OTERO & OTERO
[2018] FamCAFC 188
•25 September 2018
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| OTERO & OTERO | [2018] FamCAFC 188 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PARENTING – Interim orders – Orders for both supervised and unsupervised time – Lack of procedural fairness – Inadequate reasons – Challenges to the primary judge’s exercise of discretion – Appeal allowed – Orders for unsupervised time set aside – Matter remitted for rehearing. FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – Further evidence – Evidence adduced to buttress the findings of the primary judge – Where the evidence is controversial – Leave refused. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 94AAA(3) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) Sch 3 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r.16.05 |
| Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191; [1990] FamCA 148 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55 Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 Kennedy v Thorne (2017) 350 ALR 1; [2017] HCA 49 Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 Robinson Helicopter Company Ltd v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550; [2006] HCA 22 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54 U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238; [2002] HCA 36 Vanzin & Vanzin [2014] FamCAFC 245 |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Otero |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Otero |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 2818 | of | 2018 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 109 | of | 2018 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 25 September 2018 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Aldridge J |
| HEARING DATE: | 20 September 2018 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 2 August 2018 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2018] FCCA 2093 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: | Ms Kennedy |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: | Pearson Emerson Meyer Family Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Livingstone |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Cominos Family Lawyers |
Orders
Leave for the respondent to file in court an Application in an Appeal seeking to adduce further evidence is refused.
Appeal EA109 of 2018 is allowed.
Orders 4(b) and 4(c) made by Judge Harper on 23 July 2018 are set aside.
The matter is remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing by a judge other than Judge Harper.
The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs assessed in the sum of $17,000.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Otero & Otero has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
Appeal Number: EA 109 of 2018
File Number: SYC 2818 of 2018
| Ms Otero |
Appellant
And
| Mr Otero |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Ms Otero (“the mother”) appeals from interim parenting orders made by Judge Harper on 23 July 2018 in proceedings between her and Mr Otero (“the father”). The parties have two children who were born in 2015 and 2016.
On 23 July 2018, the parties were able to agree on a number of orders which were made by consent. The orders provided for the children to live with the mother. The father was ordered “to obtain a referral to a suitably qualified Psychiatrist to discuss his mental health and issues relating to the separation” and to obtain a report.
The parties could not agree on the time that the children would spend with the father or the manner in which they would spend that time. The mother sought an order for short periods of supervised time (of the order of two hours), whereas the father sought unsupervised time in approximately six hour blocks.
The primary judge made the following orders:
(4)The children shall spend time with the father as agreed between the parties and in the absence of agreement as follows:
(a)On Mondays for a period of two (2) hours supervised by the organisation known as ‘[P Supervision Agency]’ between the hours of 3:30pm and 5:30pm;
(b)On Thursdays:
(i)In relation to the child, [B] born … 2015, from on and after 3:00pm until 6:30pm, with the father to collect the child from daycare, [G Daycare], [Suburb S] at 3:00pm;
(ii)In relation to [C] born … 2016, between the hours of 8:30am and 6:30pm, with the father to collect the child from the mother’s residence at 8:30am.
(iii)In relation to both previous orders, the father is to deliver both children to the mother’s residence by no later than 6:30pm.
(c)For the purposes of the previous order, on Thursdays, the time spent with by the father with the child, [C], in accordance with order 4(b)(ii) is to take place in the presence of the paternal grandmother, [Ms L Otero], noting that such supervision is to end when the father travels with [C] to collect the child [B] from daycare on and after 3:00pm on Thursdays and that the presence of the paternal grandmother is not required during the period the children are in the care of the father in the [Suburb T] area up until 6:30pm on Thursday.
(d)On Sundays from 11:00am to 5:30pm with such time with the father to be in the presence of [his sister].
His Honour delivered reasons on 2 August 2018.
On 8 August 2018 the mother filed an Application in a Case seeking a stay of the orders pending this appeal. On 15 August 2018, the primary judge dismissed that application but amended the orders under r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) to provide as follows:
(2)Pursuant to Rule 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), orders 4(b) and (c) made on 23 July 2018 be varied as follows:
4(b)On Thursdays:
(i)In relation to the child, [B] born … 2015, from on and after 4.15pm until 6:30pm, with the father to collect the child from day-care, [G Daycare], [Suburb S] after 4.15pm;
(ii)In relation to [C] born … 2016, between the hours of 8:30am and 6:30pm, with the father to collect the child from the mother’s residence at 8:30am.
