Pacific Dunlop Limited v Hogan

[1989] HCATrans 306

i~

~

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Sydney No S62 of 1989

B e t w e e n -

PACIFIC DUNLOP LIMITED

Applicant

and

PAUL HOGA.i.~, RIMFIRE FILMS LIMITED

and BURNS PHILP TRUSTEE COMPANY

LIMITED

Respondent

Application for special leave to

appeal

MASON CJ	BRENNAN,_J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 8 DECEMBER 1989, AT 9.37 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
SlT 1/1/RB 1 8/12/89
Pacific

'

MR J.McL. EMMERSON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MR J.E. MIDDLETON, for the applicant.

(instructed by Freehill Hollingdale & Page)

MR J.P. HAMILTON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MR P. CAMPBELL, for the

respondents. (instructed by Henry Davis York)

MASON CJ:	Mr Emmerson.
MR EMMERSON:	If the Court pleases, this is a case concerning

what is known as character merchandising and it

raises the issue of what are the rights and

obligations of persons who seek to engage in this

type of merchandising.

The problem arises as follows: for any advertising

it is necessary for the person making the advertisement
to somehow attract the attention of the proposed

customer; in the case of television advertisements,

the attention of the viewer. To do that it is usual

to have what is called a hook or a grab, something

which attracts the attention of the viewer and,with

any luck, also puts the viewer in a good frame of mind.

The hook or the grab need not necessarily have anyth:ing

much to do with the subject-matter that is being

advertised. Its purpose is one of attracting attention.

Now one can, of course, use a variety of hooks or

grabs; some of them, on any view, are matters which

could be said to be in the public domain. You can have

a picture of seaside or Sydney Harbour Bridge or

anything else which you hope will serve your purpse.

In the case of character advertising, what you

seek to do is attract attention with the aid of

some image which suggests a particular character, in

this case the character of Mick Dtmdee. Now, it has

become common for there to be character merchandising

and persons who have rights in respect of characters

sometimes license those rights for reward and they
can become valuable.	Now, the rights that they have

had in the past have been such rights as copyright,

trademark and matters of that sort, where there is

an identifiable right which is licensed or,

alternatively, what has been licensed is the actual

services of someone who is known and recognized by

the public.

The question raised in this case is whether, even

if there are no such rights, nevertheless persons who

are associated with the particular character have a

right to prevent others from using that character in

advertisements without permission or without paying

such sums of money as are required. Now, in our

submission, this is a case where the question arises

in a very sharp form because the findings of the

SlTl/2/RB	2	8/12/89
Pacific

learned trial judge make it quite clear that there is

no background right here which is capable of being

licensed. There is - in order for my learned friends

to succeed it has been necessary to construct some

right and, in our submission, the right has been

constructed in a variety of different ways by the

different judges who constituted the court at first	instance.and the majority of the Court of Appeal,
constructed in yet another way by His Honour
Mr Justice Pincus of the Federal Court in the KOALA
DUNDEE case.

Now, the relevant findings of fact are in short

compass. As the Court is aware, the subject-matter of

complaint is an advertisement which is a parody of a

scene from a film called Crocodile Dundee but there is

no dispute that that parody did not, itself, involve

an infringement of copyright; it did not involve the use

of Mr Hogan who played the relevant part in the film.

What it relied upon was the grabbing of attention by

reason of something which was reminiscent of what had

been seen in the film.

His Honour's findings of fact are set out at

pages 48 and 49:

the television advertisement was devised for
the respondent on the basis, borne out by
the evidence before me, that a very large

number of television viewers in the target

audience would be aware of the character Mick

Dundee as played by Mr. Paul Hogan in the

film "Crocodile Dundee" and of the incident

comprising the knife scene of the film

the knife scene was the scene which was the subject

of the parody.

(b) Mr. Hogan was well regarded by those persons

as an individual in the public eye who

represented archetypal Australian attitudes

and values, (c) many of those television viewers

would recall fairly closely the dialogue in the

knife scene: "He's got a knife." "That's not

a knife -

and of course the large knife is produced -

"That's a knife."

The Court will recall that the parody involves,

"That's not a pair of shoes. This is a pair of shoes"

and one then led on to the advertisement.

