Oue v Commissioner of Police

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

OUE v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 147

PARTIES:

OUE
(appellant)

v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

DC 611 of 2023

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Richlands

DELIVERED ON:

24 August 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

31 July 2023

JUDGE:

Wooldridge KC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed.

2.   The sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Richlands on 8 March 2023 is set aside, and the following sentencing orders made:

a)   The appellant is fined $800.

b)     The appellant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver licence for a period of 3 months.

c)   No conviction is recorded.

3.   The respondent pay the appellant’s costs on this appeal,      calculated to be in the amount of $1800.  

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – MAGISTRATES – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE – an appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant was sentenced for an offence of Driving while over the general alcohol limit but not over the middle alcohol limit pursuant to s 79(2)(a) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) – where the appellant was fined $1600 and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period of 12 months – where a conviction was recorded – where the appellant contends the sentencing discretion miscarried due to specific error – whether the sentence was excessive

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222, s 223, s 225
Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 7.34, s 7.35
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9, s 12
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 79, s 86

Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58
CDG v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 183
Colley-Presnell v Commissioner of Police  [2023] QDC 63
Connor John Wilson v The Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 15
Franich v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 171
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612
Mould v Newland [2001] QCA 211

Purcell v Commissioner of Police [2016] QDC 342

R v Graham [2023] QCA 125
R v Kilic (2016) 259 CLR 256
R v O’Sullivan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld); R v Lee; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2019) 3 QR 196
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550
R v ZB [2021] QCA 9
Scarce v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 246
Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489

Wilson v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 15

COUNSEL:

DP Jones KC for the appellant

DJ Sampey for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Gnech & Associates for the appellant
The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the respondent

Introduction

  1. On 8 March 2023 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court at Richlands to an offence of Driving while over the general alcohol limit but not over the middle alcohol limit, pursuant to section 79(2)(a) of the Transport…

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 147
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the District Court of Queensland, the case of Oue v Commissioner of Police involved an appeal against the sentence imposed on the appellant for driving while over the general alcohol limit but not exceeding the middle alcohol limit, under section 79(2)(a) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld). The appellant had been fined $1600 and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 12 months, with a conviction recorded. The appellant argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the sentencing discretion had miscarried.

The court considered whether the sentence was excessive and whether the Magistrate's decision to disregard certain prior cases was appropriate. The court noted that while the decisions referred to might not directly involve the same sentencing orders, they could still provide persuasive value given the legislative hierarchy and the importance of consistent sentencing. The court also examined the appellant's good character and the potential impact of recording a conviction on his career, drawing comparisons with other cases.

The District Court found that the sentencing discretion had indeed miscarried due to the Magistrate's failure to consider the appellant's good character and the minimal impact of recording a conviction on his career. In exercising its discretion afresh, the court imposed a fine of $800, disqualified the appellant from holding a driver's licence for three months, and decided not to record a conviction. The court considered the appellant's BAC, the circumstances of the offence, and the broader implications of recording a conviction for drink-driving offences.

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and impose a new fine of $800, a three-month disqualification from holding a driver's licence, and no conviction recorded. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of $1800.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Richlands on 8 March 2023 is set aside, and the following sentencing orders made:

a) The appellant is fined $800.

b) The appellant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver licence for a period of 3 months.

