Owners SP 58631 v Caporale

Link copied
Case Copied 13 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Owners – SP 58631 v Caporale [2011] FCA 109

Citation: Owners – SP 58631 v Caporale [2011] FCA 109
Appeal from: Caporale & Anor v The Owners Strata Plan 58631 [2010] FMCA 346
Parties: THE OWNERS – SP 58631 v TOMMASO CAPORALE
THE OWNERS – SP 58631 v GIUSEPPE CAPORALE
File numbers: NSD 688 of 2010
NSD 689 of 2010
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 15 February 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Magistrate – leave required under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) – whether substantial injustice can be occasioned when dispute does not involve a question as to a substantive right – whether the Owners Corporation has a fiduciary duty on behalf of members of a Strata Plan to recover costs under s 80 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW) – consideration of a situation where costs incurred out of all proportion to initial recoverable debt – whether granting leave to appeal is contrary to overarching purpose of disposing of litigation inexpensively in s 37M of the Federal Court Act (1976) (Cth)

HELD that an action brought to recover costs after the substantive issue of litigation has been disposed of does not give rise to a substantial injustice if leave to appeal is denied where costs incurred and to be incurred are out of proportion to the costs sought to be recovered – there is no duty on the owners corporation to recover the costs of collecting contributions – continuing proceedings solely to recover costs is inconsistent with overarching purpose of disposing of litigation quickly, efficiently and inexpensively

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 25(2)(a), 37M
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW) s 80
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Re the will of FB Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 318
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
Owners of Strata Plan 36131 v Dimitriou [2009] NSWCA 27
Date of hearing: 22 November 2010
Place: Brisbane (Heard in Sydney)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
NSD 688 of 2010
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JC Prowse
Solicitor for the Applicant: MCW Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Caporale appeared on behalf of the Respondent
NSD 689 of 2010
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JC Prowse
Solicitor for the Applicant: MCW Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Caporale appeared on behalf of the Respondent

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 688 of 2010

BETWEEN:

THE OWNERS ­– SP 58631
Applicant

AND:

TOMMASO CAPORALE
Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 FEBRUARY 2011

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal filed on 10 June 2010 be refused.

Note:Settlement and entry of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Owners SP 58631 v Caporale and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] FCA 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Owners Corporation SP 58631 brought an application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision of the Federal Magistrate, Lloyd-Jones FM, which set aside two bankruptcy notices issued by the Owners Corporation against the Caporales. The primary issue for the court was whether the Owners Corporation could demonstrate that it would suffer substantial injustice if the application for leave to appeal was refused. The Owners Corporation also argued that it had a fiduciary duty to recover costs on behalf of the members of the Strata Plan. The court considered whether the denial of leave to appeal would occasion a substantial injustice, particularly in light of the significant escalation in costs due to the proceedings.

The court held that the Owners Corporation could not demonstrate substantial injustice if the application for leave to appeal was refused. The court emphasised the importance of keeping a tight rein on applications for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions, particularly where the matter does not involve a substantive right and primarily concerns costs. The court also noted that continuing the proceedings solely to recover costs was inconsistent with the overarching purpose of disposing of litigation quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively. The significant escalation of costs due to the proceedings further supported the refusal of leave to appeal.

In reaching its decision, the court applied the well-established principles that guide the granting of leave to appeal, including whether there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the judgment and whether the denial of leave would involve a substantial injustice. Given that the matter did not involve a substantive right and primarily related to costs, the court found that the Owners Corporation could not establish sufficient doubt about the correctness of the Federal Magistrate’s decision to warrant reconsideration by a Full Court. The court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to encourage further pursuit of costs in this matter.

ORDERS:
1. The application for leave to appeal filed on 10 June 2010 be refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal filed on 10 June 2010 be refused.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

