Pachis & Turnbull (No 3)
[2024] FedCFamC1A 116
•11 July 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Pachis & Turnbull (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1A 116
Appeal from: Pachis & Turnbull [2024] FedCFamC1F 420 Appeal number: NAA 170 of 2024 File number: BRC 15185 of 2022 Judgment of: CAMPTON J Date of judgment: 11 July 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Practice and procedure – Where the grounds of appeal do not clearly articulate any form of legal, factual, or discretionary error – Where the appeal was listed to afford the appellant procedural fairness and an opportunity to be heard as to why the Notice of Appeal should not be struck out – Where the grounds are incompetent – Where the appeal is summarily dismissed. Legislation: Family Law Act1975 (Cth) s 65DAAA
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 28, 32, 46
Cases cited: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692; [2016] FamCAFC 34
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28
Nootkamp & Brulja [2023] FedCFamC1A 90
Pachis & Turnbull [2023] FedCFamC1A 110
Pachis & Turnbull (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 16
Number of paragraphs: 25 Date of hearing: 11 July 2024 Place: Sydney via Microsoft Teams The Appellant: Litigant in person The Respondent: Did not participate ORDERS
NAA 170 of 2024
BRC 15185 of 2022FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS PACHIS
Appellant
AND: MR TURNBULL
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CAMPTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 JULY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is summarily dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonyms Pachis & Turnbull has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CAMPTON J:
By way of a Notice of Appeal filed 8 July 2024, Ms Pachis (“the appellant”) seeks leave to appeal and if successful, appeals from an order made on 26 June 2024 by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1). That order dismissed her Initiating Application filed 23 September 2023 seeking to vary orders made 28 February 2023 regulating the parenting of two children of she and Mr Turnbull (“the respondent”), who were born in 2014 and 2015, pursuant to s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The respondent informed the appellant and the Court by email this morning that he would be unable to attend the hearing as this is the third appeal that the appellant has lodged, and he was unable to take more time off work to attend court events.
The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (“the FCFCOA Act”) enables the summary dismissal of appeals if they have no reasonable prospect of success even if it is not hopeless or bound to fail (ss 46(2) and 46(3)). The dismissal power may be exercised by a single judge (ss 32(3)(b) and 32(5)).
Leave to appeal is required from an order dismissing an application to vary parenting orders (s 28(1) FCFCOA Act; Nootkamp & Brulja [2023] FedCFamC1A 90).
The appeal was listed today to afford the appellant the opportunity to make submissions about why the appeal should not be summarily dismissed in circumstances where the 40 grounds of appeal do not disclose any reasonable prospect of success in establishing that the decision under challenge is attended by sufficient doubt so as to justify leave and that a miscarriage of justice would occur if leave was not granted, supposing it to be wrong (Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692).
For the reasons that follow, the appellant cannot demonstrate that the application for leave to appeal has any reasonable prospect of success. The appeal will be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The parties separated in early 2015, prior to the birth of the second child. Parenting proceedings were commenced on 12 June 2018.
In August 2020, after a two-day defended hearing, interlocutory orders were made providing for the children to live with the respondent and for them to spend time with the appellant for four nights each fortnight and for half of the school holidays.
On 23 September 2022 final orders were made by a judge in the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) providing:
(a)The respondent to have sole parental responsibility for the children and for the children to live with him;
(b)For the children to spend time with the appellant on alternate weekends during the school terms and for half of the school holidays; and
(c)Restraining the appellant by injunction from attending or contacting the children’s school or health professionals, and from taking the children to any health professionals unless it is a medical emergency.
The appellant did not appeal from or challenge those orders.
On 2 December 2022 the appellant withheld the children. The respondent commenced proceedings, again in Division 2, seeking orders for the children to be returned to him and to spend no time with the appellant.
On 28 February 2023 orders were made providing for the respondent to have sole parental responsibility for the children, for the children to live with him, and to spend no time with and have no contact with the appellant.
On 10 July 2023 the appellants appeal from those orders was dismissed, being “wholly devoid of merit” (Pachis & Turnbull [2023] FedCFamC1A 110).
On 23 September 2023 the appellant filed an application in Division 2 to vary the orders made 28 February 2023, seven months after those orders were made and two months after the determination of the Appellate Division.
The appellant appealed a procedural order made by a Division 2 judge on 10 January 2024, dismissing a review. An appeal from that determination was dismissed on 21 February 2024 (Pachis & Turnbull (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 16).
The proceeding was transferred from Division 2 to Division 1 on 28 May 2024. The order of the primary judge dismissing the transferred application filed 23 December 2023 is the subject of challenge by way of this appeal.
A transcript of the hearing before the primary judge on 14 June 2024 is available and was read during the hearing of the appeal, informing some of the complaints made by the appellant during oral submissions.
THE APPEAL
The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant on 8 July 2024 records the grounds of appeal as follows:
1. Intentional tactics used to sabotage a fair trial.
2. Criminal negligence.
3. Conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
4. Extortion involved by the use of children.
5. Concealing for corruption and pedophilia.
6. Verdict could not be sustained on evidence before the commonwealth.
7. Manipulation surrounding the circumstances of the family.
8.Serial sex offenders and human child traffickers employed by the commonwealth to conceal for the previous judicial corruption.
