Panneton & Delauder - [2022] FedCFamC1F 422

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)
Panneton & Delauder [2022] FedCFamC1F 422

File number(s): BRC 10322 of 2018

Judgment of: JARRETT J

Date of judgment: 14 June 2022

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – CHILD WELFARE – The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and related legislation – best interests of the child – where mother seeks to live with the child to the United States of America – where the father seeks the child should live equally between each parent in Australia or alternatively with him – where the greatest risk of harm to the child is the exposure to parental conflict – whether the mother’s parenting capacity will decline if she is not permitted to live in the USA

Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss, 4AB(2)(d), 60CA, 60CC, 60CC(3), 61DA(1), 61DA(2), 65DAA(1), 65DAA(3), 65DAA(5), 65DAC

Cases cited:
Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346,

Whisler v Whisler (2010) 42 Fam LR 633

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 159

Date of hearing: 7, 8, 9 February 2022

Place: Brisbane

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Chekirova

Solicitor for the Applicant: Stolar Law Pty Ltd

Counsel for the respondent: Mr Drysdale Queens’s Counsel

Solicitor for the Respondent: Hopgood Ganim Lawyers

Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyers Mr Cahill

Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyers Berck Solicitors
ORDERS

BRC 10322 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MR PANNETON

Applicant

AND:
MS DELAUDER

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

order made by:

JARRETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 june 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Subject to orders 2 and 3, the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for decisions concerning the major long-term issues for X, born 2016.
2.The respondent have sole responsibility for renewing the passport issued by the United States of America to the child which expires on 12 April 2022 and each renewal thereafter.
3.The applicant have sole responsibility for causing a passport to be issued by the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Scotland and Wales for X, born 2016 and each renewal thereafter.
4.Prior to 9 July 2022:
(a)X shall live with the respondent in Brisbane, Australia;
(b)X shall live with the applicant at all times as agreed between the parties in writing and, failing agreement, as follows:
(i)for the balance of Term 2 2022, each alternate week from the conclusion of school or 6pm if it is a non-school day on Thursday until the commencement of school or 8am if it is a non-school day on Tuesday, commencing from the date of these orders;
(ii)for the June/July school holidays in 2022, from the conclusion of school or 6pm if it is a non-school day on 24 June 2022 until 8am on 8 July 2022.

(c)Unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, changeovers shall occur in the following locations and manner:
(i)on days X attends school, changeover will occur at the school in which X is enrolled; and
(ii)otherwise, changeover will occur at McDonald’s Suburb C, and:
A.the respondent is at liberty to cause a third party to attend on her behalf to conduct changeover (with such third party to be nominated by the respondent);
B.the applicant will remain in his vehicle during changeover if the respondent is present.

(d)X shall remain enrolled in V School.
(e)X shall communicate with the parent with whom he is not spending time by telephone, mobile, Zoom or FaceTime at all times as may be agreed in writing and, failing agreement, by FaceTime at 7pm on Thursday, with the parent with whom X is spending time to facilitate such communication.

5.From 9 July 2022:
(a)X shall live with the respondent who shall be at liberty to live with X in the United States of America;
(b)Whilst soever X lives in the United States of America, X shall live with the applicant at all such times as might be agreed between the parties and failing agreement as follows:
(i)during the Summer school holidays at all times as agreed between the parents in writing and, failing agreement, as elected by the applicant for up to six weeks of the Summer school holidays, as follows:
A.the time will occur between the first day of the Summer school holidays and the day that is three days before the conclusion of the Summer school holidays (including X’s travel to and from his place of residence, if any);
B.the applicant may nominate for X to spend such time in one period or instead no more than two separate periods with a minimum of four weeks between periods;
C.prior to X attaining 8 years of age, X will return to the respondent for one night after each continuous 14 nights with the applicant;
D.after X attains 8 years of age and prior to X attaining 12 years of age, X will return to the respondent for one night after each continuous 28 nights with the applicant;
E.after X attains 12 years of age, X will spend continuous time with the applicant;
F.prior to X being able to travel unaccompanied internationally, if elected by the applicant in accordance with orders 6 and 7, as part of X’s time with the applicant in the Summer school holidays, the respondent will travel, or cause a member of her family to travel, with X to either City KK, United Kingdom or Australia provided that the duration of the period is to be no more than 12 days (excluding travel to and from the United States) and no more than once per year;
G.any changeovers occurring other than by X’s unaccompanied international travel will occur at 3pm.

(ii)during the school holidays other than the Summer school holidays at all times as agreed between the parents in writing and, failing agreement, the applicant may nominate for X to spend the following holidays with the applicant:
A.in even years – mid-winter break and spring break; and
B.in odd years – two of the following school holidays nominated by the applicant:
(1) Christmas break;
(2) mid-winter break;
(3) spring break,

between the first day of the relevant school holidays and the day that is two days before the conclusion of the relevant school holidays (including X’s travel to and from his residence, if any).
(iii)any changeovers occurring other than by X’s unaccompanied international travel will occur at 3pm.

(c)with the applicant in the United States of America during the school term at all times as agreed between the parents in writing and, failing agreement, as follows:
(i)the applicant may nominate for X to spend time with the applicant over a period of up to three weeks per school term;
(ii)X is to spend time with the applicant during the three week period referred to in paragraph (a) during the school term in a two week cycle from the conclusion of school or 4:30pm if it is a non-school day on Monday in the first week until the commencement of school or 8am if it is a non-school day on Friday in the second week;
(iii)the applicant is to cause X to attend school and extra-curricular activities in which the child is enrolled which occur during his time with X.

6.For the purposes of order 5 hereof, the applicant provide to the respondent no later than one month prior to the conclusion of each school year written notice in respect of his nomination of X’s time with him during the following school year, including:
(a)which school holidays the applicant nominates in accordance with paragraph 5(b)(ii), if applicable;
(b)the period(s) X will spend with him during the Summer school holidays in accordance with paragraph 5(b)(i);
(c)if applicable, whether he nominates for the respondent to cause X to travel to Brisbane, Australia or City KK, United Kingdom during the Summer school holidays in accordance with paragraph 5(b)(i)(F) and, if so, the period in which the time will occur.

7.The applicant provide to the respondent in writing, at least 16 weeks’ prior to each occasion X will spend with him, the following:
(a)the precise dates on which X’s time with him will commence and conclude; and
(b)the telephone number at which X can be contacted and address at which X will reside during the time X will spend time with the applicant.

8.In respect of the costs of international travel arising as a result of the parenting arrangements for X, the following applies:
(a)prior to X being able to travel unaccompanied internationally, the following applies:
(i)the respondent is responsible for the costs of X’s and her travel to the City KK, United Kingdom or Brisbane, Australia in accordance with order 5(b)(i)(F) including:
A.flights for her and X; and
B.accommodation for her and X while X is in her care; and
C.any other travel costs of the respondent and child, and the respondent will provide a copy of flight and accommodation bookings to the applicant within 48 hours of receipt.
D.The applicant is responsible for the costs of other travel, including:
(1) flights for him and X;
(2) accommodation for him and X while X is in his care; and
(3) any other travel costs of the applicant, and the applicant will provide a copy of any flight and accommodation bookings to the respondent within 48 hours of receipt.

(b)After X is able to travel unaccompanied internationally, the respondent and applicant will be responsible for the costs of X’s economy return flights on each alternate occasion that X travels, commencing with the respondent, provided that if X is travelling to a location other than Brisbane, Australia, the maximum cost that the respondent is responsible for is the average of the cost of X’s four previous economy return flights to Brisbane, Australia, and the respondent is not obliged to make a flight booking until the applicant pays an amount to the respondent, to an account nominated in writing by the respondent, in respect of any additional flight cost.

9.Notwithstanding any other order, X will spend time with the parents on special occasions as agreed between the parents in writing and, failing agreement, as follows:
(a)on X’s birthday, with the parent with whom X is not already spending time as follows:
(i)if X’s birthday falls on a weekday – from the conclusion of school or 4:30pm if it is a non-school day until 8pm; and
(ii)if X’s birthday falls on a weekend – from 1pm until 8pm.

(b)on each of the parent’s birthdays, if X is not already spending time with that parent, with that parent from the conclusion of school or 5pm if it is a non-school day on the day prior to that parent’s birthday until the commencement of school or 8am if it is a non-school day on the day following that parent’s birthday;
(c)on Father’s Day, if X is not already spending time with the applicant, with the applicant from 5pm on the day prior to Father’s Day until the commencement of school or 8am if it is a non-school day on the day following Father’s Day;
(d)on Mother’s Day, if X is not already spending time with the respondent, with the respondent from 5pm on the day prior to Mother’s Day until the commencement of school or 8am if it is a non-school day on the day following Mother’s Day;
(e)in respect of the Fourth of July, in even years, if X is not already spending time with the respondent, with the respondent from 5pm on the Friday prior to 4 July until 8am on 5 July;
(f)in respect of Thanksgiving, if X is not already spending time with the respondent, with the respondent from the conclusion of school or 5pm if it is a non-school day on the day prior to Thanksgiving Day until 5pm on the Sunday following Thanksgiving Day;

and to the extent of any inconsistency with order 5 hereof, this order 9 prevails.
10.Changeover will occur as agreed between the parents in writing and, failing agreement, as follows:
(a)in respect of changeovers occurring in City E, United States of America – at the child’s school if possible, or otherwise at the McDonalds closest to the respondent’s residence;
(b)in respect of changeovers occurring in Brisbane, Australia – at McDonalds, F Street;
(c)in respect of changeovers occurring in City KK, United Kingdom – at G Street railway station, City KK, United Kingdom;
(d)in respect of changeovers occurring other than at X’s school or by X’s unaccompanied international travel, the respondent is at liberty to cause a third party to attend on her behalf to conduct changeover, with that third party to be nominated by the respondent.

