Page & Gaubert - [2022] FedCFamC2F 820

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Page & Gaubert [2022] FedCFamC2F 820

File number(s): PAC 5874 of 2020

Judgment of: JUDGE NEWBRUN

Date of judgment: 22 June 2022

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – de facto property adjustment proceedings - threshold hearing - declaration that de facto relationship existed between the parties, in the aggregate, for at least 2 years - declaration, in the alternative, that the parties were in a de facto relationship, within the meaning of section 4AA(1) of the Family Law Act, 1975, for a period of less than 2 years, and the Applicant made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4) (b) and (c), and that a failure to make the declaration would result in serious injustice to the Applicant

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss. 90 SM, s 90SB(c), 4AA, 90RG, 90SB

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021, r 8.20

Cases cited:
Crick & Bennett [2018] FamCAFC 68

Dover & Mosely & Anor [2019] FCCA 2488

Fairbairn v Radecki [2022] HCA 18

Sinclair & Whittaker [2013] FamCAFC 129

Division: Division 2 Family Law

Number of paragraphs: 189

Date of last submission/s: 23 March 2022

Date of hearing: 22 and 23 March 2022

Place: Parramatta

Counsel for the Applicant Self-represented litigant

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Hodgson
ORDERS

PAC 5874 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:
MS PAGE

Applicant

AND:
MR GAUBERT

Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE NEWBRUN

DATE OF ORDER:

22 June 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Court declares, pursuant to s 90RD(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), that the Applicant and the Respondent were in a de facto relationship, within the meaning of section 4AA(1) of the Act, for a period of at least 2 years, and comprising the periods:
(i)from 24 September 2016 to 29 January 2017,
(ii)from 15 March 2017 to 2 September 2018,
(iii)from 6 October 2018 to 3 January 2019.

2.In the alternative, the Court declares, pursuant to s 90SB(c) of the Act, that the Applicant and the Respondent were in a de facto relationship, within the meaning of section 4AA(1) of the Act, for a period of less than 2 years, and the Applicant made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4) (b) and (c), and that a failure to make the declaration would result in serious injustice to the Applicant.
3.The proceedings are adjourned to 24 August 2022 at 9:30am for mention.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Page & Gaubert has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE NEWBRUN:
Introduction

