Parker & Boase v The Queen
[2010] VSCA 316
•25 November 2010
SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCI 2008 0892
S APCI 2008 0900
| JASON CAMERON PARKER |
| and |
| LEIGH STUART BOASE |
| v |
| THE QUEEN |
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| JUDGES | NEAVE, HARPER JJA and ROSS AJA |
| WHERE HELD | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING | 15 November 2010 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT | 25 November 2010 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION | [2010] VSCA 316 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM | R v Boase & Parker (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Howard, 5 November 2008) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Appellants convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and false imprisonment, and counts of theft, arson and handling stolen goods – Excessive cumulation ordered on counts of false imprisonment not involving separate incidents of criminality – Victims of some false imprisonment counts also victims of armed robbery counts – Appeal allowed – Appellants re-sentenced having regard to parity principle.
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Appearances: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the appellant (Parker) | Mr S A Moglia | Paul Vale Criminal Law |
| For the appellant (Boase) | Mr C G Mandy | Slades & Parsons Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr S M Cooper | Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
NEAVE JA
HARPER JA
ROSS AJA:
The appellants, Leigh Stuart Boase and Jason Cameron Parker, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of armed robbery and false imprisonment, and counts of arson, theft and handling stolen goods. Mr Boase also pleaded guilty to a count of being a prohibited person in possession of an unregistered firearm. After hearing pleas in mitigation of sentence, and after a very thorough and careful analysis of the factual background thus presented to him, the learned sentencing judge sentenced the men as follows:
Count
Offence
Maximum term/fine
Sentence (Boase)
Cumulation (Boase)
Sentence (Parker)
Cumulation (Parker)
Presentment C0605483.1
4
Armed robbery
25 years
7 years
1 year
N/A
N/A
5
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
N/A
N/A
6
Armed robbery
25 years
N/A
N/A
6 years
9 months
7
False imprisonment
10 years
N/A
N/A
2 years
1 month
8
Armed robbery
25 years
7 years
Base sentence
6 years
Base sentence
9
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
10
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
11
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
12
Armed robbery
25 years
7 years
1 year
6 years
9 months
13
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
14
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
15
Theft
10 years
2 years
3 months
2 years
3 months
16
Armed robbery
25 years
7 years
1 year
6 years
9 months
17
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
18
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
19
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
20
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
21
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
22
Armed robbery
25 years
7 years
1 year
6 years
9 months
23
False imprisonment
10 years
3 years
2 months
2 years
1 month
24
Arson
10 years
3 years
6 months
3 years
6 months
25
Handling stolen goods
15 years
2 years
3 months
2 years
3 months
Presentment C0605483.C.1
1
Being a prohibited person in possession of an unregistered firearm
1800 penalty units or 15 years’ imprisonment
4 years
1 year
In the case of Mr Boase, this amounted to a total effective sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. The judge directed that he serve a period of 11 years before being eligible for parole. In the case of Mr Parker, this resulted in a total effective term of imprisonment of 11 years and the judge imposed a non-parole period of 7 years.
Both appellants were granted leave to appeal against sentence by a single judge of this Court. The grounds of appeal relied upon by each appellant are set out below.
Circumstances of the offending
The armed robberies and false imprisonment offences were committed over the course of six days in November 2006, against convenience stores, newsagents and petrol stations. The appellants each committed one armed robbery, without the involvement of the other, and then went on to commit four armed robberies together. The offences of theft, arson and handling stolen goods occurred on separate occasions preceding or following the armed robberies.
The offenders entered businesses with their faces concealed by hoods, stockings, plastic masks or balaclavas, and demanded cash and/or cigarettes. On each occasion a fire-arm was used to threaten the person conducting the business or an attendant.
Count 4 was committed by Mr Boase at a petrol station in Tullamarine in the early morning of 25 November 2006. He pointed a firearm at the attendant, demanding money and cigarettes. He left with $400 and three packs of cigarettes. Count 5 related to Mr Boase’s instruction to the attendant to bend down while Mr Boase fled to a waiting car.