11.In respect of changeovers occurring by X’s unaccompanied international travel, each parent will deliver X to the relevant airport at the conclusion of their time with X for the child to commence his travel.
12.Prior to X having a phone of his own, X will communicate with the parent with whom he is not spending time by telephone, mobile, Zoom or FaceTime at all times as may be agreed in writing and, failing agreement, on the following days (in the time zone of X):
(a)each Wednesday and Saturday;
(b)the special occasions set out in paragraph 9 if the other parent is not spending time with the child for such special occasion, with the parent with whom X is spending time to facilitate such communication, at the following time:
(i)if the parents and X are in the same time zone, 6pm in that time zone;
(ii)if X is in Brisbane and is contacting the respondent in the United States, 9am Australian Eastern Standard Time;
(iii)if X is in the United States and is contacting the applicant in Australia, 6pm Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight Time (as the case may be).

13.Upon X having a phone of his own, each parent be at liberty to contact X directly at all reasonable times and the parent with whom X is spending time will encourage X to communicate with the other parent regularly.
14.Subject to order 15, X attend H School, City E, United States of America from kindergarten to grade 8.
15.Should the respondent provide written notice to the applicant that she cannot afford to meet her share of the fees for H School, then X attend the public school in the catchment in which the respondent resides.
16.Including pursuant to s 65Y of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the parents be at liberty to travel internationally with X at all times as agreed between the parents in writing and, failing agreement, provided as follows:
(a)that the travelling parent provides at least 28 days’ written notice to the other parent of his or her intention to travel overseas with X, including:
(i)the approximate departure and return dates;
(ii)the name of the persons who will be accompanying X;
(iii)the country or countries X will be travelling to.

(b)that at least 14 days prior to the departure date, the travelling parent must provide to the other parent:
(i)a copy of X’s itinerary which must include return airfare ticketing;
(ii)the dates on which X will arrive and depart each country;
(iii)a telephone number and address at which X can be contacted in each country.

(c)that X will only travel to countries which have acceded to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and are a convention country for the purposes of regulation 10 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 at the time of X’s travel.
(d)that X will only travel to:
(i)Australia;
(ii)the United States of America;
(iii)the United Kingdom; or
(iv)any other country providing his travel is consistent with any recommendations or travel advisory warnings that may issue by the relevant government department in the United States of America such that X will not travel if any of the following warnings (or the equivalent) are in place at the time of his travel:
A.Level 2: Exercise a high degree of caution;
B.Level 3: Reconsider your need to travel; or
C.Level 4: Do not travel.

17.Pursuant to section 65Y of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the parents be at liberty to travel internationally with X in the event of an emergency, including but not limited to a significant health event or death of a family member or friend of that parent, provided the travelling parent provides the information referred to in order 16(a) and (b) as soon as practicable to the other parent and no less than 24 hours prior to travel. This paragraph prevails over paragraphs 5(b)(i) and 6, provided that the period of travel be no more than two weeks.
18.For the purposes of X’s travel in accordance with order 16 or 17, X may travel unaccompanied internationally if that is permitted by the policy of the particular airline with which the child will travel, provided that either parent is at liberty to travel with X for some or all of his travel, at that parent’s cost.
19.The respondent, the applicant and/or X are not required to travel internationally pursuant to these orders should such travel result in:
(a)greater than seven days quarantine; or
(b)hotel quarantine facilitated by the relevant government at the traveller’s cost,

and to the extent of any inconsistency between this paragraph and any other paragraph, including orders 5(b)(i) and 6 this order prevails.
20.Each party will do all things and sign all documents as soon as practicable and within 7 days of a written request by the other parent, or 24 hours in the event of an emergency, necessary to facilitate a parent’s or X’s travel pursuant to these orders, including obtaining any travel exemptions.
21.While X is travelling overseas with a parent other than in accordance with paragraphs 5(b)(i) and 6, X will communicate with the other parent by telephone, mobile, Zoom or FaceTime at all times as may be agreed in writing and, failing agreement, on each Wednesday and Saturday, for a 30 minute window, at such times as may be agreed in writing between the parties having regard to their respective time zones, with the travelling parent to facilitate such communication and this paragraph prevails over any other order.
22.In respect of X’s passports:
(a)X’s passports are to be held by the respondent.
(b)for the purposes of X’s international travel, each parent will ensure that X’s passport(s) necessary for the travel accompany X, provided that the applicant will return all of X’s passports in his possession at the conclusion of his time with X to the respondent (or any third party conducting changeover on the respondent’s behalf).

23.The parties do all acts and take all steps necessary to ensure X’s passports remain valid with an expiry date no less than 6 months validity at all times with any renewal costs (including, while X resides in Australia, costs associated with X attending the US Consulate in person, if that is required) to be shared equally between the parties.
24.Each parent facilitate any reasonable request of X to contact the other parent, including by Zoom, FaceTime or by telephone.
25.Any communication in respect of X occur through the website “Our Children” (with the parties to meet their own subscription fees), except in the case of emergencies, including in the case of X’s hospitalisation, where communication is to occur by text message.
26.The parents keep each other informed of their respective residential address, email address and telephone numbers and each parent is to notify the other parent within 24 hours of a change.

27.Each party is to keep the other informed as to any illness, accident, hospitalisation or medical condition with respect to X while he is in that party’s care (including providing the name of the child’s treating specialist) and keep the other informed of any medication to be taken by X.
28.Neither parent denigrate the other, their family, their partner, or their friends, to, in front of, or within X’s hearing or to any school of X, and each parent will direct third parties to refrain from such denigration, and failing their compliance, will remove X from that environment immediately.
29.These orders serve as any necessary authority to X’s treating doctors, schools, extracurricular activities and the like to the effect that either parent be able to communicate with same and be advised of X’s treatment and/or progress and obtain reports, newsletters, school photographs and the like.
30.Neither party smoke or vape in the presence of X.
31.The applicant be restrained from using illicit drugs or drugs of abuse.
32.The applicant be restrained from using a phone while operating a motor vehicle in which X is travelling.
33.Within 7 days of the date of this order, the applicant do all things and sign all documents necessary to authorise the respondent to access information from and claim on her own behalf upon X’s Medicare account and, in the event of a default continuing for in excess of 7 days, a Registrar of this Court is appointed to sign such documents and do such acts as are necessary in lieu of the applicant.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Panneton & Delauder is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JARRETT J:

X was born in 2016. For 179 days of his life his parents managed X’s parenting arrangements without the court’s regulation. However, for the majority of his five, nearly six years now, he has lived on what can only be described as a battlefield where the opposing generals are his parents, Mr Panneton, the applicant in these proceedings and Ms Delauder, the respondent in these proceedings.
X’s parents had a brief relationship of about three and half years in length. They started living together in late 2014 or perhaps mid 2015 (the difference does not matter) and separated on a final basis in the first half of 2018.
The procedural history of this matter is tragic, but not unusual. On 7 September 2018 Mr Panneton filed an initiating application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known). On 5 November 2018 a judge of that court ordered, by consent and inter alia, that X spend 4 nights per week in Mr Panneton’s care. Otherwise he was to live with Ms Delauder. On 15 July 2019 another judge, by consent, reduced X’s time with Mr Panneton to one overnight stay and one afternoon per week.
In November 2019 the court heard a defended interim application for further parenting orders. The judgment delivered in early December 2019 ordered gradually increasing time between X and Mr Panneton. Those orders contemplated X spending one overnight and one afternoon with Mr Panneton each week, though in a different form to the orders of 15 July 2019.
The first three days of the hearing of the final parenting application occurred on 25, 26 and 27 May 2020. The trial concluded on 20 July 2020. On 21 July 2020 further interim orders were made pending the delivery of the final judgment. Those orders imposed another graduating regime of time upon X. Ultimately, he began spending two nights per week with Mr Panneton.
Judgment was delivered in November 2020. Amongst other things, the final orders provided for X to live with Ms Delauder in the United States of America after 19 December 2021. The orders imposed a requirement for her to register the orders in an enforceable form in City B in the United States of America. In the meantime, X’s time with Mr Panneton again began increasing in stages. The final step was the current arrangement, by which X presently spends five nights per fortnight with Mr Panneton.
Mr Panneton appealed the trial judge’s decision. On 12 May 2021 the Full Court of this court heard Mr Panneton’s appeal and in June 2021 the appeal was allowed and the application remitted for rehearing by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known). On 5 July 2021 the application was transferred to this court.
Pending the rehearing of the application, the parties agreed that the interim arrangements imposed by the orders of 18 November 2020 should continue. Pursuant to those orders X presently spends nine continuous nights with Ms Delauder and five continuous nights with Mr Panneton.
By these proceedings, Mr Panneton seeks orders that X live in Australia and that he live equally between his parents. In the event that Ms Delauder decides to return to the USA, he argues that X should remain in Australia and live primarily with him. The details of the primary orders he seeks are set out in his case outline filed on 31 January 2022. These remained the orders he sought at the conclusion of the trial. He did not fashion orders in the alternative, as he had been directed to do on 10 November 2021.
Ms Delauder seeks an order that X live with her in the United States of America. The details of the primary orders she seeks and the alternatives are set out in her case outline filed on 31 January 2022. She did not depart from this position at the conclusion of the trial.
I also have the benefit of an ICL in these proceedings. She recommends orders that require X to live in Australia with both of his parents. She too, promotes orders whereby if Ms Delauder decides to return to the USA, X should remain in Australia and live primarily with Mr Panneton. The details of the primary orders she seeks and the alternatives are set out in her case outline filed on 31 January 2022. She did not depart from this position at the conclusion of the trial.
Mr Panneton
Mr Panneton was born in the United Kingdom in 1981. He is a citizen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and came to Australia in 2008. He is now a permanent resident of Australia. He works in the resources industry and is employed on a full-time basis here in Australia. He has no other children.
Mr Panneton gave evidence-in-chief that he is in a relationship with Ms W and they have lived together in Suburb Y since October 2019. In cross-examination he said it was 2020. Whatever is the case, for reasons that are entirely unexplained, Ms W gave no evidence in these proceedings. Nor did she participate in an interview with the author of the family reports in this case, Mr M, a consultant social worker. Mr Panneton’s only explanation for this was that Ms W was scared of the proceedings, whatever that means and that Mr M did not ask to interview Ms W.
Significantly, Mr Panneton did not inform Ms Delauder about his alleged relationship with Ms W directly. He said that he did not see it as important that Ms Delauder know that there was another person living in the home in which X was living when he was with Mr Panneton. Mr Panneton took the view that the information that he provided in his affidavit material for the purposes of this proceeding was sufficient notice to Ms Delauder of his relationship with Ms W. Senior Counsel for Ms Delauder taxed Mr Panneton on the fact that he had omitted all reference to Ms W in his affidavit filed on 27 March 2020 for the purposes of the first trial in these proceedings. Mr Panneton accepted that there was no reference to Ms W in that affidavit and he had no explanation for his omission. That is so despite telling Mr M in mid-2019 for the purposes of an earlier family report that he and Ms W were “officially dating” soon after February 2019.
It was open to Mr Panneton to call Ms W to give evidence. That she was “scared of the proceedings” is no answer to his failure to call her because she could have been compelled to give evidence. These proceedings involve the best interests of a child, not the best interests of the parties to the proceedings or other adults associated with them. I infer, in the circumstances, that Ms W’s evidence would not have assisted Mr Panneton’s case concerning his relationship with her and the nature of X’s relationship with her and the importance to him of her.
Whilst I accept that Mr Panneton probably has a relationship with a person called Ms W, I cannot make any finding about the nature or quality of that relationship. Mr Panneton gives evidence in his most recent affidavit of evidence-in-chief about the relationship between X and Ms W under the heading “[Ms W’s] Relationship with [X]”. His evidence on this topic is not only self-serving and uncorroborated, but disorganised and, at times, it is difficult to discern precisely the point of the evidence.
Mr Panneton drifts between a description of X’s routine, the leisure activities he enjoys at Mr Panneton’s residence and a description of X’s relationship with Ms W. When Mr Panneton uses the word “we” it is at times unclear whether he means himself and Ms W, himself and X, or all three. It is not plain from his evidence how facts he has deposed to could possibly be within his first-hand experience, being those things he can competently give evidence on.
I do not accept Mr Panneton’s self-serving evidence insofar as he purports to give evidence of the nature of the relationship between X and Ms W. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is a correct description to say that Ms W is Mr Panneton’s “partner”. Nor do I accept that she has any relationship with X perhaps other than that she is his father’s sometime girlfriend. I do not accept that she is an important person in X’s life.
Mr Panneton has a history of using marijuana. He said in cross-examination that although he used marijuana in the past, he ceased his use a long time ago. He says that for the past 13 years he has been subjected to “countless” random workplace drug tests for drugs. He swears that he has never returned a positive drug or alcohol reading in his employment. He swears that he has never taken sick or annual leave in an attempt to avoid a random drug test, or pre-shift test. However, he produces no corroborative evidence from his employer to support his own evidence about those matters and there is reason to doubt it.
Notwithstanding his evidence about his marijuana use, in cross-examination he said that he had smoked marijuana in X’s presence. That was obviously within the last 13 years. Indeed, it must have been within the last five years at most. He says it was a mistake. He had marijuana in his tobacco pouch and accidentally rolled it into his cigarette. That begs the question of course: what was he doing with marijuana at all if he was subjected to countless workplace tests over the last 13 years and otherwise abstinent from marijuana use? The evidence he gave about this matter in cross-examination, I found, was disingenuous.
Otherwise, Mr Panneton’s health is unremarkable. He has a circle of friends in Brisbane and he called some of them to give evidence in these proceedings. One of them was Mr Z who swore that he has known Mr Panneton since his arrival in Australia in 2009. He deposes to having spent a great deal of time with Mr Panneton and Ms Delauder when they were together and with Mr Panneton after the parties separated. He speaks in glowing terms of Mr Panneton’s abilities with children – Mr Z’s own children and X. His evidence was that his child, BB, and X have “play dates every weekend Mr Panneton spends with X”. They have been on several camping trips together as well, particularly in 2021. However, despite spending so much time with Mr Panneton and/or X, Mr Z makes no mention of Ms W in his evidence-in-chief. Not one. That is beyond curious. It underscores my reluctance to accept Mr Panneton’s evidence about Ms W and the quality of her relationship with him and with X.
Presently Mr Panneton lives in a property which he describes as “Ms W’s house” at Suburb Y, Brisbane.
Mr Panneton gave evidence that he does not wish to leave Australia, that he probably could not obtain work in the United States and that it would be a long and involved process for him to obtain a visa to live and work there. I do not know if any of that is true because none of his assertions about those matters are corroborated by reliable evidence. He gives no basis for his belief that he would probably not obtain work there. However, when I asked him a question in response to his evidence in cross-examination that he would do anything for his son, he said that he would move to the United States of America if the court ordered X to live there. The impediments that he sees to such a move are plainly not insurmountable.
Ms Delauder
Ms Delauder, the respondent, was born in City AA, United States of America in 1985. She is a citizen of that country. Ms Delauder works as a professional for an international firm. Her expertise is in the resources industry, though her skills are currently under-utilised by her employer, for reasons for which I will examine later. She has no other children.
Ms Delauder is not an Australian citizen and her ability to remain in this country is contingent upon her holding a visa that permits her to be here. At the moment she holds a Medium Term Temporary Skill Shortage (subclass 482) visa sponsored by her employer. Her visa will expire on 12 December 2022. She has never applied to become a permanent resident because, she said in evidence, she never intended to remain permanently in Australia.
Originally, she came to Australia in her teens and completed the last year and half of her secondary schooling in Sydney before leaving Australia. She returned to the United States for university studies between 2003 and 2007. Thereafter she travelled to the United Kingdom. She returned to Australia about 10 years ago and commenced a relationship with Mr Panneton in 2013 or so.
Ms Delauder has not re-partnered since separating from Mr Panneton. She remains living at the property the parties rented together in Suburb C, Brisbane when their relationship was intact.
Ms Delauder’s evidence is that she is not coping well living in Australia and having to deal with Mr Panneton. She swears, and I accept, that since separation she has experienced weight loss due to constant nausea, a skin rash, hair loss, and sleeping difficulties. She attributes all of these things to stress, fear or anxiety. The hair loss and sleep difficulties are themselves, sources of stress and anxiety which compound upon themselves cyclically.
She describes attempts to relieve these symptoms via prescriptions from her doctor for increasingly potent sleeping aids and anxiety medications. The sleeping aids, she says, have limited impact and the anxiety medication makes her feel “emotionally numb”, foggy at work and generally groggy. She describes having no love for life, no motivation and she feels like she is on autopilot. She believes the medication made her a worse parent, employee and person to be around. She discontinued the medication in November 2019. Whether that was in accordance with, against, or without seeking, medical advice is not apparent from her evidence.
Her symptoms, she says, are impacting on her ability to work. She takes a number of sick days and work from home days at short notice, although she said she only receives one “mental health day” from her employer per year. She has taken that when it has been available to her.
Ms Delauder swears that many of these difficulties were relieved when judgment was delivered in November 2020. She was able to sleep, her brain fog (whatever that means) went away, her migraines and muscular pains decreased and her joy and energy for life returned. She was looking forward to returning to the United States and her family. However, she says she has been struggling to cope emotionally, mentally and physically since the appeal was allowed in June 2021. Her difficulties have resurfaced. I accept her evidence about these matters.
Ms Delauder swears that she experiences aches, pains and migraines on a daily basis. Sleep is difficult and frequently disturbed by moments of panic and fear. She says that her “brain fog” is back and feels worse than before. She experiences constant stomach upsets. Her evidence was that concentrating at work has become difficult and she struggles to deliver work in a “comprehensive and clear way”.
Ms Delauder presently has a position on an internal project for her employer. She does not deal with her employer’s clients and so she has been able to be more flexible with her working hours and times. She has been able to disguise some of her distress from her employer. If she was required to deal with her employer’s clients her working hours and times would be less flexible. She is able to manage her exhaustion with the flexibility provided by her current role, which permits breaks and sleeping during the day.
None of Ms Delauder’s evidence about these matters was challenged in cross-examination. I accept her evidence about her symptoms and her observations about how and when they have waxed and waned. I accept her evidence about her state of mind. Indeed, her fragility was demonstrated in cross-examination when she was asked to deal with these sensitive subjects.
However, I do not accept her theorising about the cause of her symptoms, an area in respect of which she has no demonstrated expertise. There is, though, some expert evidence which deals with the potential causes of her symptoms. Ms Delauder says that in July 2021 she was given a preliminary diagnosis of a number of medical conditions by her general practitioner. She was referred to Dr CC, a consultant in arthritis & rheumatic diseases. Dr CC provided two reports to the GP, one dated 13 September 2021 and the other dated 22 November 2021.
Dr CC’s first report records that a number of Ms Delauder’s issues predate these proceedings. Musculoskeletal pains have episodically troubled her since she was in an accident at the age of 18 years. Wrist pains have troubled her in the last 16 years. She damaged a knee 11 years ago. In the last six years she has been prone to spinal pain. She has been prone to migraines since age 25 averaging one or two per month. Relevantly, in the last three-four years she has been prone to “significant Malaise” and needs to lay down for two-three hours during the day. In the last two years, she has become prone to abdominal bloating provoked by dairy foods and foods containing gluten.
Significantly, and inconsistently with Ms Delauder’s sworn evidence, Dr CC records “Photosensitive skin erythema, affecting her face/upper chest, has troubled her throughout life” – i.e., skin rashes. This must be something that Ms Delauder told Dr CC. Further, Dr CC also records “No history of alopecia/seborrhoea/psoriasis”. Alopecia is hair loss. She reported anxiety for the last six years (so pre-dating separation). She reported to Dr CC that her weight has been stable, but over what period is not clear.
In his first report, Dr CC concluded:
I thought the above presentation with Polyarthralgia’s / soft tissue rheumatism in this 36-year-old female with some features of IBS (irritable bowel syndrome) and stressful lifestyle was suggestive of possible evolving inflammatory CTD. As treatment I prescribed a trial of Plaquenil 400mg a day and Prednisone 5mg a day; oral B 12 supplements also recommended.