These reasons for judgment relate firstly to the determination of the Applicant’s application for a declaration that a de facto relationship existed between herself and the Respondent during the period from about September 2016 to August 2019.
And secondly these reasons relate to the determination of the Applicant’s application for a declaration, in the alternative, that she made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4)(a), (b), or (c), and that a failure to make the declaration would result in serious injustice to her.
The Respondent opposed the Applicant’s above proposed declarations.
A threshold hearing was held on 22 March 2022 with oral submissions being made by the parties on the morning of 23 March 2022. The Applicant represented herself and the Respondent was legally represented by counsel.
On 15 December 2021 the parties had appeared at the Callover and the Court appointed a 1 day fixture with a date to be advised. On 16 December 2021 the Court allocated 22 March 2022 as the 1 day fixture.
CONDUCT OF THE THRESHOLD HEARING
It is helpful to briefly set out the conduct of the threshold hearing noting that the Respondent had made certain submissions relating to the Court determining to conclude the threshold hearing on 22 March 2022 with oral submissions on the morning of 23 March 2022. The Court had imposed time limits on the cross examination of each party on 22 March 2022. And further, the Court had not acceded to the Respondent’s request that the Applicant make her lay witnesses available for cross examination, noting that those witnesses were not present for cross examination on 22 March 2022.
At the outset of the threshold hearing, which commenced at 10:24am, both parties confirmed the extent of Affidavit evidence relied upon by each of them; Affidavit evidence from each party, together with each party relying upon the Affidavits of numerous lay witnesses (the Applicant relied on the Affidavits of 7 lay witnesses and the Respondent relied upon the Affidavits of 7 lay witnesses).
The Respondent informed the Court that he would be objecting to parts of the Applicant’s Affidavits as well as to parts of the Applicant’s lay witness Affidavits. The Respondent informed the Court that he had not previously filed a document setting out his objections to the Applicant’s Affidavits.
The Court indicated to the Respondent that time could be saved if the Court was permitted to allow the Applicant’s Affidavits to stand subject to submissions as to weight, however the Respondent sought to make formal objections to those Affidavits. The Respondent informed the Court that it would take the Court half an hour to deal with his objections. The Court then indicated to the parties that it would very shortly (that morning) make directions to ensure the matter finished on 22 March 2022.
The Court then heard the Respondent’s objections to the Applicant’s Affidavits. The Court had indicated to the parties that it would be limiting the time for cross examination of each party. The Respondent’s objections were commenced at about 11am. Noting 2 short adjournments in the morning session of about 13 minutes, the Respondent’s objections and the Court’s associated rulings concluded at about 12.53pm. The Court then heard brief objections from the Applicant to the Respondent’s Affidavits.
The Court heard submissions from the Respondent who had submitted, inter alia, that cross-examination was necessary, not only upon the Applicant, but also upon her lay witnesses and that those lay witnesses should be made available for cross-examination. He submitted that any time limitation imposed by the Court upon cross-examination of the Applicant, as foreshadowed by the Court, would not permit him to do justice to his case at the threshold hearing, and he sought a longer time for cross-examination.
The Court determined that no adjournment should be permitted so as to permit the Respondent to cross-examine the Applicant’s lay witnesses. Neither party, prior to the threshold hearing, had complied with Rule 8.20 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021; that is, pursuant to that Rule, neither party had made a written request to the other side requesting the attendance for cross examination of their witnesses. The hearing had been set down for a 1 day hearing. At no time after 16 December 2021 and prior to 22 March 2022 did the Respondent, apply to the Court to have further time allocated for the threshold hearing. The Court observes that the Applicant’s Affidavits and her lay witness Affidavits had all been served upon the Respondent a significant time prior to 22 March 2022.
Counsel for the Respondent cross-examined the Applicant from 2:09pm until about 3:32pm.
The Respondent gave evidence in chief from 3:47pm until 3:54pm. The Applicant cross-examined the Respondent from 3:54pm until about 4:53pm.
The Court then indicated to the parties that it had one hour available for oral submissions of each of the parties at 9:30am the following day, 23 March 2022. Each party made oral submissions on 23 March 2022.
As will be apparent from the Court’s reasons for judgment below, the Court observes that in any event it did not place any significant weight upon the Applicant’s lay witness Affidavits except to the extent discussed below.
MATERIAL RELIED UPON
The Applicant relied upon:
(a)Case Outline headed “De-Facto Relationship Threshold” dated 18 March 2022;
(b)Amended Initiating Application filed 29 October 2021;
(c)Her two Affidavits filed 9 and 24 November 2021;
(d)Affidavits of the following lay witnesses:
(i)Affidavit of Ms B filed 29 April 2021;
(ii)Affidavit of Ms C filed 29 April 2021;
(iii)Affidavit of Ms D filed 29 April 2021;
(iv)Affidavit of Ms E filed 29 April 2021;
(v)Affidavit of Mr F filed 29 April 2021;
(vi)Affidavit of Mr G filed 29 April 2021;
(vii)Affidavit of Mr H filed 29 April 2021.
The Respondent relied upon:
(a)Case outline of his counsel filed 18 March 2022;
(b)Initiating Application for Final Orders filed by the Applicant on 3 November 2020;
(c)Response to Initiating Application filed 16 February 2021;
(d)Amended Initiating Application for Final Orders filed by Applicant on 25 February 2021;
(e)Amended Initiating Application for Final Orders filed by Applicant on 29 October 2021; this
(f)His Affidavits filed 16 February 2021, 28 July 2021, and 25 November 2021;
(g)Affidavits of the following lay witnesses:
(i)Affidavit of Mr J filed 15 January 2021;
(ii)Affidavit of Mr K filed 15 January 2021;
(iii)Affidavit of Mr L filed 15 January 2021;
(iv)Affidavit of Ms M filed 15 January 2021;
(v)Affidavit of Ms N filed 24 January 2021;
(vi)Affidavit of Ms O filed 12 February 2021;
(vii)Affidavit of Ms P filed 16 February 2021. (However, the Court did not permit the Respondent to rely upon this Affidavit, objected to by the Applicant, as it had not been executed by Ms P nor had it been signed electronically as permitted by Joint Practice Direction 2: JPD 2 of 2020-Special Measures in response to COVID 19.)
The following Exhibits became evidence in the proceedings:
(a)Exhibit A: bank statements.
CREDIT
At the outset, the Court should refer to credit and related issues arising from the evidence.
The parties each gave oral evidence and were cross-examined.
The Court found the Applicant’s oral evidence to be generally consistent with her Affidavit evidence.
The Respondent’s oral evidence was generally consistent with his Affidavit evidence, however his oral evidence relating to the parties’ communications with architects in late 2017 and later communications with them in December 2018, in respect to the construction of livestock shelter at the property, was inconsistent with certain contemporary documentary material and lacked credibility.
To explain this inconsistency and lack of credibility, the contemporary documentary material annexed to the Applicant’s Affidavits (discussed under “Evidence” below, and see, for example, Annexures 1 f), 1 e), 1 d), 35, being annexures to the Applicant’s affidavit filed 9 November 2021) revealed that:
(a)in November/December 2017 the parties had engaged architects to design, inter alia, a house together with livestock amenities, shelters, feed shed, on acreage property (about 20 acres) at Town Q NSW (hereinafter referred to as “the property”) purchased by the Respondent in about mid 2017,
(b)In July 2018 and early August 2018 the parties had discussed buying a livestock transport business,
(The Court interpolates here that the Respondent alleged that he ended the parties’ relationship, being a mere boyfriend and girlfriend relationship, in early September 2018.)
(c)In October 2018 the parties had established a livestock transport business, with the Respondent providing the purchase price,
(d)On 17 December 2018 the Respondent had emailed the architects referring to discussions that had occurred with the Respondent, the Applicant and the Respondent’s children in relation to the proposed house to be erected on the property (there being no reference to livestock structures in that email).
In the Respondent’s oral evidence, regarding architect’s plans for livestock structures to be built on the property, he initially stated that the issue of livestock shelters with the architects “was a later addendum when we started the livestock transport business”. He then was cross-examined about a meeting with architects in December 2018 and he again stated that the issue of livestock shelters was raised in about October 2018 when the parties had established a livestock transport business. When pressed a short time later in cross-examination about the architect’s quotation in late 2017 which had included livestock amenities to be built at the property, the Respondent then gave this evidence:
MS PAGE:   So you claim that the [shelters] and [livestock] amenities were only then added after we buy [livestock] transport?   That’s why we were having a further meeting with [Ms R].
Yes or no?   I don’t know when it was first raised. I don’t.
HIS HONOUR:   Next question.
MS PAGE:   [Mr Gaubert], the architect quotation stated [livestock] amenities on 4 November 2017. You claim there was no [livestock] amenities included until after we bought a business. We didn’t buy the business until 2018 – October – one year later. Please explain?   Well, as you know, we discussed a property. I bought the property. And a part of the property improvements were to build a shed. And the shed might as well make a facility for [livestock], being in an area like that. It would increase its rent value so that it could be rented out. And if I’m going to build a shed, I might as well build it so that it has got a facility for [livestock]. We were going out together. You had [livestock].
Why would you build a [exercise area] and a round yard?   Because you liked [animals].
But you’re not in relationship with me. I’m only your girlfriend. A [exercise area] that would cost, like, $90,000. That was in the quotation for the architect. So was the round yard. So was a boutique barn. Could you please explain that?   So was the house, none of which I could afford, as you know.
The question is why would you have an [exercise] area?   Because you were putting in plans to council so that I could build a shed for accommodation, which is all that I could afford.
When did you start getting interested in [livestock], [Mr Gaubert]?   I’m not particularly interested in [livestock].
Then why would you have an [exercise area] on your property?   It’s in a [livestock] area, and we were going out together.
Okay. Enough.
In light of the above, the Court has approached the Respondent’s evidence with particular caution.
Having made this observation in relation to the Respondent, the Court should state that there were numerous factual allegations made by the Applicant, in particular certain financial contribution allegations made by the Applicant in her Affidavit filed 24 November 2021, disputed by the Respondent, which were untempered in the Applicant’s evidence by the likely reality that such alleged financial contributions would have been for the benefit of both parties; these financial contribution allegations indicated a certain stridency in the Applicant’s evidence which leads the Court to approach her evidence particularly carefully.
The parties contended for diametrically opposed positions. The Applicant contended that the parties were in a relevant de facto relationship, and the Respondent contended that they were merely boyfriend and girlfriend going out together. The Respondent disputed the Applicant’s contentions, in the alternative, that she had made substantial contributions under s 90SB(c) of the Family Law Act, 1975. The parties’ respective factual assertions in support of their positions were disparate to a significant extent.
In light of the above matters, the Court, in resolving the parties’ competing factual assertions and making findings of fact, has, in the absence of an admission by a party or a failure of a party to cross-examine the other party on a significant allegation, preferred the assertion(s) of a party as against the competing assertion(s) of the other party where the first mentioned party’s assertion (s) is supported by contemporary documentary material.
By contemporaneous documentary material, the Court is referring to, for example, the parties’ correspondence with each other (such as emails and text messages), third-party correspondence between a party/parties and a third party (for example, correspondence between architects and the parties), their travels together, living with each other at various times (see the Court’s findings below), attendance at certain places together at certain times (see the Court’s findings below), and photographs. In relation to the significant amount of such evidence adduced by the Applicant in particular (see her annexures in her affidavit filed 9 November 2021), no persuasive evidence was given by the Respondent that this contemporaneous documentary material was inaccurate on its face.
The above stated fact finding approach has resulted in the Court declining to make certain findings of fact in respect to numerous factual disputes at this hearing where there is no supportive contemporary documentary material; for example, cash payments withdrawn from the Applicant’s bank account and alleged by the Applicant to have been given to the Respondent to assist him with mortgage loan repayments, which the Respondent disputes receiving.
The evidence of the Applicant was consistent with the above referred contemporaneous documentary material and tended to support her contentions that a relevant de facto relationship existed between the parties, or, in the alternate, that she had made substantial contributions under s 90SB(c).
On the other hand, to a significant extent, the Respondent’s evidence, in particular his evidence relating to the nature of his relationship with the Applicant, was not consistent with this contemporaneous documentary material, and his related contention that the parties were merely boyfriend and girlfriend going out together ultimately lacked persuasiveness.
evidence
The Court has considered the documentary material relied upon by the parties discussed above, and the parties’ oral evidence. The Court has considered both parties’ allegations and contentions in relation to the Applicant’s claimed relief in these proceedings. The Court has considered all of the Respondent’s allegations and contentions as to why he contends that there was no relevant de facto relationship, including his contentions in paragraph 97 of his Affidavit filed 16 February 2021, and paragraph 18 of his Affidavit filed 25 November 2021.
The following recitation of facts represents findings by the Court unless a contrary intention appears. Findings will also be set out below under the heading, “Relevant circumstances under section 4AA(2)”, and under the heading, “Applicant’s application for a declaration, in the alternative, that, being a party to a de facto relationship, she made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4)(a), (b), or (c), and that a failure to make the declaration would result in serious injustice to her.” The standard of proof applied by the Court in respect to the evidence is the balance of probabilities. The Court does not propose to set out the entirety of the evidence. Relevant evidence relating to the issues to be determined will be set out.
A) The parties’ Affidavit evidence and oral evidence

