P and P
[2007] FMCAfam 383
•11 May 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| P & P | [2007] FMCAfam 383 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property division – two pools – factors considered where parties agree husband’s share of non-superannuation pool be offset against entitlements in superannuation pool – order which does justice and equity. |
| Family Law Act 1975 Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 |
| Browne v Green (1999-2000) 23 FLR 482 Coughlan (2005) FLC 93-220 Gollings v Scott (2006) Family Court of Australia (delivered 4 May 2007) Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143 Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092 Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218 |
| Applicant: | B M P |
| Respondent: | C J P |
| File number: | SYM7731 of 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Baumann FM |
| Hearing date: | 8 May 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 11 May 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Bernie |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Golotta’s Solicitors Barristers & Conveyancers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Burridge |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Woodgate Hughes |
ORDERS
Each of the parties shall retain the furniture, contents and other chattels in their respective possession including but not limited to bank accounts, Superannuation and motor vehicles save for those items covered in these Orders. Further, each party will indemnify the other and keep the other indemnified in respect of any debts in their respective names incurred by each of them both before and after the date of these Orders.
That the wife retains sole right, title and interest in the property located at 30 N W A Road, G in the state of New South Wales (“the G property”).
That within fifteen (15) days of the date of sealing of these orders :
(a)That the Wife shall provide the Husband’s Solicitors with a Withdrawal of Caveat Form for the G property;
(b)That the Wife shall provide the Husband’s Solicitors with a transfer of registration form for the Mitsubishi Magna motor vehicle, registration number UHP-***;
Within thirty (30) days of the date of sealing of these orders:
(a)That the Husband shall sign the transfer documentation provided by the Wife in order to transfer all his right, title and interest in the Mitsubishi Magna motor vehicle, registration number UHP-*** to the Wife;
(b)That the Husband shall sign the Withdrawal of Caveat Form and provide the wife with same and with a cheque in the sum of $79.00 made payable to Land & Property Information.
That a base amount of $95,000.00 is allocated, as required by s90MT(4) of the Family Law Act 1975, to the wife out of the husband’s interest in the accumulation interest portion of his Qantas Superannuation Plan fund.
That, in accordance with paragraph 90MT(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975:
(a)The wife is entitled to be paid the amount calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001; and
(b)The husband’s entitlement, and the entitlement of such other person to whom a splittable payment may be made to payments out of the husband’s interest in the Qantas Superannuation Plan fund, is correspondingly reduced.
That the trustee of the Qantas Superannuation Plan fun (“the trustees”) shall do all acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to:
(a)Calculate, in accordance with the requirements of the Family Law Act 1975 and the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, the entitlement created for the wife by clause 1.5 of this order; and
(b)Pay the entitlement whenever the trustee makes a splittable payment out of the husband’s interest in the Qantas Superannuation Plan fund.
(c)That this order has effect from the operative time and the operative time is 30 days from the date of these orders.
That within 30 days from the date of this order, the parties shall do all acts and things and execute all Deeds, instruments or other documents necessary to effect the above transfers.
If either party refuses or neglects to sign any Deed or instrument to carry out the terms of these Orders, an officer of the Family Court shall be appointed pursuant to Section 106A of the Family Law Act to execute such Deed or instrument in the name of such party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity to the operation of the Deed or instrument.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
SYM7731 of 2004
| B M P |
Applicant
And
| C J P |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
After a relationship of some 15 years and separation of some six years the applicant wife B P and the respondent husband C P come to this Court being unable to resolve how the modest pool of assets and superannuation interests which they now possess ought to be divided.
I should indicate at this early stage that I was greatly assisted in this matter by Counsel on behalf of the parties, Mr Burridge for the husband and Mr Bernie for the wife.
The background to this dispute will become apparent from the reasons, but in summary was not seriously contested. The parties, who were both born in 1958, commenced cohabitation in late 1986 and married in February 1987. At the time of their cohabitation they were both working as flight attendants with Qantas, having begun in about 1977.
It is agreed that each brought into the relationship the same amount of approximately $30,000 - the husband in the form of equity in a property at K, the wife through cash investments available to her which were contributed to home renovations.
