Ord Air Charter Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ord Air Charter Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Authority [2000] FCA 1545

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – decision by respondent not to grant Air Operator Certificate – whether decision was made by reference to a pre-determined rule or policy without proper consideration of the merits – respondent was concerned at previous non-compliance by the applicant with civil aviation safety legislation at times when its affairs were under the control of its former Managing Director – applicant’s former Managing Director was re-employed by it – respondent was concerned that applicant’s former Managing Director might have undue influence on the applicant’s Board of Directors – whether the respondent denied the applicant natural justice by failing to give it a fair opportunity to address the respondent’s concerns – whether respondent took into consideration irrelevant matters – whether respondent otherwise improperly exercised its statutory power – whether respondent’s decision involved any error of law – whether there was no evidence or other material to justify making the decision – whether respondent under any duty make further inquiry.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – adequate provision otherwise made by law for applicant to seek review – exercise of discretion – applicant made application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for merits review simultaneously with its application to the Court for review – applicant obtained expedited hearing before Tribunal while application to Court put on hold – applicant withdrew merits review application on first day of hearing before the Tribunal – whether the Court should, in its discretion, refuse to grant any relief.

Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth), s 28
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5, 10(2)(b)(ii)

McPhee v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 16 ALD 77 referred to

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 referred to

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 followed

Pilbara Aboriginal Land Council Aboriginal Corporation Inc v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs [2000[ FCA 1113 cited

Edelsten v Minister for Health (1995) 58 FCR 419 referred to

Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 distinguished

Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 distinguished

ORD AIR CHARTER PTY LTD v CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
W 56 of 2000  

CARR J
31 OCTOBER 2000 
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 56 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

ORD AIR CHARTER PTY LTD
(ACN 008 750 507)
Applicant

AND:

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J 

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 56 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

ORD AIR CHARTER PTY LTD (ACN 008 750 507)
Applicant

AND:

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J 

DATE:

31 OCTOBER 2000

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1545
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ord Air Charter Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Authority concerns a refusal by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to issue an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) to Ord Air Charter Pty Ltd. The AOC is a requirement for operating an aircraft commercially in Australia. The applicant sought judicial review of CASA's decision, which was made on 23 March 2000. In response, CASA made a motion under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) that the Court refuse to grant the application. The primary issues before the court were whether CASA's decision was legally valid, whether it was based on irrelevant considerations, and whether there was insufficient evidence to justify the decision.

The court examined whether CASA's decision was legally sound, considering whether it was based on irrelevant considerations and whether it lacked sufficient evidence. Regarding irrelevant considerations, the court found that CASA was entitled to consider the applicant's history of non-compliance with safety regulations when determining its capability to comply with safety provisions. The court held that CASA could reasonably infer that continued non-compliance might extend to safety-related areas. The court also determined that there was sufficient evidence to justify CASA's decision. Specifically, the court noted that the applicant had been aware of CASA's concerns about Mrs Reid's influence and was in as good a position as CASA to obtain and present evidence to counter these concerns.