The Court’s reference to any annexures in the Wife’s Affidavit filed 9 November 2021 will be referred to as “Annexure ” with an accompanying number, for example, “Annexure 24”.
The Applicant is aged 43 years. The Respondent is aged 57 years.
The Applicant, since attending high school in Country S, worked in sales roles and been in full-time employment prior to commencing a relationship with the Respondent.
The Respondent is a medical professional.
The Respondent has three adult children from a previous relationship; Mr T, Mr U and Mr V.
Following a short period of dating, the parties commenced living together on 24 September 2016. The Respondent moved into the Applicant’s rented townhouse in Suburb W, being a suburb of Brisbane, Queensland. At this time the Applicant was employed by Employer X in a sales role earning $110,000 salary plus superannuation and benefits. The Respondent travelled from Town Y to Brisbane to stay with the Applicant at least a couple of times a week between August 2016 and January 2017. The Respondent would drive from the rented townhouse in Brisbane to his workplace in Town Y having stayed the night at the Applicant’s townhouse.
The Respondent did not contribute to rent in relation to the Applicant’s rented townhouse at Suburb W.
In October 2016 the Respondent went on a holiday to Country Z with his son for about a week. This holiday had been planned prior to the parties’ relationship commencing.
On 24 November 2016 the parties flew to Sydney together to meet the Respondent’s family. The Applicant was also introduced to several of the Respondent’s close friends.
At the beginning of the parties’ relationship the Respondent told the Applicant that he was in love with her and that he wanted to spend the rest of his life with her. They began planning their future together. They both told each other that they had always dreamt of living on acreage and having animals.
The Applicant came to the Respondent’s family Christmas on 25 December 2016 held at his brother’s place.
Annexure 24 are photographs of the parties physically close to each other and smiling on 29 January 2017 in Brisbane whilst they socialised with the Applicant’s friend Ms D. These photographs also form part of Annexure A to the Affidavit of Ms D. Also in Annexure A to the Affidavit of Ms D are photographs of the Respondent feeding the Applicant’s livestock on about 29 January 2017.
On 30 January 2017, the Respondent went to Melbourne for about 3 months for a training rotation. He primarily stayed in Melbourne during this three month period. The parties met each other on several occasions at least between about 30 January 2017 and April 2017, both in Brisbane and Sydney.
Annexure ‘10’ includes a picture of a bouquet of flowers sent by the Respondent to the Applicant’s workplace on Valentine’s Day 2017 (14 February 2017), together with various text messages sent from the Respondent to the Applicant and dated from 15 to 27 March 2017 containing, inter alia, the following messages: “You are so gorgeous, Mwah xxx”, “You and I are the naughtiest sex maniacs! xxxx”, and “Flat out here sexy girl. Missing you xxx”.
Annexure 32 refers to:
·Message on Messenger from the Respondent to the Applicant of 27 February 2017 stating “oh Ms Page I’m so sorry for all this madness of mine. You are just the sweetest. xo”
·Message from the Respondent to the Applicant of 28 February 2017 stating “oh my I just want to hug you xx”
·Message from the Respondent to the Applicant of 13 March 2017 stating “You are so hilarious. Wish I could b driving you xxxx”
·Message from the Respondent to the Applicant of 13 March 2017 stating “I am hoping to gradually claw back to sanity Doing my best It was good catching up with kids xxxx”
·Photograph of Respondent dated 15 March 2017 sent by the Respondent to the Applicant
·Message from the Respondent to the Applicant of 10 April 2017 stating “okay I’m driving to you I missed u too much xxx”
·Photograph of Respondent dated 10 April 2017 and dog and cat in living room in Brisbane
·Photograph of Respondent with members of his family on 14 April 2017 in townhouse in Suburb W
·Photograph of parties kissing each other on 15 April 2017 at an event in Brisbane
·Photograph of parties physically close to each other smiling on 22 April 2017 at Location AB
·Photograph of parties physically close to each other smiling on 23 April 2017 at Suburb AC.
On behalf of the Respondent, Ms O, a Melbourne resident, swore an Affidavit.She stated that the Respondent and herself “dated briefly in Melbourne from around mid February 2017 to around April 2017.” (Court’s emphasis).
On the balance of probabilities, at the instance of the Respondent, because the Respondent was experiencing doubts as to the continuation of his relationship with the Applicant, there was a break in their relationship from 30 January 2017 to about mid March 2017.
On about 18 April 2017 the parties, together with the Respondent’s sister and her family, attended a social event at Location AD. Annexed to Ms D’s Affidavit are photographs of the parties together, with others, at that time.
In 2017 Ms D and her friend Ms AE attended the Applicant’s rented townhouse in Suburb W, Brisbane. The parties were present and the Respondent performed a procedure on at least one of the women (not the Applicant); see paragraph 13 and Annexure C a) to the Affidavit of Ms D filed 29 April 2021. In oral evidence the Respondent admitted that he appears in the photo depicted in Annexure C a) and which depicts him, wearing surgical gloves, carrying out a procedure to a woman’s face.
In 2017 the Respondent had surgery at a hospital in City AF. The Applicant flew to Sydney and picked up the Respondent’s son Mr T and they drove together to City AF to see the Respondent. The Applicant looked after the Respondent in his recovery from surgery.
Annexure 3 includes an email dated 5 May 2017 from the Applicant to the Respondent, and the Respondent is referred to as “hun xxxx” by the Applicant.
On 15 June 2017 the Applicant and Ms P exchanged certain text messages; see the Applicant’s Annexure 22. The Applicant informed Ms P that the Respondent was “moving Town Y house to mine”. Ms P then asked, “You’re moving in together? He’s still working down there though?” The Applicant responded, “he practically stays here now only in Town Y 2 nights so make sense. Still working down there yeah.”
On 17 June 2017 the Applicant attended Ms P’s birthday party with the Respondent when she met Ms P’s friends and family. Ms P was a friend of the Respondent. The Applicant’s Annexure 20 is a photo of this event.
On 18 June 2017 the parties inspected the property. The Respondent’s sister and her family were in attendance also. The property was purchased in the name of the Respondent, an offer having been made to purchase a property, in late June 2017. The parties had decided that the Respondent would be the sole person on the mortgage due to the Applicant’s credit rating having been damaged previously by an ex-partner. Settlement of the purchase of the property occurred on 13 August 2017. The parties drove to the property that day.
Annexure 3 includes an email dated 27 June 2017 from the Applicant to Ms P (now Ms P) of Company AG. The Applicant discusses invoices and statement of accounts in relation to services provided by “Mr Gaubert”. The Applicant refers to the Respondent’s Westpac bank details. Also included within Annexure 3 is a reply email from Ms P (now Ms P) of the same date to the Applicant.
In July 2017 the Respondent went with his siblings and their partners and spouses and children to the USA for about 2 weeks. The Applicant did not go with them. She stayed home to deal with the purchase of the property and to care for the animals.
During the parties’ relationship, the Respondent maintained alternate accommodation. He went overseas and interstate on a number of occasions without the Applicant for his work, including conferences. The Applicant attended one conference with the Respondent.
The Respondent states that from July until December 2017 while working in Town Y he would stay with staff and friends, or the Applicant in Brisbane during the week.
On 23 July 2017 the parties took a day trip to the Region AH to look at display homes. They did this again on 3 January 2018.
On about 26 August 2017 the parties attended a venue with Ms D and her husband in Brisbane. Annexure D to Ms D’s Affidavit is a photograph of the parties kissing each other at that time.
The parties commissioned architectural plans for a home to be built on the property through Company AJ. The Applicant paid Company AJ $5,577 and paid surveyor costs of $3,157, albeit on 23 May 2018 the Respondent reimbursed the Applicant $3,157 for the surveyor fees.
Annexure ‘1 (f)’ is an email correspondence sent from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 6 September 2017, being a draft email to an architect, detailing the future plans of both parties and “our overall aim” to develop a property on AK Road, Town Q. The email refers to the property requirements that “we were wanting” and “we want to establish”. It states, inter alia, “Livestock property features. We want to establish an exercise area and feed shed that can be used by agistees and Ms Page (aka Ms Page). We are thinking of setting up about 10 paddocks for animals with shelters/sheds in each. We’d like to have rotating paddocks such that each of the animals has two paddocks and so always has access to fresh grass. In other words, two adjacent paddocks for each animal, with perhaps shelters/sheds in the apex of the paddocks. We were going to establish a trail around the perimeter of the property.” The email concludes with “Chat soon, Mr Gaubert and Ms Page xoxo”.
After settlement of the purchase of the property on 13 August 2017, the Applicant, with the concurrence of the Respondent, took steps to move residence from Brisbane to the property, including ending her lease of the Brisbane townhouse.
Annexure 14 includes emails from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 6 September 2017 with the subject being “rural house images”, “AL images”, and “house idea images”.
On 16 September 2017 the parties flew from Sydney to Country S for about 10 days to visit the Applicant’s family there. The Respondent paid for the parties’ airfares. They travelled around together and spent time with the Applicant’s family and friends. The parties slept in the same bed when staying at the Applicant’s parent’s home in Country S. In Annexure 16 the parties are depicted physically close together in various photos in Country S.
