Supreme Court
New South Wales
Case Title: Paccar Financial Pty Limited v David Menzies & Anor Medium Neutral Citation: [2011] NSWSC 1255 Hearing Date(s): 4 October 2011 Decision Date: 05 October 2011 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Walmsley AJ
Decision: (1) Order the amended defence be struck out.
(2) Grant the defendants leave to file and serve an amended defence to the amended statement of claim drafted in accordance with pt 14 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 20.05, on or before 26 October 2011. Dispense with the need to comply with r 19.5(2).
(3) Order the first cross-claim be struck out and give leave to the defendants to file and serve an amended cross claim on or before 26 October 2011. Dispense with the need to comply with r 19.5(2).
(4) Order the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of and incident to the motion of 18 August 2011.Catchwords: PLEADINGS - principles involved in pleading defence - striking out defence - costs - whether successful party entitled to order for assessment forthwith
Legislation Cited: Competition and Consumer Act 2010
Contracts Review Act 1980
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)Cases Cited: Fiduciary Ltd & Anor v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd & Ors (2002) 55 NSWLR 1
Richards v Kadian (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 373Texts Cited: Hamilton, Lindsay, Morahan and Webster, New South Wales Civil Procedure Handbook 2011 (2011)
I H Jacob, Bullen and Leake and Jacob's Precedents and Pleadings (12th ed 1975)Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Paccar Financial Pty Limited (Plaintiff, cross-defendant)
Ian David Menzies (First defendant, first cross-claimant)
Colleen Anne Menzies (Second defendant, second cross-claimant)Representation - Counsel: D Rayment (Plaintiff, cross-defendant)
W Washington (Defendants, cross-claimants)- Solicitors: Hopkins Lawyers (Plaintiff, cross-defendant)
Hall Partners (Defendants, cross-claimants)File number(s): 2010/377702 Publication Restriction:
JUDGMENT
The questions for resolution are whether I should strike out the defendants' defence to the amended statement of claim, and whether I should also strike out their cross-claim.
On 23 June 2011 the defendants filed a defence to the plaintiff's amended statement of claim. By two letters of 14 July 2011, the solicitors for the plaintiff complained to the defendants' solicitors that there were technical defects with their pleading. Among other matters, it was said that it had pleaded matters which were really matters of evidence and was in breach of UCPR 14.7, it was too long, it was repetitive, it was prolix, and it was hard to understand. Details of a number of the asserted defects were set out.
Following the sending of those letters the defendants filed a cross-claim, purportedly with leave, although as I take Mr W Washington (who appears for the defendants) to concede, leave had not in fact been given. Pursuant to leave which was in fact given on 9 August 2011, the defendants then filed a further defence, called an amended defence, to the plaintiff's amended statement of claim.
Before me yesterday was a motion for the striking out of both the cross-claim and the amended defence, together with consequential orders.
Mr…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWSC 1255
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether Menzies' amended defence disclosed a reasonable defence and whether it was appropriate to strike out the defence and order Menzies to pay the plaintiff's costs. The court considered the principles involved in pleading a defence and the requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. Menzies' defence did not specifically traverse the material allegations contained in the plaintiff's statement of claim, nor did it state the material facts on which he relied for his defence. The court held that Menzies' defence failed to comply with the requirements of the rules of pleading and was struck out. The court ordered Menzies to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding.
The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an order for assessment forthwith. The court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and that Menzies' defence did not disclose a reasonable defence. The court held that it was appropriate to strike out Menzies' defence and order him to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding. The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to an order for assessment forthwith. The final orders of the court were that Menzies' amended defence be struck out, that Menzies pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding, and that the plaintiff be entitled to an order for assessment forthwith.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plaintiff alleges also that it had a charge on the equipment, that the liquidator disclaimed any interest in it under s 568A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act), and that although it is now entitled to take possession of the equipment, the defendants, when required to hand it over, declined to do so. The plaintiff alternatively avers that the defendants disposed of the equipment without its consent, and, among other orders, asks for a vesting order under s 568F of the Act. As appears from the amended defence, the defendants agree that the plaintiff lent money to the company but say that the loan agreement made was not the one sued on. They say they were misled about the terms of the agreement they did make. They complain about the circumstances in which the loan documents were executed. For example, they allege that they signed blank attestation pages without seeing what they would be attached to, and that employees of the plaintiff later attached the pages they had signed, to other pages, which they had not. They say the agreement they made with the company, being one different from that sued on, was one which involved money being lent to the company to permit it to buy the semitrailers and prime movers, the company then being obliged to repay the debt. But under that agreement the company had the right to have repayments revised or suspended, to accommodate the company when business was slow, or when there occurred what was described as a "downtime event". The requirement for repayments, it was said, would then be given flexibility, and applied in a commonsense way, so as to accommodate any change in circumstances of the company. The defendants allege that on 24 June 2008 Mr Menzies (the first defendant) suffered a neck fracture, and that caused what was called a "downtime period", which was not accommodated by the plaintiff in the way the agreement the defendants and the company had contemplated. In not permitting the company to operate in that commonsense and flexible way, the plaintiff itself was in breach of the agreement, and the company had no obligation to repay the money; they, accordingly, also had no obligation. In substance then, the defendants' version of the agreements was that they did not sign the agreement sued on and the money they concede was lent was lent on quite different terms from those alleged by the plaintiff. The defendants say further that by reason of what they were told by an employee of the plaintiff as to the availability of flexible payments and an understanding approach when there were downtime events, they were misled, and the plaintiff was in breach of s 18 Pt 2-1 Ch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 or, alternatively, the Contracts Review Act 1980, and they are entitled to consequential relief. The plaintiff attacked the amended defence on a number of grounds. The grounds are based on long established principles of pleading, and the UCPR rules of pleading which reflect those principles. In the 12th edition of Bullen and Leake and Jacob's Precedents and Pleadings at p 73 the learned authors said this under the heading "Function of the defence": "The function of the defence is to state the grounds and the material facts on which the defendant relies for his defence. The primary object of the defence is to inform the plaintiff precisely how much of the statement of claim the defendant admits and how much he denies, and what grounds and facts the defendant relies on to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. In his defence the defendant must deal specifically with every material allegation contained in the statement of claim, traversing it or admitting it or admitting it with some stated qualification. He may object, if he wishes, that the statement of claim or some special part of it is bad in law. He must state in a summary form the material facts on which he relies for his defence, but not the evidence by which he will seek to prove those facts at the trial. He may plead any set-off or counterclaim which he desires to set up." The reference to "counterclaim" of course in this jurisdiction ought be read as a reference to a cross-claim.