Parashumti and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
[2006] AATA 882
•17 October 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 882
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No W2005/330
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re NICK PARASHUMTI Applicants
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms L R Tovey, Member Date17 October 2006
PlacePerth
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal dated 9 September 2005.
......(Sgd L R Tovey)..........
Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – disability support pension – recovery of overpayments – turns on own facts
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 8, s 10, s 117, s 1064, ss 1191-1194, s 1223, s 1236, s 1237A and s 1237AAD
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 68 and s 72
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 28A and s 29
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1985) 7 ALD 670
Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134; [2003] FCAFC 133
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1
Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281
Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348
Re Fuller and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 83 ALD 152; [2004] AATA 615
Ryde v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] FCA 866
REASONS FOR DECISION
17 October 2006 Ms LR Tovey, Member 1. This is an application by Mr Nick Parashumti ("the Applicant") for a review of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("the SSAT"). The SSAT affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Respondent. The decision affirmed was to recover $1,047.16 in disability support pension overpayments for the period 7 November 2001 to 17 June 2003, made under provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ("the Act").
BACKGROUND FACTS
2. It is not in contention that the Applicant was in receipt of a disability support pension during the period 7 November 2001 to 17 June 2003 ("the Relevant Period"). He is currently working, and does not receive any social security payments.
3. During the Relevant Period the Applicant was married to his former wife and they supported four children. The Applicant's former wife worked at a number of casual positions at health clubs.
4. On 26 February 2004 a delegate of the Respondent determined that the Applicant had been overpaid disability support pension in the amount of $1,047.16 for failing to declare the full amount of his former wife's income during the Relevant Period (T59). On 30 June 2004 an Authorised Review Officer ("ARO") of the Respondent affirmed that decision.
5. The Applicant subsequently sought further review by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("the SSAT") which, on 9 September 2005, affirmed the decision of the ARO.
6. On 20 September 2005 the Applicant lodged an application for review by this Tribunal of the decision of the SSAT.
7. The Applicant has already repaid the amount claimed by the Respondent, through deductions from his social security payments.
8. It may also be noted that an amount of $129.24 ("the Previously Recovered Amount") had already been recovered from the Applicant as an overpayment of disability support pension paid between 19 June 2002 and 24 September 2002. Those payments related to a time within the Relevant Period. On 7 November 2002 a delegate of the Respondent had determined that the Previously Recovered Amount had been overpaid in this period (T19-T21). That decision was affirmed by an ARO on 24 December 2002 (T29) and the SSAT on 7 March 2003 (T36).
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
9. The entitlement to disability support pension is provided for by Part 2.3 of the Act. Section 117(a) of the Act provides for the rate of the Applicant's pension to be calculated using Pension Rate Calculator A at the end of s 1064 of the Act.
10. In general terms the method provided for by that pension rate calculator involves calculating an amount called the "maximum payment rate". Module E of s 1064 of the Act deals with the calculation of the "income reduction", which is subtracted from the maximum payment rate to give an amount called the "income reduced rate". Module G of s 1064 of the Act deals with the calculation of a "reduction for assets", which is subtracted from the maximum payment rate to give an amount called the "assets reduced rate". The lower of the income reduced rate and the assets reduced rate is (subject to further reduction in some cases) the rate of pension.
11. Under Module E of s 1064 of the Act the income reduction for a person in the position of the Applicant is calculated by reference to the amount of the person's "ordinary income" on a yearly basis. In general terms, the rate of pension is reduced by half the difference of the ordinary income of the person and the person's "income free area". Further, the ordinary income of each member of a couple is half the sum of both members' ordinary income: s 1064-E2 of the Act.
12. The term "ordinary income" for these purposes is defined in s 8(1) of the Act to mean income that is not maintenance income or an exempt lump sum. It is clear that the income of the Applicant's former wife is neither maintenance income nor an exempt lump sum for these purposes. It is not an exempt lump sum because it is a periodic amount, that is a series of related payments: ss 8(11) and 10(1A) of the Act. It is not "maintenance income", which relates to payments of child and spousal maintenance: s 10(1) of the Act.
13.The term "income" is defined in s 8(1) of the Act as follows:
income, in relation to a person, means:
(a)an income amount earned, derived or received by the person for the person’s own use or benefit; or
(b)a periodical payment by way of gift or allowance; or
(c)a periodical benefit by way of gift or allowance;
but does not include an amount that is excluded under subsection (4), (5) or (8).