On 29 September 2017 the parties attended a party at the residence of the Applicant’s friend Ms B in Brisbane. The party was also a baby shower and the parties completed a card together, for the baby to be, signed “Uncle Mr Gaubert & Auntie Ms Page”. The photographs annexed to Ms B’s Affidavit show the parties together smiling and in one photograph they are holding hands.
Exhibit A is copy bank statements from the Commonwealth Bank relating to a Goalsaver account held by the Applicant with that bank. Statement 5, for the period 15 April 2017 to 14 October 2017 is addressed to the Applicant at her Suburb W address in Queensland, and Statement 6, for the period 15 October 2017 to 14 April 2018, is addressed to the Applicant at the address of the property.
The Respondent contended, in relation to the above bank statements, that numerous credit entries in the amount of $346.54 indicated that the Applicant was receiving Government benefits. In oral evidence the Applicant indicated she had no recollection of what these credit entries constituted and the Court accepts this evidence. There is, in relation to each credit entry for this sum, a series of numbers and dates and the letters “T”. The Respondent adduced no evidence as to the meaning of these numbers, dates and letters “T”.
On 22 October 2017 the parties and the Respondent’s family spent the weekend at the property. A dog yard was built and there was a general cleanup conducted.
The Applicant quit her job with Employer X in about 2017.
Annexure 17 is a letter from Company AJ dated 4 November 2017 addressed to both parties at the property (“Mr and Mrs Gaubert and Ms Page”) and which refers to the parties’ enquiry regarding those architects designing and documenting “your new home in Town Q”.
Annexure 1 is a copy letter from ANZ to the Respondent at the Applicant’s Suburb W address, and dated 21 November 2017.
Annexure 25 is a Facebook entry dated about 21 November 2017 relating to a dinner that the parties attended at that time at the AM Hotel in Brisbane with Ms J and her then husband Mr AN. The entry refers to, “Dinner with Mr AN, Ms Page and Mr Gaubert and to celebrate their big move to Sydney.”
On 3 December 2017 the parties moved to the property full-time. The Applicant’s animals (two) arrived along with her two dogs and cat.
Annexure ‘1 (d)’ is an architectural design fee proposal from Company AJ for the Town Q Property dated 4 December 2017 referring to “Dear Ms Page and Mr Gaubert”. The proposal refers to, inter alia, “Livestock amenities/property. Livestock property: paddocks with shelters, exercise area/amenities (toilet), feed shed.”
Annexure 41 is a message from the Respondent and the Applicant dated 20 December 2017 stating, inter alia, “I love you honey… I want to support you and help you get into it… I love u honey. Thank you for being so patient xxxx”. A further message from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 21 December 2017 states, inter alia, “I love you sweetheart. I know you’re struggling and I just want to look after you and have a brilliant life with you xxxx”.
Over the next few months the parties had many visitors to friends and family to the property.
The Applicant ended up working full-time for Company AO in Town AP NSW in sales.
The Respondent purchased a tractor for the maintenance of the property. It arrived at the property on a 12 January 2018. The Applicant carried out maintenance work on the property, including slashing paddocks, and operated the tractor to effect maintenance. She organised and paid for electric fences which she installed herself.
In 2018 the parties flew to Country S to attend the Applicant’s father’s funeral. The Respondent paid for the parties’ airfares. At the funeral, the Respondent took the place of the Applicant’s absent brother and held a cord on the coffin. They arrived back in Sydney in 2018. Later the Applicant received an inheritance of $157,000.
Annexure 3 includes an email dated 9 April 2018 from the Respondent to the Applicant, with the subject heading being “Ms K accounts”, and the Respondent states, “thought if I attach the photos of the notes here we could get all the accounts sorted. What do you think?” The Applicant is referred to as “Hun” by the Respondent.
Annexure 6 attached to the Respondent’s Affidavit filed 16 February 2021 are copies of bank statements of the Applicant’s Goalsaver bank account with the Commonwealth Bank, addressed to the Applicant at the property, with the statement being from 15 April 2018 to 14 October 2018.
Annexure 26 includes an email from the Applicant to the Respondent stating, “Hi Hun, attached is Clinic AQ invoice. Do you want me to send to AG? xx” The annexure also includes a reply email from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 23 April 2018 with the subject, “Clinic AQ up to April 2018”, with the Respondent stating, “Yes please do. Thanks so much honey.xxxx”.
Annexure 3 includes an email dated 7 May 2018 from the Applicant to Ms K, copying in the Respondent, with the subject being “Updated Clinic AQ Invoice”, and in the email there is reference made to “Mr Gaubert”.
Annexure 42 includes the first page of a letter dated 29 May 2018 from Employer AR of AS Street, Suburb AT to the Applicant offering the Applicant a part-time position commencing 25 June 2018. The Applicant took up this position.
Annexure 42 includes a letter from the Commonwealth Bank to the Applicant at the address of the property dated 6 June 2018.
In about May 2018 the Respondent’s employment with Employer AU in Sydney ceased and he then obtained work at clinics on the Region AV and Town Y.
The parties rented a property together at AW Street, Suburb AX, Queensland, in June 2018 (Suburb AX being a suburb in Brisbane). Annexure 23 is a copy of the front page of the general tenancy agreement with the tenants’ names stated to be the Applicant and the Respondent. It was a joint lease for 6 months from 11 June 2018 to 9 December 2018. The Applicant paid for the bond, rent in advance and all living costs. These expenses were paid out of the Applicant’s inheritance. During the period that the parties lived in Queensland, the Applicant paid for the rent, groceries, utilities, bills and gardening maintenance contractors.
The Respondent travelled from Town Y to Brisbane to stay with the Applicant a couple of times a week from June 2018 to about early September 2018.
Annexure 14 includes an email from the Respondent to Mr AY dated 11 July 2018, stating, inter alia, “One thought we did have was changing the angle of the house as it looked down the property. We wondered about rotating it may be 15° anticlockwise… Probably easier to describe when we come in.” The email concludes, “See you guys then, Mr Gaubert and Ms Page”.
Annexure ‘14’ includes an email from the Respondent dated 13 July 2018 to Mr AY, the subject being “Gaubert Dwelling – Concept Plans”, and stating, inter alia, “Just been chatting with Ms Page. She’s wondering if we can push next Fridays 10 AM meeting a week later?”
Annexure 31 is an email from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 17 July 2018 headed “Confidential: Council”. Attached is an email sent by the Respondent to Mr Gaubert.
Annexure 45 includes an email from the Respondent to Mr AZ, his accountant, dated 23 July 2018 stating, inter alia, “Subject: contemplating buying a livestock transport business with Ms Page”; “Ms Page and I were thinking of buying an existing livestock transport business. They have sent us their financial statement for last year.”; “Ms Page has got this info so far re-Company BA”.
Annexure 45 includes an email from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 1 August 2018 attaching a message regarding, “Approval of Livestock Truck”.
Annexure 40 contains an email from Mr AY of Company AJ dated 16 August 2018 addressed to the Respondent and the Applicant, stating, inter alia, “Hope you are both well. Just touching base to see if you guys were available in the coming weeks to meet to discuss the concept design for your dwelling?”
Annexure ‘2’ is a copy of the Will of the Applicant signed and dated 27 August 2018. Clause 1 (b) appoints the Respondent as the Applicant’s substitute executor and trustee. Clause 5 devises the Applicant’s animals to the Respondent. Clause (d) directs that “50% pro indiviso share shall pass to my partner, the said Mr Gaubert, absolutely”. The Will is signed at Suburb AX, Queensland.
Annexure 33, is a message sent from the Respondent to the Applicant in about September 2018 stating, inter alia, “Just heard from lawyer. They’re closing investigations and have referred to the prosecution director.”
On 3 September 2018 the Respondent told the Applicant that he wanted to end their relationship. The next day he informed his family on Group Messenger that he had broken up with the Applicant. Thereafter, during September 2018, the parties had discussions about their relationship, and at one point, in about mid September 2018, the Respondent agreed to counselling.
The Court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that at the instance of the Respondent, the parties had a break in their relationship from 3 September 2018 until 6 October 2018 by which time the relationship had resumed. As to the resumption of the parties’ relationship, the Court places significant weight on the parties in July 2018 having discussed the purchase of a livestock transport business (including the Respondent contacting his accountant at that time) including their email communication on 1 August 2018 in relation to the livestock truck; the parties having taken steps in early October 2018 to investigate the purchase of such a business; the actual purchase of the livestock transport business in about mid October 2018 involving, inter alia, the parties becoming joint directors of a corporation; the Applicant then operating the business, with the Respondent intending to receive a passive percentage of the net profits during the lifetime of the business; the Respondent thereafter depositing monies into the business to pay for business expenses; the parties’ later time spent together in 2018 including the continuation of their sexual relationship; and their continued joint plans to build a home and structures on the property through their architects (for example, in December 2018 the parties had discussions with the architects).