MASON CJ:	The nub of the finding is at page 49, is it not?
MR EMMERSON:	Yes, Your Honour, I am going on to those . Most

of the findings, in fact, that we rely on are on

SlTl/3/RB	3	8/12/89
Pacific

page 49, but I am setting out the background from

page 48.

MASON CJ: Yes. We have read the judgments.

MR EMMERSON:  The critial findingson page 49 begin at the

top:

Contrary to the primary submission of the

applicants, I do not find that a substantial

number or even a reasonably significant number

of viewers in the target audience would react

to the advertisement as being one in which Mr. Paul Hogan was participating, nor do I

find that the intention was that this should

• be the response.

So there is no suggestion that we were representing

that Mr Hogan was taking part in the advertisement.

Rather, I find both - - -

MASON CJ: There was a suggestion of that but that was

repudiated by the primary judge.

MR EMMERSON: That is correct, Your Honour, and that does not

arise any further. That was, in fact, my learned

friend's principal ground before the primary judge but

it disappeared after his decision.

Rather, I find both that a substantial number of those

viewers would believe that the male actor was a

"send-up" of the Mick Dundee character played

by Mr. Hogan, and that the advertisement was

intended to achieve this result. The objective

of the advertisement was that a substantial

number of viewers take away a favourable

impression of "Crocodile Dundee" and Mr. Hogan

in connection with "Grosby Leatherz", rather

than that they go away to analyse differences

between the real thing and the character in the

advertisement dressed up like "Crocodile Dundee".

I find that intention was realised.

So the question that comes up is whether the mere giving

of a favourable impression in connection with something,

which is of course what one is doing in character

merchandising, is something that you are not allowed

to do without payment to whoever claims the right, if

there is a right, to convey a favourable impression

in connection with particular merchandise.

BRENNAN J: It depends, perhaps, on what the nature of the

impression is that is favourable.

MR EMMERSON: It does indeed, Your Honour. What we say is that

if it is no more than a favourable impression, that is

to say what the advertisement has done is put the

SlTl/4/RB	4	8/12/89
Pacific

viewers in a good mood, so to speak, then there can

be no passing off and no breach of section 52.

MASON CJ:	But did not the primary judge reject that view of the impression?	Did he not find that the impression
went further?
MR. EMMERSON:	Indeed he did, Your Honour.	The way that he

found that it went further is the way that we criticize

because we say this was where he went wrong.

MASON CJ: Are you not criticizing a finding of fact when you

make that submission?

MR. EMMERSON:  No, Your Honour, we are criticizing an inference

which is drawn from the fact. The fact which goes on

to lead to the reasoning that we criticize is the fact

which is set out at page 48, at line 16, item (e):

many of those television viewers would be

aware in a general way of business practices

whereby licences for reward were given for

marketing of products in association with

representations of well known fictional

characters and whereby persons in the public

eye agreed to associate themselves with the

marketing of products.

So that is the primary fact.	We do not criticize
that primary fact.	But that fact is then used, we say

impermissibly, by His Honour with the following line

of reasoning. He says, given that fact, there is a

general or normal perceived practice that permission

is sought for an advertisement. Now, pausing there,

there has already been an important leap. One has gone

from the case where people who do have rights have

licensed them to reward, to a general public

understanding that some people grant licences for

reward, to a general or normal practice, not said by

His Honour to be an invariable practice but a general practice. Then we have the real leap which His Honour relies upon to construct a misrepresentation out of

these events, namely he says, well if you show an

advertisement,and some people are going to think that

there is a general or normal practice that this might

be a licensed advertisement, if it is not a licensed

advertisement you are engaging in misleading or

deceptive conduct.

Now, in our submission, at that point His Honour

has gone wrong because His Honour is saying, "Given an

expectation which is held as to what is usual, if you
depart from that expectation, because some people might

still think that a particular course of events had

occurred in the case in point, you are engaging in

misleading or deceptive conduct." Now, in our submission,

you cannot go from "some people have rights" to the

SlTl/5/RB	5	8/12/89
Pacific

proposition "this is known" to the proposition
"therefore there is a general association of rights

with this particular activity" to the proposition

"all people have rights". And His Honour goes wrong

in that leap from "some" to "all" and in relying on

the law of passing off and the TRADE PRACTICES ACT to

found a view that if you depart from what some people

are going to expect, then you are thereby engaging in

misleading or deceptive conduct.