Later that day, Mr Parker and another co-offender carried out an armed robbery (count 6) at a newsagency in Pascoe Vale. His co-offender pointed a pump action shotgun at the shop attendant. Mr Parker emptied the till and asked if there was another drawer. His co-offender leant over the counter and took a handful of gold coins. The offenders fled in a white Mitsubishi Lancer belonging to Mr Parker’s de facto partner. Before fleeing, Mr Parker told the attendant to lie down (count 7).
Counts 8 to 11 relate to the offences committed by both the appellants at a milk bar in Keilor East on 26 November 2006. The owner had his two children in the lounge room just behind him. Mr Boase pointed the shotgun at the owner’s chest with his finger on the trigger and demanded money (count 8). The owner and two customers who entered in the course of the robbery were told to lie down at the rear of the store (counts 9 to 11). Mr Parker took approximately $400 in cash and cigarettes worth about $1,800.
Counts 12 to 14 concern offences committed at a convenience store in Altona Meadows on 27 November 2006. Mr Boase entered the store carrying the shotgun and demanded money. Mr Parker then entered the store and told the proprietor to open the cash register. He put notes and coins from it in the bag. He then took cigarettes from the shelf. At this point, a customer entered the store and was told to lie down at the rear of the store (count 14). The appellants fled with about $200 and cigarettes.
The count of theft (count 15) concerned the Ford Laser stolen by the appellants from the parking lot of a train station. The car was worth approximately $1,000 and contained compact discs, clothing and a portable music device. The judge found that the theft was ‘part of a larger plan to commit further armed robberies’.[1]
[1]R v Parker & Boase (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Howard, 5 November 2008) (‘Reasons’), [23].
Counts 16 to 21 relate to the offences the appellants committed at a newsagency in Burwood on 28 November 2006. The appellants had arranged for Dwayne Knight, the boyfriend of the daughter of Mr Parker’s de facto partner, to drive the stolen Laser. Mr Boase pointed the shotgun at the proprietor and her daughter and demanded cash. Three other customers who came into the shop during the robbery were also threatened with the gun. Together with the proprietor and her daughter they were told to lie down on the floor (counts 17 to 21). While Mr Boase kept the shotgun pointed at the victims, Mr Parker collected the money from the cash register and from other places, which he discovered after making further demands. Mr Parker then asked about the location of the safe. Before fleeing to their getaway car with the $7,315 they had stolen, the appellants told the victims to lie down for a further five minutes.
Counts 22 and 23 related to offences committed at a newsagency in Ormond on 30 November 2006. Mr Knight drove the stolen Laser and kept a lookout near the front of the store. Mr Boase pointed the shotgun at the proprietor and demanded cash while Mr Parker emptied the cash register. Mr Parker then gained access to another cash register and the strong room by making further demands and threatening the proprietor that she would be in ‘trouble’ if she did not have keys. The appellants and Mr Knight left with $9,873 in cash and an amount of cigarettes.
The arson count (count 24) related to the appellants’ conduct in setting fire to the Ford Laser used in the commission of counts 16 to 21.
Count 25 related to the stolen number plates affixed to the Mitsubishi Lancer used in the robberies committed before the Ford Laser was stolen, which were found hidden under a refrigerator in the home of Mr Parker’s sister.
Count 1 on Presentment C0605483.C.1 related to Mr Boase’s possession, as a prohibited person, of the shotgun between 25 and 30 November 2006. The shotgun was discovered by police on 4 December 2006, hidden in a bag at the back of a Caltex service station in Sunshine.
The appellants were arrested on the evening of 30 November 2006. In a routine check conducted before the offences occurred, the police had taken photographs of distinctive stickers affixed to the Lancer owned by Mr Parker’s de facto partner. Mr Parker was later observed driving the car to his sister’s house. On 1 December 2006, police went to the premises and discovered that the stickers and licence plates had been removed from the car. A search of the premises resulted in the discovery of the licence plates the subject of count 25.
When arrested, Mr Parker was in possession of almost $4,000 in cash and a shopping bag containing gloves and balaclavas, on one of which Mr Parker’s DNA was found. Mr Knight was arrested with Mr Parker and was also in possession of a large amount of cash. Mr Parker made extensive admissions of guilt when interviewed by police. Mr Boase gave a ‘no comment’ interview, although he later pleaded guilty to the offences after a contested committal.