What that means in layman’s terms is not explained in the evidence.
Dr CC organised some further tests for Ms Delauder. His second report was issued after the results of those test were to hand and Dr CC had reviewed Ms Delauder. The second report does not advance the matter.
There is also a letter written by Dr CC to Ms Delauder’s lawyers in which he answers certain questions posed by them. In that letter, Dr CC indicates a “relatively good prognosis”. This is conditional upon her learning to manage her symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome and “avoiding significant life stresses”. He says that stressful lifestyles can aggravate the immune system, which follows on to aggravate musculoskeletal symptoms. He prescribed medication, the ingestion of which, Ms Delauder says, has not led to any noticeable improvements in her condition.
Dr CC’s evidence falls short of establishing on the balance of probabilities that Ms Delauder’s present symptoms are caused by the stresses that she perceives as a result of the present proceedings, her dealings with Mr Panneton and her present inability to return to live in the United States. At best the evidence establishes that her symptoms could be the result of aggravation of her immune system caused by a stressful lifestyle and an aggravation of pre-existing conditions. In the end, it may be a distinction without a difference.
Ms Delauder says she cannot think about her current circumstances and the fact that X’s, and thus her own, future circumstances will likely be defined by these proceedings. To do so makes her feel depressed.
That her present circumstances whereby she lives in Australia and deals with Mr Panneton is having a deleterious effect on her is clear on the evidence. Mr M is a consultant social worker who was engaged for the purposes of preparing reports pursuant to s 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). He has prepared three reports dated 6 November 2018, 12 July 2019 and 25 January 2022. I have earlier referred to some of Mr M’s evidence. During re-examination Mr M was asked by counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer about the effect that Ms Delauder’s current circumstances upon her:
Is it a concern for you – the mother has only attended two or three changeovers in the last three years. Is that a concern for you that she hasn’t made more of an effort to attend those changeovers in person? Well, it’s – it’s a symptom of something else. So to particularise their relationship – I mean, it’s quite clear that the mother, since separation, has had a psychological reaction to the father, an adverse reaction, to being around him such that she cannot cope with that. I think that that has been a consistent response from her over time. I mean, in the recent report there was an issue about – not parent/teacher meetings, something at the kindergarten that he might have gone to. If it’s true that she has some sort of stress over that, that she can’t manage or some reaction, it’s always probably going to be that way and difficult to change. I think a psychologist report that she has, has probably made some mention of that, too, in terms of how she reacts to that sort of thing. I just think it’s a factor that has to be taken into account.
(my emphasis)
To return to Ms Delauder’s employment, she swears that her proximity to Mr Panneton has been problematic for her in her employment. Her employer is aware of the difficulties between her and Mr Panneton. Mr Panneton’s employer is apparently Ms Delauder’s employer’s most significant client in the resources industry. Ms Delauder’s expertise lies in an area of the resources industry. She has been moved to a role within her employer’s business outside of the resources field. While this role distances her from Mr Panneton, it precludes her from the work necessary to meet her employer’s requirements for further promotion. Thus, she is not exercising her earning capacity to its fullest nor taking advantage of advancement opportunities in her chosen field. This difficulty, in conjunction with the expense to her employer of renewing her visa and the impact of her difficulties on her work, makes her concerned about the future of her employment. However, she called no evidence from her employer as to these matters and so it is difficult to make an assessment of the security of her current employment and I do not do so.
Ms Delauder believes that in her current circumstances, her income is unlikely to increase. According to her, her employer is one of the, if not the largest, employers of consultants in Brisbane. She considers that her continued employment is tenuous. She is unable to progress her career in her current role in the circumstances in which she finds herself in Australia. That she genuinely holds these beliefs was not challenged in these proceedings.
Were Ms Delauder to lose her job, her visa requires her to find another sponsoring employer within 60 days, get a different type of visa or leave Australia. Ms Delauder is the parent of an Australian citizen and thus other visas are available to her. She identifies two such, being the Subclass 103 Parent visa and the Subclass 143 Contributory Parent Visa. The 103 visa is, according to the information Ms Delauder has accessed on the internet from the relevant department, “likely to take at least 30 years for final processing”. Years is not a typographical error. It has a cost of $6,490 attached to it.
The 143 visa will be processed faster. Given the timeframes of the 103 visa, that is not difficult, but Ms Delauder does not outline how much faster. Its cost is $47,825. Ms Delauder’s evidence is that she cannot afford that. She claims to have no savings and to have a current income of $148,667 gross, excluding superannuation. She annexes a budget to her affidavit, with a weekly surplus of $359 per week.
She has also acquired significant legal debts in the course of this matter, and now owes $204,538 to her parents and $39,558 to her grandmother.
Ms Delauder says that her support network in Australia is non-existent. She regularly contacts her family in the United States, electronically. She has been able to establish and maintain one important friendship while in Brisbane with a colleague named “DD”. Their schedules permit them to interact approximately once per month and she says he has told her he is considering relocating from Brisbane. Mr and Ms EE are also friends, but they are not described as close friends. She also receives some support from her former au pair, who she says is considering relocating to the United Kingdom, her home country.
In terms of professional support, Ms Delauder sees a counsellor from U Counselling named Ms FF. They meet fortnightly, or weekly in periods of acute stress. Ms FF has informed her that U Counselling will discontinue this support, given ongoing demand and the resources they have already dedicated to supporting Ms Delauder. She received an extension until after the trial of this matter on 9 February 2022 otherwise this support would have been discontinued in December 2021.
Ms Delauder had been able to access a psychologist through her employment and had been seeing Ms GG in that regard. However, there is a limit to her access which she reached in 2021. Her private medical insurance has recently commenced providing a rebate for psychologists and she has commenced seeing Dr HH a consulting psychologist. Seven sessions between Ms Delauder and Dr HH were conducted between August and October 2021. There have been a further two since.
Dr HH gave evidence in these proceedings. She provided a report dated 6 November 2021 upon which she was cross-examined. According to the report, initially Ms Delauder presented as a well-educated and articulate woman, who was well presented and oriented to time and place. However, in her later sessions in September 2021 Dr HH describes Ms Delauder “[appearing] dishevelled and fatigued, and she explained that she had been experiencing an increasing number of negative physical symptomology that was causing her distress, and interrupting her ability to function normally. She had had to reduce her activity level and monitor her work engagement, as she had troubles with concentrating and coping with migraines.”
Ms Delauder complained to Dr HH of a lack of support, financial distress, stress and anxiety which escalated when dealing with Mr Panneton and being fearful of having to engage with Mr Panneton on a long-term basis. When tested, she scored in the moderate range for depression and extremely severe range for anxiety and stress. Dr HH recorded Ms Delauder’s claims that her symptoms are negatively impacting her ability to work productively, engage in household duties, engage socially and enjoy her lifestyle. Her symptoms were linked to her concerns over her future, the parenting orders and communicating with Mr Panneton.
Dr HH recorded her treatment for Ms Delauder as follows:
4.25 As a result of background information, observation and DASS scores, [Ms Delauder] was treated for symptomology associated with depression and anxiety, as well as post-traumatic stress symptoms that largely stemmed from her relationship with [Mr Panneton].
Dr HH describes that the various forms of treatment she administered were helpful and that Ms Delauder was a motivated and willing participant. In summary, she thought that Ms Delauder responded well to the treatment.
The underlying theme of Dr HH’s report and opinion is that there were two general matters that informed Ms Delauder’s psychological health. First are what she describes as “lifestyle issues”. Within that description Dr HH refers to Ms Delauder’s isolation from her family and the lack of emotional and physical support that means for her. She includes the lack of financial stability that Ms Delauder perceives in her current situation and the effects of her physical ailments. The second of the general matters informing Ms Delauder’s psychological health is the stress and anxiety associated with communicating with Mr Panneton and the claimed fear of having to engage with him on a long-term basis. Dr HH considered that Ms Delauder will require ongoing support with these matters:
5.01 [Ms Delauder] requires ongoing psychological support to address the symptoms identified. It is expected that, as many of [Ms Delauder’s] lifestyle issues cannot be resolved in Brisbane (e.g., receiving family emotional and physical support), and she reports ongoing conflict and communication issues with her child’s father, she will continue to experience symptoms and likely have periods of time when symptoms flare and escalate.
According to Dr HH, the way to manage Ms Delauder’s emotional difficulties and improve her psychological health would be for her to disengage from Mr Panneton:
5.03 Typically, people reporting negative consequences (e.g., anxiety and stress) as a result of engaging with a specific individual, would initially be supported to disconnect from this individual. This is particularly the case when the client reports a perceived power imbalance in the relationship, which can lead to them experiencing further self-doubt, an ongoing loss of confidence and a reduced sense of identity.
5.04 Being in physical proximity to her family members who would be able to provide physical and emotional and financial support, along with access to appropriate health professionals for her treatment of [her medical conditions] would definitely be beneficial to [Ms Delauder’s] lifestyle and psychological well-being.
Dr HH expects that Ms Delauder will continue to experience symptoms and likely have periods of time when symptoms flare and escalate while she remains in Brisbane.
These assessments are consistent with the observations of Mr M who noted that “[Ms Delauder] presented anxiously and was teary at times through her assessment.”
Ms Delauder swears that she puts a great deal of effort into shielding X from her difficulties. However, as time has gone on her ability to do so has diminished. Concerningly, she reports X commenting that “I [(X)] will take good care of you [(Ms Delauder)]”. She swears that he asks her questions about her back and other physical ailments. It is of course natural for X to want his mother to be well and happy, but it would not be in his best interests for him to decide he was a care taker for Ms Delauder. His energy should be spent on his development, not caring for his parents.
Ms Delauder is concerned that this problem will only get worse. While she exhausts her capacity to shield X, he will grow older and become more perceptive of her difficulties.
Prognosis in Australia
Dr HH’s prognosis if Ms Delauder remains in Australia can be found at paragraphs 5.15-5.19 and 5.25-5.29 of her report. She discusses the following vulnerabilities: the loss of Ms Delauder’s U Counselling counsellor, her lack of financial means to access her choice of professional, her lack of family and friends in Brisbane and the exposure to conflict with Mr Panneton. She does not clearly state that Ms Delauder’s health and in particular her psychological health, would deteriorate, but it seems to me that that is the effect of her evidence. If X were required to stay in Australia, and Ms Delauder stayed with here, Dr HH recommends she have the ability to take extended trips to the United States to have the benefit of familial support.
Dr HH notes that a well-adjusted parent is the best predictor of a well-adjusted child, and that Ms Delauder is anxious, sad and coping with physical discomforts in Brisbane. These things will impact upon her capacity to care for X in the long-term.
Dr CC’s prognosis is that if Ms Delauder continues to experience a stressful lifestyle, it may continue to aggravate her symptoms.
I am satisfied and I find that the lifestyle that Ms Delauder has experienced in Australia since separation and more latterly since her desire to return to the United States has been thwarted has aggravated her symptoms as described by Dr CC. Whilst her underlying conditions may not have been caused by the stress experienced by Ms Delauder since separation the weight of the evidence satisfies me that those symptoms and her experiences of them have been exacerbated and aggravated by that stress.
Utter devastation is what Ms Delauder expects if she is forced to remain in Australia. Without the hope of being able to relocate with X she predicts the following for herself:
I believe I will cry, a lot and all the time. I believe that I will be continuously triggered to feel these emotions because everything around me will be a reminder that [sic] am stuck in a life I do not want for myself, with no autonomy as to the trajectory that my life takes. I will feel controlled by [Mr Panneton] on a long-term basis.
Significantly, she goes on to state “finding energy for [X] will be even more difficult than it is now. […] I am worried that I will have insufficient energy to maintain my employment as well as be a parent to [X].” She swears that “I am worried that my perpetual ‘bad day’ will mean that I am shorter with [X]”. I have no doubt that Ms Delauder genuinely believes these matters.
Ms Delauder indicates she has put significant effort into planning how she would manage herself if X is to stay in Australia. She outlines those plans, including reinstating her anxiety medications and other steps relating to her health, though she is concerned her income will limit what she can accomplish. She says she will try to remain in Australia to be with X, but states “I will feel trapped in my life, having to choose between being miserable every day, or leaving for the United States without [X]”.
Prognosis in the United States of America
In the United States, Ms Delauder expects she will be able to obtain a wage of $199,000 USD in base salary. At trial, she said this was equivalent to $276,927 AUD, though I expect that figure fluctuates. She has annexed emails from a recruiting manager in Employer L in the United States which indicates Employer L’s branch in the United States “currently intends to extend an offer of employment to [Ms Delauder]”.
Ms Delauder proposes to move in with her parents in City E initially. They have offered her the use of a car and their holiday home if needed. Her support network would be greatly expanded. She would have access to her parents and her brother. Her grandmother, aunts and uncles and cousins also live in the area. She expects she will be significantly more relaxed and financially stable in the United States. She expects to be able to recuperate mentally.
Ms Delauder indicates that her mother, X’s maternal grandmother, experiences a number of chronic medical conditions. It is not in Ms Delauder’s own evidence, but the report of Dr HH indicates that the medical care available to her mother in the City E area has been excellent, and would also be available to Ms Delauder.
In my view, the evidence clearly establishes that in the event that Ms Delauder was to return to the United States with X it is more than likely that her mental health will improve and the chances of her poor mental health affecting her parenting of X will be significantly reduced. I am not so sure that will be the case if she returns to the United States without X but in that event, the potential for her reduced parenting capacity to affect her parenting of X will be greatly diminished.
X
They can be no doubt that each of X’s parents love him very much. Nor is there any suggestion in the evidence that he does not love each of his parents.
Mr M described X as an easy child to relate to “in the sense that he is engaging and active and has an inquisitive attitude”. Mr M has had the opportunity of observing X on 3 separate occasions and in his most recent report he remarked “it is clear however from the last assessment by this writer, that [X] has made significant developmental progress, mainly in line with what would be expected for his age, although I did think that his language was developed slightly more than most children his age”. Two further observations made by Mr M are important at this point:
50.[X] had slight difficulty saying goodbye to each parent as he needed to throughout the day, but he compensated for this quickly. He would be a boy who would make friends relatively easily, as he has a robust personality and is physically active.
51. I would think also that he has academic potential which that might become more obvious as he gets older.
By all accounts, then X is doing well. Given the impact that litigation, particularly litigation as contested as this, often has on children that is a pleasant surprise, although one that is not likely to be long-lived.
The parties’ lives together
Following X’s birth, Ms Delauder cared for him most of the time. There were times when Mr Panneton cared for X in Ms Delauder’s absence. There is nothing to suggest that either parent was not adept at meeting X’s needs as a baby.
X developed some health concerns early in his young life and it was necessary for the parties to attend specialists to have X’s issues addressed. They both did so although Ms Delauder attended more than Mr Panneton. Fortunately, those health issues have resolved and no longer trouble X.
Mr Panneton returned to work soon after X’s birth. Ms Delauder returned to employment about 15 months after X’s birth. The parties managed their employment and X’s care with the assistance of au pairs or nannies.
In July 2017 the parties travelled with X to the United Kingdom to see Mr Panneton’s family. Mr Panneton only had two weeks of annual leave and so he needed to return to Australia. Ms Delauder and X went on to the United States to visit her family who lived there.
I am satisfied that from X’s birth both of his parents cared for him as best as they could. They assisted each other and complemented each other’s care taking into account their respective work lives.

