FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2G 725
File numbers: MLG 2955 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS Date of judgment: 20 May 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Fair Work – where earlier finding of contravention of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where finding of liability reflected failure of the respondent employer to discharge onus under s 361(1) of the Fair Work Act- where proceeding listed separately for hearing on relief – where respondent sought to rely on evidence of “decision-maker” to make submissions about compensation and penalty – where “decision-maker” had not given evidence at the liability hearing – where applicant objects to parts of affidavit – whether respondent is estopped from relying on parts of evidence of “decision-maker” because they invite the Court to trespass on findings of fact or law made in the liability judgment – objections upheld in part Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 340, 361, 546
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic)
Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v SunshineLoans Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 32
Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; 62 CLR 464
Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155
Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club Limited (No 1) [2021] FCA 1298
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of last submissions: 9 April 2025 Date of hearing: Matter determined on the papers Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr I Latham Solicitor for the Applicant: JPM Law Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Rinaldi Solicitor for the Respondent: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
MLG 2955 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: STACEY PALFREYMAN
Applicant
AND: ALFRED HEALTH
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SYMONS
DATE OF ORDER:
20 MAY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.With respect to the affidavit of Ms Bolster dated 6 March 2025 that:
(a)the objections to paragraphs [39], [40], [41], [43], [44] and the last sentences of [38] and [47] be dismissed; and
(b)the objections to paragraphs [51], [58], [60], [61] and the last sentence of [55] be upheld, and that those paragraphs and sentence be struck out.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SYMONS:
INTRODUCTION
On 18 September 2024 I published reasons for judgment in Palfreyman v Alfred Health (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 241 (liability judgment or LJ) which included the finding that the respondent, Alfred Health, had failed to discharge…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 725
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles articulated in Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club Limited (No 1), where it was held that a judicial determination of an issue of fact or law disposes of that issue once and for all, barring it from being raised again by the same parties or their privies. The court also referred to the reasoning in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v SunshineLoans Pty Ltd, where it was noted that a trial judge’s reasons for granting a declaration of contravention often traverse matters relevant to penalty, and attempts to contradict such findings in a penalty hearing may constitute an abuse of process.
After evaluating the submissions from both parties, the court found that the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata did apply to certain parts of Ms Bolster’s affidavit. The court ruled that these parts be struck out and that Ms Bolster be denied leave to give oral evidence on those matters. The decision was based on the need to prevent the court from trespassing on findings of fact or law made in the liability judgment and to uphold the integrity of the legal process.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Palfreyman submits that there is no counter-factual before the Court. It is unknown what the Court would have found with respect to Alfred Health’s section 361 onus had there been evidence before it concerning the state of mind of Ms Bolster when she came to make the termination recommendation. It follows that any submission as to what the Court would have found in those circumstances is pure speculation. CONSIDERATION In the recent decision of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v SunshineLoans Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 32, a Full Court of the Federal Court had occasion to consider the question of whether the fact that the primary judge had made adverse credit findings about a witness in a hearing on liability would disqualify him, on the ground of apprehended bias, from hearing the case on penalty, including in circumstances where the same witness was expected to give evidence. The primary judge had allowed the recusal application made by the respondent and disqualified himself from hearing the corporate regulator’s case on penalty. A majority of the Full Court found that the circumstances of the case did not give rise to apprehended bias and there was no impediment to the primary judge hearing and determining the question of penalty having first found that the case on liability was established. While the circumstances of SunshineLoans are not on all fours with this case, the reasoning of the appeal judges provides a useful starting point in the evaluation of the questions that fall to be determined here. This is especially so because in SunshineLoans, it was expected that the witness about whom adverse credit findings had been made would address issues related to the Court’s determination of an appropriate penalty. To begin with, Perram J (who was in the minority and would have refused ASIC’s appeal) said (at [25]) about the nature of a penalty hearing and its place vis à vis the hearing on liability that:…In many cases these will require fact finding beyond the terms of the conclusive declaration [as to liability]. But a trial judge’s reasons for granting a declaration of contravention will often traverse many of these matters [relevant to penalty]. Where they do, issue estoppels are likely to arise between the parties which will bind them in any penalty hearing. Attempts to contradict such findings at any penalty hearing may also, in appropriate circumstances, constitute an abuse of process. Then, Bromwich J (who was in the majority that allowed ASIC’s appeal) said the following (at [100]) in the context of a discussion about and identification of “categories of pre-judgment cases”:A third type of case can be distinguished from the first and second. This is one where the judge is permitted or required to have regard to, and apply, findings made at an earlier stage of the proceedings. In this category of case, a logical connection between findings made at the earlier stage of the proceedings and the feared impartiality at the later stage cannot be established merely on the basis that that judge has determined facts in dispute, or had regard to evidence that is not led at the penalty hearing. These two bases on which the second Ebner step may be established in true prejudgment cases are absent here. That is because the judge is required, or at least is entitled, to have regard to those factual findings and the evidence on which the appropriate penalty will be determined will overlap, perhaps entirely, with the evidence on which liability was established. Moreover, the party the subject of the liability finding may wish to revisit aspects of what has been determined, such as to adduce evidence of what has been done to address the problem of a kind that would not be relevant or admissible, or may be prejudicial, at the liability determination stage.