Mr Boase’s appeal against sentence
Mr Boase’s grounds of appeal were as follows:
Ground 1: The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in sentencing on the count of being a prohibited person in possession of a unregistered firearm, in that –
(a) he treated it as a rolled up offence; and
(b) he ordered some cumulation in respect of it.
Ground 2: The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in holding that neither R v Verdins nor R v Van Boxtel had any bearing on the sentence to be imposed on the Appellant.
Ground 3: The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in ordering partial cumulation on the counts of false imprisonment.
Ground 4: The total effective sentence should be reconsidered in light of fresh evidence, namely the determination of the Adult Parole Board requiring the Appellant to serve the balance of his parole.
Ground 5: The Learned Sentencing Judge did not give sufficient weight to the principle of totality.
Ground 6: The individual sentences and the total effective sentence are manifestly excessive.
In our opinion ground 3 is made out to the extent that the false imprisonment offences related to the persons who were robbed at gunpoint. We do not consider that these offences involved separate incidents of criminality. Most of them were fleeting incidents (for example the victim of count 5 was simply told to ‘bend down’) and other victims were told to lie on the floor until the appellants left the scene.
As his Honour correctly found, the armed robberies were serious offences, for which it was appropriate to impose sentences at the higher end of the range. However the judge should not have further cumulated an additional period of two months on the false imprisonment counts, which related to the persons who were the direct targets of the particular armed robbery. We also consider that a sentence of three months’ imprisonment would be sufficient to reflect the gravity of count 5 and that, as with counts 9, 13, 17, 18 and 23, there should be no cumulation in respect of the sentence imposed on that count 5.
By contrast, the customers who entered premises when the armed robberies were under way and who were prevented from leaving by the offenders were victims of separate incidents of criminal behaviour. Counsel for Mr Boase conceded that some measure of cumulation was justified in relation to these offences (counts 10, 11, 14, 19, 20 and 21).[2]
[2]Counsel for Mr Parker submitted that counts 7 (Parker only), 9, 14, and 23 were counts of false imprisonment where the victim was also the direct victim of the armed robbery. We would add counts 5 (Boase only), 13, 17 and 18. We do not consider that the victim of count 14 was a direct victim of the armed robbery.
Our conclusion on ground 3 makes it necessary to re-sentence Mr Boase. Accordingly, we refer only briefly to the other grounds of appeal, none of which are made out.
In relation to ground 1, counsel for Mr Boase relied on his Honour’s observation that Mr Boase had pleaded guilty to a rolled–up count of being a prohibited person in possession of a fire-arm.[3] This reflected the incorrect way in which the offence was described in the prosecution opening. In fact the charge to which Mr Boase pleaded guilty alleged that he had been in possession of a fire-arm between 25 November and 30 November 2006. As counsel for Mr Boase correctly submitted, it would have been a sentencing error for Mr Boase to have been sentenced on the basis that this offence was a rolled up count.[4]
[3]Reasons, [43].
[4]R v Jones [2004] VSCA 68.
Despite his Honour’s reference to what was said by the prosecutor, nothing in his sentencing reasons or in the sentence he imposed suggests that Mr Boase was sentenced on the basis that this was a rolled up count. The maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment which applies to the offence reflects its seriousness. In the successful Crown appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions v Faure,[5] the offender was re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years, after the Court had made allowance for double jeopardy. Neither the individual sentence nor the order for cumulation imposed on Mr Boase were inappropriate for the offence covered by count 1, having regard to the fact that Mr Boase had previously been convicted of offences involving violence, had two prior convictions for being a prohibited person in possession of a fire-arm and had two other convictions for fire-arms offences.
[5]DPP v Faure (2005) 12 VR 115.
The specific error alleged in ground 2 is not made out. His Honour’s sentencing reasons made detailed reference to R v Verdins[6] and considered its application to the circumstances of the offender.[7] It was open on the evidence to conclude that Mr Boase’s mental condition did not make prison more burdensome for him. In essence, ground 2 is a particular of the manifest excess ground (ground 6).
[6](2007) 16 VR 269.
[7]Reasons, [67]-[69].