(iii)In relation to both previous orders, the father is to deliver both children to the mother’s residence by no later than 6:30pm.
4(c)For the purposes of the previous order, on Thursdays, the time spent with by the father with the child, [C], in accordance with order 4(b)(ii) is to take place in the presence of the paternal grandmother, [Ms L Otero], noting that such supervision is to end when the father travels with [C] to collect the child [B] from day-care on and after 4:15pm on Thursdays and that the presence of the paternal grandmother is not required during the period the children are in the care of the father in the [Suburb T] area up until 6:30pm on Thursday.
(Original emphasis)
On 23 August 2018 the appeal was expedited.
Background
The parties had a short relationship. They commenced cohabitation in 2014, were married on 6 February 2016 and separated on 28 February 2018.
The father commenced spending time with the children in March 2018, which time was supervised by the mother or the maternal uncle. From April to June 2018, the time was supervised by a professional supervision agency.
The primary judge described the significant issue before him as follows:
7.The primary issue at this hearing stemmed from the mother’s position that the father suffered from mental health issues. She submitted that the father could potentially pose an unacceptable risk to the children and she was justified in seeking to exclude unsupervised time between the children and their father until he underwent a psychiatric assessment. Additionally, to support her orders sought, the mother contended that the father’s lack of involvement in the children’s life impugned his parental capacity.
His Honour expanded on that statement later in the Reasons, saying:
40.The basis for the mother’s concerns lie in conversation and text messages between November 2017 and 3 March 2018, set out at paragraphs 22 to 29 of her Affidavit. In these exchanges the father made comments such as “I am a failure and need to die”, “I turned into a monster”, and “I fear I will hurt them [the kids]”. The father also made comments such as “I am useless and arrogant and a bludger”, “They [the children] will be harmed if a I stay more than if I go” and “I believe it is easier to die than continue to drugged [sic] day to day hour to hour.”
41.The father denied ongoing problems with mental health, although he accepted he had suffered problems in the past. He has been willing to accept supervision in the past, as the price for time with his children. He remained willing to have to be subject to supervision for his time with the children, but submitted that it did not need to be at a contact centre. He put forward both the paternal grandmother and his sister … as suitable supervisors.
This led to the following conclusion:
44.In my view, the evidence does not raise a prima facie or other inference that the father suffers from serious mental health problems which he should be required to rebut before the children can be allowed to spend more time with him.
45.Nevertheless, the recent contact between the father and the children has been supervised and the father is prepared to accept some ongoing supervision.
Application to adduce further evidence
At the outset of the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the father sought leave to file in court an Application in an Appeal seeking leave to adduce evidence in the appeal. In particular, the father sought to place before the Court a report of Dr M, a forensic psychiatrist.
The primary judge had ordered the father to undergo a psychiatric assessment. The father’s contention was that the psychiatric assessment performed by Dr M established that the father posed no risk of harm to the children and that any order for unsupervised time was properly made. In other words, the father sought to “buttress the findings already made” (CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172, per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ at [109]).
In response, counsel for the mother contended that there were a number of issues raised by the report which would need to be dealt with if it was received into evidence. These included:
·no independent tests were administered to the father;
·the report relies entirely on the statements made by the father;
·there was a lack of analysis of the text messages sent by the father which precipitated the orders for the report; and
·there is no transparent reasoning as to what the text messages mean or how they were assessed.
As the High Court has pointed out in CDJ at [114], the Court will more readily admit the proffered evidence where that evidence is not in dispute. However, as has been seen, the opinion of the psychiatrist will be tested by the mother. It is very difficult for that to take place in an appeal.
It is also relevant that the issue of interim parenting orders will be before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia shortly where the impact of the report can be considered.
For these reasons, I refused leave to file the Application in an Appeal.
The Appeal
The appeal was heard by a single judge pursuant to a direction given by the Chief Justice under s 94AAA(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The mother raises four grounds of appeal. The fourth asserts a lack of procedural fairness and, as it goes to the integrity of the hearing itself, must be dealt with first (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at 611–612, 634).
Was there a lack of procedural fairness? (Ground 4)
The mother submits that by the end of the hearing, it was common ground that the father’s time with the children should be supervised, yet without notice to the parties, an order was made for unsupervised time.
The mother also submits that his Honour indicated to the parties that he would make an order that the children would spend 5.5 hours with the father on Sundays but, again, without further notice to the parties, made an order for 6.5 hours.