14. The term "income amount" used in the definition of "income" is defined in s 8(1) of the Act to mean valuable consideration, or personal earnings or moneys or profits (whether of a capital nature or not). It is clear that the earnings of the Applicant's former wife were income, which was to be taken into account in determining the rate of the Applicant's disability support pension.
15. Section 1064-E4 of the Act identifies the manner in which a person's income free area is worked out, taking account of whether or not they have a partner, whether or not the partner receives a pension or benefit and the number of children who are in the care of the person. It provides:
"A person’s ordinary income free area is worked out using Table E-1. Work out which family situation in Table E-1 applies to the person. The ordinary income free area is the corresponding amount in column 3 plus an additional corresponding amount in column 5 for each dependent child of the person.
Table E-1—Ordinary free area limits
Column 1
ItemColumn 2
Category of person
Column 3
Basic free area per yearColumn 4
Basic free area per fortnightColumn 5
Additional free area per yearColumn 6
Additional free area per fortnight1. Not member of a couple $2,080 $80 $639.60 $24.60 2. Partnered (partner getting neither pension nor benefit) $1,820 $70 $639.60 $24.60 3. Partnered (partner getting benefit) $1,820 $70 $639.60 $24.60 4.
Partnered (partner getting pension)
$1,820
$70
$319.80
$12.30"
16. The amounts identified in the tables in s. 1064 of the Act are subject to adjustments for CPI indexation in the manner prescribed by ss 1191 – 1194 of the Act.
17. Section 68(2)(a) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ("the Administration Act") 1999 provides that:
"(2) The Secretary may give a person to whom this subsection applies a notice that requires the person to … :
(a)inform the Department if:
(i)a specified event or change of circumstances occurs."
18. The Applicant, as a person to whom a social security payment in the form of a disability support pension is made, is a person to whom s 68(2) of the Administration Act applies.
19. Section 72 of the Administration Act provides for the requirements of a notice given under s 68(2) of the Administration Act. Section 72(1)(a) of the Administration Act requires that the notice must be given in writing. Section 72(1)(b) of the Administration Act provides that the notice:
"… may be given personally or by post or in any other manner approved by the Secretary"
20. In relation to the giving of a notice under s 68 of the Administration Act, ss 28A and 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) relevantly provide:
"28A Service of documents
(1)For the purposes of any Act that requires or permits a document to be served on a person, whether the expression “serve”, “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless the contrary intention appears, the document may be served:
(a)on a natural person:
(i)by delivering it to the person personally; or
(ii)by leaving it at, or by sending it by pre‑paid post to, the address of the place of residence or business of the person last known to the person serving the document …
29Meaning of service by post
(1)Where an Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then unless the contrary intention appears the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing prepaying and posting the document as a letter, and unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post."
21.Section 1223(1) of the Act provides that:
"Subject to this section, if:
(a) a social security payment is made; and
(b) a person who obtains the benefit of the payment was not entitled for any reason to obtain that benefit;
the amount of the payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the person and the debt is taken to arise when the person obtains the benefit of the payment."
22.Sections 1223(1AB) and (1AC) of the Act provide that:
"1223(1AB)
Without limiting by implication the circumstances to which paragraph (1)(b) applies apart from this subsection, a person who obtained the benefit of a social security payment is taken not to have been entitled to obtain the benefit if the payment should not have been made for any one or more of the following reasons:
(a) the payment was made to the person by mistake as a result of a computer error or an administrative error;
(b) the person for whose benefit the payment was intended to be made was not qualified to receive the payment;
(c) the payment was not payable;
(d) the payment was made as a result of a contravention of the social security law, a false statement or a misrepresentation;
(e) the payment was made in purported compliance with a direction or authority given by the person who was entitled to obtain the benefit of the payment but the direction or authority had been revoked or withdrawn before the payment was made;
(f) the payment was intended to be made for the benefit of someone else who died before the payment was made.
1223(1AC)
If a social security payment was made by mistake as a result of a computer error or an administrative error, subsection (1) applies:
(a) whether or not the payment was made under a determination that had effect at the time when the payment was made; and
(b) whether or not a determination in relation to the payment could be made after that time with effect from and including that time."
23. Subsequent provisions of s. 1223 of the Act deal with an exception, which is not presently relevant, to the application of s. 1223(1AC) of the Act.