MASON CJ: Are you drawing a distinction, in making this

submission, between passing off and section 52?

MR EMMERSON:	For the purpose of this submission, the question in each case is whether there is a misrepresentation
and that is, of course, the principal question that
arises in passing off.  So for the purpose of this
submission, I am directing attention to both causes of
action because we say that a mere departure from what is preceived by some people to be expected behaviour is not sufficient to found a misrepresentation which is required for either action.

BRENNAN J: That is a somewhat different proposition from the

proposition that the error lies in a process of

reasoning which starts with some people having rights

and ending with all people having rights.

MR EMMERSON:	It is really a related criticism of this Act.
BRENNAN J:	It may be related but once goes to section 52, that

argument falls down, does it not?

MR EMMERSON: 

We would say not, Your Honour, because once one

goes to section 52, what you have got to determine is
whether someone has engaged in conduct - and the two

important things are: it has to be conduct in trade or
commerce and it has to be conduct which is misleading

or deceptive. Now, we say that the mere fact that you

do something which may be open to misconstruction is not, on its own, sufficient to amount to a breach of

section 52. 

BRENNAN J: But what if it is known to be open to misconstruction

and the misconstruction is intended?

MR EMMERSON:  If _it is known to be open to misconstruction and

the purpose of the activity, so to speak, is to rely

on the misconstruction, then I would accept that as a

breach of section 52. But we say - and this is the

other aspect of the case - that that is not this case

at all; this is a case in which, so to speak, the

question of whether Mr Hogan had or had not been paid

is entirely irrelevant to our intentions which were

to attract the viewers' attention.

BRENNAN J: And to commend the product?

SlTl/6/RB	6	8/12/89
Pacific

•.

MR EMMERSON: Oh indeed; yes, indeed. And the intention was to set up in the viewer's mind a favourable impression of

the product and that was the purpose of the advertisement.

But it was not the purpose of the advertisement to convey

to the public "Mr Hogan has been paid for this

advertisement" or "Mr Hogan has given his permission".

BRENNAN J: Or "Mr Hogan thinks that Leatherz are good shoes"?

MR EMMERSON:  It was not that intention either, Your Honour.

Nor do we have, in fact, His Honour Mr Justice Gummow making that finding. The purpose of Mr Hogan and the

purpose of the whole use of the knife scene is a purpose

of a grabbing of atten,ttion. It is not, in our

submission, a purpose of misleading the public about

• background commercial relations or Mr Hogan's views.

McHUGH J:  Mr Emmerson, what is the special leave point in the

case?

MR EMMERSON:  The special leave point arises basically in two

says: first,we say that it is very important that

people should know what is the permissible and what is

the impermissible limit of what you can do with character

merchandising; secondly, we say that the reasoning that

was followed by the learned trial judge and the different

reasons of the majority of the Court of Apepal is

reasoning of a type which is capable of creating great

uncertainty as to what is the ambit of proper commercial

behaviour. Now, I have so far been directing submissions

to what His Honour the learned trial judge said. When

one gets to the decisions on appeal, in fact one gets

a three way division of what the court said.

Mr Justice Sheppard does not accept

Mr Justice Gummow's reasoning at first instance.and he

finds in favour of my clients. Mr Justice Beaumont does

reach the same conclusion but he, in our submission, in

fact finds a different misrepresentation. He works

through, by successive stage of reason, and goes away

from Mr Justice Gummow's rather tight definition of the

misrepresentation to something broader.

Mr Justice Burchett says he agrees in general terms with
Mr Justice Beaumont but then he gives his preferred

approach which is to find a quite different and, we

would say, even more dangerous misrepresentation- - -

McHUGH J: What was his, a false message of endorsement?

MR EMMERSON:  No, it was not a false message of endorsement; he used the expression "false responses". So what he says

at thebottom of page 141 and the top of 142, he deals

with the vague message of character merchandising, which

we accept of course is vague:

SlTl/7/RB	7	8/12/89
Pacific

I,

That is why the technique has grown in

importance with the rise of the television

industry. Its implications have hardly yet

been explored in the courts.

We say that, indeed, this is the first case where

the matter has come before this Court.

