Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Branir Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Branir Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 145

CONTRACT – oral agreement to grant a sub-lease or other interest over 20,000 acres of land subject to a pastoral lease for use as a wildlife sanctuary for the breeding and preservation of endangered and exotic animals – consent for change of use under a pastoral lease – lease in perpetuity under Crown Lands legislation – Statute of Frauds – requirement of evidence in writing of an agreement to transfer an interest in land – necessity to plead the doctrine of part performance – ascertainment and enforceability of terms under an oral agreement which is partly evidenced by writing – oral agreement to issue shares – admissibility of oral evidence – whether written document embodies the entirety of the agreement – establishment of precise terms of oral agreement where the written document does not adequately reflect the intentions of the parties

ESTOPPEL – proprietary estoppel – whether representations as to the granting of a sub-lease or other interest in land under a pastoral lease and reliance on those representations gives rise to an estoppel against denying the interest in land

MISLEADING AND DECEPTIVE CONDUCT – whether representations as to the granting of a sub-lease or other interest in land under a pastoral lease constituted misleading and deceptive conduct under the Corporations Law, the Trade Practices Act or the Fair Trading Act

Corporations Law s 995

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW)
Crown Lands Act 1931 (NT) ss 23A, 26
Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT) ss 3, 38, 61, 67, 68
Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913 (NSW)

Statute of Frauds

Roach v Bickle [1915] 20 CLR 663
Davies v Littlejohn [1923] 34 CLR 174
Massart v Blight [1951] 82 CLR 423
Brown v Heffer [1967] 116 CLR 344
Regent v Millett [1976] 133 CLR 679
The Wik Peoples v State of Queensland [1996] 187 CLR 1
Pejovic v Malinic [1960] 60 SR (NSW) 184
Millett v Regent [1975] 1 NSWLR 62
BHP v Hapag-Lloyd [1980] 2 NSWLR 571
Sidney Cooke Ltd v Hapag-Lloyd [1980] 2 NSWLR 587
Francis v Francis [1952] VLR 328
Riley v Osborne [1986] VR 193
Caton v Caton [1866] LR 1 Ch App 137
Maddison v Alderson [1883] 8 AC 467
White v Nealyon [1886] 11 AC 171 (PC)
Carr v McDonald’s Australia Limited & Ors, Federal Court of Australia (Burchett J), unreported, 16 February 1994

