FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 3) [2016] FCA 253
File number(s): NSD 937 of 2014 Judge(s): YATES J Date of judgment: 17 March 2016 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – security for costs – where parties have previously agreed to the amount of security to be provided – where consent orders as to security for costs have previously been made – whether “top-up” security for costs should be ordered – amount of security to be provided for future costs Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt IVA
Federal Court Rules 2011 Sch 3
Cases cited: Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits International B.V. (No 2) [2012] FCA 23
Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland [2015] FCA 1010
Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 2) [2015] FCA 1485
Date of hearing: 11 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 96 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Withers and Mr R May Solicitor for the Applicant: Squire Patton Boggs Counsel for the Respondent: Mr DB O’Sullivan QC with Mr J O’Regan Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
NSD 937 of 2014 BETWEEN: OZTECH PTY LTD ACN 005 907 871
Applicant
AND: THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF QUEENSLAND
Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MARCH 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.By 31 March 2016, the applicant provide security for the respondent’s costs up to the commencement of the trial on 27 June 2016 in the amount of $925,265 by way of cash deposit with the Court.
2.If the applicant does not provide security for costs in accordance with Order 1, the proceeding be stayed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
YATES J:
INTRODUCTION
The respondent applies for orders that the applicant provide further security for his costs of the proceeding. The respondent seeks security in the amount of $1,775,000, representing:
·“top-up” security for costs from 16 October 2014 to 1 September 2015, in the amount of $775,000; and
·security for costs from 1 September 2015 to the first day of the trial on 27 June 2015, in the amount of $1 million.
The applicant accepts that the respondent has an entitlement to security for costs, specifically in relation to the respondent’s future costs. The issues that divide the parties are whether the respondent is entitled, in the circumstances of this case, to the “top-up” security he claims and whether, in any event, the overall amount of the security that the respondent seeks is appropriate.
BACKGROUND
This proceeding is a representative proceeding commenced under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It arises out of the respondent’s role as the trustee for noteholders in respect of senior unsecured notes issued by the company now called Octaviar Investment Notes Limited (in liquidation)…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 253
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that "top-up" security should not be granted, except for certain tasks, because the orders for security made in February and July 2015 were the result of negotiated outcomes. Each negotiated outcome was forward-looking and the parties advanced competing arguments as to what they considered to be the respondent's likely allowable costs on a party/party taxation for the specifically identified steps in the proceeding. The court found that the respondent could not have underestimated his then likely costs for these steps to the extent represented in the present application. The court found that the respondent was not entitled to "top-up" security for work covered by the first tranche of security and the applicant was entitled to proceed on the reasonable expectation that there would be no re-visiting of the question of security in respect of work covered by the first tranche. The court found that the respondent, or at least his solicitors, must have had a fair idea of the level at which costs were running for the tasks that were intended to be covered by the second tranche of security, particularly in relation to discovery. The court found that the applicant was entitled to provide security for the respondent's costs up to the commencement of the trial on 27 June 2016 in the amount of $925,265 by way of cash deposit with the Court. If the applicant does not provide security for costs in accordance with the order, the proceeding be stayed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. By 31 March 2016, the applicant provide security for the respondent’s costs up to the commencement of the trial on 27 June 2016 in the amount of $925,265 by way of cash deposit with the Court.
2. If the applicant does not provide security for costs in accordance with Order 1, the proceeding be stayed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant submits that if, contrary to its submission, the Court is persuaded that “top-up” security should be given, the amount claimed by the respondent is manifestly excessive. In that connection, the applicant refers to the amounts I have noted at [29] above, and says that costs, in these amounts, and in the amounts claimed for other work, would not be allowable on a party/party taxation. Consideration I am not persuaded that “top-up” security should be granted other than for certain tasks to which I refer below. The orders for security for costs made in February and July 2015 were the result of negotiated outcomes. Each negotiated outcome was forward-looking, in the sense that the orders for security made in February 2015 were for costs up to the close of pleadings and the orders made in July 2015 were for costs from the close of the pleadings to the case management conference listed for 1 September 2015. On each occasion, the parties advanced competing arguments as to what they considered to be the respondent’s likely allowable costs on a party/party taxation for the specifically identified steps in the proceeding. In a letter dated 13 February 2015, the respondent’s solicitors identified what they regarded to be the relevant steps to be taken up to the close of pleadings, and summarised the parties’ competing positions on the costs for each step. Those steps were identified as: Defence; Particulars (which includes the Reply); Amended Statement of Claim and Defence; and Security for Costs. In a letter dated 10 July 2015, the respondent’s solicitors identified what they regarded to be the relevant steps to be taken from the close of pleadings up to the case management hearing appointed for 1 September 2015 and, once again, summarised the parties’ competing positions on the costs of each step. Those steps were identified as: Notice to Group Members; Opt Out Notice Application; Security for Costs; Discovery; Case Management Conference; Correspondence; Telephone attendances; and Care and Consideration. I do not understand how, at the time of these negotiations, the respondent could have underestimated his then likely costs for these steps to the extent represented in the present application. Apart from the experience and expertise of his solicitors, he was assisted in formulating his position by Mr Garrett’s reports. He also had the competing views advanced by the applicant’s solicitors, who were assisted by Ms Higinbotham’s reports. Moreover, at the time that negotiations were in progress for the second tranche of security, the respondent must have known that his actual costs for work referable to the first tranche of security were well in excess of the considered view that had been taken in February 2015. At that time, the respondent did not seek “top-up” security for work covered by the first tranche. In the circumstances, the applicant was entitled to proceed on the reasonable expectation that there would be no re-visiting of the question of security in respect of work covered by the first tranche. Furthermore, at that time, the respondent, or at least his solicitors, must have had a fair idea of the level at which costs were running for the tasks that were intended to be covered by the second tranche of security, particularly in relation to discovery.