Packwood and Packwood (Child support)

Packwood and Packwood (Child support) [2018] AATA 4002 (21 August 2018)

DIVISION:Social Services & Child Support Division
REVIEW NUMBER:  2018/SC013202
APPLICANT:  Mr Packwood
OTHER PARTIES:  Child Support Registrar
Ms Packwood

TRIBUNAL:Member M Douglas
DECISION DATE: 21 August 2018
DECISION:

The decision under review is varied so that from 1 May 2018 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Packwood is $4,214 until the end of the current child support period.

For the avoidance of doubt, this decision means that the objection decision of 13 December 2017 shall apply in accordance with its eight terms but only until 30 April 2018 and after that Mr Packwood is liable to pay child support to Ms Packwood at $4,214 only until the end of the child support period.

CATCHWORDS
Child support - Departure determination - Significant orthodontic costs - Costs of education - Income and financial resources of parents - Decision to depart - Decision under review is varied

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988

REASONS FOR DECISION

BACKGROUND

Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood are the parents of [Child 1], [Child 2] and [Child 3], in regards to whom the Child Support Registrar has issued an administrative assessment of child support with effect from 1 June 2009.
The Tribunal observes that the Child Support Registrar acts through the Department of Human Services and for these reasons the Tribunal shall refer to the Registrar as the Department.
The Tribunal, on Mr Packwood’s application, is reviewing an objection decision the Department made on 13 December 2017. The Department’s primary decision to which that objection decision relates was made on 20 October 2017 under subsection 98S(1) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act). The primary decision was in response to an application that Ms Packwood made under subsection 98B(1) of the Act. The Department in its primary decision of 20 October 2017 recorded in the following terms the assessments that were extant at the time Ms Packwood made her application:
For the period 1 January 2017 to 26 February 2017 Ms Packwood is assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $2,123. This assessment is based on Ms Packwood’s adjusted taxable income of $188,678 and Mr Packwood’s ATI of $172,106. This assessment takes into account a previous change of assessment (COA) to increase Ms Packwood’s liability by $1,207.
For the period 27 February 2017 to 28 February 2017, Mr Packwood is assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $1,588. This assessment is based on Mr Packwood’s ATI of $172,106 and Ms Packwood’s ATI of $188,678. This assessment takes into account a previous COA decision to decrease Mr Packwood’s liability by $1,207.
For the period 1 March 2017 to 1 April 2017, Mr Packwood is assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $2,137. This assessment is based on Mr Packwood’s ATI of $178,378 and Ms Packwood’s ATI of $188,678. This assessment takes into account a previous COA decision to decrease Mr Packwood’s liability by $1,207.
For the period 2 April 2017 to 21 August 2017, Mr Packwood is assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $14,161. This assessment is based on Mr Packwood’s ATI of $178,378 and Ms Packwood’s ATI of $188,678. This assessment takes into account a previous COA decision to decrease Mr Packwood’s liability by $1,207 and a change of care of [Child 1].
For the period 22 August 2017 to 31 August 2017, Mr Packwood is assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $2,963. This assessment is based on Mr Packwood’s ATI of $4,942 and Ms Packwood’s ATI of $188,678. This assessment takes into account a previous COA decision to decrease Mr Packwood’s liability by $1,207.
For the period 1 September 2017 to 30 June 2018, Mr Packwood is assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $2,963. This assessment is based on Mr Packwood’s ATI of $4,942 and Ms Packwood’s ATI of $188,678. This assessment takes into account a previous COA decision to decrease Mr Packwood’s liability by $1,207.
The Department in its primary decision of 20 October 2017 determined that:
The previous COA decision of 4 April 2017 to set Ms Packwood’s adjusted taxable income at $188,678 will cease to apply from 1 January 2017.
For the period 1 January 2017 to 30 September 2018 Ms Packwood’s adjusted taxable income is set at $154,573.
The Department in its objection decision of 13 December 2017 determined as follows:
1. Decision maker (DM) [Mr A]’s decision to set Ms Packwood’s adjusted taxable income (ATI) at $154,573 in the period 1 January 2017 to 30 September 2018 ceases to have affect (sic: effect) from 1 January 2017 and DM [Mr B]’s decision dated 4 April 2017 to set Ms Packwood’s ATI at $188,678 is reinstated from 1 January 2017 and ceases to have effect from 22 October 2017.
2. From 23 October 2017 to 31 October 2019 Ms Packwood’s ATI is set at $130,000.
3. For the period 22 August 2017 to 28 February 2018 Mr Packwood’s ATI is set at $178,378.
4. DM [Mr C]’s decision dated 30 September 2016 in relation to the annual rate of child support being reduced by $1,207 for [Child 2]’s orthodontic cost ceases to have effect from 30 June 2017.
5. DM [Mr B]’s decision increasing the annual rate payable by $1,207 for [Child 1]’s orthodontic cost, when Ms Packwood is the paying parent, ceases to have effect from 30 June 2017.
6. For the period 1 November 2017 to 31 October 2019 the annual rate of child support is increased $1,855 ($3,710 in total) to reflect a contribution by Mr Packwood for [Child 2]’s orthodontic cost.
7. For the period 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018 the annual rate is increased by $3,824 to reflect a contribution by Mr Packwood to [Child 2] and [Child 3]’s private schooling cost.
8. For the period 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019 the annual rate payable is increased by $4,015 to reflect a contribution by Mr Packwood to [Child 2] and [Child 3]’s private schooling cost.
The Tribunal observes that [Child 1] was residing with Mr Packwood until 1 April 2017 but has since then been residing with Ms Packwood. The Tribunal also observes that from 1 March 2018 Mr Packwood’s adjusted taxable income is set at $181,410 in accordance with section 58 of the Act, and this is because his taxable income for the 2017 year has not yet been assessed.
The objection decision the Department made departing from the provisions of Part 5 of the Act has resulted in Mr Packwood being required to pay child support to Ms Packwood as follows:
i.Nil for the period 1 January – 26 February 2017;
ii.At an annual rate of $1,588 from 27 to 28 February 2017;
iii.At an annual rate of $2,137 from 1 March to 1 April 2017;
iv.At an annual rate of $14,161 from 2 April to 30 June 2017;
v.At an annual rate of $15,368 from 1 July to 22 October 2017;
vi.At an annual rate of $20,552 from 23 October to 31 October 2017;
vii.At an annual rate of $22,407 from 1 November to 31 December 2017;
viii.At an annual rate of $26,231 from 1 January to 28 February 2018;
ix.At an annual rate of $26,453 from 1 March to 30 November 2018.