Their exploration involves the application of established principles in an unfamiliar

setting, where a pervasive feature is not so

much the making of statements that may mislead

the mind directly, as suggestions that may

inveigle the emotions into false responses.

And what he seems to go on to say is that if

Mr Hogan has given permission, the favourable response

is somehow a true emotional response. If he has not

given permission, it is a false emotional response

and it does not seem to matter, on that analysis,

whether the viewer, either consciously or unconsciously,

is thinking, "Oh, this is something that Mr Hogan has

said they can do" or whether he is saying, "This is

something that he has not said they can do."

He goes on to use the language of parasitic copy

which we say is simply using	emotional language and
clouding the issue.	He then goes on, on page 145,

again in our submission to misapply

the findings of the learned trial judge because he

says at l,ine 1.1:

In my opinion, the deployment in circumstances

of the present kind of techniques of persuasion,

designed to influence prospective customers in

favour of a trader or his products upon the

basis of some underlying assumption which is

false -

now the thrust of what His Honour Mr Justice GUDm1ow

had said was not that this was the principal

intention; the principal intention is, as it were,

the warm and favourable feeling. But it now goes on

to a reference to a basis and so he has at this stage,

in our submission, again gone way off what was found

by the learned primary judge. So we have a real divergence of opinion within the Full Court, ranging

from Mr Justice Sheppard who says this is not misleading

to two other judges, each of whom finds, but on the

basis we would say of a shift in precisely what

Mr Justice GUDm1ow said, who finds the other way.

In our submission, in considering the divergence

of view within the Federal Court, it is also proper

to bear in mind that there has been a parallel case,

the KOALA DUNDEE case - has the Court been provided

with that? It is No 5 in our list of authorities.

SlTl/8/RB	8	8/12/89
Pacific

This again points up what we say is the confusion

and difficulty that has arisen in this area. That

was another case in which Mr Hogan sued. This time
he was suing a shop and the name in dispute was

"Koala Dundee". The approach adopted by His Honour

Mr Justice Pincus, in effect, rejects the view of

Mr Justice Gunnnow as being artificial and sets out

to construct a different way of supporting character

merchandising on the basis that there is really some

quasi property here. If the Court goes to His Honour's

judgment which begins at page·l88, in the second full

paragraph of his judgment:

In so far as the applicants rely on the

connnon law, they do not contend that the facts

fall within the traditional doctrine of passing

off, but base their case on the extension of

this branch of the law so as to render illegal

some uses of images which say nothing about the

origins or history of goods and services. The

case is perhaps able to be described as one

concerning a character merchandising, but the

dispute is wider than one concerning a character.

Then His Honour describes what is character merchandising

and at page 189, line 13, he says:

One issue is whether members of the public

(who, if not themselves in the advertising
business, would be unlikely to have any reason

to think about the problem) would assume the

koala image and the names "Dundee Country" and

"Aussie Dundee" were used with the permission of

the respondents.

So he raises the permission matter which was what

His Honour Mr Justice Gunnnow found.

But the applicants argued that, whatever the answer to that question, they should succeed,

on the basis that the material I have

mentioned conveyed the idea, without

authority, of an association with the film.

Now, there the difficulty that one has, of course, is as to what is meant by a need for authority for

association.

BRENNAN J: Is that not the exact problem, though, that is

involved in character merchandising? One does not have to be specific about the association in order

to make the advertisement effective?

MR EMMERSON: Precisely.

BRENNAN J: And if one simply has to have a vague warm feeling

of association, that is sufficient for the advertisement's

purposes. And the question then arises whether, if there

SlTl/9/RB	9	8/12/89
Pacific

is no association in fact and none has been authorized,

which is the same question, then there is a falsity.

MR EMMERSON: 

Your Honour, with respect, we say that the fallacy

in that particular line of reasoning comes because the
word"association"can be used in two different senses.

One is one could have an association, in the sense that you might use an image of a beach of Sydney Harbour

Bridge or something in the public domain as your

attention grabbing device in an advertisement. Now, if

that is what is meant by association, then the answer is
in character merchandising there is an association.
We would then say that the fallacy in the line of

reasoning is that in the next part of it the word
"association" is used in a different sense; not in

what we say is the proper sense of a vague association

but a specific sense of suggesting that there is some

commercial relationship or sponsorship.