The couple were blessed with three children - Simon who was born in 1987, J who was born in 1989 and A who was born in 1991. The husband maintained his employment with Qantas, however, the wife resigned her employment after 12 months maternity leave arising from the birth of S. The wife did return to the workplace in 1997, initially on a part-time basis but now permanently with the Board of Studies.
The home, registered in the husband's own name, at K was sold in May 2000 and it is agreed that net proceeds of $293,453 were available. It is apparent that at this stage the relationship between the parties was starting to breakdown, although they still maintained an intact relationship.
Investments off-shore, to which I will refer shortly, were made during the course of that year and were unsuccessful. To what extent this disappointing financial result contributed to the final separation in March 2001 is uncertain. However, separate they did and shortly thereafter the husband commenced cohabitation with his current partner D.
Ultimately, the mother utilised funds available to her sourced from the net proceeds of K to purchase a home utilised by the family in G. Again, the circumstance of that purchase for $487,000 approximately with a deposit from the proceeds of $103,000 is not seriously contested.
The father decided to move to Queensland with his new partner in February 2005 and when he did so J, the middle child moved with him. J continues to reside with the father. He is in his final year at school and hopes to be engaged in tertiary education.
S continued to reside with the mother and/or in that area, and is now approaching his twentieth birthday and is not a significant financial drain on the parties.
A had a period where she decided, after residing with her mother post-separation, to reside with her father in Queensland, which she did between approximately November 2005 and December 2006. The child would seem to now reside with the mother, but with the support of both parents.
A further aspect of this matter is that the husband as a result of some type of business venture with his new partner was unable to pay his creditors and as a result in or about February 2005 on his own petition became bankrupt.
The wife brought proceedings initially in the Family Court of Australia in Sydney in February 2006 and after some steps were taken to try and resolve the matter in that jurisdiction the matter was ultimately transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court in Brisbane and proceeded to trial before me last week.
Principles
The methods and analysis to be undertaken in a property dispute are not in doubt and were recently and succinctly restated by the Full Court in Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143. It essentially involves a four stage process initially to determine, usually at the time of trial, the assets and liabilities of the parties. Secondly, by reference to s.79(4) to consider the respective contributions of a financial, non-financial, direct and indirect nature. Thirdly, to consider as directed by s.79(4)(e) the relevant s.75(2) factors and finally the Court is required to step back and look at the order it proposes to make to ensure that it does justice and equity to the parties in all the circumstances.
Furthermore, in this case both Counsel, consistent with the requirements of C & C (also known as Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220) agreed that this was a case where it would be appropriate to deal with the assets and interests on a two pool approach.
Credit
Although both parties were the subject of cross-examination by the experienced Counsel of the other party I do not regard credit as a major determinative issue in this matter. In fact, if anything, both parties impressed me as basically honest and truthful. To the extent that there was some divergence of the facts it was more, it seemed to me, attributable to recollection than any attempt to mislead the Court.
Overseas investment
A factual issue of some significance in this matter arises from funds from the sale of the former matrimonial home at K being use for what has been described as "off-shore investments". The affidavit material filed by both parties reveals little about the "off-shore investments", however, further evidence under cross-examination allows me to make the following findings:
a)The net proceeds of sale from the K property amounted to $293,453.18 and were received on 31 May 2000 payable to the husband (who was the sole registered proprietor). The funds were dispersed initially as follows
·$200,000 to wife's Qantas Credit Union account
·$93,453.18 to the husband.
b)At the time of sale the parties were still residing together, although the relationship was certainly in decline.
c)The wife says she was "unaware" what the husband did with the sum of $93,453.18 save that she recalls he pre-paid rental for six months on the home at C for the family.
d)The husband in his affidavit filed by leave on 8 May 2007 says the funds totalling $93,453.18 were dispersed as follows:-
i)$22,840.97 to pay out a personal loan, such debt being incurred during the relationship.
ii)$13,650 for six months rent in advance.
iii)$46,184.92 deposited into "off-shore investments" (by four separate cheques) between 13 June to 23 June 2000.