The Court now refers to certain facts relating to, inter alia, the establishment of the livestock transport business. Over the weekend of 6 and 7 October 2018 the parties, again having previously considered purchasing a livestock transport business in July 2018 and communicating with each other in relation to it on 1 August 2018, investigated livestock transport companies for sale and inspected a truck (which was later purchased by the Respondent). The Respondent states that over the weekend of 13 and 14 October 2018 the parties met with the vendors of the truck and business that the Respondent’s company Company BB purchased for the benefit of the company “that we formed, Company BA.” (Court’s emphasis). The parties became joint directors of this corporation. The Respondent’s company funded the purchase of the business for $102,000 through a deposit of about $7,764 and a loan for about $92,235. The Respondent stated that it was the parties’ intention in starting the livestock transport business that the Respondent would put up the capital to get it going, the Applicant was to run it, and the Respondent would receive a passive 20% of net profits over the lifetime of the business.
Annexure 29 is a photograph of the Respondent dated 6 October 2018 taken by the Applicant (on her animals) at the property.
The parties lived apart from September 2018 to November 2018. Again, the Applicant ran the livestock transport business. She obtained a heavy vehicle driver’s licence. She had quit her job in sales to run the business. She drove for days and weeks at a time. The Respondent worked between clinics on the Region AV and in Town Y.
The Respondent, in cross-examination, was asked by the Applicant why he obtained a heavy vehicle licence. He stated that he obtained a heavy vehicle licence because he was going into business with the Applicant and there might be some occasions when the truck needed to be retrieved or driven.
The parties established a joint bank account for Company BA. The parties both had access to this account. The Applicant primarily operated the account. The Respondent had paid monies into that account to meet shortfalls on outgoings in the livestock transport business.
Annexure 7 annexed to the Respondent’s Affidavit filed 16 February 2021 is an advertisement for the business Company BA which the Respondent states remained in place online from October 2018. Inter alia, under the heading “Our Story” is a statement that “Mr Gaubert is my business partner...” There is force to the submission of the Applicant that the parties’ business material had no need to mention their personal life. The statement that “Mr Gaubert is my business partner...” is not necessarily inconsistent with the parties being in a de facto relationship at this time.
Annexure 11 includes an email from the Respondent to the Applicant dated 7 November 2018 with the subject being, “Your Location BC Australia Ticket”.
Over the weekend of 10 and 11 November 2018 the parties attended a party at Town BD .
Annexure 45 includes a letter from the Applicant to Mr BE on behalf of Company BA dated 28 November 2018.
Annexure ‘11’shows pictures of the Applicant and the Respondent together at a concert in Melbourne dated 1 December 2018 and emails dated 16 November 2018 and 30 November 2018 showing hotel booking confirmations in Melbourne for 1 December 2018 (Superior King Room) to 2 December 2018 (Executive King Room). Annexure 34 is a photo of the Respondent dated 1 December 2018 lying naked on a hotel bed. Following the parties attending the concert, the parties went to Location BC to view penguins.
Annexure 35 is an email from the Respondent to Ms R of Company AJ, dated 17 December 2018, with subject being, “Meeting with Mr Gaubert to discuss Sketch Plans”, and stating, inter alia, “Chatting with Ms Page and my kids about the plans we have so far… It seems like everybody would really like:
1)if we could orient the outlook of the house down the property to be parallel with the road…
2)We wondered if we could make the ensuite have bifold doors to, so that you could sit in the bath and looked down the property..
3).. Not sure if this is possible, but there was some thought re-winter… And whether an indoor fireplace was a possibility…”
On Christmas Day 2018 the parties spent time together with the Respondent’s family at his sister’s home in Town BF, NSW. Annexure 13 shows pictures of the parties together on Christmas Day 2018 and playing games with the Respondent’s sister and Respondent.
Annexure ‘1 (a)-(c)’ are Christmas cards from family members addressed “To Ms Page and Mr Gaubert” and one is a Christmas card from the Applicant’s mother and partner, addressed to the parties, stating, “love and good wishes for 2019”.
The Respondent asserts that he formally recommenced a relationship with Ms O over the weekend of 5 and 6 January 2019.
On 13 January 2019 the Applicant attended Event BG on the Region AV to promote the parties’ livestock transport business. The Respondent joined the Applicant at the Event BG. He had driven from Town Y to the Region AV to assist the Applicant in obtaining livestock contracts for Company BA.
On 26 January 2019 the Respondent flew to Tasmania to visit his cousins. During this trip it became apparent to the Applicant that things with the Respondent did not add up and she became suspicious of his real whereabouts. Shortly thereafter the Applicant lost all trust in anything the Respondent was saying to her.
On 16 March 2020 the Applicant swore an Affidavit and filed in NCAT that her relationship with the Respondent ended in January 2019.
B) The Applicant’s lay witness Affidavits
Affidavit of Ms D
The Court has previously referred to aspects of her Affidavit in these Reasons. Otherwise, the Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Ms B
The Court has previously referred to her aspects of her Affidavit in these Reasons. Otherwise, the Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Ms C
The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Ms E
The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Mr F
The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Mr G
The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Mr H
The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
The Court, other than as stated above in relation to the above lay witness affidavits, has not placed significant weight upon these affidavits by reason of their form, but in particular by reason of their failure to state the sources of significant content of their allegations.
C) The Respondent’s lay witness Affidavits
Affidavit of Ms J
In the Affidavit of Ms J, filed by the Respondent on 15 January 2021, Ms J alleges, inter alia, that the Respondent “broke it off” with the Applicant in September 2018 and in this context refers to a medical clinic party. She alleges that the Applicant was present and in a conversation with Ms J the Applicant had stated, inter alia, “She was very sad about the breakup.” She does not refer to any of the contemporaneous documentary material relating to the parties’ relationship previously referred to in these Reasons, inter alia, for example, such material relating to the parties being with each other on various occasions after September 2018 and up to January 2019, the parties’ livestock transport business, and the parties continued discussions with architects in December 2018. The Court found her opinions as to the nature of the parties’ relationship unhelpful. The Court takes into account her evidence as to the Respondent announcing his relationship with Ms O in January 2019. Otherwise, the Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Ms N
Ms N refers to the Applicant’s attendance at the “practice going away party” wherein the Applicant expressed distress to Ms N that the Respondent was no longer with her. She too does not refer to any of the contemporaneous documentary material relating to the parties’ relationship previously referred to by the Court in these Reasons. The witness often fails to specify the source of her asserted knowledge and awareness. The form of her affidavit was deficient in that she did not refer to the actual content of asserted discussions with the parties and she did not consistently give the dates of asserted discussions with them. The Court found her opinions as to the nature of the parties’ relationship unhelpful. The Court takes into account her evidence as to the Respondent announcing his relationship with Ms O in January 2019. Otherwise, the Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Ms K
Ms K refers to her business Company AQ. She does not refer to Annexure 3 which includes an email dated 7 May 2018 from the Applicant to Ms K, copying in the Respondent, with the subject being “Updated Company AQ Invoice”, and in the email there is reference made to “Mr Gaubert”. She too does not refer to any of the contemporaneous documentary material relating to the parties’ relationship previously referred to in these Reasons. The witness often fails to specify the source of her assertions. The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Affidavit of Ms M
This witness’ Affidavit filed 15 January 2021 refers to Ms M being a sister of the Respondent. She refers to first meeting the Applicant at “our family Christmas gathering” on 25 December 2016. She, as with Ms O, refers to the Respondent merely “dating” Ms O in the first quarter of 2017. She refers to the parties’ plan to buy a livestock transport business several weeks after 4 September 2018 but does not refer to the parties’ communications in relation to such a business in July and August 2018. She too does not refer to any of the contemporaneous documentary material relating to the parties’ relationship previously referred to in these Reasons. The witness often fails to specify the source of asserted statements. The form of her affidavit was deficient in that she did not refer to the actual content of asserted discussions with the Respondent and she did not consistently give the dates of asserted discussions with him. The Court found her opinions as to the nature of the parties’ relationship unhelpful. The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit, apart from the reference in this paragraph to meeting the Applicant on 25 December 2016 and the Respondent “dating” Ms O.
Affidavit of Ms L
This witness’ Affidavit, like Ms M’s Affidavit, refers to the Applicant being present at “the family Christmas” on 25 December 2016. She too refers to the Respondent merely “dating” Ms O in early 2017.
She refers to the parties’ plan to buy a livestock transport business several weeks around October 2018 but does not refer to the parties’ communications in relation to such a business in July and August 2018. She too does not refer to any of the contemporaneous documentary material relating to the parties’ relationship previously referred to in these Reasons. The witness often fails to specify the source of her assertions. The form of her affidavit was deficient in that she did not refer to the actual content of asserted discussions with the Respondent and she did not consistently give the dates of asserted discussions with him. The Court found her opinions as to the nature of the parties’ relationship unhelpful. The Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit but takes into account her reference to the Applicant’s presence at the family Christmas on 25 December 2016 and the Respondent “dating” Ms O.
Affidavit of Ms O
Ms O states in her Affidavit that the Respondent and herself reconnected again in Melbourne in January 2019 and a relationship “resumed”. Again, the Court refers to Ms O’s own statement that she and the Respondent merely “dated briefly” in about the first quarter of 2017. She too does not refer to any of the contemporaneous documentary material relating to the parties’ relationship previously referred to by the Court in these Reasons. She refers to the Respondent and herself announcing their relationship in early January 2019. Otherwise, the Court does not place any significant weight upon this Affidavit.
Notice to Admit Facts of Respondent filed 9 February 2021
In paragraph 3 of the Respondent’s Affidavit filed 25 November 2021, he states that he relies upon a Notice to Admit Facts filed on 9 February 2021. He states that the Applicant was legally represented when “the Notice to Admit Facts was filed and served upon (the Applicant) “through her lawyer’s office.” The Respondent adduces no evidence to indicate when he alleges he served the Notice to Admit Facts “through her lawyer’s office”. He adduces no evidence as to who allegedly served such document. No separate formal affidavit of service is relied upon. He adduces no evidence to indicate how he complied with either Rule 6.11 of the Court’s former Rules (Ordinary Service, Service other than by hand) or Rule 2.40 (Ordinary service) of the Court’s present Rules. For example, he does not adduce evidence to state that he (or some third party) sent the Notice to Admit Facts to the Applicant’s former solicitor’s postal or email addresses. The Court observes that no submissions were made by the Respondent relating to the Notice to Admit Facts. The Court observes that no cross examination was conducted upon the Applicant by the Respondent in relation to the Notice to Admit Facts. The Court, accordingly, disregards the Notice to Admit Facts.
Legislation and legal principles
Section 4AA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), provides, inter alia:
De facto relationships
Meaning of de facto relationship
(1) A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a) the persons are not legally married to each other; and
(b)the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).
Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple
(2) Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:
(a) the duration of the relationship;
(b) the nature and extent of their common residence;
(c) whether a sexual relationship exists;
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(g) whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;
(h) the care and support of children;
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
(3) No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.
(4) A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the Court in the circumstances of the case.
As to relevant case-law, the Court refers to the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Crick & Bennett [2018] FamCAFC 68 and the cases referred to and discussed therein including Sinclair & Whittaker [2013] FamCAFC 129.
The Court also refers to the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Fairbairn v Radecki [2022] HCA 18. The High Court decision discussed s 4AA(1)(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 including the words “living together” and the issue of the “breakdown” of a de facto relationship. It also discussed the issue of whether there was a need for cohabitation within s 4AA(1). Inter alia, the Court stated:
"Living together" and "breakdown"
28. Section 4AA(1)(c) identifies the relationship which is the concern of the Act: "a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis". The existence of such a relationship is determined having regard to "all the circumstances" of a relationship; significantly, those "circumstances" include any or all of the circumstances listed in s 4AA(2), and, by reason of s 4AA(3), no particular finding about any circumstance is necessary for there to be a de facto relationship. Consistently with the reality that human relationships are infinitely mutable, in determining whether a de facto relationship exists a court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate [23].
29. A de facto relationship will have broken down when, having regard to all the circumstances, the parties no longer "have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis". Such a conclusion is not precluded by the presence of an ongoing relationship of some sort. That is not the inquiry. The question is whether a de facto relationship exists or has broken down.
30. In the context of a human relationship, "breakdown" refers to the "end" or "breakup" of what had been an enduring emotional bond. It is the "breakdown" or "end" of a de facto relationship that is the trigger point for the Federal Circuit and Family Court to be seized of jurisdiction to make a property settlement order under s 90SM of the Act. It would make no sense for such a jurisdiction to arise before a de facto relationship had ended. The appellant's submission finds no support in statutory context, in history, or in any extrinsic material referred to the Court's attention.
31. Other provisions in the Act support the view that "breakdown" refers to the "end" of a de facto relationship…
The need for cohabitation
32. The appellant's primary argument that the parties' de facto relationship had broken down when the appellant was placed into an aged care facility such that the parties were no longer physically living together must be rejected. It is contrary to the text of s 4AA and to statutory context and purpose to which reference has been made. It is also contrary to real-world considerations. It would be productive of injustice if two people who live apart (including for reasons of health) were incapable of remaining in a de facto relationship.
33. Living together for the purposes of s 4AA(1) will often, perhaps usually, mean cohabitation of some residence by a couple for some period of time. But cohabitation of a residence or residences is not a necessary feature of "living together". That phrase must be construed to take account of the many various ways in which two people may share their lives together in the modern world [26]. Two people, for any number of reasons, may not reside in the same residence, but nonetheless be in a de facto relationship in the sense required by s 4AA.
34. The fact that here the appellant was placed into an aged care facility may be relevant to the existence or breakdown of a de facto relationship under the Act, but it could not, of itself, be determinative of that issue. The same observation applies to the decline in the appellant's cognitive ability.
35. Two decisions support the proposition that physical cohabitation at a single home or homes is not a necessary feature of an ongoing relationship whether by way of marriage or otherwise; it is not an irreducible minimum that all relationships must exhibit…
39. The language of s 4AA of the Act and its reference to "living together" requires no different approach to determining whether a relationship exists of the kind defined. "Living together", consistently with authority, should be construed as meaning sharing life as a couple. Section 4AA does not prescribe any way by which a couple may share life together. Its language is sufficiently broad to accommodate the great variety of ways a de facto relationship may exist [41]. That conclusion is supported by the varied factors listed in s 4AA(2). In a given case, some of the factors listed in s 4AA(2) may be relevant and some may be irrelevant; inevitably some may have greater prominence than others. A conclusion that a de facto relationship has ended may also arise because of factors not listed in s 4AA(2). Such a conclusion is mandated by s 4AA(3) and (4). In particular, s 4AA(4) is a statutory recognition that what may constitute a genuine de facto relationship is not be determined in the same way in every case by reference to rigid criteria that must always be satisfied. In that respect, the language of s 4AA(2)(b) does not assume that every de facto relationship must have a "common residence" to some "extent" and of some "nature". Such a construction is entirely denied by s 4AA(3).
Relevant circumstances under section 4AA(2)
(a) the duration of the relationship;