On the other hand, the father submits that the issue of supervision “was very much a live issue well before the time she arrived at court” and that it “was a recurring theme over the course of the hearing extending over the day”.
It is therefore necessary to identify the positions taken by the parties from time to time.
In his Initiating Application, the father sought the following interim order:
4.The children shall spend time with the Father as follows:
(a)Until 20 December 2018, every Monday Thursday and Sunday from 8.00am to 6:30pm …
(Original emphasis)
In her Response, the mother sought that the children spend time with the father at a contact centre each Tuesday from 3.30 pm until 5.30 pm and each Saturday from 10.30 am until 12.30 pm.
The hearing on 23 July 2018 was stood down on two occasions. First, the parties saw a family consultant who prepared a Child Dispute Conference Memorandum. The consultant opined that “[c]hildren spending supervised time with a parent is not considered to be a positive long-term solution”.
Secondly, the parties agreed on a number of orders which were made by consent.
The lawyer for the father opened the proceedings saying, “[w]hat [the father] seeks today is unsupervised time with the children” (Transcript 23 July 2018, p.2).
Later in the day, the lawyer for the mother indicated that her client was “not agreeable to the father spending unsupervised time with the child[ren] and certainly not for that length of time” (Transcript 23 July 2018, p.4).
Importantly, after referring to the consent orders, the lawyer for the father said:
The issue then for your Honour to decide is what time the children should be spending with my client. My client offers his sister … and he offers his mother in court – who is in court as supervisors. I can call her, although I note it’s very late. And both can give undertakings in relation to their role as supervisors. But your Honour will hear that the paternal grandmother is a former schoolteacher and a former childcare worker. As I understand it, the mother is not prepared to agree to any more than two hours’ supervised.
My client seeks half a day on Mondays, Wednesdays and Sundays, supervised by his sister or his mother.
(Transcript 23 July 2018, p.16) (Emphasis added)
Thus, whatever might have been his earlier position, the father no longer sought orders for unsupervised time. This is confirmed by the description in the first sentence of that passage of “the issue”, which referred solely to time.
After some considerable discussion, his Honour said:
HIS HONOUR: What I’m proposing to order is that there be two hours supervised time with [P Supervision Agency] on Mondays, that there be five and a half hours time on Sundays in the presence of [the father’s sister], and that there be time on Wednesdays in the presence of the paternal grandmother. That could be Thursdays. The father nominated Wednesdays, the mother nominated Thursdays.
(Transcript 23 July 2018, p.22)
The focus then turned to Thursday, in lieu of Wednesday. Counsel for the father submitted:
MR APELBAUM: Yes. He proposes to spend the day with [C], to collect [B] from child care in the afternoon, to spend time with both children in the [Suburb T] vicinity. For example, he has spent a lot of time with the children at the library.
HIS HONOUR: So collect [C] in the morning?
MR APELBAUM: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
MR APELBAUM: [B] goes to child care. She is there for most of the day. He will collect her in the afternoon at around 3 o’clock, spend time with both children in the vicinity, whether that’s at the shops or a park or the library, and return her at 6.30pm to the mother’s household. And what I’m instructed is the time that he will pick up [B] from the child care centre will depend upon when [C] wakes up from her nap.
(Transcript 23 July 2018, p.24)
The mother’s lawyer replied, submitting that the proposed time with C was too long and that all time should be supervised:
MS SANTO: My client’s instructions in relation to that day, she’s extremely concerned as to going from one and a half hours with [C]. She has got no issue in relation to [B], I should say, with him picking her up early or – as long as that’s supervised. She does have reservations about the paternal grandmother. She has given evidence in relation to those reservations in her affidavit at paragraphs 77 - - -
(Transcript 23 July 2018, p.24)
His Honour then sought assistance as to whether reasons were required and, if so, indicated they would be delivered at a later time. The orders the subject of the appeal were then made.
The orders provided for three and a half hours of unsupervised time. As amended under r.16.05, they provide for two and a quarter hours of unsupervised time.
It is clear that whatever had been the father’s position at the beginning of the hearing, by its close he had amended his position unequivocally and accepted the position that the interim orders should provide for the time the children were to spend with him to be supervised. He proposed his sister and mother as supervisors. Nothing that subsequently occurred indicates a retreat from that position.
The comments of the primary judge quoted at [33] above accord with the father’s final position.