I accept this evidence. The balance of $10,778 approximately was, I accept, utilised for general living expenses for the family.
e)On 8 September 2000 the wife caused to withdraw from her Qantas Credit Union account the sum of $90,000 (leaving at that time a balance in that account of approximately $103,000). It is reasonable to infer that the reduction of $7000 in capital can also be attributable to reasonable living expenses of the family.
f)The wife says (in paragraphs 20 to 22 of her affidavit) that:-
“20.I agreed to the above and I gave the respondent about $90,000, being the balance of his agreed half of the proceeds of sale of the said former matrimonial home at K ($50,000), which at that time was deposited in my bank account as well as a further $40,000 to be invested on my behalf.
21.I trusted the respondent and I believed him that the above was a good thing to do with my money as he was so persuasive.
22.The respondent had said to me words in the following effect, "You should invest another 50,000. Give them to me and I will invest it together with the other money." I refused to give the applicant the further $50,000 which he requested.”
g)I am satisfied that a sum totalling $136,184.92 was placed in various off-shore investments. The husband describes them as investments in
“computer technology; trading options; bank debenture trading and an entity called Gold Stock Investments Limited.”
h)I am satisfied that the parties were attracted to these investments because of the offer of high returns. It seems as a couple the parties were considering buying a property in the C beachside area and they thought a high investment return would further that joint endeavour.
i)I formed the view that even though the wife did rely on the husband's investigations and trusted him, nonetheless this was a joint endeavour. At the time of the investments the parties were still an intact couple. I acknowledge the husband had met D K in March 2000. It seems at the time his marriage was decaying, his relationship with D (who the husband remarried) was strengthening. The wife says D was introduced to her by the husband
“as his business partner in the same off-shore investment.”
j)“Exhibit 1” is a document entitled "Client beneficiary advice form" dated 11 December 2000 addressed to Gold Stock Investments Limited in the Republic of Mauritius. Mr Bernie for the wife says that this form and its nomination of D K as "Beneficiary 1" in the event of the husband's demise supports a finding that the moneys invested of $90,000 (the husband said US $65,000) were "his" moneys for which he ought bear responsibility. Clearly, the investment which was totally lost was imprudent. I regarded, however, the decision to invest the funds as a joint endeavour. The funds were not separated - save in the manner set out above. The evidence does not support a finding that the sum of $239,453.18 was consciously divided as a partial or informal division of the matrimonial pool of assets.
As the Full Court recently in Gollings v Scott (2006) Family Court of Australia (delivered 4 May 2007) noted:-
“In Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218, the Full Court identified three categories of cases where it was appropriate to notionally add back to the pool assets which were said by the Full Court to "no longer exist". Those three categories were:-
(a) money spent on legal fees;
(b) moneys dispersed by way of premature disposition of matrimonial assets;
(c)moneys lost by one party either during or after the marriage as a result of a course of conduct designed to reduce or minimise the effective value or worth of matrimonial assets or the result of reckless, negligent or wanton behaviours which had the effect of reducing or minimising the value of assets.”
Category (c) clearly is an adoption of the well-known statement of principle enunciated by Baker J in Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092 later affirmed by the Full Court in Browne v Green (1999-2000) 23 FLR 482. The evidence has not established that the off-shore investment made by the husband supported by the wife (for the reason she gave) was made as a result of any reckless, negligent or wanton behaviour. Each party should therefore share the resultant diminution of the available assets for division.
Pool
It is agreed between the parties that any furniture divided by their agreement remain where they are, and I am not to be concerned about the minimal other personal assets in the parties' possession (motor vehicles, personal bank accounts, etc).
It is also not a fact in dispute that the wife used the balance of funds (after the off-shore investments were made) in her Qantas staff credit Union account as a deposit on the purchase by the wife (in her name solely) of the G home. The home, as I say, was purchased for $487,135 and a mortgage of $389,000 was raised to complete the purchase.
The evidence before the Court is that even though the wife has continued to make payments on the mortgage (such that the balance at trial is now only $355,000) the home has actually not increased in value. The current agreed market value of the home is $460,000. The equity, therefore, is now $105,000 which is approximately the same amount as was invested over three years ago. I propose to regard this sum as the only "non-superannuation" asset for the pool.
