OSWAL and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE

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JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ACT: LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2008 (WA)

CITATION:   OSWAL and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2015] WASAT 14

MEMBER:   JUSTICE J C CURTHOYS (PRESIDENT)

MR M SPILLANE (SENIOR MEMBER)
MS R MOORE (MEMBER)

HEARD:   2 FEBRUARY 2014

DELIVERED          :   16 FEBRUARY 2015

FILE NO/S:   VR 179 of 2014

BETWEEN:   RADHIKA OSWAL

Applicant

AND

LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
First Respondent

TIMOTHY BURROWS
Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Complaint against legal practitioner - Unsatisfactory professional conduct - Complaint dismissed by Legal Profession Complaints Committee - 'No reasonable likelihood'

Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 424, s 425, s 427
Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA), r 34, r 35, r 36

Result:

Application dismissed

Summary of Tribunal's decision:

On 25 October 2013, Ms Radhika Oswal made complaints to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee, against Mr Timothy Burrows, who had acted for the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in two proceedings in the Federal court - WAD 95 of 2011 and WAD 264 of 2012.

The complaints made by Ms Oswal to the Complaints Committee were summarised by the Committee as follows:

1.failure to make reasonable enquiries;

2.failure to disclose existence of mortgage annexed to Logue affidavit at ex parte hearing;

3.made misleading statements in application to amend statement of claim; and

4.failure to correct previous incorrect statements made to the Court.

On 29 March 2011, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation commenced Federal Court proceedings against Ms Oswal to recover a taxation debt and then on 31 March 2011, sought ex parte freezing orders against Ms Oswal's assets.

Mr Burrows settled an affidavit sworn on 28 March 2011 by an employee of the Australian Taxation Office, annexing a complete copy of a Landgate search of a mortgage registered against the properties Ms Oswal owned in Western Australia

Ms Oswal's solicitors filed an affidavit sworn by her on 26 May annexing an incomplete copy of the mortgage.

In October 2012, Federal Court proceedings (WAD 264 of 2012) were commenced by the Deputy Commissioner to set aside the mortgage on the basis that Ms Oswal had engaged in fraud or serious misconduct.  In December 2012, in WAD 264 of 2012, Mr Burrows prepared a statement of claim which relied on the Oswal affidavit annexing the incomplete copy of the mortgage filed in WAD 95 of 2011.

In effect, Ms Oswal complained that Mr Burrows did not have reasonable grounds for his belief that Ms Oswal had engaged in fraud or serious misconduct.

In addition, when the Deputy Commissioner applied ex parte for alternative service orders against Ms Oswal in December 2012, in WAD 264 of 2012, Mr Burrows prepared submissions based on the incomplete copy of the mortgage.  At the relevant time, he had no recollection of the existence of the complete copy of the mortgage filed in WAD 95 of 2011.

In August 2013, Mr Burrows became aware that a complete copy of the mortgage existed and made an application to amend which was listed for hearing on 16 September 2013.  In the…

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Details
Case
[2015] WASAT 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of OSWAL and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE, the Legal Profession Complaints Committee dismissed a complaint against a legal practitioner. The complainant argued that the practitioner had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct by making certain allegations in court documents. The Committee found that there was no reasonable likelihood of the practitioner being found guilty of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The case raises questions about the standard of proof required for a complaint to be dismissed and the threshold for a reasonable likelihood of guilt.

The court had to determine whether the Complaints Committee's decision to dismiss the complaint was legally sound. This involved interpreting the relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) and the Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA), particularly the definitions of "unsatisfactory professional conduct" and "professional misconduct." The court also considered the meaning of the phrase "reasonable likelihood" as used in the Act. Furthermore, the court had to assess whether the Committee's decision was consistent with the requirement for clear and cogent evidence to establish unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.

The court found that the Complaints Committee's decision to dismiss the complaint was legally sound. The Committee had considered all relevant evidence and applied the correct legal standards. The court emphasised that the standard of proof for dismissing a complaint was not as high as for finding guilt, but still required a reasonable likelihood based on clear and cogent evidence. The Committee had correctly applied this standard and found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty. The court also noted that the phrase "reasonable likelihood" was not synonymous with "more likely than not" but referred to a chance that was "fair," "sufficient," or "worth noting." The court concluded that the Committee's decision was consistent with these principles.