THE HEARING AND THE EVIDENCE

The Tribunal heard Mr Packwood’s application on 19 June 2018 and 21 August 2018.
Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood participated in the hearing by telephone. Both gave affirmed oral evidence. The Department did not appear at the hearing.
Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood also provided documents to the Tribunal which have been received into evidence. Mr Packwood’s documents are marked A1–A242 and Ms Packwood’s documents are marked B1–B123.
The Department provided the Tribunal a bundle of documents in accordance with its obligation under subsection 37(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, which the Tribunal also received into evidence. These are paginated 1–564. Following a request the Tribunal made under subsection 95J(1) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988, the Department also obtained from Mr Packwood’s former employer a deed of release made between it and Mr Packwood. The Department also provided that to the Tribunal and that document, and the Department’s covering letter, are marked C1–C19.
The Tribunal has had regard to this evidence.
For completeness the Tribunal notes that it held a direction hearing with Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood some weeks prior to the hearing. Following that direction hearing, Mr Packwood made an application for Member Douglas, who conducted the direction hearing, to recuse himself from further hearing the matter because of “unfair bias”. The basis of that application by Mr Packwood was that, according to Mr Packwood, Member Douglas had made a finding of fact with respect to a wage payment Ms Packwood had received and was “dismissive” of comments that Mr Packwood had made. Member Douglas declined that application to recuse himself because he had made no finding of fact at the direction hearing and indeed had explained to Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood that the purpose of the direction hearing was not to take evidence but to clarify the issues the Tribunal would need to consider to review the objection decision of the Department and to establish what further evidence might be available to assist the Tribunal in that regard. Nothing that was said at the direction hearing could cause a fair-minded person to entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal, were Member Douglas to conduct the hearing, by reason of Member Douglas having prejudged any issue that the Tribunal would need to consider to review the decision.