Mr Burridge for the husband contended in final submissions that it may be proper to include an "add-back" of $6000 - being funds the wife acknowledged she had used for legal expenses drawn down on the mortgage facility over G. I do not propose to do so. The wife substantially reduced the mortgage by more than $30,000 over the period which, if the property had even maintained its purchase price, would have increased the property equity. In essence, a draw down on her mortgage was nothing more than a return to her of the repayments made post-separation on the mortgage.
Both Counsel say consistent with the preferred approach in C & C (supra) that I should adopt two pools. I intend to do so and confirm the pools as follows:
Pool 1
Equity in G home
$105,000
Pool 2
Husband’s Qantas superannuation
$395,849
Wife’s Qantas superannuation
$11,607
Wife’s First State superannuation
$40,436
Total superannuation pool
$447,892
The parties rely on a single expert report from Mr Stephen Bourke dated 23 January 2007 for determining the value of the husband's interests in the Qantas superannuation plan. There is an apparent typographical error at page 5 of the report as to the value of the interest at 30 June 2001 (shortly after separation). The calculation on "attachment A" shows a calculated value of $223,133.20 whilst the summary at the end of the report shows a figure of $239,540.89. Mr Bourke was not called to explain this difference, however, with the benefit of attachment A the figure I propose to adopt is the lower figure of $223,133.20.
Contributions
The parties were both 28 and working for Qantas when cohabitation commenced in late 1986. The parties essentially agreed that each contributed the sum of $30,000 - the husband had equity in the K property purchased by him prior to cohabitation and the wife contributing that sum from savings towards home renovations.
It was also essentially conceded by both Counsel that contributions to final separation in March 2001 were equal – save for the contention (which I have rejected by the wife's Counsel) that the off-shore investment is, in effect, a "negative contribution". Had the parties not sensibly agreed on equality of contribution to separation I would have so found. The parties adopted fairly "traditional" roles after cohabitation - with the wife ceasing work before the birth of the parties' first child in August 1987 and resigning after the 12 months maternity leave.
Although the husband's flight roster with Qantas as a flight attendant meant blocks of time away from home I am satisfied he did make a contribution as carer and homemaker when available. However, his contributions were much less than the wife who remained at home caring for the three children. The husband's financial contributions to separation were superior to those of the wife.
The wife returned to employment in 1997 initially part-time and increasing to full-time. She is now employed full-time with the New South Wales Board of Studies. Post-separation the husband contributed a reasonable sum towards child support and other payments when the children were with the mother as they were initially, with the child Justin, as I say, choosing to relocate with the father to Queensland in February 2005. Adele also had a period of time living with the father as I have already indicated. Although the father filed for bankruptcy in early 2005 his income has remained essentially available to him (and not his creditors).
In regard to the asset in pool 1, had the wife's decision to buy a home manifested in an increase in the equity that may have increased her prospects to a more significant post-separation adjustment. In circumstances where the wife shared the financial and emotional expenses of the children post-separation and allowing for the husband's payment of child support and generosity and even, for example, allowing her to use spouse travel benefits, I will still make an adjustment to the wife of 10 per cent on the non-superannuation pool. I have adjusted the entitlement to 60/40 in the wife's favour.
Superannuation assets
The husband's significant Qantas superannuation has been amassed since his service began with the company in 1977, although he first became a member of the fund on 1 February 1978 according to the documents. The best evidence of the husband's interest at cohabitation is a letter from the Qantas superannuation administrator of
16 November 2006 to the solicitors for the husband indicating the husband's
“benefit activity to June 1988 was $16,564.89.”
I take the view that the wife's interests in her Qantas superannuation at cohabitation was likely to be similar to that of the husband as she had been working with Qantas for about the same time. She has, of course, not made further contributions to her Qantas superannuation since her resignation in 1988.
During the course of the relationship between 1987 until March 2001 (15 years) I would regard the contributions to the husband's Qantas superannuation as equal. Although superannuation arose from his employment alone the wife's non-financial contributions as homemaker and carer for the children must be given some weight as well. Simply, the husband would not have been able to maintain his career with three young children unless the wife was at home caring for them.
The more difficult part of the exercise is weighing the contributions made post-separation. In respect of the wife's First State superannuation, it is agreed that her interest at separation was approximately $5000 (equally contributed to in my view) and has swollen post-separation to $40,436 - an increase of $35,000.