The court upheld the Complaints Committee's decision to dismiss the complaint. The Committee had correctly applied the relevant legal standards and found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The court emphasised that the standard of proof for dismissing a complaint was not as high as for finding guilt, but still required a reasonable likelihood based on clear and cogent evidence. The Committee's decision was consistent with these principles and was therefore legally sound.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUSTICE J
Section 424 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) provides:Decision of Complaints Committee after investigation (1)After an investigation under section 421 is completed, the Complaints Committee must ­(a)in the case of the investigation of a complaint, dismiss the complaint under section 425 or, in the case of an investigation on the initiative of the Complaints Committee, decide to take no further action; or(b)take action under section 426; or(c)refer the matter to the State Administrative Tribunal under section 428.(2)Nothing in this section affects section 416. Section 425 of the Legal Profession Act provides:Dismissal of complaint After an investigation of a complaint against an Australian legal practitioner is completed, the Complaints Committee may dismiss the complaint if satisfied that ­(a)there is no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty by the State Administrative Tribunal of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct; or(b)it is in the public interest to do so. The Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA) (the Conduct Rules) relevantly provide:34.Frankness in court…(4)A practitioner seeking any interlocutory relief in an ex parte application must disclose to the court all factual and legal matters ­(a)that are within the practitioner’s knowledge; and…36.Responsible use of court process and privilege…(3)A practitioner must not draw or settle any court document that alleges criminality, fraud or other serious misconduct by a person unless the practitioner believes on reasonable grounds that ­(a)factual material already available to the practitioner provides a proper basis for the allegation; and(b)the evidence by which the allegation is made will be admissible; and(c)the practitioner’s client wishes the allegation to be made, after having been advised of the seriousness of the allegation and of the possible consequences for the client and the client’s case if it is not made out.(4)A practitioner must not open as a fact any allegation which the practitioner does not then believe on reasonable grounds will be capable of support by available evidence. In Greenwood and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 31, a decision of the Tribunal comprising Judge Pritchard (as she then was), Ms Dean and Mr Odes QC at [25] ­ [29] the Tribunal stated:'Unsatisfactory professional conduct' is defined in s 402 of the LP Act to include conduct of an Australian legal practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner. 'Professional misconduct' is defined in s 403 of the LP Act to include:(a)unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and(b)conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.'The word 'likelihood' means 'the chance or fact of being likely', and 'a thing that is likely' or a 'probability' (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th ed, 2007) and the word 'likely' means 'that looks as if it would happen, be realised, or prove to be what is alleged or suggested; probable' (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). However, the word is qualified by the requirement that the likelihood be 'reasonable'. The word 'reasonable' means 'not greatly less or more than might be thought likely or appropriate; of a fair, average, or considerable amount' (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). The meaning of the phrase 'reasonable likelihood' in the context of s 425 of the LP Act is synonymous with the phrase 'reasonably likely'. The meaning of that phrase was discussed in Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836 at [842] (Marks J, Young CJ and Teague J agreeing) in the following passage:The relevant expression here is 'reasonably likely' which has some analogy to 'fair probability'. It suggests the mathematical approach; the word 'reasonably' being a qualification of 'likely', alternatively, a measure in colloquial language of the likelihood. The expression 'reasonably likely' is substantially idiomatic, its meaning not necessarily unlocked by close dissection. In its ordinary use, it speaks of a chance of an event occurring or not occurring which is real ­ not fanciful or remote. It does not refer to a chance which is more likely than not to occur, that is, one which is 'odds on' or where between nil and certainty it should be placed. A chance which in common parlance is described as 'reasonable' is one that is 'fair', 'sufficient' or 'worth noting'.Those observations are equally apt to describe the meaning of 'reasonable likelihood' in s 425 of the LP Act.In considering whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a practitioner would be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, it is also necessary to bear in mind the Tribunal's approach to the proof of matters referred to it under s 428(1) of the LP Act. It is well recognised that the consequences for a practitioner of an adverse determination are such that clear and cogent evidence will be required before a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct is made: Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and Trowell [2009] WASAT 42 at [63]. That follows from the fact that although the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, nevertheless the Tribunal must feel an 'actual persuasion' of the occurrence or existence of a relevant fact in determining whether or not conduct of that kind has been made out: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361 to 362 (Dixon J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JUSTICE J