9.Deliberate appointments of federal employees to cause further duress.
10.Commonwealth employee (Judicial Officer) stalking the families and making false baseless allegations.
11.Cannibal pedophile syndicate operating out of agencies.
12.Attempts to use fraudulent pedophile third parties to abuse processes.
13.Concealment of financial abuse and financial crimes.
14.Sick psychological tactics used to abuse the biological mother, Judicial officer showed signs of being mentally impaired.
15.Judge made threats to resign.
16.Failure to arrest.
17.Judge failed to adhere to the set list of arguments.
18.Issues in dispute left unaddressed.
19.Concerning behaviour by the Judicial officer (Mental Health).
20.Failure to comply with previous appeal judicial officers instructions and adhere to the case management of the proceeding.
21.Children abandoned/ forcefully removed by an child trafficking pedophile syndicate.
22.Plagiarised judicial noes from a mentally ill, pedophile cannibal [sic], nagretta mafia judicial officer.
23.Abandoned children in a cult to be drugged and disfigured.
24.Refusal to assist children in need of protection from criminals and remove from repetitive rapes and abuse.
25.Dismissed a child abduction proceeding to assist his “friends” and ignored all principles of natural justice.
26.Conspiracy to cause extensive delays
27.Previous request for the proceeding to be diverted out of Brisbane federal Court due to the corruption.
28.Performance audit for professional conduct required.
29.Children rapped and home invasions occurred while awaiting trial.
30.Attacked the children’s biological mother as retaliation to continue abuse and assist the syndicate.
31.Two million dollar extortion plot ignored and dismissed.
32.Obstruction of Justice assisting pedophiles and corrupt public service members to evade liability.
33.Illegitimate practices for private gain.
34.In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things)–
(a)the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken;
(b)the likely seriousness of the harm;
(c)the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d)the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm
35.Conflict of interest involving government procurement.
36.Improperly dismissing and continuing custody of children to pedophiles, who are controlled by former pedophile cannibal judicial officers and corrupt police.
37.Organised crime had infiltrated the Brisbane federal Court and was responsible for human child trafficking and financial fraud.
38.Encouraging pedophiles to continue to defraud the government while condoning social acceptance of pedophiles.
39.Along with fraud, there have been soaring levels of participation in the syndicate – with children remaining with pedophiles for longer than expected.
40.Investigation of the Judicial officer is necessary for improperly awarding child custody to a dangerous pedophile and dismissing a family law application.
(As per the original)
Grounds 1 to 17, 19 to 24, and 26 to 40 are not proper grounds of appeal. They do not articulate any form of appellate error of the kind identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 or any other recognised appellate error as to judicial process or procedure. These grounds are incompetent. The allegations in these grounds are fallacious, scandalous, and egregious.
During oral submissions the appellant could not articulate any matter underscoring or supporting the challenges by Ground 18, being a failure to take into account a relevant consideration, or by Ground 25, being a denial of natural justice. The appellant repeated her complaints as to the State of Queensland being a systematically corrupt and as to members of the judiciary and other organisations and institutions in Queensland being vehicles to enable crimes and their protection.
As to Ground 18, the contention as to error by way of failure to take into account a relevant consideration is anchored in the determination of the Division 2 judge by the orders regulating the parenting of the children on 28 February 2023. As recorded earlier in these reasons, the appellant’s appeal from that determination has been concluded. Each of the remaining matters identified by the appellant in oral submissions today as being “left unaddressed” were the subject of exchange between the appellant and the primary judge and submission as recorded in the transcript of 14 June 2024. The ground has no merit.
As to Ground 25, being a denial of natural justice, the appellant said she was not afforded “a full and proper trial” before the primary judge, in that it is her view that the primary judge ought to have brought criminal charges against currently unspecified persons in Queensland. The appellant conceded that no such request was made of the primary judge on 14 June 2024 because “it’s all there, it’s not acceptable.” She further said that it “goes without saying” that the primary judge would have access to the relevant information to construct and bring those criminal charges and had an obligation to do something. This complaint did not form part of the appellants case as prosecuted at first instance; it is now too late to raise it. She is bound by the conduct of her case at trial (Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68). The ground is baseless.
The appellant has been given the opportunity to show cause as to how the application for leave to appeal, or if achieved, the appeal itself, had any reasonable prospect of success. She has been unable to do so.
The reasons of the primary judge were prophetic:
24I am satisfied that nothing I say in these Reasons will satisfy the [appellant]. I expect, not only that she will appeal my decision, but there is every likelihood I will now be accused of personal or judicial conduct of a similar nature that has been asserted about other judicial officers.
CONCLUSION
The appeal is summarily dismissed because it does not enjoy reasonable prospects of success.
I certify that the preceding twenty-three (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Campton. Associate:
Dated: 11 July 2024
0
5
2