The husband's Qantas fund entitlement, within the two separate components identified by Mr Bourke, had increased since separation as follows:
Defined Benefit at separation
$94,291.30
At trial
$116,113.45
Accumulation component (minus surcharge) at separation
$128,841.90
At trial
$229,736.06
Total Qantas superannuation at separation
$223,133.20
At trial
$395,849.54
This computes to an overall increase of $172,716.34.
I have not been provided with any evidence that establishes how much of the increase in the accumulation component of the husband's superannuation is attributable to:-
·contributions made by the husband
·occupational superannuation payments made by the employer (or whether the rate of payment exceeds the statutory minimum of nine per cent)
·investment earnings on the fund.
The father's financial statement dated 20 April 2007 reveals (at item 20) the payment of $45 per week ($2340 per annum) which may be a "salary sacrifice" payment. I simply do not know with certainty, although since the husband's bankruptcy in 2005 (when and thereafter he has not been required to make any contributions to his estate) I regard it as unlikely the trustee would support salary sacrificing.
In respect of investment earnings it is reasonable to infer that if no further contributions post-separation had been made at all (by either the husband or his employment) the husband with a balance of $128,841 accumulated would still have earned a return. It was up to the parties to provide details of returns in the Qantas fund since 2001 but none have been provided.
As an example only, if the fund generated earnings of 10 per cent per annum net of fees for six years then additional earnings of approximately $80,000 (allowing for compounding) could be expected. The defined benefit component is, of course, under the formula adopted an amount derived from elements such as the salary at the time; years of service and the unique mandated formula under the regulations for determining the growth value of defined benefit interest in the growth phase. The Minister has not approved any other method for valuation and as a result, Regulation 38 applies with respect to the valuation of the husband’s interest in the Qantas superannuation plan.
Of the other combined superannuation of the parties at separation totalling $237,442.82 as follows:-
Husband’s Qantas entitlement
$223,133.20
Wife’s Qantas entitlement
$9298.72
Wife’s First State entitlement
$4910.90
Total
$239,342.82
I regard the contributions to this “asset” as having been equal to separation.
I would make an adjustment to the husband's Qantas entitlement for superior post-separation contributions by him to the accumulation component of his superannuation and an allowance for the positive effect on the defined benefit component (arising from his continued service for another six years and his increased salary) of 15 per cent.
I may have made a slightly larger adjustment for the husband's
post-separation contributions except that it is fair to give some weight to the wife's non-financial contributions to the care of the children which in respect of the non-superannuation asset I have allowed at
10 per cent.
The increase in the wife's First State superannuation interest is almost entirely due to the wife's contributions. The low level of the fund interest at superannuation (5000) means any net investment earnings would not be significant.
The observations made above and the lack of specific evidence available in some respects, as I have identified, makes a detailed calculation impossible. In fact, there is no binding authority which says that it is proper to make such a calculation anyway. This is yet another example of the difficulty of exercising judicial discretion. As I say, in any event a long line of authority makes it clear the precise mathematical calculations to determine contributions under s.79(4) (or for that matter adjustments pursuant to the factors of relevance under s.75(2)) is not a proper approach. The exercise of my discretion, to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily, is shaped by the matters which I have identified in these reasons.
Weighing all factors I regard the respective contribution based entitlements the parties in the superannuation interests to be as follows:
1)Wife's First State superannuation - wife 90 per cent, husband
10 per cent.
2)Combined Qantas superannuation - husband 65 per cent, wife
35 per cent.
In respect of the Qantas superannuation this in effect means the husband will get a credit for the first 20 per cent or $122,000 of the combined superannuation.
Section 75(2) factors
The most significant differentiating factors between these parties who are of the same age; enjoy reasonable health and who are both in employment are:
a)The husband has a superior income of $88,000 than that of the wife of approximately $67,000.
b)Although each parent has some ongoing responsibility to the son in their care (with J in the father's care being younger) the mother has a responsibility for A (currently aged nearly 16). It could be safely assumed that because of the age of A this future support, financially and emotionally, is not a significant factor.
c)Because the husband says he will not require the wife to pay him any cash sum (as a result of an entitlement he might otherwise have had to a share of the non-superannuation asset represented by the equity in the wife's G home), the wife has the advantage and benefit of disposable assets whereas the husband's entitlement will be replaced and represented by superannuation which he cannot access for at least seven years. I do not ignore that at least a major part of the husband's poor cash position is attributable to his bankruptcy in 2005.
d)I accept the father will continue to be assessed and will pay whatever child support liabilities are determined from time to time.
e)The husband has accepted the responsibility to support his wife and her child.
