Parker v Hatton

[2005] QDC 184

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Parker v Hatton [2005] QDC 184
PARTIES:	HEATH CAMERON PARKER

Appellant

v

RUTH HATTON

Respondent

FILE NO/S:	D101/2004
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:	Appeal
ORIGINATING  COURT:	Magistrates Court, Beaudesert
DELIVERED ON:	18 February 2005
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
JUDGE:	Nase DCJ
ORDER:	Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
COUNSEL:
SOLICITORS:

1. On 21 July 2004 Heath Cameron Parker (the appellant) was convicted in the Magistrates Court at Beaudesert of a breach of s 106A Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (“QBSA Act”). On 16 August 2004 an appeal was lodged from the above conviction and orders.

2. The grounds of appeal are set out in a document described as an amended notice of appeal. The grounds of appeal generally challenge the jurisdiction of the court. The appellant appeared in person to argue his appeal before me. His challenge to the conviction and orders are:

(a)	a denial of natural justice as the decision and orders were made in his absence;
(b)	that the breach of which he was convicted is unconstitutional and invalid because it infringed his common law right of silence, or because the relevant section of the QBSA Act is inconsistent with the Privacy Act 1988, and/or the Trade Practices Act, and/or the Tax Administration Act 1953.

1. The QBSA Act is a fairly common form of regulatory legislation. In this case the activity regulated by the legislation is the building industry.[1] Only persons licensed under the QBSA Act may carry out building work. To facilitate the regulatory scheme imposed by the QBSA Act an authorised officer (an inspector) has a power to require the production of documents in certain circumstances. In the present case, an inspector by writing required the appellant produce the documents described on the requisition. Failure to comply with such a requisition without reasonable excuse is a breach of the QBSA Act. In this case the inspector gave an apparently lawful requisition to the appellant, who declined to produce the specified documents.

[4]     Such regulatory legislation is common in all modern democracies. The circumstance that disclosure may incriminate the recipient is expressly declared in the legislation not to be a reasonable excuse.[2] Although the right against self- incrimination is a common law right, in a modern democracy, the right may be removed by legislation as it has been in this case.

[1] See s 3 QBSA Act.

[2]            Section 106B(2) provides: “It is not a reasonable excuse … that producing the document may tend to incriminate the person.”

1. The point that the QBSA Act is inconsistent with Commonwealth legislation was merely asserted by the appellant. No particular argument was developed by him. Accordingly I am not satisfied the various jurisdictional points made by the appellant based on inconsistency have any merit.

2. The main point raised by the appellant is that the court convicted him in his absence. What happened before the magistrate is revealed by the transcript of evidence of the proceedings below:

“DEFENDANT: As I – with due respect, your Honour, as the Court intends to
proceed under statute law, I do not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court.
BENCH: Well my question is simple: are you Mr Heath Cameron Park?

DEFENDANT: I do not intend to go any further with this, your Honour. As I’ve just said, your Honour, as the Court intends to proceed under statute law, I do not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court.

BENCH: And what basis do you say you don’t consent to the jurisdiction of this
Court?

DEFENDANT: Because as – as I understand statute law, it is another name for admiralty law, and under admiralty law, the Court is one vessel and I am another vessel and the Court vessel is trying to engage me in contract to do business with me in order to obtain my money but the terms and conditions of the contract are weighted against me whereby I am automatically guilty and have a monumental task of proving my innocence. For this reason, I do not with to do business with the Court vessel, hence, I do not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court.

BENCH: So you’re telling me you are not – you’re not even going to tell me if you’re Mr Parker?

DEFENDANT: I’m not – I’m-----

BENCH: And you don’t want to appear in the matter?

DEFENDANT: I do not – as I just said, your Honour, with all due respect-----

BENCH: You don’t want to appear?

DEFENDANT: I do not want to what?

BENCH: You don’t want to appear in this matter? You don’t want to respond-----

DEFENDANT: I am – I am appearing – I am not – I have just responded.

BENCH: You want to respond to the summons or not?

DEFENDANT: I have just responded.

BENCH: Very well, you’re free to go. I’ll deal with the defendant ex parte. Yes, thank you, Mr Robinson.”

As can be seen from the passage the appellant refused to supply his name and soon afterwards he elected to leave. The magistrate then proceeded to deal with the matter in his absence.

1. The appellant of course could have remained and contested the matter, perhaps scrutinising the evidence to be called by the prosecution, and/or he could have argued for a lighter penalty if convicted. He did none of those things as he elected to leave after refusing to confirm his identity or otherwise respond to or answer the summons.

2. I can see no merit in any ground of appeal raised by the appellant.

3. The appeal is dismissed.