In U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 at [171], Hayne J pointed out that a trial judge is not bound by the orders proposed by the parties and may formulate for him or herself the orders to be made. His Honour further observed:
172.That is not to say that the Family Court is to embark upon some roving inquiry about the matter, unfettered by any regard for the evidence led and the matters which the parties seek to contest. Due account must be taken of the fact that proceedings in the Family Court are conducted in a framework of adversarial procedure familiar to the common law. (I do not stay to consider how or to what extent that adversarial model has been modified by the Act or rules of court made under it.)
It is submitted by the father that the mother was aware that the father’s case was that time should not be supervised, such that she had the opportunity to adduce evidence and put submissions to the Court. Indeed, that was the father’s position until well into the hearing. In response, the mother adduced evidence and advanced submissions in favour of supervision. It was only late in the hearing that the father’s concession as to supervised time was made.
Ultimately, however, there was no issue that the children’s time with the father was to be supervised.
If the primary judge felt inclined to go beyond the common position of the parties and make an order for unsupervised time, then it was necessary for him to draw that inclination to the parties’ attention and receive submissions on it. The primary judge’s failure to do so was therefore a denial of procedural fairness (Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [69] – [72]).
Similarly, although it is of much less consequence, the primary judge moved from his stated intention to make orders for 5.5 hours on Sunday to 6.5 hours without raising it with the parties.
This ground has been established.
Did the primary judge give adequate reasons for making an order for unsupervised time? (Ground 3)
The mother submits that the primary judge did not give adequate reasons as to why part of the time the children were to spend with the father was not to be supervised. In the light of the outcome as to ground 4 this challenge is now otiose, but nonetheless I shall address it.
The obligation to give reasons is well-known: Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191 at 78,266. The reasons must enable the parties to understand the basis of the decision and the extent to which their arguments have been understood and accepted: see, for example, Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 at [59] and the cases cited therein.
In determining the adequacy of the reasons, consideration must be given to the nature of the hearing and to the issues before the Court. In Vanzin & Vanzin [2014] FamCAFC 245, Murphy J said:
20.The process by which interim parenting decisions are made within busy lists containing many cases with equal claims to be heard is “…an abridged process where the scope of the inquiry is significantly curtailed” (Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at [68]). That consideration, and the fact that the issues for determination here are extremely narrow, does not obviate the need to follow mandatory statutory requirements (Goode (above) at [82]).
21.Nor does it obviate the need to give reasons for the decision reached; the orders pertain to the life of a child, however benign the issues might seem, and the parents should know why a decision has been reached (see for example, Kirby J writing extra-curially ‘Always permissible, usually desirable and often obligatory’ (1994) 12 ABR 121,135-6). No ground here asserts an inadequacy of reasons, but the brevity of the ex tempore reasons delivered in this case contributes to at least some of the arguments made on behalf of the appellant.
In Kennedy v Thorne (2017) 350 ALR 1 the High Court said at [61]:
The content of that judicial duty to give reasons will depend upon the circumstances of the matter being considered. Importantly, it is not necessarily the case that reasons be lengthy or elaborate in order to be adequate.
The critical issue in this case is whether the reasons explain adequately why an order was made for unsupervised time. Such reasons could be brief and simple.
The parties posed the following issue for determination. The mother’s position, disputed by the father, was that the text messages sent by the father indicated a risk that would, pending the production of a psychiatric assessment, require his time to be supervised so as to ameliorate any risk of harm to the children.
The crucial part of his Honour’s reasons appears in the following passage:
41.The father denied ongoing problems with mental health, although he accepted he had suffered problems in the past. He has been willing to accept supervision in the past, as the price for time with his children. He remained willing to have to be subject to supervision for his time with the children, but submitted that it did not need to be at a contact centre. He put forward both the paternal grandmother and his sister … as suitable supervisors.
42.At this interim stage I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that the father presents an unacceptable risk to the children. The text messages sent at and around the time of separation certainly contain extreme and concerning language. At that time the father was clearly struggling to cope and presented with low self-worth. However, it is not unusual for parties in the throes of relationship failure to conduct themselves or express themselves in a manner which is extreme or depressive. It may be out of character. At this interim stage it is not possible to form a view that the father’s mental health is as seriously compromised as the mother submits.
43.Moreover, the reports from the [W Contact Centre] are clear and consistent in recording positive and loving interactions between the father and the children.
44.In my view, the evidence does not raise a prima facie or other inference that the father suffers from serious mental health problems which he should be required to rebut before the children can be allowed to spend more time with him.
