| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 7718 of 2008
| JOHN PAOLACCI | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| CAPITAL FINANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ACN 069 663 136 | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | FORREST J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 17 & 18 September 2008 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 13 February 2009 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Paolacci v Capital Finance Australia Limited | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2009] VSC 31 | |
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PRACTICE and procedure- Consent judgment – Setting aside – Fresh evidence – Unilateral mistake – Fraud, unconscionability or silence.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr M. Harris | Impex Lawyers and Advisers |
| For the Defendant | Mr A. Schlicht | Koroneos Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
On the face of the document, Mr John Paolacci guaranteed and indemnified the obligations of Oxygen Print & Media Pty Ltd (“OPM”) under a rental agreement entered into with Capital Finance Australia Limited (“Capital Finance”) for the provision of a photocopier. OPM defaulted upon payments to Capital Finance, resulting in it issuing proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court against Mr Paolacci based on the guarantee.
Subsequently, those proceedings were settled and a consent judgment entered into in the Magistrates’ Court in favour of Capital Finance.
The twist in the case and the reason for this application is that the uncontested evidence before this Court is that Mr Paolacci did not sign the guarantee; rather, it was signed by one of his employees, a Mr David Ryan.
Mr Paolacci now relies upon two grounds upon which to set aside the judgment:
(a) That fresh evidence has emerged and this Court should set aside the judgment.
(b) That the consent judgment was procured by fraud or unconscionable conduct.
The proceedings in this Court
Mr Paolacci issued an originating motion on 8 August 2008 seeking to set aside orders made in the Magistrates’ Court and remit the matter to the Magistrates’ Court for rehearing.
The parties were agreed that neither s 109 nor s 110 of the Magistrates’ Court Act applied to the facts in this case. No issue was taken by Capital Finance as to the form of the application made by Mr Paolacci, which sought the quashing of orders made in the Magistrates’ Court based upon the grounds I have set out above.
It was accepted by the parties that I should determine, as a preliminary issue, whether the material provided on behalf of the plaintiff was sufficient to disclose a case to set aside the consent judgment. It was accepted by Capital Finance that this required me to take the evidence at its highest for Mr Paolacci.
The parties were also agreed that in the event of a finding that there was a prima facie case upon which the consent judgment could be set aside, then I should adjourn the matter for a further hearing at which the deponents of the affidavits would be cross-examined.
Factual background
OPM conducted the business known as “Oxyprint Solutions”. Although Mr Paolacci was a director, the running of the business was delegated…
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- Case
- [2009] VSC 31
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether Mr. Paolacci had demonstrated a unilateral mistake that warranted setting aside the consent judgment and whether the fresh evidence presented amounted to fraud, unconscionability, or silence that would justify the setting aside of the judgment. The court also needed to consider whether the fresh evidence could have reasonably been known or discovered by Mr. Paolacci prior to the consent judgment being entered.
The court found that while Mr. Paolacci had established a unilateral mistake, this alone was not sufficient to set aside the consent judgment. The court further held that the fresh evidence presented by Mr. Paolacci did not amount to fraud, unconscionability, or silence on the part of the respondent. The court concluded that the fresh evidence was either already known to Mr. Paolacci or could have been reasonably discovered by him prior to the consent judgment being entered. As such, the application to set aside the consent judgment was dismissed.
The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia dismissed the application to set aside the consent judgment. The court ruled that Mr. Paolacci's unilateral mistake did not warrant setting aside the consent judgment, and the fresh evidence presented did not amount to fraud, unconscionability, or silence on the part of the respondent. The court held that the fresh evidence was either already known to Mr. Paolacci or could have been reasonably discovered by him prior to the consent judgment being entered.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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