Pardo and Silve

[2012] FamCA 276

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PARDO & SILVE [2012] FamCA 276

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – enforcement of orders

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Mr Pardo

RESPONDENT: Ms Silve

FILE NUMBER: SYC 973 of 2010

DATE DELIVERED: 23 April 2012

PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney

PLACE HEARD: Sydney

JUDGMENT OF: Watts J

HEARING DATE: 23 April 2012

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Gayle Meredith & Associates

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Litigant in person

Orders

1. Order 14 made 2 March 2011 be discharged.

2. Pursuant to s 123 Child Support (Assessment) Act monies held by Gayle Meredith & Associates on behalf of the husband and wife, being in the current approximate balance of $85,000, be paid to J School to pay G’s private school fees and associated expenses (as invoiced by G’s school) until completion of her secondary education and at the conclusion of the secondary schooling, if there are any funds remaining, the husband and wife forthwith thereafter authorize J School to pay the remaining funds as to 60% to the husband and 40% to the wife and the husband be otherwise responsible for any costs associated with G’s education.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Pardo & Silve has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: SYC 973 of 2010

Mr Pardo

Applicant

And

Ms Silve

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. In this matter, I have an application before me to vary some orders I made over a year ago for the parties, the parents of G, to place $100,000 into a cash management account for the purposes of securing the fees for her education to the end of her secondary schooling.  The parties have been spectacularly unsuccessful in being able to achieve what one might think was the fairly easy feat of transferring from Ms Meredith’s account the sum of $100,000 into a joint account that both parents would operate for the purposes of paying the school fees.

2. The correspondence between the father’s lawyer and the mother to attempt to achieve this feat is extensive and breathtaking in many ways.  Having read it, I can do nothing other than to conclude that to continue an order that required the two parties to agree on signing anything, including a cheque for term school fees, is fraught with the possibility that that will not happen, and that more letters will come from this poor girl’s school to her parents complaining about the fact that school fees have not been paid at a time when there is $100,000 sitting in an account to do it.

3. I am not apportioning blame, although it appears to me, on the face of it, the father did do, or attempt to do, what I ordered happen.  The mother decided that there was a different way and that was the genesis of the problem.  I might say that the mother actually did not do anything of a proactive nature herself for about four and a half months after I made the orders.

4. The balance between creating a situation where the parties do not have to come back to court about this dispute and losing a bit of interest on a cash management account is one that I will decide in favour of creating a situation where the parties do not have to come back to court about this particular aspect of the dispute between the two of them. 

5. Accordingly, I intend to grant the orders sought by the father in paragraph 1.1 of the application that he makes, which was filed on 15 December 2011.

6. The mother has made an application that I vary the order for child support that I made at the conclusion of the final hearing.  The statement of financial circumstances that she has filed indicates that she is currently unemployed, but that does not tell me as to why I should reach a different conclusion to the conclusion I reached in the reasons for judgment that I previously gave.  Based on the material that has been filed in support of that application, I will dismiss it, and there is no material before me that would indicate why it would be that.

7. The mother has filed what is in fact an interim application for spousal maintenance.  There is no application for a final spousal maintenance order.  Final financial orders have been made between the parties.  I have indicated to the mother today that and I will be dismissing the application for interim spousal maintenance.  I have indicated to the mother today that, if she believes that she can put together the evidence to support either an application for a change of the periodic child support or an application for spousal maintenance, then she can re-file an application.

I certify that the preceding seven (7) paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Watts delivered on 23 April 2012.

Associate:   

Date:  1.5.12