Owens & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No Ml5 of 1991

B e t w e e n -

RONALD GEORGE OWENS, KEVIN

NOEL REYNOLDS, and NORMAN

LESLIE GALLAGHER

Plaintiffs

and

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Defendant

Demurrer

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J

McHUGH J

Owens 1 5/6/91

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 5 JUNE 1991, AT 10.19 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned friend, MR S.J. GAGELER, for the

plaintiffs. (instructed by Arnold Bloch Leibler)

MR G. GRIFFITH, QC, Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned

friend, MS s.c. KENNY, for the defendant.

(instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

MR R.A. BRETT: If it please the Court, I appear with my

learned leader, MR H.C. BERKELEY, OC,
Solicitor-General for Victoria, on behalf of the

Attorney-General for Victoria, intervening on

behalf of the defendant. (instructed by the Crown
Solicitor for Victoria)

MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Bennett?

MR BENNETT:  I hand up an outline of submissions and a copy

of a second reading speech to which I will be

referring.

MASON CJ:  Yes Mr Bennett.
MR BENNETT:  If the Court pleases. Your Honours, there are

two issues in this case; the first is the limits of

a purpose of power and the second is the extent to

which one can assume the necessary constitutional

facts. One starts with a proposition that placitum

(xxxv) confers a purpose of power and it is clear

that legislation concerning the registration and

deregistration of industrial organizations is

incidental to that power, and to take the familiar

passage from Jumbunna Mines, for such legislation

to be valid, it must be capable of being seen to be

appropriate and adapted to the object of that

power.

Now, what this legislation does is something

which stretches the limits of that. There has been

legislation, the validity of which has been upheld,

which is said, because of the activities of the

federation, while within the system, it should be

deregistered for five years and at the end of five years, it should only be permitted back within the

system on it proving to the satisfaction of an

appropriate body, the Commission, certain matters,

and those are set out in section S(l)(b) of the

Consequential Provisions Act. That has a long

name; it is the Builders Labourers' Federation

(Cancellation of Registration-Consequential

Provisions) Act 1986.

Your Honours will see that paragraph S(l)(b)

precludes reregistration after five years unless the Commission has declared that it is satisfied

that: first, if it were registered it would not

Owens 5/6/91

engage in conduct inimical; that its

registration -

would not prevent or seriously hinder the

achievement of an object of the Conciliation

and Arbitration Act;

the requirements of the Act would apply in relation

to it, and so the other requirements are there.

What was…

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Details
Case
[1991] HCATrans 133
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of Australia, Ronald George Owens, Kevin Noel Reynolds, and Norman (the plaintiffs) brought proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia (the defendant). The dispute concerned the validity of certain legislative amendments that extended the period of deregistration for an industrial organisation. The Attorney-General for Victoria intervened on behalf of the defendant.

The primary legal issues before the Court were the limits of the Commonwealth's legislative power under placitum (xxxv) of the Constitution, specifically concerning its incidental scope, and the extent to which a court can assume the constitutional facts upon which such legislation relies. The plaintiffs argued that the legislation, which extended a deregistration period from five to ten years based on events occurring after the initial deregistration, stretched the limits of the incidental power.

The plaintiffs contended that while legislation concerning the registration and deregistration of industrial organisations is generally incidental to the placitum (xxxv) power, the amendments in question were not appropriate and adapted to the object of conciliation and arbitration. They argued that the extended deregistration period and the conditions for re-registration, as amended by the Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration-Consequential Provisions) Act 1986, were imposed as a consequence of past conduct and were not sufficiently connected to the purpose of industrial peace or the achievement of the Act's objects. The plaintiffs sought to rely on a second reading speech to demonstrate the purpose of the legislation, though this was questioned by Brennan J.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Owens & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia revolves around the constitutional validity of an amendment to the Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration-Consequential Provisions) Act 1986 (Cth), which extended the period of deregistration of the Builders Labourers' Federation from five to ten years. The plaintiffs, Ronald George Owens, Kevin Noel Reynolds, and Norman Leslie Gallagher, challenged the validity of the Builders Labourers' Federation Legislation Amendment Act 1990 (Cth) on the grounds that it was beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The Commonwealth defended the amendment as being within its legislative power to regulate the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes.

The original act deregistered the Builders Labourers' Federation for five years, following its involvement in unlawful activities. The plaintiffs argued that the amendment went beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power by imposing a sanction based on the federation's conduct outside the industrial system. They contended that the amendment extended the period of deregistration as a penalty for conduct that occurred while the federation was not part of the industrial relations system, which they claimed was outside the ambit of the Commonwealth's power.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, maintained that the amendment was a legitimate exercise of its power to determine which organisations could participate in the conciliation and arbitration system. They argued that the amendment did not exceed the limits of the power by merely extending the period of deregistration, and that the onus was on the plaintiffs to prove that the amendment was unconstitutional.

The court considered the scope of the Commonwealth's legislative power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution and whether the amendment fell within that power. They examined the relevant case law, including the trilogy of cases concerning the deregistration of the Builders Labourers' Federation, and the principle of "privilegium" as discussed in the Communist Party case. The court also considered the role of purpose and motive in determining the validity of legislation and the onus of proof in relation to constitutional facts.

