Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 3)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2G 725

File numbers: MLG 2955 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS
Date of judgment: 20 May 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Fair Work – where earlier finding of contravention of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where finding of liability reflected failure of the respondent employer to discharge onus under s 361(1) of the Fair Work Act- where proceeding listed separately for hearing on relief – where respondent sought to rely on evidence of “decision-maker” to make submissions about compensation and penalty – where “decision-maker” had not given evidence at the liability hearing – where applicant objects to parts of affidavit – whether respondent is estopped from relying on parts of evidence of “decision-maker” because they invite the Court to trespass on findings of fact or law made in the liability judgment – objections upheld in part
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 340, 361, 546

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic)

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v SunshineLoans Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 32

Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; 62 CLR 464

Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155

Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club Limited (No 1) [2021] FCA 1298

Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 241

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 53
Date of last submissions: 9 April 2025
Date of hearing: Matter determined on the papers
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr I Latham
Solicitor for the Applicant: JPM Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Rinaldi
Solicitor for the Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

MLG 2955 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

STACEY PALFREYMAN

Applicant

AND:

ALFRED HEALTH

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SYMONS

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.With respect to the affidavit of Ms Bolster dated 6 March 2025 that:

(a)the objections to paragraphs [39], [40], [41], [43], [44] and the last sentences of [38] and [47] be dismissed; and

(b)the objections to paragraphs [51], [58], [60], [61] and the last sentence of [55] be upheld, and that those paragraphs and sentence be struck out.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SYMONS:
INTRODUCTION

  1. On 18 September 2024 I published reasons for judgment in Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 241 (liability judgment or LJ) which included the finding that the respondent, Alfred Health, had failed to discharge…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 725
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, the case of Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 3) involved a dispute between Ms Palfreyman and Alfred Health regarding the admissibility of certain evidence in a relief hearing following a prior finding of liability. The court was required to decide whether Alfred Health was estopped from relying on parts of an affidavit from Ms Danielle Bolster, an employee of Alfred Health, concerning her state of mind at the time of the employment termination decision. Ms Palfreyman argued that this evidence would trespass on findings of fact or law made in the liability judgment, engaging the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata.

The court considered the principles articulated in Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club Limited (No 1), where it was held that a judicial determination of an issue of fact or law disposes of that issue once and for all, barring it from being raised again by the same parties or their privies. The court also referred to the reasoning in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v SunshineLoans Pty Ltd, where it was noted that a trial judge’s reasons for granting a declaration of contravention often traverse matters relevant to penalty, and attempts to contradict such findings in a penalty hearing may constitute an abuse of process.