OWSTON NOMINEES NO 2 PTY LTD & ANOR v BRANIR PTY LTD & ORS

NG 3184 OF 1995

EINFELD J
25 FEBRUARY 2000
SYDNEY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1
Tipperary 1
The Sanctuary 2
THE DISPUTE 4
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SUMMARY 4
The 1990 deal 4
After the 1990 deal 7
The Macquarie Bank deal 7
The December 1993 deal 9
After the Settlement 11
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 12
THE CLAIM 20
THE CROSS CLAIM 22
THE SANCTUARY 22
Overview 22
The Facts 23
The 1989 events 23
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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 145
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd brought an action against Branir Pty Ltd in the Federal Court of Australia, alleging breach of contract, misleading and deceptive conduct, and misrepresentation in relation to the sale of a property known as the Sanctuary. The applicants claimed that the respondents had entered into a binding agreement to sell them a half interest in the Sanctuary and that the respondents had subsequently breached the agreement and engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. The respondents denied the allegations and counterclaimed for specific performance of the agreement. The central legal issues in the case were whether there was a binding agreement between the parties to sell the Sanctuary, and if so, what the terms of the agreement were. The court had to determine the credibility of the parties' evidence and the contemporaneous documents, and to interpret the terms of the agreement. The court found that there was a binding agreement between the parties to sell the Sanctuary, and that the agreement embodied the terms set out in the Branir Shareholding Agreement. The court held that the agreement was binding and enforceable in those terms as from 23 December 1993, and that the Share letter represented a failed attempt to embody that agreement in writing. The court also found that the respondents had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of the Corporations Law, the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act and the New South Wales Fair Trading Act. The court ordered the parties to seek to achieve consent orders and declarations to achieve the results arising from these reasons for judgment. If agreement was not possible, the matter may be mediated by a Registrar or another agreed mediator or may be listed for argument before the court on a date to be arranged with the Associate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Finally, they alleged that in making certain representations about the applicants’ interest in the Sanctuary, the respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of the Corporations Law, the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act and the New South Wales Fair Trading Act.The FactsThe 1989 events It is common ground that after Anderson’s discussions with Japto in early 1989, Bakrie visited Tipperary in mid-1989 and discussed with Anderson the possibility of purchasing a half interest in the properties with Japto. Anderson’s evidence was that during the visit he showed Bakrie the Sanctuary and the following words were said:WA:If I do a deal with you Ichal, this is not part of it. The licences for the Sanctuary have been issued to me personally and it is my personal responsibility.AB:That’s no problem Warren. We could take it off as your own. How big is the area?WA:Over time I will need at least 20,000 acres.AB:What if I want to build a house here for myself? If you’ve got 20,000 acres can I have 20,000 acres to build a house for myself as a personal asset?WA:Fine. In cross-examination Anderson stated that he and Bakrie had had this conversation as they drove away from Tipperary, inspecting the Sanctuary, along the road which leads to the main highway. Anderson recalled that as they drove, he said words to the effect: “I will have 20,000 acres this way” pointing to the left of the road. He then pointed to the right side of the road and said “You can have 20,000 acres that way.” They then came to a point in the road where there was a cattle grid and Anderson said words to the effect: “This is about as far as we will go and then we will go west as far as [necessary to] take in … 8,000 hectares or 20,000 acres”. The cattle grid is no longer there but when the Court visited the property, Anderson pointed out on the ground where he recalled the discussion had taken place. He identified it on the map as being at the point on the road where it meets the northern fence line of a paddock known as “Campbells”. To reach this point Anderson and Bakrie would have driven well beyond the then existing area of the Sanctuary along a stretch of road which has the paddocks called “Turkey Flat”, “Little Gardner” and “Campbells” to the left and “Heifer”, “Station Creek” and “Gardner” to the right. Other paddocks covered by Anderson’s “left wave” were those called “Jumbo”, “Electric Fence”, and “Boords”. All these paddocks are clearly marked on Appendix 6. Bakrie’s evidence on this matter did not differ greatly from Anderson’s. He recalled Anderson driving him up the road on his 1989 visit to the property and that they had what Bakrie termed “a casual conversation” about the parts of the land on which Anderson proposed to build a house and extend the Sanctuary. According to Bakrie, Anderson said to him: “This for you, this for me.” At this point in his evidence Bakrie waved his hands to the left and to the right. Bakrie agreed that there was a conversation about 20,000 acres for each party and admitted that the discussion concerned 20,000 acres on “each side of the road”. He agreed that Anderson made it clear that his 20,000 acres were on the same side as his house site which was located in Stage II of the Sanctuary. Bakrie did not, however, recall stopping at a cattle grid and maintained that there was no discussion of the boundaries of the 20,000 acres.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

EINFELD J
In my view, the differences between the agreement alleged and the Share letter raised by the respondents are largely pedantic, discovered in an effort to justify their position. To a large extent, and certainly on the major issues, the respondents do not seriously take issue with the evidence, except in some minor ways. In the main, they did not advocate their witnesses’ evidence, in particular Graham’s and parts of Bakrie’s, as more believable than the applicants, when it might have been expected that a party who was presenting the truth would argue more than simply that the other side had not sufficiently proved its case. Despite some inconsistencies and anomalies, which are hardly surprising given that these events occurred up to 10 years ago, the evidence, including many contemporaneous documents, reveals quite clearly that there was an agreement between the parties which embodied the terms set out in the Branir Shareholding Agreement. I hold that the agreement was binding and enforceable in those terms as from 23 December 1993, and that the Share letter represented a failed attempt to embody that agreement in writing.CONCLUSIONS In view of the complexity of this matter, it is not appropriate for me to attempt to frame final orders without hearing submissions following the publication of these reasons for judgment. To assist this process, I propose for discussion a series of draft declarations and orders in Appendix 7. These proposals are not the Court’s final views on the matters concerned. Nor are they intended to be complete. A number of issues remain including specific remedies, the subordinated loan involving Nusatara, the question of ministerial consent for the Sanctuary sub-lease or other exclusive grant, the term of the occupancy of the Sanctuary, and several other matters including costs. I direct the parties to seek to achieve consent orders and declarations to achieve the results arising from these reasons for judgment. If agreement is not possible, the matter may be mediated by a Registrar or another agreed mediator or may be listed for argument before me on a date to be arranged with the Associate. Whether a mediated or court resolution is sought, the parties are to submit their separate proposed forms of relief five days prior to the resolution proceedings. I express my appreciation to counsel and their instructing solicitors and clerks for their assistance in this difficult case, and to the parties and their staffs for their many courtesies especially at the hearings in Bali and at Tipperary Station, and in the Court’s inspection of the Sanctuary and Tipperary itself. The applicants' submissions provided a useful description and summary of the development of the Sanctuary which, together with the evidence and my observations at the on-site inspection, I have largely used. I thank those responsible for this contribution to this judgment. Indeed, the submissions of both parties were of a particularly high quality without which, in view of the complexity and detail of the case, these reasons for judgment would not have been achievable in any reasonable time frame or with the same degree of consideration of the issues. I acknowledge the work of those responsible for their excellence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EINFELD J