RELEVANT LAW AND ISSUES

Part 5 of the Act contains the provisions by which the Department assesses the annual rate at which a liable parent is to pay child support to the carer entitled to child support. A liable parent or the carer entitled to child support may, if there are special circumstances, apply to the Department under section 98B of the Act for a determination to depart from the provisions relating to the assessment of child support. The Department, or the Tribunal in the Department’s place, if satisfied that the criteria of subsection 98C(1) are met can make one or more of the determinations listed in subsection 98S(1) to depart from the provisions of the Act relating to an administrative assessment of child support. The criteria specified in subsection 98C(1) are:
i.that one, or more than one, of the grounds for departure referred to in subsection (2) exists; and
ii.that it would be:
a.just and equitable as regards the child, the liable parent, and the carer entitled to child support; and
b.otherwise proper;
to make a determination (under subsection 98S(1)).
The grounds for departure referred to in subsection 98C(2) are those set out in subsection 117(2) of the Act.
In reviewing the Department’s decision, the Tribunal must consider whether these criteria are met, and if they are, the Tribunal must then consider what determination or determinations should be made under subsection 98S(1).
In her application to the Department under subsection 98B(1) of the Act, Ms Packwood relied on the grounds for departure enumerated in subparagraphs 117(2)(b)(ia) and 117(2)(c)(ia) of the Act.

CONSIDERATION

Is there a ground to change the assessment?

It is convenient to deal separately with the grounds for departure on which Ms Packwood relied.

Subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ia)

Subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ia) of the Act reads as follows:
(b) that, in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected:
(ia)because of special needs of the child.
It is common ground that [Child 2] required orthodontic treatment, in the form of bands being applied to her teeth. This was done on 25 July 2017. In evidence is a letter from the orthodontist to Ms Packwood dated 20 July 2017 in which he advised the cost of the treatment would be $8,150, which Ms Packwood would have to pay by means of an initial payment of $650 and then 20 monthly payments of $375.
Ms Packwood was entitled to a rebate from her health insurer of $1,200 for the cost of the orthodontic treatment [Child 2] received, meaning that the amount Ms Packwood would pay for that treatment would be $6,950.
The Tribunal is satisfied that that is an amount that significantly affects the cost of maintaining [Child 2]. The Tribunal also considers that because [Child 2] had a special need with respect to her teeth, that required orthodontic treatment, there is a special circumstance in this case.
It follows that this ground for departure is established.

Subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia)

Subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia) of the Act reads as follows:
(c) that, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child:
(ia)because of the income, property and financial resources of either parent; or …
The circumstances Ms Packwood articulated in her application under subsection 98B(1) with respect to this ground for departure was that in an earlier decision the Department made under subsection 98S(1), the Department set her adjusted taxable income in an amount greater than the gross income of $160,167 that she received in the year ending 30 June 2017, as disclosed in a PAYG payment summary that her employer had provided.
Ms Packwood however had entered into a salary sacrifice arrangement with her employer whereby part of her remuneration was provided by way of lease payments on a car. In evidence is the final payslip she received from that employer, being for the pay period 13 October to 31 October 2017. That revealed her gross remuneration to the end of that pay period was $46,920, whereas the taxable portion of her gross remuneration was $40,761.63. Ms Packwood’s evidence to the Tribunal was the difference between those two amounts related to that part of her remuneration that was paid as lease payments for her vehicle. Ms Packwood also produced her PAYG payment summary that this same employer issued to her for the 2018 financial year, which revealed her period of employment with it in the 2018 year was between 1 July 2017 and 13 October 2017 and which also revealed gross payments in that period of $40,762, being the same as that disclosed in the payslip as the taxable portion of her income. The Tribunal infers from this that her employer did not include within the gross payments it disclosed in the PAYG payment summary it issued to Ms Packwood for the 2018 year, the lease payments made with respect to Ms Packwood’s car. The Tribunal also infers that would have been the case for the 2017 year. That is to say, the Tribunal infers that the effective remuneration that Ms Packwood was receiving from her then employer comprised both the gross payment as disclosed in the PAYG payment summary plus the lease payments related to her vehicle.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the adjusted taxable income that was used for Ms Packwood of $188,678, which was set in an earlier determination the Department made under subsection 98S(1), is wrong. It follows that the Tribunal is not satisfied that the use of that income amount for Ms Packwood in the assessment in force at the time she made her application resulted in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by Mr Packwood for the children.
It is of course relevant to consider Mr Packwood’s income, property and financial resources, given that this ground for departure relates to the income, property and financial resources of either parent.
As was noted in paragraph 3 above, Mr Packwood’s adjusted taxable income after 22 August 2017 was $4,942. He elected under subsection 60(1) of the Act for that amount to be his adjusted taxable income.
Mr Packwood’s employment with his most recent employer was terminated on 14 August 2017 following his position becoming redundant. In accordance with a Deed of Release he made with his employer, his employer paid him, within 14 days of his redundancy, amounts totalling $129,696.70. Those amounts included payments his employer made “in lieu of notice”, payments for accrued but untaken annual leave and long service leave and payments by way of compensation for the redundancy.
The money that Mr Packwood received upon the termination of his employment was money that he could apply towards the cost of his children’s needs.
The Tribunal observes that in the financial year concluding 30 June 2017 Mr Packwood’s taxable income was $178,378. Based on that level of income, the Tribunal calculates that had his employment not been terminated, it would have taken him to approximately the end of April 2018 to receive, as wages, the gross amount he received upon his redundancy. Given that the assessment of his child support obligation was calculated on an income amount for him of $4,942 over that period, the Tribunal is satisfied that because of the money that was available to him by way of his redundancy payment, the assessment of child support for that period did result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by him for his children.
Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that this ground for departure is established.

Is it just and equitable to make a determination?

The matters the Tribunal must consider are listed in subsection 117(4) of the Act. The Tribunal is not required to go slavishly through each of these matters. Insofar as these matters are relevant the Tribunal takes into account the following.
Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood each have a primary obligation to support their children. That obligation ranks in priority to all their commitments, other than those necessary to enable them to support themselves.
Neither Mr Packwood nor Ms Packwood has an obligation to support any other person.
The Tribunal takes into account that the cost of raising [Child 2] has been increased because she had orthodontic treatment in July 2017. Ms Packwood is indebted to the orthodontist who provided that treatment for the cost of the treatment. She made an initial payment, as was discussed above, of $650 and is making monthly payments of $375 to clear the debt. She received a rebate of $1,200 from her health insurer.
The Tribunal takes into account that [Child 1] left school midway through 2017. He was until that time attending [School 1] in accordance with the expectation of both Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood. In March 2017 there were arrears of school fees owing that Mr Packwood committed to pay by monthly instalments of $437.50 commencing on 7 March 2017. He made those payments each month from March to September 2017.
[Child 2] and [Child 3] attend [School 2]. [Child 2] has done so since 2016 and [Child 3] since 2017. Mr Packwood signed both the enrolment form and the acceptance form for [Child 2] to attend that school. He did not sign the form for [Child 3] to attend the school.
In evidence is an unsigned “bonding child support agreement” that Mr Packwood’s solicitors presented to Ms Packwood’s solicitors under cover of a letter dated 27 July 2015. A term within that draft agreement recorded that the parties had agreed that [Child 2] and [Child 3] were to be enrolled at [School 2] at [Suburb 1] for their secondary education. Mr Packwood’s solicitors also presented Ms Packwood’s solicitors under cover of the same letter a copy of proposed consent orders relating to the living arrangements of the children and which provided for the children during school terms to live with each of Ms Packwood and Mr Packwood on a week about basis.