24.Section 1236 of the Act relevantly provides that:
"1236(1)
Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, decide to write off a debt, for a stated period or otherwise.
1236(1A)
The Secretary may decide to write off a debt under subsection (1) if, and only if:
(a) the debt is irrecoverable at law; or
(b) the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt; or
(c) the debtor’s whereabouts are unknown after all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the debtor; or
(d) it is not cost effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt."
25.Section 1237A of the Act relevantly provides that:
"1237A(1)
Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt.
Note: Subsection (1) does not allow waiver of a part of a debt that was caused partly by administrative error and partly by one or more other factors (such as error by the debtor).
1237A(1A)
Subsection (1) only applies if:
(a) the debt is not raised within a period of 6 weeks from the first payment that caused the debt; or
(b) if the debt arose because a person has complied with a notification obligation, the debt is not raised within a period of 6 weeks from the end of the notification period;
whichever is the later."
26. The only other possibly relevant waiver provision is s. 1237AAD of the Act, which provides:
"The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt."
THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
27. Against the above statutory background, the issues for determination are:
(a)Whether the Applicant has been paid more disability support pension than he was entitled to receive, and if so what is the amount of that overpayment? The amount of any such overpayment will be a debt due to the Commonwealth under s 1223(1) of the Act;
(b)Should any debt of the kind referred to in subparagraph (a) be written off or waived under ss 1236, 1237A or 1237AAD of the Act?
Consideration of the Issues – Did the Applicant Receive More Disability Support Pension than the Amount to which he was Entitled?
28. The records of the Respondent's delegate in relation to the disability support payments made to the Applicant in the Relevant Period were tendered to this Tribunal as part of the Section 37 Documents (T Documents).
29. Included in those records were the calculations of the Respondent's delegate in which the amount of the debt was determined by the Respondent's delegate (T59). In summary, that calculation is as follows:
(a)In a table headed "Entitlement Calculations" the rate of disability support payments to which the Applicant was entitled for each payment period in the Relevant Period is calculated, taking into account half of the combined ordinary income of each of the Applicant and his wife (T59 pages 183-189);
(b)The income used for the entitlement calculations was derived from advice received from employers of the Applicant's former wife (T52-T54 and T56-T57), which income was attributed to each payment period (T59 pages 190-191);
(c)In a table headed "Debt Report" the amount of the Applicant's entitlement for each payment period was compared to the records of the amounts paid to the Applicant during that period. On some occasions there was an overpayment, and on others an underpayment. The total amount of the overpayments, after deducting the amount of the underpayments, was $1,176.40 (T59 pages 179-182). The overpayments arose because income of the Applicant's former wife was not taken into account when the rate of pension actually received by the Applicant was calculated.
(d)The amount of $129.24, being the Previously Recovered Amount, was then deducted from this total, to give the total outstanding overpayment of $1047.16.
30. Having reviewed these papers, I am satisfied the Applicant received payments of disability support pension which did not fully take into account the amount of income received by the Applicant's former wife, and that the Respondent's delegate correctly calculated the amount of the overpayment.
31. The Applicant's complaint in relation to the calculation of the overpayment appeared to be that he was underpaid on occasions, that he had four children to support at that time and that the Previously Recovered Amount related to part of the same period as the Relevant period.
32. As to the first of these matters, I am satisfied that the calculations of the Respondent's delegate deducted the amounts by which the Applicant was underpaid from the amounts which he was overpaid. That the underpayments were taken into account in working out the nett amount of the Applicant's debt appears from the table headed "Debt Report" (T59 pages 179-182).
33. As to the second of the matters raised by the Applicant, I am satisfied that the calculations of the Respondent's delegate as to the rate of disability support pension to which the Applicant was entitled took account of the number of children which the Applicant and his former wife had in their care. As I have noted above, under s. 1064-E4 of the Act the ordinary income free area is calculated by reference to the number of children in the care of the person. The calculations as to the Applicant's entitlement took account of the children in his care. For example, on the first payment period of 7 November 2001 the Applicant's "income threshold" was noted as $198.40 (T59 page 183). At the hearing before this Tribunal the Respondent's delegate indicated that this amount comprised $100.00 of the Applicant's income fee threshold and $24.60 income free threshold for each of his four children. I am satisfied that, in that manner, the fact that the Applicant and his wife had four children in their care was properly taken into account in calculating the rate of disability support pension to which the Applicant was entitled.