In our submission, so far as character merchandising

is concerned vague association, if it conveys no more

than the type of association I have mentioned,

association as it were with a beach or a bird or Sydney

Harbour Bridge, is not conveying a false representation,

it is simply using an image to attract attention.	One
has to - - -

BRENNAN J: Put that to the test, Mr Errn:nerson. Let us assume

that a scene comes on the television of Her Majesty

and gradually in the background there appear roofing

tiles. Would one not think that Her Majesty had

endorsed the roofing tiles?

MR EMMERSON:  Your Honour, again that, with respect, we would say,

is not testing the association point. One can construct

cases in which an advertisement amounts to a

representation that, for example, Her Majesty has this

sort of roofing tile at Buckingham Palace. Once it

becomes sufficiently specific that you can say, well,

that is what is represented, you can test it and you

can ask whether it is true or false. The vice with the

reasoning in the judgments in the Full Court is that

you cannot test it because what the courts says is,

well, all we need to find is that there is some

association and it does not distinguish between something

which is an association, as it were, merely in the

advertisement, and a representation of some external

association.

McHUGH J: But what I cannot help feeling at the moment is that

the highest you can put your case is that there is

some error in the reasoning in applying the proper

principle to the facts of this case.	Now, can you put
it higher than that?

MR EMMERSON:  We can put it, and indeed do put it, higher than

that, Your Honour, because we say that it really takes

SlTl/10/RB	10	8/12/89
Pacific

on a new principle. The new principle which comes out most clearly in the judgment at first instance is this principle that if you can show that a

substantial number of people are going to draw some

inference, whether correctly or not and whether

relevantly or not, then that is sufficient to amount

to a passing off or a breach of section 52.

McHUGH J: Is that really what Mr Justice Gummow did? I

rather thought from that passage at pages 49/50 he

made a finding of fact which you say is an erroneous

finding of fact.

MASON CJ: That his reasoning towards the conclusion of fact

could not be supported as a matter of logic.

MR EMMERSON: His reasoning towards the conclusion that this

was misleading could not be supported as a matter

of logic, yes, but that was a conclusion of law based

on primary facts which went no further than: some
people were genuinely aware of a practice which
sometimes has to happen but at other times does not.

It is his reasoning starting from that proposition of fact to build a conclusion of law that there is therefore misleading conduct within section 52 which

we say is wrong and if you apply that in wider

circumstances, we would say that it is very dangerously

wrong because - - -

MASON CJ: Is this how you put it, that there was an error in

the reasoning of Mr Justice Gummow which one could not
describe as an error of principle, but it led to a
conclusion which, if followed in other cases, will

generate a principle of general application?

MR EMMERSON:  We would say that it leads to a principle which

potentially has general application because it leads

to a principle which takes one from a general and,

for the purposes of the Act in question, irrelevant

expectation to a finding of breach of the Act. So

we say that there really is a principle which emerges

here and which is one which is wrong and dangerous.

We say further that this is a principle which, of course,

was not accepted by Mr Justice Sheppard; it was

specifically disapproved by Mr Justice Pincus in KOALA

DUNDEE, though he formed his own principle based on a new form of property right, and it is one which we say

even Mr Justice Burchett seems uncomfortable with because

he tries to get his own different shortcut to the matter.

MASON CJ:  Mr Emmerson, could I invite your attention to this

approach to the case. Let us assume for the moment

that all you say is acceptable. Is it none the less a

case in which, before one can be assured that the

which is going to be applied in future cases, one needs judgments are going to give rise to a general principle

to look at how the cases develop from case to case. In

S1T2/1/RB	11	8/12/89
Pacific

other words, having regard to the position of this

Court and the supervisory appellate jurisidiction

that it exercises, there is a great deal to be said for not granting special leave in cases where there

is a possibility or potentiality for a general
principle to develop and be applied, but to wait and
see how it develops at the hands of judges at first

instance and in intermediate courtsof appeal.

MR EMMERSON:  Your Honour, we would say two things about that:

one is that in our submission the principle now has

emerged sufficiently clearly that it ought to be

stopped now. The second is that the principle, and

indeed the very divergence in the reasoning of the

various members of the Federal Court, leaves one quite

uncertain as to what the law is.

MASON CJ: Is that not a reason for not granting special leave

to appeal?