The parties separated under one roof in April 2018 and Mr Panneton moved out of the Suburb C property in May 2018. Apparently they had separated and reconciled a number of times previously, but little turns on that. It does demonstrate, however, the volatility in the parties’ relationship.
Whilst the parties were separated under the one roof, X spent regular time with the applicant. They physically separated on 10 May 2018.
On 19 May 2018 Mr Panneton attended the property in Suburb C to spend time with X and, while there, closed a dresser drawer on Ms Delauder’s fingers. She then locked herself and X in a car while he aggressively attempted to get in, before reducing himself to taunting her from outside the car’s windows. Her fingers took two weeks to recover. I accept her evidence about this episode.
Following 19 May 2018 Ms Delauder says that whenever Mr Panneton attended the Suburb C property to spend time with X, he would yell “leave” at her in front of X. I accept her evidence about this.
It is not clear whether X was exposed to Mr Panneton harming Ms Delauder’s fingers, but it is difficult to envisage how he could be in the car with Ms Delauder without being exposed to Mr Panneton’s behaviour outside of the car. Similarly, it is difficult to understand how he could avoid exposure to Mr Panneton yelling at X’s mother every time he attended to spend time with X.
Between 7 June 2018 and 20 June 2018 Ms Delauder and X travelled to the United States so that she could spend time with her family in the United States. The travelled occurred with Mr Panneton’s consent.
Ms Delauder made an application for a protection order against Mr Panneton on 13 July 2018, followed shortly by a cross-application by Mr Panneton on 30 July 2018. They finalised their domestic violence proceedings on 22 November 2018 with reciprocal orders without admissions.
After X and Ms Delauder returned to Australia, Ms Delauder ceased facilitating X spending time with Mr Panneton. That position persisted for about 22 weeks until 11 November 2018, following the first interim orders made on 5 November 2018.
On 17 January 2019 Mr Panneton says that he requested that Ms Delauder consent to X travelling with him to the United Kingdom to visit his terminally ill father and Ms Delauder refused.
The order of 5 November 2018 provided for supervised changeovers at the Brisbane Children’s Contact Centre. There appears to have been conflict between Mr Panneton and the facilitator of the changeovers, a Ms JJ. Ms JJ was not called to give evidence. It appears from the affidavits of both parties that Ms JJ formed and expressed in writing, the view that, inter alia, Mr Panneton would not follow directions and frustrated the arrangements. Mr Panneton’s believes that Ms JJ was aligned with Ms Delauder and treated him unfairly. To support his belief, he notes that Ms Delauder agreed that Ms JJ was “easily flustered” and on a number of occasions on which Ms Delauder supposedly breached the centre’s protocols Ms JJ raised no concern. Regardless, the centre cancelled their agreement with the parties on 14 March 2019. It was briefly reinstated before being cancelled again on 29 March 2019.
This commenced another period of difficulty facilitating time between Mr Panneton and X. There was significant negotiation between the parties through their respective solicitors. Both parties suggest the other was unresponsive and unreasonable during those negotiations.
Between 19 April 2019 and 7 May 2019 Ms Delauder travelled to the United States with X with Mr Panneton’s consent. Even achieving that was fraught.
Eventually, the orders of 15 July 2019 were made and X spent time with his father again on 24 July 2019.
There were a number of other skirmishes between the parties conducted through their solicitors prior to the first trial of the matter. Despite the outrage with which they are expressed by the parties, nothing truly turns on them. They serve to illustrate, however, the fractious and conflicted nature of the parties’ co-parenting relationship.
Ms Delauder travelled to the United States again with X. Mr Panneton travelled to the United Kingdom again. A change in Mr Panneton’s employment required an additional change to how X would spend time with his father. There were a number of alleged breaches of the protection order to which Ms Delauder is the aggrieved, none of which resulted in prosecution.
As discussed above, the trial resulted in orders which, in part, remain the current arrangements.
Changeovers are at either X’s kindergarten or a public fast food establishment in Suburb C. To Mr Panneton’s frustration, Ms Delauder ensures a third party conducts any changeovers where the parties might otherwise be forced into contact. While Ms Delauder’s reluctance to attend is easily explicable from her evidence, Mr Panneton’s insistence seems most readily explained by the knowledge she fears him and his delight in her discomfort.
From at least 11 December 2018 Mr Panneton has been pushing the boundaries which Ms Delauder sought to impose between herself and him. His constant refrain that in seeking to avoid him she is less than a responsible adult, or an adult at all, could not more squarely fall into the definition of family violence in s 4AB(2)(d) of the Family Law Act of “repeated derogatory taunts”.
It is also not true that Ms Delauder has not attended, or been involved in, changeovers. It simply appears that Mr Panneton has always endeavoured to make sure that every time she did she would hesitate to do so again.
On 20 September 2020 Ms Delauder did participate in a changeover, as the person assisting her did not have a driver’s licence. Mr Panneton closely followed her car with his and pulled up beside her at a red light. No good explanation for his conduct appears in the evidence.
On 10 May 2021 Ms Delauder agreed for Mr Panneton to drop X directly to her home, as the circumstances made it the only method available to her she considered safe for X. She waited for Mr Panneton to leave before exiting the house to meet X. When she did I am satisfied that Mr Panneton rapidly reversed up the street to stop in front of the house.
It is difficult to understand these actions except as an attempt to intimidate Ms Delauder. I find that they were nothing more than an attempt by Mr Panneton to intimidate Ms Delauder. It worked.
Mr Panneton has not challenged the evidence of Ms Delauder’s fragility or the impact which he has on her. He knows of this impact. He is an intelligent and educated man and so must also recognise that when he provokes a panic response in Ms Delauder while X is present, X will likely be exposed to it. I suspect that Mr Panneton simply cares more about harming Ms Delauder than he does about ensuring X has a functional mother.
Some legal principles
Part VII of the Family Law Act provides the relevant statutory framework within which the court must determine what parenting orders to make. The court must have regard to the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration in determining what parenting orders ought to be made: s 60CA of the Act.
The best interests’ principle informs each of the orders that a court might be called upon to make concerning parenting, including orders concerning the incidence of parental responsibility, where children should live and with whom they should spend their time and communicate.
As to the issue of parental responsibility, s 61DA(1) of the Act provides that when making a parenting order, a court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child or children concerned for their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for them. That presumption will not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child or children concerned either has engaged in abuse of a child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family or has engaged in family violence: s 61DA(2).
The phrase equal shared parental responsibility is not defined in terms in the Act. It is defined by its consequences. There are consequences for the court and there are consequences for the parents. The consequence for the court is that if it makes an order for equal shared parental responsibility, the court must consider whether it would be in the best interests of the children to spend equal time with each parent and whether spending equal time would be reasonably practicable: s 65DAA(1) of the Act. If it is, then the court must consider making an order for equal time. If the court does not make such an order then it must consider whether it is in the best interests of the children to spend substantial and significant time with each parent and whether spending substantial and significant time would be reasonably practicable. If it is, then the court must consider making an order for substantial and significant time. The phrases substantial and significant time and reasonably practicable are defined in s 65DAA(3) and 65DAA(5) of the Act respectively.
The consequences for the parents are found in s 65DAC of the Act. The effect of that section is that if two or more persons are to share parental responsibility for a child and the exercise of that parental responsibility involves making a decision about a major long‑term issue in relation to the child then the people who share parental responsibility must, for every major long-term issue:
(a)consult the other person in relation to the decision to be made about that issue;
(b)make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about that issue; and
(c)make the decision jointly.
The court is required to presume that it is in the best interests of the children for their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for them unless:
(a)there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child or a person who lives with a parent of the child has engaged in:
(b)abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family); or
(c)family violence;
(d)the court is persuaded by the evidence that it is not in the best interests of the children for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
Family violence is defined in s 4AB of the Act. Relevantly it provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.
Even if the presumption does not apply, it may still be in the best interests of the children to make an order for equal shared parental responsibility. Moreover, if the presumption does not apply, or if it is rebutted, the court may still consider whether it is in the best interests of the children to, and whether an order ought be made that the children, spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent: see Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346, [46] – [48].
However, where s 65DAA(1) or (2) is not engaged (because there is no order for equal shared parental responsibility) and the parties’ proposals have the capacity to adequately meet the best interests of the children, the court is not obliged to consider an equal time, or any other type of alternative arrangement: cf. Whisler v Whisler (2010) 42 Fam LR 633, 643.
In determining what are in the best interests of children the court must have regard to primary and additional considerations as set out in s 60CC of the Act. The court must give greater weight to the primary considerations. Of the two primary considerations, the court must give greater weight to the latter consideration. The primary considerations are:
(a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
(b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
The additional considerations are those set out in s 60CC(3) that are relevant to the matter at hand.
Consideration
There is no dispute between the parties that X will benefit from a meaningful relationship with each of his parents. Both parties struck me as articulate and intelligent people with much to offer their son. Ms Delauder was described as such by Dr HH.
Neither of the parties, nor the independent children’s lawyer, contend that X is at an unacceptable risk of physical, psychological or emotional harm by reason of being exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence in the household of either of his parents.
Nor does either party suggest that X has expressed any particular view about his living arrangements. Mr M did not conduct formal interviews with X and so, does not record any views that X might have expressed.
The evidence is clear that X has a good relationship with each of his parents. His relationship with each one is different and according to Mr M’s observations recorded in his last report:
48.It is clear also that the way he engaged with each of his parents had transitioned. With his father, he was physical in his play in a happy and playful way, and engaging, and he asked for his father at times when he was with his mother. She managed this appropriately.
49.[Ms Delauder] has a calm demeanour with [X] and they have conversations about this or that, mostly in things which are of interest to him. She (sil. He) was affectionate with her by sitting close to her and how he listened to her. [Mr Panneton] was energetic how he would play with him and his vocabulary and manner of relating to [X] was commensurate with how you would relate to a child of [X’s] age.
Mr M’s evidence in cross-examination made clear that between his two observations of X for his second and third reports, X’s relationship with Mr Panneton appeared to have strengthened. He was asked about this and his evidence at the earlier trial by senior counsel for Ms Delauder:
And on the last occasion you recommended, you may recall, in cross-examination that there be – when it was put to you whether [X] should move. That was in July 2020 when this was put to you, whether [X] should move at that stage or whether, in accordance with the mother’s proposal, he move in 2021. And you thought that 2021 – December 2021 was the more appropriate time for [X] to relocate. Do you recall giving that evidence? --- I think so.
All right. And that was – it was – the – and you said that that time would allow more time for the bond between [X] and the father to strengthen. And that’s exactly what has happened? --- Yes.
… isn’t it? So that the – your recommendation at the time that [X] spend more time with the father to allow the bond to strengthen, what you were hoping for has, in fact, been achieved? --- Yes.
As I have already set out, I am not satisfied that X has a significant relationship with Mr Panneton’s girlfriend, Ms W.
All of X’s grandparents reside overseas. His paternal grandparents reside in the United Kingdom and his maternal grandparents reside in the United States of America.
I am satisfied, and I find that Mr Panneton has, to the extent that he has been permitted to do so by Ms Delauder, participated in making decisions about major long-term issues for X. He has spent as much time with X as he has been able and he has communicated with X appropriately.
Similarly, I am satisfied that Ms Delauder has participated in making decisions about major long-term issues for X. No question arises as to whether she has spent as much time with X as possible given that X lives with her.
Both parents are, I am satisfied committed to the parenting of X and subject to my findings below concerning Ms Delauder, they are committed to doing that together as much as they can.
I am satisfied and I find that both Mr Panneton and Ms Delauder have fulfilled their obligations to maintain X. This is not a case where there is difficulty with financial support for X from either of his parents.
The evidence permits of no other finding than that the relationship between X’s parents is poor. There are many adjectives in the evidence to describe it, but neither party suggests that it is healthy or that it is likely to improve. The disdain that Mr Panneton has for Ms Delauder is palpable. His evidence about his girlfriend Ms W and his failure to inform Ms Delauder of that relationship bespeaks a complete lack of respect for Ms Delauder as the mother of Mr Panneton’s son and the person who cares for him most of the time.
Tellingly, Mr M was cross-examined about the parents relationship by senior counsel for Ms Delauder in these terms:
I put to you on the last occasion that, having regard to the past relationship, with the personality traits that would – that were – that you observed in the father, that arguments would tend to escalate very quickly if he wasn’t getting the response he wanted, and you said, “Yes, I agree.” Do you recall giving that evidence? --- Yes.
And you would still maintain, I take it, that as being an appropriate answer to what you observed on the first occasion? --- Well, it was a trait that I thought he demonstrated problematically through the relationship.
Yes. And to – and the – there is no evidence from reading any of the affidavit material you have, could I suggest to you, that there has been any improvement in any relevant sense in the relationship between these parties since they separated, that is, their ability to – I will label it, firstly, in their ability to communicate? --- No.
In their ability to make decisions? --- I can’t think of any.
Mr Panneton’s primary proposal will see X live in an equal time arrangement between his parents. However, there is no support in the evidence for such an arrangement. Mr M was asked about this by counsel for Mr Panneton in cross-examination:
And, [Mr M], you would have seen my client’s amended application. You’re aware that he seeks a week-about arrangement commencing from August this year. You remember that? --- Yes.
Would you support that type of arrangement ? --- No.
…
Well, if the – his Honour didn’t allow the mother to leave and the mother remains in Australia. That’s effectively what my client is seeking. So your response is that you wouldn’t support it. Would you be able to elaborate on the reasons why not? --- Well, an equal time arrangement, even though it’s perhaps considered to be a difference of only a few nights from what it is now, in my view a prerequisite is at least some degree of competent communication that doesn’t end in conflict between the parents because there normally is a greater duress for them to do so under an equal time arrangement than otherwise. And the other question was whether increasing the time for [X] would pass a specific benefit to him, as opposed to how things are at the moment, and I thought from what I saw of him recently that given the history, things were going pretty well as they were. And I wouldn’t like to trifle with that by just increasing his time with dad at this point in time. I’m just talking about where things are now. It’s not possible, really, to predict how arrangements might be in this family very far ahead because they have had litigation for the last four years of – nearly four years of his five years. So for that reason I think a safer arrangement would be the one that they’re doing.
But that’s for the time being. He is seeking that increase from August. Are you saying that it’s still too early? --- I’m saying that at this point in time I couldn’t recommend it. I mean, perhaps in a year or two’s time maybe things are much different, but conflict is still high between the parents. The mother finds it very difficult, even to have anything associated with the father with [X] or the way [X] talks sometimes, and has a reaction to contact with him. I don’t think that type of parental relationship lends itself to an equal time arrangement which would benefit the child, at least this child in this family.