34. As to the third of the matters raised by the Applicant, I am satisfied that the amount of $129.24, which was the Previously Recovered Amount, was deducted from the total overpayment of $1176.40 to arrive at the amount owing of $1,047.16.
35. For the above reasons I find that the Applicant received $1,047.16 in disability support pension to which he was not entitled and which is not offset either by previous repayments made by the Applicant or the amounts by which he was underpaid from time to time.
36. Under s 1223(1) of the Act, the amount of $1,047.16 is therefore a debt due to the Commonwealth. It was a payment which was paid but was not payable to the Applicant, for the purposes of s 1223(1AB)(c) of the Act. In determining the existence of the debt it is not necessary to determine whether or not the overpayment is the result of an administrative error or a failure of the Applicant and his former wife to comply with the requirements of the social security law. In either of the latter two cases, the debt is taken to have arisen.
Consideration of the Issues – Whether the Debt should be Written Off or Waived
37. It is then necessary to consider whether the whole or part of the debt should be written off or waived.
38. Section 1236 of the Act provides for the writing off of a debt. However, the circumstances in which the Respondent, and therefore this Tribunal, may write of a debt are confined by . 1236(1A) of the Act. Where, as in the present case, the debt has been repaid none of the criteria set out in s 1236(1A) of the Act are satisfied. The debt is not irrecoverable at law, as it has in fact been recovered: s 1236(1A)(a) of the Act. It cannot be said that the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt, since the repayment of the debt demonstrates that capacity: s 1236(1A)(b) of the Act. The debtors whereabouts are not unknown: s 1236(1A)(c) of the Act. As the debt has already been repaid through deductions from subsequent pension payments, the recovery of the debt was cost effective: s 1236(1A)(d) of the Act. Therefore, I find that it is not open to me to write off the debt.
39. Section 1237A of the Act requires the waiver of a debt in circumstances where a debt, or a proportion of it, is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the payments were received in good faith. There is a dual requirement of this section. Firstly, I must be satisfied that a proportion of the debt is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth. If I am so satisfied, then I must also be satisfied that the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt. If both requirements are satisfied, then the relevant proportion of the debt must be waived.
40. On the material before me, I am unable to see any evidence that the debt, or any proportion of it, is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth. In the absence of that evidence, section 1237A of the Act is not shown to be applicable.
41. I note that the Respondent's delegate sent a number of notices to the Applicant, which required that the Applicant tell Centrelink within 14 days if his combined income increased. These notices were posted to the Applicant at a post office box address, in a manner that accorded with the requirements of ss. 68 and 72 of the Administration Act. There was no issue taken during the course of the hearing as to the fact that the notices were posted and received. A notice had been sent to the Applicant on 7 March 2001 (T3), prior to the commencement of the Relevant Period, and notices were sent on various occasions during the relevant period from 27 March 2002 (T4-T7, T14-T18, T25-T28, T30-T32, T35, T37-T40 and T42-T44). Other than the first of these notices, all identified the combined income used for calculating the regular payment of the Applicant's disability support pension. I find that the Applicant did not comply with these requirements, and it was that failure of the Applicant and his former wife to notify Centrelink of all of his former wife's income that was a cause of the overpayments. When it was put to the Applicant in his evidence before this Tribunal that this was the case, he did not deny that there had been a failure to disclose relevant information.
42. For these reasons, I do not consider that any proportion of the debt is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth. It follows that s 1237A does not require that any proportion of the debt be waived, and it is not necessary to consider whether the Applicant received the payments "in good faith" for the purposes of that section.
43. I would, however, note in passing that the Respondent relied, for his contention that the payments were not received in good faith, on a statement attributed to the Applicant in an interview with the Respondent's officers on 12 February 2004. A computer record of that interview attributed to the Applicant the comment "I know that we were getting overpaid. I had to do it to survive with four kids, six people in the house" (T55, pages 157(a)-158). In his sworn evidence before this Tribunal the Applicant denied making that statement. In the absence of any oral evidence from the officers concerned, I would not be prepared to find that the Applicant made this statement in the face of his denial. However, for the reasons noted above, it is not necessary to pursue this issue given my finding that no proportion of the debt was solely attributable to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth.
44. It is then necessary to consider whether s 1237AAD of the Act provides a source of authority to waive the whole or part of the debt.