The draft agreement was never signed and the proposed orders were never made and the week about living arrangements with respect to the children never eventuated. Ms Packwood said that that was due to [Child 3] and [Child 2] not wanting a week about arrangement. Ms Packwood also said that Mr Packwood was not willing to compromise with respect to the week about arrangement.
Whatever be the case, Mr Packwood’s evidence to the Tribunal was that because it never eventuated he changed his mind regarding his agreement for [Child 3] and [Child 2] to attend [School 2]. Ms Packwood’s evidence is that they never had any further discussion following Mr Packwood’s solicitors submitting the draft agreement and proposed consent orders to her solicitors regarding which school the children would attend. It was her evidence, which the Tribunal accepts, that she signed an enrolment form and acceptance form with respect to [Child 3] attending the school without any further discussion with Mr Packwood regarding it but in the belief that Mr Packwood had endorsed [Child 3] attending the school.
Bearing in mind that [Child 1] attended a Catholic high school in accordance with the expectation of both parents and that [Child 2] commenced at a Catholic high school in accordance with the expectation of both parents, the Tribunal considers that, on balance, Mr Packwood did expect that [Child 3] would also receive her secondary education at a Catholic school.
The evidence establishes that the fees for both girls to attend the school amount to $7,647 a year. Ms Packwood has been paying the cost of the girls’ education at the Catholic school since 2017. As that cost related to how both parents expected [Child 2] and [Child 3] would be educated, the Tribunal considers that the cost is to be characterised as a direct cost that Ms Packwood incurs to provide care for [Child 3] and [Child 2]. To the extent that Mr Packwood is able to contribute to that expense, the Tribunal considers it would be just and equitable for him to do so.
The Tribunal takes into account that [Child 1] held employment as an apprentice for a period of around four months from April to July this year. Ms Packwood’s evidence is that he was subject to bullying within his employment and for that reason resigned. She said that she did not collect any board from [Child 1] during that period because she was encouraging him to save for a car. He was otherwise using his wages, which Mr Packwood described as being modest, to purchase uniforms and textbooks and the like. She said that she met all his other living costs during the period he was employed. He remained living in her home.
The evidence does not disclose that [Child 3] or [Child 1] have any special needs. Other than the condition [Child 2] had with respect to her teeth that required orthodontic treatment, the evidence does not disclose that she has any special needs.
Ms Packwood signed a statement of financial circumstances on 29 January 2018 in which she declared the content therein to be complete and correct. Her evidence to the Tribunal was that with respect to her income and household expenditures, the information remained true and correct. Her situation with respect to her property has changed in that she and her partner have purchased a house that they are presently leasing out. The lease expires at the end of the year and it is their intention to move into that property then and use it as their residence. At the time she signed her statement of financial circumstances she had around $300,000 held on deposit with a bank. She used that money, together with moneys she and her partner obtained through finance, to purchase the house. Her only other assets are household contents and her motor vehicle.
In her present employment, which she commenced at the end of October 2017, she receives a weekly wage of $2,500. As mentioned previously, the remuneration she received in her prior employment was of the order of $188,000 a year. Her evidence, which the Tribunal accepts, was that she had to cease that employment because her employer was relocating its offices.
Her list of expenditures in her statement of financial circumstances reveals that she incurs all the normal costs to support herself and the children.
The Tribunal takes account of the fact that any reduction in child support she receives from Mr Packwood will cause her and the children hardship, and the contrary would be the case in that any additional child support she receives from Mr Packwood would lessen the financial burden she has consequent upon caring for the children.
Mr Packwood also signed a statement of financial circumstances. He did so on 16 July 2018 declaring the content therein to be complete and true. His evidence to the Tribunal was that the content remains currently correct. He indicated in his statement that he receives no income whatsoever. His listed weekly expenses amount to $2,900. They include some relatively large items of discretionary expenditures such as $100 a week for entertainment and hobbies, $200 a week for holidays, $200 a week for gifts and $100 a week for hairdressing and toiletries. He did not in his evidence reveal how he affords to pay that without receiving an income.
The Tribunal takes account of the fact that his most recent employment was terminated in August 2017. Mr Packwood’s evidence, which the Tribunal accepts, was that he did not foresee his employment would be terminated and it came as a surprise to him. He has since applied for around 25 jobs, without success.
Mr Packwood’s monthly credit card statements reveal that he uses his credit card to meet several of his household and domestic expenditures. His credit card statements for the eight-month period following the date on which his prior employment was terminated until 17 May 2018 revealed he used his credit card to meet expenditures totalling $34,542.44, the average monthly amount being $4,317. Over that time the outstanding balance of his credit card dropped slightly from $5,628.97 to $5,045.38.