These warnings and admonitions apply with even greater force in this particular application. This is so because, not only does this matter not involve a substantive right, but the point of practice or procedure at issue essentially relates to a question of costs. This is further compounded by the fact that the costs at issue have been increased to about four times their original amount as a result of the processes leading up to, and including, this application.FACTUAL BACKGROUND To show how this extraordinary situation has come about, it is necessary to set out the factual background of this application in a little more detail. As noted above, the effect of the judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM was to set aside two bankruptcy notices issued by the Owners Corporation against the Caporales. The central point at issue in his Honour’s decision was the date of service of those bankruptcy notices. This was so because, under the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Caporales had to apply to set aside the bankruptcy notices within 21 days of them being served on them. Since they made their applications on 25 February 2010, service therefore had to have occurred on or after 4 February 2010. On that issue the Owners Corporation contended that the bankruptcy notices were served at about 10.40 pm on 3 February 2010. As a result, it contended that the Caporales’ applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices were out of time by a day. To establish this, Mr Edney, the Owners’ legal representative, relied upon an affidavit in which he deposed that he served the bankruptcy notices after he finished work on the evening of 3 February 2010. He also claimed that this was supported by a file note he made shortly thereafter, and his draft affidavit of service. Ms Rosa Caporale, the sister of the two Caporale brothers, appeared by leave in the proceedings before the Federal Magistrate. Ms Caporale relied upon an affidavit she had sworn to the effect that she was present at the address where the bankruptcy notices were allegedly served throughout the whole of the evening of 3 February 2010 and the early morning of 4 February 2010, until about 6.45, when she left to catch a plane to Melbourne. She said that she was in a position to observe the letterbox at that address at around 10.40 pm and she did not see anyone put anything in it. Moreover, she said that when she left to go to the airport at about 6.45 on the morning of 4 February 2010, she passed the letterbox and did not see anything in it. The Federal Magistrate considered all this evidence and concluded, as a matter of fact, that the Owners Corporation had failed to establish that the bankruptcy notices were served at about 10.40 on the evening of 3 February 2010. In the final paragraph of his decision, his Honour said, among other things:I do not consider it in the interests of justice to make such a finding when the evidence provided in support of the earlier service time was so poorly presented to the Court. Additionally, I do not consider that a course of continuing these proceedings serves any purpose considering the debts under each Bankruptcy Notice have been discharged by the Applicants. THE LEGAL COSTS HAVE ESCALATED SIGNIFICANTLY

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, I do not consider that the Owners Corporation can show that it will suffer substantial injustice if this application for leave to appeal is refused. Moreover, I do not consider that it is in the interests of justice that this Court should give further encouragement to this costs pursuit. This being so, it does not matter whether the Owners Corporation is able to demonstrate that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the Federal Magistrate’s decision to warrant it being considered by a Full Court.CONCLUSION – LEAVE REJECTED For these reasons, I order that the Owners Corporation’s applications for leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Magistrate be refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Since the Federal Magistrate’s decision was an interlocutory decision, an appeal cannot be brought from it unless the Court, or a judge, gives leave: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Act”). This application for leave is before me as a single judge of the Court under s 25(2)(a) of the Act.RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS IN GRANTING LEAVE While I clearly have an unfettered discretion to grant leave, it has been long-established that there are at least two matters to which I should have regard. They are:i)whether there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the judgment to warrant reconsideration of it by a Full Court; andii)whether the denial of an opportunity to appeal would involve a substantial injustice if the decision of the primary judge supposed to have been wrong.See Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (“Décor”) at 398–9. In the vast majority of cases, if the judgment that is sought to be appealed involves a substantive right and the applicant can show there is sufficient doubt about its correctness, he or she will generally have little difficulty also showing that substantive injustice would be occasioned if leave to appeal were not to be granted. However, a different attitude is adopted where the judgment sought to be appealed involves a matter of practice or procedure. In that case, as Sir Frederick Jordan observed in Re the will of FB Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 318 at 323:[I]f a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal. To similar effect, the Full Court in Décor (at 400) underscored the strong warning given by the High Court in Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177 that “a tight rein” should be kept on such applications. These warnings and admonitions apply with even greater force in this particular application. This is so because, not only does this matter not involve a substantive right, but the point of practice or procedure at issue essentially relates to a question of costs. This is further compounded by the fact that the costs at issue have been increased to about four times their original amount as a result of the processes leading up to, and including, this application.FACTUAL BACKGROUND To show how this extraordinary situation has come about, it is necessary to set out the factual background of this application in a little more detail. As noted above, the effect of the judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM was to set aside two bankruptcy notices issued by the Owners Corporation against the Caporales. The central point at issue in his Honour’s decision was the date of service of those bankruptcy notices. This was so because, under the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Caporales had to apply to set aside the bankruptcy notices within 21 days of them being served on them. Since they made their applications on 25 February 2010, service therefore had to have occurred on or after 4 February 2010.