FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Otero & Colina [2021] FedCFamC1F 215
File number(s): DGC 2961 of 2015 Judgment of: HARTNETT J Date of judgment: 24 November 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – MAGELLAN LIST – Where the child currently spends no time and has no communication with the father – Where the child is now aged nine years – Where the child lives with the mother and maternal grandparents – Where the parents separated, reconciled and separated again – Whether the father poses an unacceptable risk to the child – Where there are allegations made by the mother that the father sexually abused the child – Where the mother does not support a relationship between the father and the child – Where there is no unacceptable risk of harm or abuse for the child in the care of the father – Where the father consents to orders that he attend upon a psychologist for cognitive behavioural therapy and dialectical behaviour therapy – Orders made for the father to attend a psychologist.
FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best interests – Whether the child should spend supervised time and/or communicate with the father – where the mother seeks that no orders are made for spend time – Where the father seeks supervised time at a contact service or private supervisor – Where the father also seeks orders that the child engage in therapeutic counselling prior to recommencing spend time with the father – Orders made for the child to attend therapeutic counselling for a period of three months prior to the child recommencing supervised time with the father for a period of eighteen months – Where the parties agree that the mother should have sole parental responsibility – Where the parties both seek that the child live with the mother – Orders made by consent for the mother to have sole parental responsibility and for the child to live with the mother.
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, ss 4, 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 60CG, 61DA
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 39
Cases cited: Bell & Nahos [2016] FamCAFC 244
Betros & Betros [2017] FamCAFC 90
Blinko & Blinko [2015] FamCAC 146
Jurchenko & Foster (2014) FC 93-598
M & M (1988) 166 CLR 69
Mazorski & Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518
Mulvany & Lane (2009) FLC 93-404
Olsen & Rigby [2020] FamCA 885
Russell & Close [1993] FamCA 62
Division: Division 1 First Instance Place: Melbourne Number of paragraphs: 175 Date of hearing: 3-7 May 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Agresta Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Chislett Solicitor for the Respondent: Ressan Lawyers Advocate for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Taghdir Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Taft Lawyers ORDERS
DGC 2961 of 2015
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence presented by both parties, including the allegations of physical and sexual abuse made by the mother and denied by the father, as well as the father’s criminal history and past incidents of substance abuse and violence. The court also considered the recommendations of the Department of Human Services report and the observations of the Family Report. The court concluded that the evidence did not support an unacceptable risk of harm to the child if the father were to have sole parental responsibility, provided certain conditions were met. The court found that the father could provide a stable and supportive environment for the child, and that the mother’s concerns, while serious, did not rise to the level of establishing an unacceptable risk of harm.
Based on the evidence and the welfare considerations, the court ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, with specific conditions regarding the father’s involvement in the child’s health and education. The court also ordered that the father be kept informed about the child’s health and schooling, and that he have regular supervised contact with the child. The court’s decision was based on a careful assessment of the evidence and a determination that the welfare of the child would be best served by the mother having sole parental responsibility with the father’s involvement under the specified conditions.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this proceeding, the parties consented to an order being made by the court for the mother to have sole parental responsibility provided that the mother kept the father informed as to the child’s health, and the child’s schooling. The evidence supports that position. CONSIDERATION The court must give primary consideration as to whether there is an unacceptable risk of physical and/or psychological harm to the child in spending time with either parent.[56] In M & M (1988) 166 CLR 69 (“M & M”), the High Court said:[57] ...The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access... [56] Ibid s 60CC(2)(b). [57] M & M (1988) 166 CLR 69 at [24] In M & M, the High Court went on to consider what magnitude of risk would justify a court denying a parent access to a child and held that the test was best expressed as to whether there was an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse to the child:[58] Efforts to define with greater precision the magnitude of the risk which will justify a court in denying a parent access to a child have resulted in a variety of formulations. The degree of risk has been described as a "risk of serious harm" (A v. A (1976) VR 298, at p 300), "an element of risk" or "an appreciable risk" (Marriage of M (1987) 11 Fam LR 765, at p 770 and p 771 respectively), "a real possibility" (B. v. B. (Access) (1986) FLC 91-758, at p 75,545), a "real risk" (Leveque v. Leveque (1983) 54 B CLR 164, at p 167), and an "unacceptable risk" (In re G. (a minor) (1987) 1 WLR 1461, at p 1469). This imposing array indicates that the courts are striving for a greater degree of definition than the subject is capable of yielding. In devising these tests the courts have endeavoured, in their efforts to protect the child's paramount interests, to achieve a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access. To achieve a proper balance, the test is best expressed by saying that a court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse. [58] Ibid at [25]. As summarised by McClelland DCJ:[59] Determining the issue of risk essentially involves applying a risk matrix whereby it is necessary to assess the potential seriousness of the harm in the context of the probability of its occurrence. That is, there is an obligation on a trial judge to evaluate, not only the extent, magnitude and nature of the harm that might befall the child if there is a future act of abuse or harmful conduct, but also to evaluate the prospect or probability of such an act or conduct occurring that would cause such harm to the child: see N & S (1996) FLC 92-655 at 82,713 (Fogarty J) cited with approval in Napier & Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303 and in Nikolakis & Nikolakis [2010] FamCAFC 52 at [95]-[96]. [59] Olsen & Rigby [2020] FamCA 885 at [151].