When I weigh up all these factors I propose to make no adjustment to either party in respect of the non-superannuation asset for the s.75(2) factors.
It has been said that the matter in which the s.75(2) factors ought be used for adjustments to superannuation assets is a vexed question. However, in this case I would not make any further adjustments in the contribution based assessments of the parties to the superannuation interests.
Just and equitable
Based on the assessment analysis above and as a guide the mathematical effect of these initial findings will be as follows:
Pool 1 -The husband $42,000 (40 per cent), wife $63,000 (60 per cent)
Pool 2 -Combined Qantas - husband $264,840 (65 per cent), Wife $142,609 (35 per cent)
Pool 2 -Wife's First State superannuation - husband $4044 (10 per cent), wife $36,392 (90 per cent).
It is common ground between the parties that any entitlement which I found the husband may have in his non-superannuation asset should not be paid in cash by the wife, but rather "offset" against any entitlements the wife may have in respect of the husband's Qantas Superannuation Fund interest.
This provides a benefit to the wife against further borrowings (if she were able to do so) or possible sale of the property to meet the husband's entitlement. I regard an order which splits the husband's Qantas superannuation so as to provide a benefit to the wife as an order which in the circumstances the parties find themselves in as just and equitable.
I should note that written advice from the husband's bankruptcy trustee had been provided indicating the trustee did not wish to participate in these proceedings.
The final important issue is what level of base amount would be just and equitable to both parties for the wife to receive from the husband's Qantas superannuation. One method of assessing that entitlement may be to adopt the following calculation.
Wife’s entitlement to total Qantas Superannuation
$142,609
Less wife’s own Qantas superannuation
$11,607
$131,002
Husband’s entitlement to wife’s First State superannuation
$4044
$126,958
Less husband’s entitlement to share of non-superannuation asset
$42,000
Total
$84,958
Other issues which in my mind must be considered when determining what order does justice and equity to the parties are:
a)I am not totally persuaded that it is fair to the husband to equate a dollar for cash now for an adjustment for a dollar in superannuation not receivable for some years into the future; and
b)the assessment of the value of the husband's superannuation was as at 16 November 2006. No explanation was offered why the valuation was not updated for trial - some six months after the valuation date. It is reasonable to infer the husband's actual entitlement at trial is higher than the amount at November 2006.
Taking all these factors into consideration I propose to order that the base amount to be allocated to the wife out of the husband's interests in the accumulation interest portion of his Qantas Superannuation Plan Fund (which is the style of order preferred by the husband) shall be $95,000. The effect of such an order on the pool earlier identified would appear to be as follows then:
Wife’s interest in G property
$105,000
Split of husband’s Qantas superannuation
$95,000
Wife’s own superannuation
$52,043
Total
$252,043
Husband’s interest in Qantas superannuation
$395,849
Less wife’s split of husband’s Qantas superannuation
$95,000
Net
$300,849
This will represent a combined pool of $552,892 - a division of 54 per cent to the husband and 46 per cent to the wife, which considering the allowances above and the substantial increase in his superannuation post-separation I regard as an order which does justice and equity.
For completeness, I regard the wife's claim at trial for a split of the husband's Qantas superannuation in the sum of $257,000 and with the wife retaining all other property and superannuation in her control would represent 75 per cent of the “notional” aggregate pool, which was well outside the range of equitable results on the evidence in my view.
In addition to an order as to the split which I propose to make it will be necessary for each party to retain each of the other assets and interests they have at the time of trial. Further, as identified by Mr Bernie at trial, it is in my view proper that there be an order that the husband sign all such documents as may be necessary to release the caveat on the wife's property.
And further, that the husband sign any documents necessary in respect to the transfer of the car that was referred to by Mr Bernie.
I make the orders as set out at the commencement of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Baumann FM
Associate:
Date:
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