Pannasara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pannasara v Minister for Immigration &Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 213

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Migration –Refusal of visa – Decision of delegate unsuccessfully appealed to Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Jurisdiction of Court to entertain challenge to delegate’s decision – Effect of applicant’s failure to institute a proceeding within 28 days of delegate’s decision – Whether proceeding ought to be entertained as a matter of discretion – Application for extension of time to appeal against Tribunal’s decision –Whether there was arguable legal error by Tribunal – Whether Tribunal erred in having regard to criminal convictions that were subject to an application for special leave to appeal to High Court – Other grounds considered – Application for extension refused.

Migration Act 1958, ss 475, 478, 485 and 501
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 44

KAHATAPITIYE PANNASARA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, STATE DIRECTOR (WA) DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL (GENERAL DIVISION, PERTH REGISTRY) and JUSTICE D F O’CONNOR, PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

W116 of 1999

WILCOX, FRENCH and CARR JJ
PERTH
1 MARCH 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W116 of 1999

BETWEEN:

KAHATAPITIYE PANNASARA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

STATE DIRECTOR (WA)
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
(GENERAL DIVISION, PERTH REGISTRY)
Third Respondent

AND

JUSTICE D F O’CONNOR
PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, FRENCH and CARR JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2000

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be dismissed.

2.The proceeding be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the costs of the respondents.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W116 of 1999

BETWEEN:

KAHATAPITIYE PANNASARA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

STATE DIRECTOR (WA)
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
(GENERAL DIVISION, PERTH REGISTRY)
Third Respondent

AND

JUSTICE D F O’CONNOR
PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, FRENCH and CARR JJ

DATE:

1 MARCH 2000

PLACE:

PERTH

EXTEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. THE COURT:  On 21 October 1999, the applicant, Kahatapitiye Pannasara, filed in this Court a document styled, "Application for an order of review - writ of certiorari."  The applicant named as respondents the Minister of Immigration and Multilateral Affairs (sic, obviously the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs), the State Director (WA) Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Justice D F O'Connor, President of the Tribunal.

  2. Having regard to the status of the last-mentioned respondent, the matter was listed before a Full Court.  At the hearing today, Mr Viji De Alwis sought leave to appear as amicus curiae to represent the applicant.  We granted leave.  Mr P R Macliver, of counsel, appeared for the Minister for Immigration…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 213
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pannasara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Pannasara, sought to appeal a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had refused his application for a visa. The AAT had found that Pannasara was not of good character due to his criminal convictions, leading to the refusal of his visa application under section 501 of the Migration Act. Pannasara applied to the Federal Court of Australia for an extension of time to appeal the AAT decision, arguing that the AAT had erred in considering his criminal convictions in determining his character.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had made an error of law in considering Pannasara's criminal convictions as evidence of his lack of good character. The court needed to determine if there was merit in the argument that the AAT should not have considered the convictions because there was an outstanding application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against those convictions. Additionally, the court considered whether the AAT had erred by focusing solely on Pannasara's criminal convictions and ignoring other aspects of his general conduct when assessing his character.

The court found that the AAT had not erred in considering Pannasara's criminal convictions. Convictions are evidence of criminal conduct and have effect while they stand. The court held that the AAT was required to consider the facts as they appeared at the time of making the decision, and there was no legal basis for attributing error to the AAT on this ground. Furthermore, the court clarified that while the AAT must consider both past criminal conduct and general conduct, it was not necessary for the AAT to confine its consideration to criminal conduct alone. The AAT's focus on Pannasara's criminal convictions did not constitute an error of law, as it was reasonable to consider his character based on the evidence available at the time.

ORDERS:
1. The application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be dismissed.
2. The proceeding be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be dismissed.

2. The proceeding be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondents.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In considering whether or not the Court should extend time, it is appropriate to consider whether the challenge appears to have merit. It would plainly be an erroneous exercise of discretion for the Court to allow time to be taken, and resources expended, on a hopeless application. With this in mind, we have heard submissions as to whether the Tribunal fell into any error of law in dealing with Mr Pannasara's case. It must be remembered that the appeal to this Court from a Tribunal decision is confined to an error of law. The Court is not empowered to review the facts found by the Tribunal.Grounds of challenge to AAT decision Mr De Alwis advanced nine matters, on behalf of Mr Pannasara, that he described as points of law concerning the Tribunal's decision. The first point is a contention that the Tribunal erred in having regard to Mr Pannasara's convictions in determining whether he is not of good character, the reason being that there was, at that time, an outstanding application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against those convictions. Put another way, the contention is that the phrase "past criminal conduct" refers only to conduct established by convictions that are not under an outstanding challenge. For the same reason, Mr De Alwis complains about the Tribunal's reliance upon material put to the District Court in connection with sentencing. We do not think that this argument is valid. Convictions provide evidence of criminal conduct. They have effect while they stand. If it should happen that Mr Pannasara is ultimately successful in the High Court, and his convictions are set aside, he may have a reasonable prospect of success in relation to any fresh visa application; but the Minister, or his delegate, or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review, must deal with the facts as they appear at the time of making a decision. There is no basis for attributing legal error to the Tribunal in respect of this ground. The second point raised by Mr De Alwis is that the Tribunal concentrated entirely on Mr Pannasara's criminal convictions, ignoring the issue of general conduct. At the material time, s501 of the Migration Act relevantly read:“501(1)The Minister may refuse to grant a visa to a person, or may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person, if:(a) subsection (2) applies to the person;…(2)This subsection applies to a person if the Minister:(a) having regard to:(i) the person’s past criminal conduct; or(ii) the person’s general conduct; is satisfied that the person is not of good character.” In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Baker (1997) 73 FCR 187 at 194, a Full Court of this Court (Burchett, Branson and Tamberlin JJ) said:“We think the key to the understanding of subsection (2)(a) is to be found in its object, satisfaction on the issue whether a person is not of good character. In deciding whether he is so satisfied, the Minister is required by the phrase "having regard to", to look at the conduct of the person the subject of the enquiry. Of course, an obligation to have regard to certain matters is not the same thing as an obligation to confine consideration to those matters. It is not conceivable that Parliament intended anything so unreasonable as a conclusion whether a person is now not of good character, based exclusively on his past criminal conduct, without regard to any recent good conduct, whether or not falling within the description of ‘general conduct’. So the words "having regard to" and the disjunctive "or" must not be given the effect of requiring a blinkered decision to be made on the basis of criminal conduct considered in isolation.”The effect of this approach is that it is necessary for a person making a judgment under s501 to consider character generally; see Powell v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1998) 89 FCR 1 at 14.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established