The Applicant, when she met the Respondent, was renting a townhouse in Suburb W, a suburb in Brisbane. The Respondent was working in Town Y. The parties dated for a short period and then, on 24 September 2016, representing the time of commencement of the parties’ de facto relationship, the Respondent began to live with the Applicant at her townhouse at least a couple of times a week up until 29 January 2017. The Respondent would drive a considerable distance from his work in Town Y to be with the Applicant at Suburb W. The Respondent told the Applicant that he was in love with the Applicant and that he wanted to spend the rest of his life with her. The parties began planning their future together including living on acreage. They attended events together. The Court infers that the Applicant had probably developed significant positive emotions towards the Respondent by the time he began to stay in her townhouse on 24 September 2016.
There was a break in the parties’ relationship, at the instance of the Respondent, from 30 January 2017 until about mid March 2017.
Thereafter, the parties relationship continued until 3 September 2018 when, at the instance of the Respondent, there was a short break in the relationship until 6 October 2018 when it resumed.
Thereafter, the parties’ relationship continued until 3 January 2019. On 4 January 2019, the Respondent probably began a relationship with Ms O, who lived in Melbourne, and he communicated this relationship to others. By about late January 2019 the Applicant had lost all trust in the Respondent. She had sworn an Affidavit in NCAT proceedings on 16 March 2020 that her relationship with the Respondent ended in January 2019.
(b) the nature and extent of their common residence;
Again, the Respondent began to live with the Applicant at her townhouse in Suburb W at least a couple of times a week up from 24 September 2016 until 29 January 2017. The Respondent would, on those occasions that he was living with the Applicant at her townhouse, travel by car from his work in Town Y to the townhouse in the evening, a considerable drive, stay the night, and then, early the next morning, would travel by car back to Town Y.
From 30 January 2017 until about the end of April 2017, the Respondent was usually in Melbourne in relation to his work. However, the parties met up with each other on several occasions during this period.
From about the end of April 2017 until about early December 2017, the Respondent resumed living with the Applicant at her townhouse at Suburb W; again, as before, he would stay there at least a couple of times a week.
On about 3 December 2017 the parties moved to live at the property. Thereafter the Respondent would travel to his work at Town Y or on the Region AV and return to the property. This position continued until about 11 June 2018 when the parties entered into a joint six month lease for rental premises at Suburb AX, a suburb in Brisbane. The Respondent then would travel from Town Y to Brisbane to stay with the Applicant at Suburb AX at least a couple of times a week until 3 September 2018.
From 3 September 2018, at the instance of the Respondent, the parties had a break in their relationship until 6 October 2018. The Respondent did not stay with the Applicant at Suburb AX from 3 September 2018 until about November 2018 when he resumed staying there with the Applicant, as before. This living arrangement continued until 3 January 2019.
Whilst the Respondent did not reside with the Applicant day in day out, week in week out, it should be observed that the Respondent had, for example, work commitments in Town Y and on the Region AV at different times, and attended work related conferences and programmes.
(c) whether a sexual relationship exists;
The parties had a sexual relationship from at least late September 2016 until at least the end of their relationship on 3 January 2019.
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
In relation to the property, and related architects plans that the parties jointly arranged with architects, the Applicant paid the architects $5,577 and initially paid surveyor costs of $3,157 (the Applicant was eventually reimbursed by the Respondent for this amount).
The Applicant purchased food for the parties at the property, whilst acknowledging that the Respondent was not continuously residing at that property.
The Applicant paid for the bond and rent in relation to the rented property at Suburb AX in Brisbane.
The parties established a joint bank account for Company BA in about October 2018. The parties both had access to this account. The Applicant primarily operated the account. The Respondent had paid monies into that account to meet shortfalls on outgoings in the business.
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
The property was purchased by the Respondent. However, the Applicant lived at the property with the Respondent, as discussed above. The Applicant made significant contributions to its maintenance.
The Applicant owned some livestock including other animals during the parties’ relationship. These animals were kept and maintained at the property for a period. The Respondent is seen pictured with the Applicant’s animals in Annexure 12 and he is seen pictured with the Applicant’s dog and cat on a lounge in Brisbane in Annexure 32.
The Applicant worked as a driver in the business Company BA, being a business purchased by the Respondent in about October 2018 and received some limited income from that work. She worked in that business from about October 2018 at least until about January 2019.
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
The Applicant committed herself to sharing a life together with the Respondent during the duration of their relationship. Such commitment continued despite some short breaks in their relationship. The Court, again, refers to the nature of the parties’ relationship from its commencement in late September 2016, as discussed above. The Court now provides some examples of such commitment from the Applicant’s perspective.
The Applicant provided significant emotional support to the Respondent during the relationship, including in relation to his dealings with the governing body of medical professionals.
In 2017, the Respondent having had surgery at a hospital in City AF, the Applicant flew to Sydney, picked up the Respondent’s son Mr T, and they drove together to City AF to see the Respondent. Thereafter the Applicant looked after him in his recovery.
The Applicant, on occasion in 2017 and 2018, had provided some administrative assistance to the Respondent in relation to his work as a medical professional; this work took the form of chasing up accounts on behalf of the Respondent and liaising with clinics in this regard. She assisted in organizing some women to attend her Suburb W townhouse in 2017 where the Respondent carried out a procedure.
The Applicant, despite having no legal ownership in the property, made a substantial contribution to its maintenance through, inter alia, fencing work, and tractor work involving slashing and mowing from about January 2018.
The Applicant made a Will on 27 August 2018 appointing the Respondent as her substitute executor and trustee and devising a significant part of her estate to him.
The Respondent contended that the parties’ relationship never went beyond a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. The Court does not accept this contention. There were numerous matters that indicates that contention to be implausible, and which confirm that the Respondent too was committed to a shared life with the Applicant. The Court refers to its discussions above in this context. The Court now relates some particular examples in relation to the Respondent.
The Respondent drove considerable distances to be with and live with the Applicant from the beginning of their relationship in late September 2016; for example, from Town Y to Brisbane.
The parties had discussed plans to improve the property with accommodation and other structures, including livestock related structures. They had together inspected display homes in the Region AH on two separate occasions; in July 2017 and January 2018. They had approached and then communicated with architects in this regard from about November/December 2017. The parties had resumed communicating with those architects in December 2018 to discuss sketch plans for the property; the Respondent’s own email to the architects on 17 December 2018 refers to his having discussed the plans with the Applicant and his children.
The Respondent had travelled with the Applicant to Country S, where the Applicant’s parents resided, on two occasions during their relationship. The first occasion was in September 2017 being a 10 day trip with the Respondent paying the parties’ airfares, and the Respondent meeting the Applicant’s family and friends. The second occasion, in 2018, a one-week trip, was for the purpose of attending the Applicant’s father’s funeral in Country S. At the funeral the Respondent took the place of the Applicant’s absent brother and held a cord on the coffin. Again the Respondent paid the airfares for this second trip to Country S.
The parties jointly rented premises together at Suburb AX, Queensland for a six-month term commencing on 11 June 2018; they signed a formal lease in this respect. The Applicant paid the rental and bond.
The parties discussed buying a livestock transport business together and the Respondent, in late July 2018, contacted his accountant indicating that the parties were contemplating buying a livestock transport business. This came to fruition in about early October 2018 when the Respondent paid the purchase price for a livestock transport business and the Applicant began to drive the livestock transport truck.
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
Both parties had introduced each other to their friends and family during the course of their relationship and social and other occasions occurred in this context, again including the attendance (and participation) of the Respondent at the Applicant’s father’s funeral in Country S.
The Court refers to the Applicant’s evidence that from the outset of the parties’ relationship they socialised and travelled extensively together, whilst there were periods when this did not occur.
The evidence also reveals the parties’ mutual affection for each other, including physical affection both privately and publicly.
The Respondent, in oral evidence, stated that he probably told the Applicant in August 2016 that he would never put the Applicant as his profile picture because 2 women (Ms BH and Ms BJ) would attack her, and that he would keep his Facebook private and only his friends would see pictures of the Applicant.
Other circumstances
The parties’ relationship was not registered under a prescribed law and there was no child of the relationship.
In summary, having regard to the above evidence, the Court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that having regard to all the circumstances of the parties’ relationship, they had a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis for at least 2 years and they were in a de facto relationship during that period, comprised by the aggregation of the following periods:
(A)from 24 September 2016 until 29 January 2017,
(B)from 15 March 2017 to 2 September 2018,
(C)from 6 October 2018 to 3 January 2019.
The Court is satisfied, pursuant to s 90RG of the Family Law Act, 1975, that the Respondent was ordinarily resident in a participating jurisdiction when the primary proceedings commenced on 3 November 2020, namely Victoria.
The Court will declare that a de facto relationship existed between the Applicant and the Respondent for a period of at least 2 years and comprising the periods:
(A)from 24 September 2016 until 29 January 2017,
(B)from 15 March 2017 to 2 September 2018,
(C)from 6 October 2018 to 3 January 2019.
Applicant’s application for a declaration, in the alternative, that, being a party to a de facto relationship, she made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4)(a), (b), or (c), and that a failure to make the declaration would result in serious injustice to her
Should the Court be incorrect in finding that the parties’ de facto relationship lasted at least 2 years, then the Court needs to determine whether “the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4)(a), (b), or (c), and that a failure to make the order or declaration would result in serious injustice to the Applicant”. The Court sets out relevant statutory provisions and refers to its findings below.
Section 90 SB provides:
A court may make an order under section 90SE, 90SG or 90SM, or a declaration under section 90SL, in relation to a de facto relationship only if the Court is satisfied:
(a) that the period, or the total of the periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years; or
(b) that there is a child of the de facto relationship;
or
(c) that:
(i) the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c); and
(ii) a failure to make the order or declaration would result in serious injustice to the Applicant; or
(d) that the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory.
Section 90 SM (4) provides:
(4) In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the Court must take into account:
(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:
(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or
(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property;
whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and
(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:
(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or
(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property;
whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and
(c) the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent.
In Dover & Mosely & Anor [2019] FCCA 2488, Lapthorn J discussed the meaning of “substantial contributions” under s90SB(c)(i) stating:
17. What is meant by the term ‘substantial contributions’? The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Redmond & Mullins[4] cited and affirmed the following view of Holden CJ in V & K :[5]
In my view, substantial means something more than usual or ordinary. In my view [the section] is aimed at more exceptional circumstances where serious injustice may be caused by the application of [the relevant provision].
18. Johnston J addressed substantial contributions in Wall & Mitchell.[6] After referring to the decisions of Miller & Trent[7] and V & K he said:
[303] With respect to both Coates FM and Holden CJ, I agree. If usual or ordinary contributions were sufficient to amount to “substantial contributions” within the meaning of s 90SB(c) , there would be little purpose in the two years requirement in s 90SB(a) of the Act. This is because in most de facto relationships to some extent usual or ordinary contributions would be a feature of such relationships.
19.The Full Court[8] decision in Harriot & Arena[9] is instructive in considering the meaning of “substantial contributions”:
59. If the appellant’s contribution of the net proceeds of her home constituted a “substantial” contribution, it will be unnecessary for us to determine the somewhat more vexed question of whether the actions taken by the appellant in relation to her career and her child should be characterised as “contributions”.
60. The trial judge made no finding as to whether the appellant’s contributions were “substantial”. However, he did record that the appellant relied on the decision of Altobelli FM (as his Honour then was) in Webb & Douglas [2012] FMCAfam 1049 to support the assertion that “substantial” means “something more than usual or ordinary”, this being the view of Holden CJ in V and K [2005] FCWA 80 when dealing with equivalent legislation. (Holden CJ’s formulation has been followed in other cases, some of which were cited by Watts J in Lee v Hutton (2013) 50 Fam LR 322 at [180]–[182]).
61. Rather than agreeing with Holden CJ, it seems to us that Altobelli FM disagreed with him, as appears from this extract from Webb & Douglas (original emphasis):
21. The cases therefore seem to suggest that before a contribution can be substantial, it must be more than usual or ordinary. This is a vague and subjective standard. In the diversity of relationships that present before courts exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act how is “usual” or “ordinary” to be determined other than by reference to the facts of the case before the Court at the time? How could a judicial officer make the comparisons that need to be made by using this standard without referring to extrinsic evidence ie. the judicial officer’s own perception of contribution in other cases?
22. By contrast it is interesting to note that FM Coates in Miller & Trent referred to dictionary definitions of “substantial” at paragraph 59 of his judgment. He noted, for example, that the Macquarie Encyclopaedic Dictionary defined substantial as “an ample or considerable amount as well as something having real worth or value”. His Honour also referred to the Concise Oxford Dictionary meaning of “having real importance or value and to a considerable amount”. Federal Magistrate Coates also referred to a Family Provision Act (1982) (NSW) decision in Wentworth & Wentworth (1995) 37 NSWLR 703 where the Court held that substantial “means not illusory, something considerable or large”.
23. Whereas the V & K and Miller & Trent definition of substantial invite comparison to other cases, the dictionary definitions invite a more contextual analysis. In other words the question is whether the contribution is substantial in the context of the case being determined, and not by reference to other cases.
62. While Altobelli FM erroneously assumed in Webb & Douglas that a court could have jurisdiction to deal with a de facto property dispute where it was common ground that neither s 90SK(1)(a) or s 90SK(1A) had been satisfied, his Honour’s discussion draws attention to deficiencies in the “something more than usual or ordinary” formulation. Noting that the matter was not the subject of proper argument, as presently advised we are not attracted to the “something more than usual or ordinary” definition, since it would, for example, seem to exclude parent and homemaker contributions in a lengthy marriage. This could not be right, as Holden CJ implicitly acknowledged at [20]–[21] in V and K. We would therefore be inclined to treat anything said in V and K as being confined to its own unusual facts, which involved two self-represented litigants, and where the issue was whether “substantial contributions” had been made in the 22 days the parties spent living in Western Australia.
63. To the best of our knowledge, the meaning of “substantial contributions” has not been the subject of careful consideration by this Full Court, although the matter was touched on in Redmond & Mullins [2015] FamCAFC 69, where V and K was cited. However, the meaning of “substantial” has been the subject of much discussion by other courts. Our review of those authorities indicates support for these observations of Deane J in Tillmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v The Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union [1979] FCA 85; (1979) 27 ALR 367 at 382:
The word “substantial” is not only susceptible of ambiguity: it is a word calculated to conceal a lack of precision. In the phrase “substantial loss or damage”, it can, in an appropriate context, mean real or of substance as distinct from ephemeral or nominal. It can also mean large, weighty or big. It can be used in a relative sense or can indicate an absolute significance, quantity or size. The difficulties and uncertainties which the use of the word is liable to cause are well illustrated by the guidance given by Viscount Simon in Palser v Grinling ( ... [1948] AC 291 at 317) where, after holding that, in the context there under consideration, the meaning of the word was equivalent to “considerable, solid or big”, he said: “Applying the word in this sense, it must be left to the discretion of the judge of fact to decide as best he can according to the circumstances of each case...
64. Clearly the “substantial contributions” test is a subjective one. Any effort to elucidate its meaning by use of other words or phrases will simply replace one subjective test with another. It will remain a matter of impression whether the contributions are considered to be “substantial”. While recognising that the test is subjective, we are nevertheless inclined to agree with Thackray J, who said in Thorburn and Oswald [2007] FCWA 43 at [54] that a trial judge
would need to interpret the word “substantial” in the context of the financial position of the parties. What might appear to be a “substantial contribution” for people of limited financial resources, might not be substantial in a case involving very wealthy parties.
65. To like effect, see Oakley and Roche [2009] FCWA 132 at [15] per Crisford J.
66. As noted, the trial judge made no finding as to whether the appellant’s submissions [sic] were “substantial”. We consider that the contribution of $80,000 from the sale of the appellant’s home was “substantial”, and we note that the Respondent effectively conceded as much, since his counsel accepted that the application of those funds in Vanuatu represented a “substantial” contribution. That being the case, it is unnecessary for us to come to a concluded view about the other “contributions” upon which the appellant relied.