Ultimately, the court found that the amendment was within the legislative power of the Commonwealth, as it was an exercise of the power to regulate the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes. The court held that the continued exclusion of the federation from eligibility for re-registration under the Commonwealth system was within the legislative power conferred upon the Parliament by section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The plaintiffs' challenge to the validity of the amendment was therefore unsuccessful.

The matter Owens & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia came before the High Court as an appeal against a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiffs, Ronald George Owens, Kevin Noel Reynolds, and Norman Leslie Gallagher, appealed the Federal Court's decision that upheld the constitutional validity of an amendment to the Builders Labourers' Federation Legislation Amendment Act 1990 (Cth). The amendment extended the period of suspension for the deregistration of the Builders Labourers' Federation. The defendant, Commonwealth of Australia, sought to uphold the amendment on the basis that it fell within the legislative power granted under section 51(xxxv) of the Australian Constitution. The Attorney-General for Victoria intervened on behalf of the defendant. The key issue in this appeal was whether the amendment was beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. The plaintiffs argued that the amendment imposed a sanction on conduct outside the industrial system, which exceeded the purpose of the power. The Commonwealth contended that the amendment fell within the legislative power to determine which organisations "shall be entitled to participate in the system of conciliation and arbitration" established pursuant to the constitutional grant of legislative power. The Court found that the amendment was within the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament, as it was appropriate for the Parliament to decide whether an organisation should be excluded from the system of conciliation and arbitration. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the amendment imposed a sanction on conduct outside the industrial system, which exceeded the purpose of the power.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What are the limits of the Commonwealth's power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution to legislate for the registration and deregistration of industrial organizations?
2. To what extent can the Court consider the purpose of the legislation, as opposed to its mere terms, in determining whether it falls within the Commonwealth's legislative power?
3. When imposing a sanction or exclusion based on conduct outside the industrial system, does the legislation still fall within the ambit of the Commonwealth's power under section 51(xxxv)?
4. Is the onus on the plaintiffs to prove that the legislation is unconstitutional, or on the Commonwealth to prove that it falls within its legislative power?
5. Does the continued exclusion of an organization from the conciliation and arbitration system fall within the legislative power conferred by section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution?

Held
1. The limits of the Commonwealth's power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution to legislate for the registration and deregistration of industrial organizations include the power to regulate and control these organizations and to cancel their registration. However, this power is not unlimited and cannot impose prohibitions or limitations inconsistent with the object of the legislative power, which is the prevention and settlement of interstate industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration.
2. The Court can consider the purpose of the legislation, as opposed to its mere terms, in determining whether it falls within the Commonwealth's legislative power. However, the purpose must be derived from the operation of the act and not from the motive or purpose that led to the introduction of the Act. The purpose should be collected from the instrument in question, the facts to which it applies, and the circumstances which called it forth.
3. When imposing a sanction or exclusion based on conduct outside the industrial system, the legislation still falls within the ambit of the Commonwealth's power under section 51(xxxv) if the purpose of the legislation is to protect the system from abuse within. However, if the purpose is to penalize conduct occurring outside the system, the legislation may be beyond the power.
4. The onus is on the Commonwealth to prove that the legislation falls within its legislative power. In cases where a law imposes some disability on a particular person or organization, the onus lies on those who support the law to prove the facts which bring it within the head of power.
5. The continued exclusion of an organization from the conciliation and arbitration system falls within the legislative power conferred by section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution, as it is within the power of the Parliament to determine which organizations "shall be entitled to participate in the system of conciliation and arbitration" and to exclude an organization from that system.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Owens v Commonwealth, the High Court considered the extent of the Commonwealth's legislative power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution to regulate the registration and deregistration of industrial organizations. The central issue was whether the Commonwealth could impose a sanction based on conduct outside the industrial system. The Court held that while the Commonwealth had broad power to regulate industrial organizations, it could not impose sanctions based on conduct occurring outside the industrial system.

The Court began by noting that legislation concerning the registration and deregistration of industrial organizations was incidental to the Commonwealth's power under section 51(xxxv). However, such legislation must be "appropriate and adapted" to the object of preventing and settling industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration. The Court found that while the Commonwealth could exclude an organization from the industrial system for conduct occurring within the system, it could not do so based on conduct outside the system.

The plaintiffs argued that the continued exclusion of the Builders Labourers' Federation from the industrial system was based on conduct outside the system and therefore exceeded the Commonwealth's power. The Court disagreed, finding that the Commonwealth's power extended to excluding organizations from the system altogether, even if the exclusion was based on conduct outside the system. However, the Court held that the Commonwealth could not impose additional sanctions for conduct outside the system.

The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the onus was on the Commonwealth to prove the legislation was constitutional. The Court held that once the plaintiffs established that the legislation was based on conduct outside the system, the onus shifted to the Commonwealth to demonstrate that the exclusion was "appropriate and adapted" to the constitutional purpose.

In summary, the Court held that while the Commonwealth had broad power to regulate industrial organizations, it could not impose sanctions based on conduct outside the system. The exclusion of an organization from the system altogether was within the Commonwealth's power, but additional sanctions for outside conduct were not. The onus was on the plaintiffs to establish that the legislation exceeded the Commonwealth's power, at which point the onus shifted to the Commonwealth to demonstrate the legislation was constitutional.