45. Section 1237AAD(b) requires that I be satisfied that there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive the debt. I am not able to find any special circumstances which I consider would warrant waiving the debt in this case.
46. The term "special circumstances" is not defined by the Act, and the approach of the Tribunal and the Federal Court in a large number of cases has been to regard the matters to which the Tribunal may have regard when considering whether special circumstances exist as unconfined. Although it dealt with a somewhat different provision to s 1237AAD of the Act, the following passage from the decision of this Tribunal in Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 at 3 is often cited in this context:
"An expression such as 'special circumstances' is by its nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend on the context in which they occur. For it is context which allows one to say that the circumstances of one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. That is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be regarded as special".
47. The decision of the Tribunal in Beadle was affirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Court on appeal: (1985) 7 ALD 670. While the Court recognised that it was not possible to lay down precise rules as to what constituted special circumstances, the expression "unusual, uncommon or exceptional" was not, as Hill J noted in Dranichnikov v Centrelink (2003) 75 ALD 134; [2003] FCAFC 133 at [65], actually affirmed by the Full Court.
48. In Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 116 FCR 1 at [17] Heerey J said, in the context of the statutory predecessor to s 1184K of the Act:
"It is not sensible to lay down precise limits or precise rules about what may constitute special circumstances: Beadle v Director-General of Social Security 7 ALD 670 at 673; 60 ALR 225 at 228. Ill health financial circumstances and the unfairness of a strict application of the Act are some matters which may in an individual case, constitute special circumstances Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281 at 284, 288; see also Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 at 71."
49. Similarly, in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545 Kiefel J said, in a passage she again adopted in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348 at [19]:
"The phrase “special circumstances”, it has been said, although imprecise is sufficiently understood not to require judicial gloss: Beadle's case (at ALR 229 ; ALD 674), and for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth's case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only enquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary. The enquiry I have referred to would involve considering what would be the effect, if the provision in question or the principle of liability it creates, is applied."
50. In Re Fuller and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2004) 83 ALD 152; [2004] AATA 615 at [27] Downes J expressed the view that both hardship and unfairness can form the basis of exercising the discretion, in the context of s 1184K of the Act.
51. The above comments reflect the approach that was taken in Ryde v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] FCA 866 in the context of s 1237AAD of the Act.
52. The only limitation apparent from s 1237AAD(b) of the Act is that the special circumstances are not constituted by financial hardship alone. That, of course, does not make financial hardship irrelevant if there are other factors which suggest that there are special circumstances.
53. However, in this case I am unable to find any special circumstances which would justify waiving the whole or part of the debt, whether based on financial hardship or otherwise. The Applicant is now working, and the debt has been repaid. There is no evidence that satisfies me that the recovery of the debt has caused financial hardship to the Applicant to a degree that would count, in a significant way, towards an exercise of the discretion, assuming other non-financial factors to be present. The Applicant has received the benefit of the disability pension overpayment to which he was not entitled. A cause of the overpayment was a failure by the Applicant and his former wife to advise Centrelink of his former wife's income.
54. The argument of the Applicant focussed on his allegation that he had been victimised by officers of the Respondent and had already been pursued for the Previously Recovered Amount which had been overpaid in the same period. As I have noted, I find that the Previously Recovered Amount was deducted from the amount which the Applicant was found to owe. I do not find the fact that the Respondent has raised two debts relating to the same period, where facts as to the second amount were subsequently discovered by the Respondent, to constitute special circumstances that warrant the exercise of my discretion to waive the debt. As I have found the debt to be properly owing, I do not consider that allegations about the motivations of officers who discovered the debt would, even if they were made out, warrant the debt being waived.
55. For these reasons, I am not satisfied that there are special circumstances, arising out of harshness, unfairness or otherwise, that make it desirable to waive the debt or any part of the debt. It follows that I would not waive the debt under s. 1237AAD of the Act even if the requirements of s. 1237AAD, other than those of paragraph (b), were satisfied (about which I make no finding).
DECISION
56. The Tribunal affirms the decision of the SSAT dated 9 September 2005.
I certify that the 56 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms LR Tovey, Member
Signed: .......(Sgd S da Motta)............................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 20 February 2006
Date of Decision 17 October 2006
Representative for the Applicant Self representedRepresentative for the Respondent Ms Margaret Conlon
Centrelink Legal Services Branch
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