c) No conviction is recorded.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs on this appeal, calculated to be in the amount of $1800.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Irrespective, it may be thought that the decisions referred to would nonetheless have some persuasive value and weight, given the legislatively imposed hierarchy whereby appeals from sentences imposed in the Magistrates Court are heard by the District Court, and the desirability of consistency in sentencing. Here the result has been an appeal to the District Court, where each of the parties submitted that the sentence imposed at first instance was manifestly excessive – such submissions having been made with reference to the decisions to which the Magistrate declined to have regard at first instance. Comparable decisions The following cases[78] were referred to in the course of submissions: Purcell v Commissioner of Police [2016] QDC 342 [78]Not all of the cases involved consideration of each part of the sentencing orders made – be it the quantum of fine, the period of disqualification and/or the recording of a conviction. The appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of Driving whilst over the middle alcohol limit but not over the high alcohol limit. His BAC was 0.149. He had been drinking on the night with friends, and had not planned to drive, but had decided to drive in order to transport an intoxicated colleague home. He was fined $800 and disqualified from holding a driver licence for a period of 8 months. A conviction was recorded. The appellant had two previous convictions for low level speeding in recent years. On appeal the licence disqualification period was reduced to a period of 6 months. CDG v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 183 The appellant CDG also pleaded guilty to one offence of Driving a motor vehicle over the general alcohol limit. His BAC was lower than that of this appellant, being 0.065. His consumption of alcohol had immediately precipitated his driving. He had consumed beers at a hotel over a period of three to four hours, while waiting for his son. He was 57 years of age and had been a serving police officer for 32 years. He had a previous for drink-driving, which was from 1984, and more dated, and six previous convictions for speeding. He had been fined $800 and disqualified from holding a licence for two months. A conviction was recorded. The appellant in that case was also subject to police disciplinary proceedings. The appeal related only to a conviction having been recorded. The sentencing discretion of the learned Magistrate at first instance was found to have miscarried – the learned Magistrate at first instance having failed to have regard to the appellant’s good character and having found that a recording of a conviction would have no further impact on the appellant’s career. In the exercise of the sentencing discretion afresh, her Honour Judge Loury QC exercised her discretion to not record a conviction, referring to[79], among other matters, the appellant CDG’s maturity, his minor traffic record despite having held a licence for 35 years, and that his employment as a police officer meant that the recording of a conviction had a real potential consequence of materially adversely impacting upon his social and economic wellbeing. Scarce v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 246[79]At [20].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ultimately, the respondent submitted that the Court would exercise its sentencing discretion afresh and impose a fine of $800, and a licence disqualification period of between three to five months, and that it would be “open” to the Court to record a conviction. Consideration The characterisation of the appellant’s offending and the recording of a conviction as a “norm” As the learned Magistrate acknowledged matters of general deterrence are of significance when sentencing for offences involving the driving or operation of a motor vehicle when having consumed alcohol, because of the clear potential for such conduct to present a danger to other road users and the community more broadly. While the appellant’s BAC was very near the middle alcohol limit, he fell to be sentenced as driving while over the general alcohol limit. It was a serious aspect of the appellant’s offending that the appellant had driven a significant distance in an urban area, on his own admission, but as the appellant highlights, he was not charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and there was no evidence of his manner of driving otherwise. The range of offending that may give rise to an offence of “drink driving” is broad, and the circumstances in which such offending may arise, and of the offender concerned, immeasurably broader. A sentencing judge must consider the potential benefits and detriments to the community in adopting the course of recording or not recording a conviction in any particular case.[66] While the recording of a conviction serves to make the fact of the conviction known to those who have a legitimate interest in knowing of it[67], the learned Magistrate was in my view incorrect to proceed on the basis that the recording of a conviction for any offence of “drink driving” should be considered “the norm”, because of the relationship such as may exist between the prevalence of drink driving and insurance premiums for road-users, or otherwise. Such an approach is to circumvent the nature of the discretion under section 12 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).[68] [66]See R v ZB [2021] QCA 9 at [9] to [10]. [67]Ibid [6]. See also R v Graham [2023] QCA 125. [68]See Mould v Newland [2001] QCA 211. The QPS disciplinary proceedings The appellant was determined[69] to be liable for disciplinary action under Part 7 of the Police Service Administration Act1990 (Qld). The potential available disciplinary sanctions as set out in section 7.35 include dismissal, suspension from duty without pay for up to 12 months, probation of up to 12 months duration, demotion, transfer, community service, a fine, or reprimand.[70] [69]See Document NTD4 within Exhibit 4 before the Magistrates Court. [70]See also appellant’s written submissions at paragraph 64. The disciplinary process was commenced prior to and independent of the appellant’s conviction for the offence of Driving while over the general alcohol limit but not over the middle alcohol limit. It is not in issue, as the learned Magistrate referred to, that the police service would be aware of the conduct, (and the outcome of the court proceedings), whether or not a conviction were recorded. However, I accept the submissions of the parties to the effect that that did not mean that the existence of the disciplinary proceedings and matters related thereto were wholly irrelevant to the exercise of the sentencing discretion.