Within that period Mr Packwood also sold an investment property in December 2017. As the Tribunal understood his evidence, Mr Packwood did not net anything on that transaction but merely retired an investment loan.
The evidence reveals that Mr Packwood was able to meet his household and domestic commitments subsequent to his being made redundant. The Tribunal infers that he used the payment he received upon the termination of his employment to enable that. He did not produce any evidence to reveal what his 2017 earnings were or the amount his taxable income is likely to be assessed for that year. He revealed in his statement of financial circumstances that his assets consist of his home, household contents, a motor vehicle and shares the values of which he specified as $220,000. As said, his evidence to the Tribunal was that the content of his statement remained correct.
He listed having a home mortgage securing a debt of $900,000, but that however did not correlate with the outstanding balances revealed in the statements he produced for the two home loan accounts he holds with [Bank 1], which revealed borrowings of a much lower order.
The Tribunal finds that Mr Packwood has no present employment and hence has no income from employment. Doing the best it can based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal considers that as at the time he was made redundant from his employment his annual level of income was around $178,000. As mentioned above, what he received upon the redundancy of his employment was equivalent to the wages he would have received until the end of April 2018 had his employment not been terminated. The evidence establishes that he was able to meet all his normal commitments within that time and, as the Tribunal has said, it infers he was able to do so because of the payment he received upon his redundancy.
The Tribunal also considers that Mr Packwood would, based upon the payment he received upon the termination of his employment, have been able to contribute towards the cost associated with the orthodontic treatment [Child 2] had and also the cost associated with [Child 2] and [Child 3] attending a secondary Catholic school, in addition to a contribution to all the usual costs of the children’s care. In the Tribunal’s view that was his position until the end of April 2018.
However, because he is not in employment, and because the only asset that he really can draw upon presently to provide for the children is the shareholding he has, it seems to the Tribunal that since 1 May 2018 his capacity to provide financially for the children has been significantly reduced.
In the Tribunal’s view, it seems that the just and equitable determination that the Department made by way of its objection decision was a just and equitable determination to make up to 30 April 2018. Thereafter however, it seems to the Tribunal that, as a consequence of Mr Packwood’s employment having come to an end in August 2017, he does not have the same capacity to provide for the children, and undue hardship would be caused to him to require him to do so beyond that point. He does however, have a shareholding to which he could resort so as to contribute to the costs of his children. The Tribunal takes into account that any determination resulting in less child support being paid to Ms Packwood will necessarily cause hardship to her and the children. That said however, noting Mr Packwood can resort to his shareholding to provide for his children, and notwithstanding that he is without income and employment, the Tribunal considers a fair balancing of the financial hardship between Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood consequent upon the costs related to their children’s care, and consequently a just and equitable determination to make, would be for Mr Packwood to provide for the children at the equivalent of the fixed annual rate provided in subsection 65A(2) of the Act.

Is it otherwise proper to change the assessment?

In deciding whether it is otherwise proper to depart from the administrative assessment, the Tribunal must have regard to the fact that the primary obligation to support the children rests with Mr Packwood and Ms Packwood and also have regard to whether, and if so how, any determination it makes would affect the entitlement of Ms Packwood or the children to an income-tested pension, allowance or benefit.
None of the children receives an income-tested pension, allowance or benefit and, also, that circumstance will not change whatever determination the Tribunal makes.
Ms Packwood does not receive a family tax benefit from the Commonwealth Government. The Tribunal understands that circumstance will not change whatever determination the Tribunal makes.
In the circumstances discussed, the Tribunal considers that the just and equitable and otherwise proper determination to make is that which the Department did by way of its objection decision but only to 30 April 2018. Thereafter, the Tribunal considers that the just and equitable and otherwise proper determination to make is for Mr Packwood to pay child support until the end of the current child support period at the equivalent of the fixed annual rate that would apply under section 65A of the Act, and the Tribunal determines accordingly.

DECISION

The decision under review is varied so that from 1 May 2018 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Packwood is $4,214 until the end of the current child support period.

[2018] AATA 4002

21 August 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Jurisdiction

Remedies

Statutory Construction

Judicial Review