SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Papale & Ors v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd (No 2) [2017] QSC 160
PARTIES:
R PAPALE & V J PAPALE (TRADING AS VJ & R PAPALE); GK & MR STOCKHAM; JORDAN FARMING (QLD) PTY LTD ACN 126 223 532 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE JORDAN FARMING TRUST; PHILIP MARANO AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
G MARANO FAMILY TRUST (TRADING AS P J &
G MARANO) & ORS(plaintiffs)
v
WILMAR SUGAR AUSTRALIA LTD ACN 098 999 985 (FORMERLY SUCROGEN LIMITED)(defendant)
FILE NO:
BS No 11630 of 2012
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Claim
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
2 August 2017
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATES:
On the papers
JUDGE:
Daubney J
ORDER:
The plaintiffs shall pay 95 per cent of the defendant’s standard costs of and incidental to the proceeding
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL RULE – COSTS FOLLOW THE EVENT – COSTS OF THE ISSUES – where a defence was pleaded and persisted with until final submissions – where the defence was not referred to in final submissions – whether to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event – whether a reduction in the costs recoverable is appropriate
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rr 681(1), 684
Alborn & Ors v Stephens & Ors [2010] QCA 58
Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (No 2) (2015) 90 ALJR 270
Papale & Ors v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd [2017] QSC 72COUNSEL:
G A Thompson QC and D Pyle for the plaintiffs
G J Gibson QC and D E F Chesterman for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Clayton Utz Lawyers for the plaintiffs
Russells for the defendant
The background to this matter is set out at considerable length in the principal judgment,[1] when I ordered that the plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed. A corollary was that the defendant’s defensive counterclaim was also dismissed.
Submissions on costs of the proceeding have now been delivered by the parties.
The plaintiffs acknowledge the operation of the general rule with respect to costs, as articulated in UCPR r 681(1), but invoke r 684 to argue that, in the circumstances of this case, the defendant should be awarded only 90 per cent of its standard costs.
The basis for this submission is that a defence of estoppel which had been pleaded by the defendant, and which was not at any time formally abandoned during the trial, was simply not pursued by the defendant in its final submissions.
The plaintiffs say that they incurred significant costs in relation to that issue, both in the course of preparation for trial and in the trial itself. In particular, it is said, Mr Christaudo was called to give evidence on that point, and but for the pleaded defence of estoppel he would not otherwise have been called. As to this, it would, of course,…
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- Case
- [2017] QSC 160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue revolved around the general rule of costs in civil proceedings in state and territory courts. This rule stipulates that costs follow the event, meaning the losing party typically bears the costs of the proceedings. However, the plaintiffs had pleaded a defence and persisted with it until the final submissions, but the defence was not referred to in the final submissions. The court needed to determine if it should depart from the general rule in this instance and whether a reduction in the recoverable costs was warranted.
In reaching its decision, the court considered the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout the proceedings. Despite having pleaded a defence and maintaining it until final submissions, the plaintiffs did not reference the defence in their final submissions. The court found that this conduct warranted a departure from the general rule of costs. Consequently, the court decided that the plaintiffs should bear 95% of the defendant's standard costs of and incidental to the proceeding. This decision reflected the court's view that the plaintiffs' conduct had contributed to an unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings, justifying a reduction in the costs they were required to pay.
The final orders of the court mandated that the plaintiffs pay 95% of the defendant's standard costs of and incidental to the proceeding, thereby providing a clear directive for the parties regarding the financial consequences of the litigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
The plaintiffs shall pay 95 per cent of the defendant’s standard costs of and incidental to the proceeding
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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