Except insofar as ground 5 reflects the complaint in ground 3, we would also reject that ground. Since the appellant must be re-sentenced it is unnecessary to discuss the complaint of manifest excess alleged by ground 6.
In re-sentencing Mr Boase, we must have regard to the fact the Adult Parole Board cancelled his parole on 3 December 2008. As a result of this cancellation, he will be required to serve an additional nine months and four days after the expiration of the sentences against which he has appealed. The current end date of his total effective term of imprisonment is 4 September 2022.[8]
[8]Although the Court was informed that the Adult Parole Board will consider parole on 4 March 2022, we cannot take that matter into account: R v Piacentino (2007) 15 VR 501.
The armed robberies were very serious offences involving the use of a pump action shotgun and were committed only a few days after Mr Boase had been released on parole. The offenders disguised themselves when committing the robberies. The use of the stolen number plates on the Lancer and the theft of the Laser indicates that the offences were premeditated. The primary victims of the armed robberies were terrorised by being held up at gun point and the customers who were present or came onto the scene were traumatised by their experiences. Denunciation, and specific and general deterrence, must therefore be given considerable weight in re-sentencing Mr Boase.
Mr Boase was 37 at the time of offending and is now over 40 years old. He had a dysfunctional upbringing, in which he was assaulted by his alcoholic stepfather. Perhaps as a result, he began drinking alcohol when aged 10 and was, in his words, an alcoholic by the age of 13. He has a lengthy history of drug addiction and was using drugs during the period of offending. He has previously been treated for depression.
At the time of sentencing, Mr Boase had two daughters, aged 14 and 15 years, from a previous relationship. He was also in a relationship with a woman with two children. Although his parents separated when Mr Boase was young, he has maintained a close relationship with them and with his siblings.
Mr Boase has an appalling criminal history, having been previously convicted of 115 offences arising from 31 court appearances over a period of 18 years between 1986, when he was 17, and 2004, when he was 34. These included 53 counts of dishonesty offences,[9] 11 counts of violent offences[10] and 7 counts of armed robbery.
[9]Including theft, handling stolen property, possession of the proceeds of crime, obtaining financial advantage by deception and obtaining property by deception.
[10]Including unlawful assault, causing injury intentionally, causing serious injury recklessly, causing injury intentionally or recklessly, assaulting a police officer, assault with a weapon and assault with intent to rob.
Because of the appellant’s lengthy history of prior offences his Honour said that Mr Boase had poor prospects of rehabilitation. However the judge noted that the appellant had voluntarily gone into protective custody in order to separate himself from other criminal associates and said that this gave him a ‘faint hope’ of improvement.[11] A psychiatric report dated 20 October 2008 and prepared by Dr Danny Sullivan, a consultant psychiatrist, was tendered at the plea hearing. Based on his interview with the appellant, Dr Sullivan expressed the following views under the heading ‘Opinion and Recommendations’:
[11]Reasons, [74].
Mr Boase has a clear diagnosis of personality disorder, involving borderline and antisocial elements. He struggles to regulate his emotions, is impulsive and volatile, and has difficulties in interpersonal relationships. At times he experiences evanescent psychotic symptoms, often in relation to stress, however not of sufficient duration or magnitude to raise the possibility that he has a psychotic disorder. In prison he requires much psychiatric, psychological and nursing input for support.
His personality predisposes him to depression. In response to minor stressors or altercations, Mr Boase is prone to depressive decompensation with suicidal ideas, irritability and despondency. He is appropriately treated with antidepressant and mood stabilising medication, although this is likely to attenuate rather than prevent or cure these episodes.
He has a past history of substance abuse and dependence. Currently he is dependent on prescribed opiates (methadone) and had a recent period of methamphetamine abuse. He periodically seeks benzodiazepines. He was in the past dependent on alcohol.
He has a history of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) which has been a consistent complaint over recent years and is manifest in his handwashing. It is not however accompanied by significant functional impairment, although at times his symptoms flare up, apparently correlated to mood deterioration. He has had specific pharmacological and psychological treatments for OCD in the past but has declined these more recently.
