Miqration Act provides that:-

"6A. (1) An entry permit shall not be granted to a non-citizen after his entry into Australia unless one OK more of the following conditions is fulfilled in respect of him, that is to say-

(a) he has been granted,

by instrument under

the

hand of a Minister,

terrltorlal

asylum in Australia;

(b)

he is the spouse, child or aged parent of an Australian citizen ... ".

In a case where persons are living

together in

cohabitation but not

married, in law the person who

is

the

prohibited non-citizen is not the spouse of the Australian

citizen,

therefore paragraph

(b) has no application to the

present case. This does not deny the fact that in an

appropriate case the decision maker may take into account a

de facto relationship, but that does not of itself justify

the granting of a permanent entry permit under sub-section

I

(1) of s.6A.

The other ground relied on for what is

described as

permanent resident status is paragraph (e) of sub-section (1)

of s.6A which reads:-

"(e) (the

non-citizen) is the holder of a temporary

entry permit which is

in force and there are

strong compassionate

or humanitarian grounds

for the grant

of an entry permit to him."

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In the present case it is clear, because of the fact of s.16

of the Act, that the Minister cannot grant a temporary

entry

permit under s.7 but he could grant such a permit under

s.16

with endorsement on it and so, for the purposes of this application. I Will assume that there is power In the Minister or his delegate to grant all necessary permlts to enable a consideration to be given to whether the applicant should be granted either the temporary entry permit or permanent residency under paragraph (e) of sub-section (1) of

S . 6A.

But despite all that, for present purposes, one

comes down to the narrow

point of whether the fact that there

is no reference

in the facts as

set out in the reasons under

s.13 of the de facto relationship is such as to give rise to an issue sufficient to justify the granting of interim relief in this case.

As opposed to that, there is the

very strong

persuasive effect of the history of this matter.

The reasons

why the decision was made are

set out in paragraphs 13 to 22

of the s.13 reasons. In that the statement is made that it has not been established that the couple do share a de facto

relationship and that there are serious discrepancies

in

their description of the relationship and

so, to some extent,

there is a question of fact which might arise there. But as far as the present application is concerned, what I must be satisfied about is whether there is an issue sufficient to

justify the interference of

the Court to stay the operation

. -

- 8 -

of the deportation order. Is there any basis to support a

case under the Judicial Review Act?

This is a case where there may well be conflicts of fact between what Mrs. Basile and Mr. Parmar say and what the officers of the department say, but one must form the view,

on

the affidavits, that there is a certain

degree of

ambivalence in them, and having regard to the length of time in which solicitors have been acting for the applicant, one

would have

expected far

more detailed material before the

Court than what is in the affidavits. In any event, this is

not a case similar

to that

in Kioa where there was an

allegation of facts which could be used adversely against the

applicant and which were not drawn to his attention

so as to

enable the person to answer

them if need be.

It is a case

where on all the

material a

relationship

between

the

applicant and Mrs. Basile was recognised.

The fact of the

marriage coming up

in September was accepted and, in

those

circumstances, I find it difficult to see any argument at all, based upon s.5 sub-section (1) paragraph (e) of the Judicial Review Act, as elaborated upon by sub-section ( 2 )

that the Minister

or his delegate

took into account an

irrelevant consideration

in exercising his discretion

or

power or failed

toake

into

account

relevant

a

consideration.

. '

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Accordingly, I hold that there is no basis for the

granting of an interim order staying the deportation order.

Further, in those circumstances, it is not necessary for me

to consider the second order sought in relation

to

the

releasing from custody.

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