After evaluating the submissions from both parties, the court found that the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata did apply to certain parts of Ms Bolster’s affidavit. The court ruled that these parts be struck out and that Ms Bolster be denied leave to give oral evidence on those matters. The decision was based on the need to prevent the court from trespassing on findings of fact or law made in the liability judgment and to uphold the integrity of the legal process.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Alfred Health submits, by reference to [127] of the liability judgment (referred to at [18] above), that the issue (and the only issue) decided by the Court in the liability judgment was whether the statutory presumption in s 361 of the FW Act (when read with s 360) was rebutted by Alfred Health by way of the evidence adduced in the liability hearing (and accordingly whether a finding of contravention of s 340(1) of the FW Act should be made). Alfred Health identifies this “issue” as the only issue in respect of which issue estoppel might operate. Further, in circumstances where there were no orders made by the Court as a result of the liability judgment, there is no res judicata. Alfred Health submits that the evidence it has sought to adduce in the relief hearing from Ms Vecchi and Ms Bolster, relates to the question of the relief (including penalty), if any to be ordered by the Court for its contravention of s 340(1) of the FW Act. This is said to be a different issue to the one decided by the liability judgment, which issue can only be controverted by way of an appeal. Alfred Health submits that the evidence of Ms Bolster goes to her intention and conduct as an employee of Alfred Health in relation to the termination of Ms Palfreyman’s employment. Alfred Health submits that such matters are relevant to the question of penalty under s 546 of the FW Act, including to factors such as the nature and extent of the conduct which led to the breach, the circumstances in which that conduct took place, the involvement of senior management, whether the breach was deliberate, and the need for specific deterrence. Alfred Health submits that each of the objections taken by Ms Palfreyman that operate on paragraphs [33], [36] and [127] of the liability judgment, relate to factual findings which do not represent the finding of the Court on the “issue”. Instead, they are all findings relating to the factual or evidentiary quality of evidence, rather than “the legal quality of the fact”. According to Alfred Health, no issue estoppel arises in respect of those findings, particularly when the ‘issue” determined by the liability judgment is not being challenged. Alfred Health submits that as far as [127] of the liability judgment is concerned, because it did not involve a positive finding that Alfred Health (acting through any relevant person, including Ms Bolster) had been motivated by an improper purpose in deciding to terminate Ms Palfreyman’s employment, or otherwise that the established contravention was deliberate, the paragraphs of the Bolster affidavit ([55] (last sentence), [58], [60] and [61]) which concerned Ms Bolster’s state of mind, would not come into conflict with the conclusion of the Court. MS PALFREYMAN’S SUBMISSIONS IN REPLY Ms Palfreyman submits that the distinction that Alfred Health seeks to draw – namely, that the evidence of Ms Bolster is being adduced for the purpose of addressing issues relevant to relief only – is misplaced. She submits that to permit the adduction of that evidence on that basis would still offend the principle of issue estoppel as the relief hearing is “the other claim or cause of action” in respect of which states of fact or law decided by the liability judgment will come into conflict.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 18 September 2024 I published reasons for judgment in Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 241 (liability judgment or LJ) which included the finding that the respondent, Alfred Health, had failed to discharge its onus under s 361(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) to disprove that it took adverse action against the applicant, Ms Palfreyman, for the prohibited reason attributed to it (LJ, [127]). This finding was made, in part, because there was limited evidence before the Court concerning Ms Danielle Bolster, an employee of Alfred Health who was found to have made a material contribution to the decision to terminate the employment of Ms Palfreyman. Following publication of the liability judgment, the matter was set down for a hearing on the question of relief and penalty with orders made for the filing of submissions and affidavit evidence. The hearing on relief and penalty commenced on 20 March 2025 and concluded on 21 March 2025, save for one matter that has necessitated this judgment. The issue concerns the admissibility of parts of an affidavit of Ms Bolster dated 6 March 2025 upon which Alfred Health wishes to rely on the question of relief and penalty. Ms Palfreyman seeks a ruling that parts of that affidavit – namely paragraphs 38 (last sentence), 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 47 (last sentence), 51, 55 (last sentence), 58, 60 and 61 (objected paragraphs) – be struck out and that Ms Bolster be denied leave (if sought) to give oral evidence as to the matters referred to in the objected paragraphs. Alfred Health submits that the objections to the Bolster affidavit identified by Ms Palfreyman are misconceived. In determining how to deal with the objections, I have been assisted by submissions of Ms Palfreyman filed on 28 March 2025 and 9 April 2025 and submissions of Alfred Health filed on 4 April 2025.MS PALFREYMAN’S SUBMISSIONS Ms Palfreyman contends that the issues that Ms Bolster seeks to agitate in the objected paragraphs are the same issues that were the subject of findings of the Court in the liability judgment and therefore the related principles of issue estoppel and res judicata are engaged in relation to her proposed evidence. Ms Palfreyman relies on the discussion of these principles in Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club Limited (No 1) [2021] FCA 1298 where at [10] Rares J said:10. In Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531-533, Dixon J explained how an issue estoppel arises. He said that a judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or law disposes of that issue once and for all so that it cannot afterwards be raised by the same parties or their privies. However, the estoppel covers only those matters which the prior judgment necessarily established as the legal foundation or justification for its conclusion:The distinction between res judicata and issue-estoppel is that in the first the very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit has in the former proceedings passed into judgment, so that it is merged and has no longer an independent existence, while in the second, for the purpose of some other claim or cause of action, a state of fact or law is alleged or denied the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by the prior judgment, decree or order.Nothing but what is legally indispensable to the conclusion is thus finally closed or precluded. In matter of fact the issue-estoppel is confined to those ultimate facts which form the ingredients in the cause of action, that is, the title to the right established. Where the conclusion is against the existence of a right or claim which in point of law depends upon a number of ingredients or ultimate facts the absence of any one of which would be enough to defeat the claim, the estoppel covers only the actual ground upon which the existence of the right was negatived. But in neither case is the estoppel confined to the final legal conclusion expressed in the judgment, decree or order.…In the phraseology of Lord Shaw, “a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at” in the former proceedings and “the legal quality of the fact” must be taken as finally and conclusively established (Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms Palfreyman submits that there is no counter-factual before the Court. It is unknown what the Court would have found with respect to Alfred Health’s section 361 onus had there been evidence before it concerning the state of mind of Ms Bolster when she came to make the termination recommendation. It follows that any submission as to what the Court would have found in those circumstances is pure speculation. CONSIDERATION In the recent decision of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v SunshineLoans Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 32, a Full Court of the Federal Court had occasion to consider the question of whether the fact that the primary judge had made adverse credit findings about a witness in a hearing on liability would disqualify him, on the ground of apprehended bias, from hearing the case on penalty, including in circumstances where the same witness was expected to give evidence. The primary judge had allowed the recusal application made by the respondent and disqualified himself from hearing the corporate regulator’s case on penalty. A majority of the Full Court found that the circumstances of the case did not give rise to apprehended bias and there was no impediment to the primary judge hearing and determining the question of penalty having first found that the case on liability was established. While the circumstances of SunshineLoans are not on all fours with this case, the reasoning of the appeal judges provides a useful starting point in the evaluation of the questions that fall to be determined here. This is especially so because in SunshineLoans, it was expected that the witness about whom adverse credit findings had been made would address issues related to the Court’s determination of an appropriate penalty. To begin with, Perram J (who was in the minority and would have refused ASIC’s appeal) said (at [25]) about the nature of a penalty hearing and its place vis à vis the hearing on liability that:…In many cases these will require fact finding beyond the terms of the conclusive declaration [as to liability]. But a trial judge’s reasons for granting a declaration of contravention will often traverse many of these matters [relevant to penalty]. Where they do, issue estoppels are likely to arise between the parties which will bind them in any penalty hearing. Attempts to contradict such findings at any penalty hearing may also, in appropriate circumstances, constitute an abuse of process. Then, Bromwich J (who was in the majority that allowed ASIC’s appeal) said the following (at [100]) in the context of a discussion about and identification of “categories of pre-judgment cases”:A third type of case can be distinguished from the first and second. This is one where the judge is permitted or required to have regard to, and apply, findings made at an earlier stage of the proceedings. In this category of case, a logical connection between findings made at the earlier stage of the proceedings and the feared impartiality at the later stage cannot be established merely on the basis that that judge has determined facts in dispute, or had regard to evidence that is not led at the penalty hearing. These two bases on which the second Ebner step may be established in true prejudgment cases are absent here. That is because the judge is required, or at least is entitled, to have regard to those factual findings and the evidence on which the appropriate penalty will be determined will overlap, perhaps entirely, with the evidence on which liability was established. Moreover, the party the subject of the liability finding may wish to revisit aspects of what has been determined, such as to adduce evidence of what has been done to address the problem of a kind that would not be relevant or admissible, or may be prejudicial, at the liability determination stage.