45.Nevertheless, the recent contact between the father and the children has been supervised and the father is prepared to accept some ongoing supervision.
In short, the primary judge was not satisfied that the father posed any risk of harm to the children, but also found that the father was prepared to accept supervised time.
His Honour later returned to this issue saying:
72.The evidence did not suggest that the mother’s mental well-being was likely to be adversely affected if the children spent more time with the father. On the other hand I accepted the mother would be made anxious by an absence of supervision. The father was willing to agree to a majority of supervised time. The orders provide for supervision for all but several hours of the father’s time on Thursdays.
I note in passing that the father agreed to supervised time and not to “a majority of supervised time”.
These considerations led to the following conclusions:
90.I am satisfied that the children should spend more time with the father. Since the father accepts supervision, it is appropriate for the additional time to be supervised for the most part, but additional supervised time can take place outside a contact centre. Contact centre supervision is expensive.
…
92.The orders make allowance for a short period of about two hours on Thursdays to be unsupervised, so long as the father remains proximate to the mother’s home.
Nowhere does his Honour explain, however briefly (which is all that would have been required), why, in light of the father’s agreement, not all time the children were to spend with him should be supervised and why the orders provided for several hours of unsupervised time. The orders seem to be inconsistent with the finding that the father did not pose a risk of harm (that is, because supervision was required for most but not all of the time) but also inconsistent with the common position of the parties which was that all the time should be supervised.
The parties are unable to discern from the reasons why most, but not all, of the time is to be supervised.
Further, there is an apparent disconformity, or even illogicality, about the one set of orders which provide for the children’s time with the father to be professionally supervised on one day and not supervised at all for a period of time another day. As counsel for the father pointed out, a trial judge’s discretion is wide and such orders, although unusual, could be made. However, in view of the unusual nature of the orders, the primary judge was obliged to explain why they were made in that form. He did not. It follows that this ground also succeeds.
Grounds 1 and 2
These grounds challenge the exercise of discretion by the primary judge, pointing to insufficient weight given to “relevant risk factors” and asserting that orders were made contrary to the evidence. Given that I have come to the conclusion that Orders 4(b) and (c) must be set aside, there is no utility in considering them further. It remains then to consider Order 4(d).
Challenges to matters of weight and findings of evidence face a high bar (Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; Robinson Helicopter Company Ltd v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550 at [43]).
Order 4(d) provides for the children to spend time with the father on Sundays from 11.00 am to 5.30 pm, supervised by the father’s sister. The mother challenges the making of this order on the basis that the primary judge mistakenly found at [91] that “the mother agreed [the father’s sister] was acceptable”.
Although the mother initially appeared to agree to the father’s sister acting as a supervisor, the mother’s solicitor later indicated that the mother did not consent to that proposal and instead sought that the Sunday time be supervised by professional supervision agency (Transcript 23 July 2018, p.19). No reason was given as to why the sister was not an acceptable supervisor and the evidence does not disclose any reason. The submissions merely indicated that there was no consent and that nothing further could be said.
This being the case, there is now no room for the mother to complain about this aspect of Order 4(d). To the extent that the primary judge erred by recording that the mother consented to the sister being a supervisor, that is not material. Even if consent was lacking the evidence did not support a finding that she was unsuitable.
Whilst the mother also submits that the amount of time the children are to spend with the father on Sunday is excessive, that was very much a matter for the primary judge. Error in the exercise of discretion must be established having regard to the principles set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 – 505. No such error has been identified. Whilst other judges may have made orders for shorter periods of time given the young age of the children, that does not establish error. The order was open to be made on the evidence that was before the Court.
Conclusion
It follows that Orders 4(b) and (c) must be set aside. The application insofar as it seeks that the children spend time with the father beyond the remaining orders must be remitted for rehearing.
Costs
In the event that the appeal was successful, the mother sought an order that the father pay her costs assessed in the sum of $22,722.12 (which has been calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)).
For his part, the father pointed to his modest income given that he works part-time. However, the mother also is not in full-time employment.
The appeal was wholly successful. It could have been conceded at an earlier stage but was not. It is appropriate that the father pay the mother’s costs of the appeal.
There is some force in the father’s submission that not all of the costs claimed were strictly necessary. The mother accepted that a figure of $17,000 was appropriate having regard to that criticism.
I consider that to be an appropriate sum, having regard to the fact that the mother incurred the expense of seeking and obtaining expedition of the appeal.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge delivered on 25 September 2018.
Legal associate:
Date: 25 September 2018
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