McHUGH J: Yes, because it is very difficult to find out what

is the ratio of this case. The reasoning goes

everywhere.

MR EMMERSON:  Yes, Your Honour, but what, in our submission,

this Court should do is take basically - there are
three strands of reasoning which have to be analysed.

Our broad submission, of course, is that one looks for

actual misrepresentation and one looks for rights

which can be shown to exist and see whether they are enforced and that is where the dividing line occurs.

Another approach which comes through Mr Justice Pincus

and to some extent in Mr Justice Gummow's judgment is

to say, well, there is in fact a new species of property

which has emerged, some right to a character or right

of that sort. Now, we say that that is something which

now arises for decision.

The third approach is this question of whether

if you can show that because people have to behave

in a particular way in some circumstances, that leads

by the chain of reasoning that I have criticized, to

requiring them to do something always. That is another

one that emerges. Now, in our submission, it can

always, of course, be said against any applicant for

special leave, oh well, you might get different cases.

But in our submission, this is a particularly clean

case in that the primary facts can be stated in very

short compass. They are not in dispute, and one is

then concerned with the precisely defined legal

problem of how one proceeds from those primary facts

in order to determine what are the obligations.

So we therefore say that this is a case which

would enable this Court to give guidance which would
be of general application and that it is not necessary

to wait to see what other judges make of it, because

S1T2/2/RB	12	8/12/89
Pacific

in fact the contesting views are already there. The

task of this Court, we say, on appeal would be to

determine which of these views is right and we would

simply say that there cannot be a case in which the

facts are cleaner than these for that purpose.

BRENNAN J: If, in this area of character merchandising, it is

a developing area of the law, as it certainly is a
developing area of commercial activity, then there is

much to be said, is there not, for getting it right,

because it will be an important area of commercial

activity.

MR EMMERSON:  Yes, Your Honour.

.BRENNAN J: Thus far we have had KOALA DUNDEE and this case

with, if your submissions be right, a smorgasbord of preferable to await the development of experience of judicial opinions expressed. Would it not be

the intermediate appellate courts in this area before

granting special leave to this Court, for after all the

only disadvantage is that in the meantime there will be

a chilling effect on the merchandising of products by

reference to characters who have not assented to it.

MR EMMERSON:  Your Honour, as to the development, there has,

of course, already been substantial development in the

United States as Mr Justice Gummow deals with in his

we say that the effect of the Full Court - of the judgment. As to the divergence of views, in effect

decision is that nobody could every advise a client

that it was possible to use character merchandising

without getting permission from everyone who might

conceivably claim some right, whether it be an actor

or an author or whatever it might be. Now, in our

submission, it is not, with respect, for this Court on

this application to say, well, we do not like the

general idea; therefore uncertainty as to the position

of the law, we will do not more than stifle something

that we do not like. This is something which is a

growing area of commercial practice. It is something

that lawyers are going to be asked by clients, what

can we do, what can we not do, and if the position is

the law is uncertain, the reasoning of the leading

decision in this area is, as Your Honour summarized

my views, a smorgasbord, but nevertheless we simply do

not know the answer and there is really no practical

way of finding out because you then say to your client,

well, do not go ahead, and so the question never arises.

So, the effect of not considering the law now is

that the opportunity to clarify it may never arise.	We
say that that is a reason why this Court should hear
this case now.

MASON CJ:  Mr Emmerson, I think you have put us in possession of the case for special leave.

S1T2/3/RB	13	8/12/89
Pacific
MR EMMERSON:	If Your Honour please.	I had been going to

deal with the proprietary type of argument which

Mr Justice Pincus raises - - -

MASON CJ:  I think we are aware of the approach that

Mr Justice Pincus takes.

MR EMMERSON : Yes. If the Court pleases.

MASON CJ: The Court need not trouble you, Mr Hamilton.

On the assumption that this case raises a

question of general principle, we are not persuaded

that the experience of intermendiate courts of appeal

with cases of this kind has developed the law to the

• point where it would be appropriate for this Court to deal with the question.

The application for special leave is therefore

refused.

MR HAMILTON: Costs, Your Honour?

MASON CJ: You cannot resist that? The application is refused

with costs.

AT 10.25 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE

SlT2/4/RB	14	8/12/89
Pacific