The history of epilepsy is predominantly based on self-report, and my perusal of the file does not provide strong evidence for this diagnosis. While Mr Boase may obtain benefit from valproate due to its mood stabilising properties, he could if he so desired cease this and is unlikely to experience seizures as a consequence. The correctional medical record indicates that this option has been proposed to Mr Boase and he has elected not to do so.
…
Mr Boase is able to access mental health services appropriately and his current treatment regimen appears sensible. Although he has frequently utilised mental health services in prison, he would be as well in the community to be engaged in a counselling service which provided him opportunity to ventilate, problem-solving and mindfulness strategies.
Having regard to these matters, and to the additional period that Mr Boase will have to serve as the result of his parole cancellation, we would re-sentence him as follows:
Count
Sentence
Cumulation
Presentment C0605483.1
4
6 years’ imprisonment
1 year
5
3 months’ imprisonment
Nil
8
6 years’ imprisonment
1 year
9
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
10
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
11
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
12
6 years’ imprisonment
1 year
13
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
14
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
15
2 years’ imprisonment
3 months
16
6 years’ imprisonment
1 year
17
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
18
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
19
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
20
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
21
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
22
6 years’ imprisonment
Base Sentence
23
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
24
3 years’ imprisonment
6 months
25
18 months’ imprisonment
3 months
Presentment C0605483.C.1
Count 1
2 years’ imprisonment
1 year
This amounts to a total effective sentence of 12 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. We would fix a non-parole period of 8 years and 4 months.
Mr Parker’s appeal against sentence
Mr Parker appeals on the following grounds:
1.The sentences imposed offend against the principle of parity.
2.The learned sentencing judge erred in ordering partial cumulation in respect of the sentences imposed on the counts of false imprisonment.
3.The learned sentencing judge erred in finding that the appellant’s level of moral culpability was equal to that of the co-offender Boase.
4.The learned sentencing judge erred in finding the offending in respect of count 8 was aggravated by virtue of the presence of children.
5.The total effective sentence offends against the totality principle when considered in light of the time spent in custody for other offences,
6.The individual sentences and the total effective sentence are manifestly excessive.
Mr Parker’s second ground of appeal is made out for the same reasons that we have given in relation to the third of Mr Boase’s grounds of appeal. He must therefore be re-sentenced.
If Mr Boase had not been re-sentenced we would have rejected Mr Parker’s complaint that the sentence imposed on him offended the parity principle. We consider that the four year difference between the total effective sentence which his Honour imposed on Mr Parker and the total effective sentence he imposed on Mr Boase more than adequately took account of the difference in the co-offenders’ personal circumstances.
In re‑sentencing Mr Parker, the parity principle requires us to compare his moral culpability with that of Mr Boase and to take account of relevant differences in the two men’s personal circumstances. In doing so we have had regard to the submissions made by his counsel in relation to grounds 1 and 3.
Both offenders were of similar age. Mr Parker was aged 34 during the period of offending and 36 at the date of sentence. Like Mr Boase he had a troubled upbringing, in which he was physically and sexually abused by his father. His educational and employment history was disrupted by his heroin addiction and abuse of other drugs. He has been on a methadone program for the past decade. He is said to have a low IQ and suffers from depression.
In 1990, when aged about 17 years, Parker commenced a de facto relationship with his current wife, who has been diagnosed with a brain tumour and suffers from associated strokes and paralysis. He has two children from this relationship, his daughter, aged 12 at the date of sentencing, and his son, aged 6 at the date of sentencing, as well as a 20 year old stepdaughter. His son also suffers from global development delay.
Prior to the hearing of the appeal, leave was sought to adduce new evidence relating to Mr Parker’s wife’s health, in support of a submission that his imprisonment would impose exceptional hardship on his family. That application was abandoned at the hearing of the appeal. However, counsel for Mr Parker submitted that in re-sentencing him, the Court should take account of the hardship suffered by him, because of his knowledge that he cannot assist his wife and children while he is in gaol. We would accept that submission.