The Court makes the following findings, again, on the balance of probabilities.
Should the Court be incorrect in finding that the parties’ de facto relationship lasted at least 2 years, then the Court finds that there existed a de facto relationship between the parties for a period of less than 2 years and at least from December 2017, when the parties moved in to live at the property, to 2 September 2018. In this context, the Court refers to its previous recitation of the evidence in these Reasons.
The Applicant made non-financial contributions towards the conservation or improvement of:
(a)the property at Town Q.
From at least about 12 January 2018, when the Respondent purchased a tractor for the Applicant’s use, the Applicant spent “hours on end” and “well over 100 hours” of manual labour maintaining the property through clearing work, whipper snipping, weeding, regularly slashing paddocks, removing old AG pipe and wire fencing, and filling holes in the property. She organised for electric fences to be installed, planted and watered boundary trees, maintained the access road grass verges and entrance. She performed this maintenance work continually whilst she resided at the property. The property was very overgrown and derelict when the parties moved in to live at the property in December 2017. The Applicant drove the tractor purchased by the Respondent to carry out some of the above tasks.
The Court observes, again, that the Applicant lived at the property at least from about early December 2017 to June 2018 (when the parties rented premises together in Suburb AX, Queensland), and probably intermittently attended the property in the second half of 2018.
(b)the business Company BA.
The Applicant obtained a Heavy Vehicle Licence and drove a livestock transport truck in the business. The period of the Applicant’s work was from about early October 2018 to at least January 2019 and during this period she drove considerable distances.
(c)the Applicant’s animals, during the parties’ relationship; the Applicant cared for her animals and domestic pets.
The Applicant made a contribution to the welfare of the family constituted by the Applicant and the Respondent through her:
(a)providing care for the Respondent in his recovery following his surgery in 2017;
(b)provided emotional support to the Respondent, particularly in relation to the Respondent’s case with the Governing Authority. For example, the Applicant accompanied the Respondent to Sydney to meet his lawyer, Mr Brown, and waited all day when the Respondent was having a meeting with Mr Brown regarding his case;
(c)paying architects $5,577 and initially paying surveyor costs of $3,157 (the Applicant was eventually reimbursed by the Respondent for this amount) in relation to the property;
(d)staying back and undertaking necessary tasks with the Real Estate and Conveyancer in relation to the purchase of the property in about June 2017, and was the primary contact for architects, including reviewing quotations;
(e)attending day trips to the Region AH with the Respondent to look at display homes for the property in July 2017 and January 2018;
(f)paying for the food and rent at the Suburb W premises during periods that the Respondent was living there with the Applicant;
(g)paying for the food, bond and rent for the parties’ leased premises at Suburb AX in Brisbane, during periods that the Respondent was living there with the Applicant;
(h)the Applicant provided some assistance to the Respondent in his work as a surgeon; she performed some accounts work (chasing accounts owing to the Respondent) in relation to the Respondent’s work for Ms K, and Clinic AQ. Such administrative work included work conducted by the Applicant in June 2017, and May 2018. The Applicant occasionally accompanied the Respondent to a clinic. She arranged some women to attend her Suburb W address in 2017 where the Respondent performed a procedure for at least one of the women.
The Court finds that the above contributions under s 90SB (c)(i), when considered together and viewed holistically, constituted substantial contributions by the Applicant for the purposes of s 90SB(c)(i) and that a failure to make an Order under s 90SM would result in serious injustice to the Applicant.
In respect to the substantial contributions and serious injustice issues referred to above, the Court observes and takes into account, inter alia, that it appears that the Applicant and the Respondent did not own significant assets at the commencement of the parties’ relationship. The Applicant had resigned her employment with Employer X in about 2017 (where she was earning an income of $110,000) to live at the property with the Respondent. She later obtained employment in Town AP but took a $60,000 drop in salary. The Respondent had purchased the property for $976,500 by utilising a deposit of $97,650 and obtaining a mortgage loan for the balance of purchase price. The Applicant was never paid for any of her work at the property or for her accounts assistance relating to the Respondent’s work. She only received one pay from the livestock transport business in April 2019 of $2,700. She has utilised all her inheritance received from her late father’s estate. Her present financial circumstances appear to be modest if not unsatisfactory. The Court recognizes that the Applicant resided at the property for a significant period, however in respect to the Applicant’s living at the property post January 2019 and the related Property BK lease between the parties, the parties had agreed that the Applicant could remain living at the property under that lease and continue to operate the livestock transport business from the property. The Respondent had an interest in the potential profits of that business. The Court observes that the Applicant makes a claim for $300,000 for property adjustment in her Amended Initiating Application filed 25 February 2021. There is $75,000 in the Applicant’s former solicitors trust account to meet any prospective property adjustment Orders between the parties.
The Court will make declarations, in the alternative, accordingly.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty-nine (189) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Newbrun.
Associate:
Dated: 22 June 2022