And by counsel for the independent children’s lawyer:
Would you ever support an equal arrangement between the parents for [X]? --- I can’t envisage it at this point in time.
Would you envisage an increase to a further day, for instance, six days out of the fortnight within the next two to three years? --- Well, I think for that to happen there would, in my mind, anyway, need to be relatively fundamental changes to the – how the parents operate with one another and how they parent [X] together.
There is no suggestion in the evidence that there is likely to be fundamental changes to how the parents operate with one another and how they parent X together. In my view the parties are unlikely to change in that respect.
If Mr Panneton’s proposals are accepted, but with some modification so that they represent more closely the current arrangements, there will be little effect upon X in the sense that he will not be separated from either of his parents and he will continue to spend time with each of them. Life would go on relatively unchanged for him. His relationship with his extended family and in particular his grandparents will remain the same and there will be, on its face, stability for X in terms of both his living arrangements and his relationships with his parents. I say “on its face” because as I discuss below, the stability in terms of X’s relationship with his mother and her capacity to provide him with quality parenting is likely to deteriorate over time. Nonetheless Mr Panneton’s proposals carry those, perhaps short-term, benefits.
Ms Delauder’s primary proposal would see X separated from Mr Panneton until such time as Mr Panneton moved to the United States of America. I have already recorded his evidence that he would move to the United States if the court ordered X to live there. X would not be separated from Ms Delauder. He would also have the opportunity to engage more frequently with his paternal grandparents in the United States. The geographical distance between X’s residence and his paternal grandparents will be significantly reduced. Mr Panneton accepted in cross-examination that there would be more likelihood of his parents visiting the United States than Australia given the geographic proximity of the United States to the United Kingdom. Thus, whilst there would be an immediate disadvantage to X in the sense that he would be separated from his father until such time as Mr Panneton moved to the United States, the proposal also carries some advantages for X in terms of his relationships with his paternal grandparents.
There is a significant disadvantage with Mr Panneton’s primary proposal. The proposal would see X living in Australia in spending equal time with each of his parents, one of whom would not be in a position to provide optimal parenting to him. The evidence clearly establishes that Ms Delauder’s continued presence in Australia is distressing to her and has affected her mental health. She has been treated for symptoms of anxiety and depression and according to the expert testimony she has exhibited post-traumatic stress symptoms. I have canvassed the evidence above. None of that evidence was seriously challenged.
For X to remain in the care of each of his parents in Australia carries the very real probability that he will be exposed to a deterioration in his mother’s health, certainly mentally and perhaps physically, which will have a consequent effect upon her capacity to meet X’s needs. It may lead to a situation where X starts to parent his mother.
Dr HH recognised this when she said that, “A well-adjusted parent is the best predicator for a well-adjusted child”. The corollary must also be true. The evidence demonstrates that Ms Delauder will not be “a well-adjusted parent” should she be required to parent X in Australia.
Mr Panneton does not intend that X should live primarily in his care. Rather, he says that X’s time should be spent equally between his mother and his father. He does not contend that Ms Delauder does not ordinarily have the capacity to properly parent X. Nor could such a submission be made on the evidence.
The only circumstance in which X would be living primarily with him, on his proposal, is if Ms Delauder decided to return to the United States of America without X. On that point she said that she would try and stay here but she was not sure if she could do it. I do not think that she was being disingenuous when she said that and I accept that evidence. Mr M was asked squarely about the proposition that Ms Delauder might return to the United States without X by senior counsel for Ms Delauder:
[Mr M], could I suggest to you that a situation where the mother was, whether it was as a result of overwhelmed or for other factors, forced to leave Australia with [X] living here would be the worst possible outcome for [X]? --- Of all the possible outcomes, yes.
There will be disadvantages for X, at least in the short term, from Ms Delauder’s primary proposal. The opportunity that X will have to spend time with Mr Panneton will be significantly reduced. X is still very young and that reduction in time will necessarily have an effect upon X’s relationship with Mr Panneton. I accept the submissions made by senior counsel for Ms Delauder, however, that there is no evidence that really suggests that X’s relationship with Mr Panneton will not continue to be meaningful (as opposed to optimal) should X live in the United States and Mr Panneton remain living in Australia. In any event, any disadvantage that might arise by reason of that circumstance will be ameliorated by Mr Panneton moving to the United States as he gave evidence he would do.
Another short-term disadvantage for X from a move to the United States will be the necessity for him to adjust to living there. There will no doubt be adjustments for him to make. He will leave his friends in Australia behind. He will have to make new friends. But I am satisfied on the evidence that those matters, to the extent that they present as problems will be short lived. In that regard, Mr M’s assessment of X does not suggest he would have any difficulty in adjusting to life in United States of America. In fact, Mr M was optimistic that X would transition without much difficulty if he had to.
Dr HH’s opinion was to the effect that the best predictor of a child’s adjustment to change, eg, separation or relocation, is the parent’s ability to adjust to those changes. Given that Ms Delauder will be returning to her country of origin and her familial surroundings I accept the submission that she will have no trouble in adjusting and that will augur well for X’s adjustments.
Neither party suggested that there would be a financial difficulty in X maintaining a relationship with both of his parents if Mr Panneton’s primary proposal was accepted, nor would there be any practical difficulty in him spending time with in communicating with each of them. However, the geographical distance between the east coast of the United States (where Ms Delauder proposes to live) and Australia raises obvious practical considerations. X would not be able to spend frequent and regular time with Mr Panneton whilst soever he lived in Australia and the proposals of each of the parties, should X live in the United States, recognise that. Neither party suggested, however, that there would be a financial impediment to X maintaining his relationship with Mr Panneton in Australia through overseas travel. Both parties make proposals in regard.
I do not think that there is any question that Mr Panneton can meet X’s physical needs. I harbour concerns about his capacity to promote X’s welfare with his mother if I was to order X to live here with Mr Panneton and Ms Delauder returned to the United States.
So too, Ms Delauder is able to meet X’s physical, emotional and intellectual needs at this stage. The gravamen of her case, however, is that by reason of her unhappiness, depression and anxiety about feeling trapped in Australia and the stress that she feels in being from being in close proximity to Mr Panneton and having to deal with him, her capacity to provide quality care to X will diminish over time.
Ms Delauder has managed so far to deal with her distress by managing her interactions with Mr Panneton. Perhaps the best example of her management of these issues is changeovers. She does not attending changeovers personally (something which was recommended by Mr M in his first report). The practice is also supported by the evidence of Dr HH to the effect that Ms Delauder should disconnect from Mr Panneton, he being the individual that she associates with her difficulties. Ms Delauder’s evidence is that the reason she does not attend changeovers personally is to shield first herself from Mr Panneton and second X from her reactions to coming into contact with Mr Panneton. Mr Panneton, however, does not seem to be able to grasp the difficulty for Ms Delauder and criticises her for this practice.
Having regard to the evidence I have discussed above and my findings about it, I accept that Ms Delauder’s ability to continue to protect X from her feelings about her continued residence in Australia and her ability to resist its impact upon her capacity to provide quality parenting for X will break down over time to X’s detriment. So too, her inability to prevent the worry and anxiety she experiences by being in relatively close proximity to Mr Panneton.
Ms Delauder’s orders would promote X’s links with his United States heritage. Under her primary proposal he would live there and he would experience that culture with his extended family. Were he to live in Australia, he would not have that opportunity. Mr Panneton’s proposal carries that disadvantage whereas Ms Delauder’s proposal carries an advantage for X.
Both parties make allegations of domestic violence against each other. Senior counsel for Ms Delauder submitted that this is not a case where it is necessary for the court to make detailed findings about individual events. Counsel for Mr Panneton made no submissions to the contrary. Neither party suggests that X is at an unacceptable risk of harm of being exposed to family violence either directly or indirectly and that to take account of those risks it is necessary to put protective orders in place.
One of the relevant considerations to be taken into account (although not the primary consideration) is that Ms Delauder is entitled to live anywhere she wishes, just as Mr Panneton is entitled to live anywhere he wishes. That freedom of movement is important and only to be interfered with when the paramount consideration – the welfare of the child the subject of the litigation – demands that interference. Where a child’s best interests would be so adversely affected by a parent’s proposal such as a proposal to live far removed from the child’s other parent, promotion of the child’s best interests may well justify an interference with the entitlement of one or other of his or her parents to live in a place of their choosing. If that circumstance arises, then the interference is legitimate only to the extent that it is necessary to avoid such adverse effects.
The evidence here demonstrates that Ms Delauder’s desire to return to live in the United States is not something that she has raised recently. It is not a desire that is born out of the breakdown of the parties’ relationship and her desire for comfort from her own family in the aftermath of that breakdown. Ms Delauder’s unchallenged evidence is that from 2014 she expressed to Mr Panneton a wish to return to living in the United States. Mr Panneton agreed that in 2016 that wish intensified when Ms Delauder fell pregnant with X. Indeed it was Ms Delauder’s unchallenged evidence (ultimately accepted by Mr Panneton) that she would only maintain the pregnancy if the parties were going to relocate to the United States.
This long-standing desire on the part of Ms Delauder to return to live in the United States does not simply underscore the genuineness of her case about returning to the United States but also underscores the findings I have expressed earlier in these reasons that a refusal to permit her to reside in the United States with X will have negative impacts upon her and ultimately her parenting of X.
Conclusions
The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply in this case. I have set out my findings of family violence above. Section 61DA(2) is clearly engaged in this case.
Further, having regard to the findings I have made above about the nature of the parties’ relationship and the effect that dealing with Mr Panneton has upon Ms Delauder, I am hesitant to conclude that it is in X’s best interests for his parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for him. In my view, the communication between the parties in such that in order for equal shared parental responsibility will be fraught.
Both parties, however, seek an order for equal shared parental responsibility. In particular, Ms Delauder seeks such an order. In deference to the way in which she has conducted her case and the orders that she seeks, I will make an order for equal shared parental responsibility. I have made an order for special provisions relating to passports with each parent being responsible to obtain or renew X’s passport for the country of origin of each parent.
Ms Delauder’s proposals carry far more advantages for X than Mr Panneton’s proposals. Whilst there will be some short-term disadvantages for X, I am not satisfied that those that disadvantages will be such as to deprive him of a meaningful relationship with Mr Panneton. His bond with Mr Panneton has strengthened since the last trial of this application as Mr M has observed. Mr M did not suggest that the strength of the relationship was insufficient for X to maintain his relationship with his father if he was to live in the United States.
The advantages, represented by an amelioration of the distress and anxiety experienced by Ms Delauder while she lives in Australia, are in my view overwhelming. That is especially so in circumstances where it is not Mr Panneton’s primary position that Ms Delauder is compromised in her capacity to care for X such that there should be an immediate change in residence.
For the reasons that I have expressed above, the proposals put forward by Mr Panneton and the Independent Children’s Lawyer carry significant disadvantages for X which are not outweighed by the advantages of those proposals. The principal disadvantage will be that Ms Delauder may well remain in Australia and her capacity to meet X’s needs is likely to deteriorate. It might be the case that she finds the situation intolerable and returns to the United States. In that event, X will be left in a situation described by Mr M as the worst of all possible outcomes.
The orders proposed by Ms Delauder are entirely appropriate. They provide X to spend time with father during holidays and at any other time that Mr Panneton might make his way to the United States. It is notable that despite being directed to do so, nowhere in his material – his trial affidavit or his case outline – does Mr Panneton countenance the proposition that X might live in the United States with Ms Delauder. He does not turn his mind to the orders that he would seek the court to make for time between him and X in the event that X lives in the United States and Mr Panneton lived in Australia. I take it from his silence about those matters and despite the submissions made by his counsel at the conclusion of the trial which might be seen to be to the contrary, that the orders proposed by Ms Delauder are entirely appropriate.
I make orders accordingly.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty-nine (159) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jarrett.
Associate:
Dated: 14 June 2022

File number(s):	BRC 10322 of 2018
Judgment of:	JARRETT J
Date of judgment:	14 June 2022
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – CHILD WELFARE – The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and related legislation – best interests of the child – where mother seeks to live with the child to the United States of America – where the father seeks the child should live equally between each parent in Australia or alternatively with him – where the greatest risk of harm to the child is the exposure to parental conflict – whether the mother’s parenting capacity will decline if she is not permitted to live in the USA
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss, 4AB(2)(d), 60CA, 60CC, 60CC(3), 61DA(1), 61DA(2), 65DAA(1), 65DAA(3), 65DAA(5), 65DAC
Cases cited:	Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346, Whisler v Whisler (2010) 42 Fam LR 633
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	159
Date of hearing:	7, 8, 9 February 2022
Place:	Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant:	Ms Chekirova
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Stolar Law Pty Ltd
Counsel for the respondent:	Mr Drysdale Queens’s Counsel
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Hopgood Ganim Lawyers
Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyers	Mr Cahill
Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyers	Berck Solicitors

BRC 10322 of 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MR PANNETON Applicant
AND:	MS DELAUDER Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

order made by:	JARRETT J
DATE OF ORDER:	14 june 2022