Like his co-offender, Mr Parker has an extensive number of prior convictions, spanning a 13 year period between 1992, when he was 19, and 2006, when he was 32. The judge accepted that the majority of the approximate 200 prior convictions Mr Parker admitted arising from 17 court appearances were committed while under the influence of drugs and to support his drug addiction. The prior convictions were almost entirely comprised of dishonesty offences and counts of using or possessing drugs of dependence. Apart from his conviction for assault in 2002, which was committed in the course of being arrested, he has no history of committing violent offences.
Two psychological reports prepared by Mr Bernard Healey dated 8 February 2005 and 26 October 2007 were tendered at the plea hearing.
The first report was prepared after Mr Healey consulted with Mr Parker on 8 February 2005. Mr Healey expressed the following opinions:
Specific testing revealed well below average intellectual capacity, where 91 per cent would do better, powers of delayed recall were reasonably sound, and personality testing was indicative [of] significant depression and marked vulnerability to substance abuse.
Similar tests were conducted on 21 October 2007, leading Mr Healey to opine:
Specific testing revealed a full scale IQ of 72, where 97 per cent of people his age would do better (somewhat lower than noted last time, a decline possible linked to the stressors with which he has to cope), powers for delayed recall were reduced, and personality testing was indicative of depression. It was evident that Jason has become even more vulnerable, less able to cope within the community (linked to his low level of intellect, inadequacy, lack of trust in others) and in particular to deal with the alarming decline in his partner’s health and his son’s significant problems (despite his efforts to adhere to programs and to act responsibly).
Counsel for Mr Parker submitted that Mr Parker’s low IQ, and the fact that he did not carry the gun used in the robberies, meant that he was significantly less morally culpable than Mr Boase. We would reject that submission. Mr Parker committed the armed robbery covered by count 6 when Mr Boase was not present. His de facto partner’s car was used in some of the robberies and the number plates were hidden under a refrigerator in his sister’s house. We agree with his Honour’s view that the moral culpability of the offenders for the offences they committed together was comparable. Although it was Mr Boase who pointed the gun at the individuals conducting the businesses which were targeted, Mr Parker was aware of its proposed use, and did not disassociate himself from the use of the shotgun after they had committed their first armed robbery together. He continued to participate in the later armed robberies knowing that the victims were being threatened with a pump action shotgun. He also actively threatened the proprietor of the Ormond newsagency (count 22).
Nevertheless, we would accept that Mr Parker’s low IQ, his lack of similar prior convictions or any real history of violence, his admissions to the police and his failure to contest the committal proceedings, require a distinction to be made between the sentence imposed on him and the sentence imposed on his co-offender, Mr Boase.[12] The sentences imposed on Mr Parker must also take account of the totality principle, in light of the 14 month period he spent in custody prior to being sentenced for these offences, of which only 53 days can be taken into account as pre‑sentence detention under s 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991.[13]
[12]R v Postiglione (1997) 189 CLR 295.
[13]R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88.
We have fixed a non-parole period which is a lower proportion of Mr Parker’s total effective sentence than the non-parole period imposed on Mr Boase. This reflects his Honour’s view that Mr Parker has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation because of his family support and the fact that he has had numerous negative drug screens while in prison.[14]
[14]Reasons, [95], [96].
Having regard to these matters, we would re-sentence Mr Parker as follows:
Count
Sentence
Cumulation
Presentment C0605483.1
6
5 years’ imprisonment
9 months
7
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
8
5 years’ imprisonment
9 months
9
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
10
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
11
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
12
5 years’ imprisonment
9 months
13
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
14
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
15
2 years’ imprisonment
3 months
16
5 years’ imprisonment
9 months
17
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
18
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
19
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
20
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
21
6 months’ imprisonment
1 month
22
5 years’ imprisonment
Base Sentence
23
6 months’ imprisonment
Nil
24
3 years’ imprisonment
6 months
25
18 months’ imprisonment
3 months
This amounts to a total effective sentence of 9 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. We would fix a non-parole period of 5 years and 8 months. We note that the total effective sentences imposed on both offenders are somewhat below the range put forward by the Crown during the plea hearing and somewhat above the range put forward by Mr Boase and Mr Parker’s counsel.
Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991, the Court declares that, but for the appellants’ pleas of guilty, Mr Boase would have been sentenced to an effective term of 14 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, and Mr Parker to an effective term of 11 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
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