File number(s):	PAC 5874 of 2020
Judgment of:	JUDGE NEWBRUN
Date of judgment:	22 June 2022
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – de facto property adjustment proceedings - threshold hearing - declaration that de facto relationship existed between the parties, in the aggregate, for at least 2 years - declaration, in the alternative, that the parties were in a de facto relationship, within the meaning of section 4AA(1) of the Family Law Act, 1975, for a period of less than 2 years, and the Applicant made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90 SM(4) (b) and (c), and that a failure to make the declaration would result in serious injustice to the Applicant
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss. 90 SM, s 90SB(c), 4AA, 90RG, 90SB Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021, r 8.20
Cases cited:	Crick & Bennett [2018] FamCAFC 68 Dover & Mosely & Anor [2019] FCCA 2488 Fairbairn v Radecki [2022] HCA 18 Sinclair & Whittaker [2013] FamCAFC 129
Division:	Division 2 Family Law
Number of paragraphs:	189
Date of last submission/s:	23 March 2022
Date of hearing:	22 and 23 March 2022
Place:	Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant	Self-represented litigant
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr Hodgson

PAC 5874 of 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:	MS PAGE Applicant
AND:	MR GAUBERT Respondent

order made by:	JUDGE NEWBRUN
DATE OF ORDER:	22 June 2022