Given these findings, the court concluded that the applicant's conduct warranted the refusal of the application for judicial review. The court held that the appropriate exercise of its discretion would have been to dismiss the application. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay CASA's costs. The decision underscores the importance of compliance with safety regulations in the aviation industry and the discretion of the court in judicial review matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for an order of review of a decision of the respondent, made on 23 March 2000, to refuse to issue to the applicant an Air Operator Certificate (“AOC”) pursuant to s 28 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”). An AOC is required for an aircraft to operate commercially in Australia – see s 27(2) of the Act. The Court also has before it a motion by the respondent, pursuant to s 10(2)(b)(ii) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”), that the Court refuse to grant the application. That motion and the application itself were heard together. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The applicant, as its name suggests, has, until the decision referred to above, carried on the business of providing the services of aircraft chartering. It has also conducted, to a certain extent, what are termed “regular public transport operations” and flying training. Its business commenced in 1970, although the applicant was not incorporated until 1971. The applicant’s business is carried out mainly in the east Kimberley region of Western Australia. Its routes include a number of remote Aboriginal communities and pastoral stations. At the time of incorporation the applicant’s directors were a Mr Peter Reid and his wife Maxine Reid. Mr Reid was killed in an accident in the mid 1980s. Mrs Reid has since re-married but she has been described in the proceedings, without any objection, as Mrs Reid and it is convenient to refer to her in that way. In the years since about 1995 the respondent has raised various concerns with the applicant about non-compliance with the requirements of the Act and the regulations made under that Act, the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (“the Regulations”). However, each year the respondent issued an AOC to the applicant. The last such AOC was issued on 22 January 1999 with an expiry date of 31 January 2000. In January, May, June and July of 1999 the respondent conducted audits of the log books and maintenance records of two of the applicant’s aircraft for compliance with the Regulations and with the applicant’s maintenance control manuals. On 8 November 1999 the respondent sent a letter to the applicant’s Maintenance Controller asking him to show cause why his approval as the Maintenance Controller for the applicant should not be suspended or cancelled. On 22 November 1999 the applicant responded to that letter. On 15 December 1999 the applicant applied, as it had done in previous years, for the issue of another AOC. On 17 December 1999 the respondent cancelled the approval of the applicant’s Maintenance Controller with effect from midnight on 20 December 1999. That letter, sixteen pages in length, gave detailed reasons for the cancellation. On 28 January 2000, Mr W D Riceman, Area Manager, Central Area, of the respondent sent a letter (which in these proceedings has been described, quite aptly, as “the show cause letter”) to the applicant giving notice of facts and circumstances which, in the opinion expressed by Mr Riceman in the letter, warranted the making of a recommendation to a delegate of the respondent to refuse its application for an AOC. That letter, which was ten pages in length plus eleven pages of attachments, set out the factual basis of Mr Riceman’s opinion. The letter was addressed to Mrs Reid as a director of the applicant. In the letter Mr Riceman said that he was allowing the applicant twenty-eight days to show cause why he should not recommend to the respondent’s delegate that the issue of an AOC to the applicant be refused. He also invited Mrs Reid to participate in an informal conference.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This ground has been dealt with above.Ground 4 – No Evidence The applicant contended that there was no evidence of Mrs Reid’s assertive nature or that it had influenced or was likely to influence the management of the applicant or that it had affected several of the company’s Chief Pilots. There were other sub-grounds in Ground 4 of the applicant’s application, but these were either not pressed at trial or have been dealt with earlier in these reasons. To succeed on this ground, the applicant had first to establish one or other of the matters referred to in s 5(3)(a) and (b) of the ADJR Act: Curragh Mining Limited v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 220-224. It was not clear from its submissions, whether written or oral, which of the two sub-paragraphs the applicant relied upon. I have inferred that it was sub-paragraph (b). Assuming, but without deciding, that each of the “facts” set out in particulars or sub-grounds 4.1 to 4.6 (both inclusive) were facts upon which the respondent based its decision, the applicant has not established that those facts did not exist. As to particular or sub-ground 4.7, the evidence before me does not go anywhere near establishing that the respondent based its decision on the applicant’s shareholders being in any way involved in its management. Moreover, even if the applicant had satisfied one of the requirements of s 5(3), and attention is then directed to applying s 5(1)(h), there was evidence or material to justify making the decision. I have summarised much of that evidence at paragraphs 56 to 67 and 69 to 71 above. Finally, the applicant contended that the respondent was under a duty to make inquiry. In its written submissions the respondent contended that if reliance was placed on Mrs Reid’s alleged effects on Chief Pilots of the applicant, evidence should have been obtained as to that. The applicant tendered the employee’s affidavits, on the basis that there was readily available evidence to the effect that Mrs Reid did not detrimentally influence the operations of the applicant. I admitted the employees’ affidavits into evidence, over objection from the respondent, only on that basis. The applicant relied on the decisions of Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-170 and Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39. This case differs from those two cases. In the present case the applicant was in as good a position as the respondent to obtain and present this evidence. The applicant was aware of the respondent’s concerns that Mrs Reid was, in reality, still influencing the applicant’s operations. In terms of air safety, that influence would have had two main aspects, namely, over mechanical matters and procedures and in relation to the flying operations conducted by its pilots. It was not, in my opinion, for the respondent to make the applicant’s case for it by instituting further inquiries.THE RESPONDENT’S MOTION In view of my conclusions above, it is not necessary to consider the application of s 10(2)(b)(ii) of the ADJR Act. However, I shall do so briefly.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J
In all of the above circumstances, I consider that the applicant’s conduct was such that the appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion (if it had found that the applicant had a case for review of the decision) would have been to refuse the application. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the application will be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J

Section 28 of the Act relevantly provides:“28.(1) If a person applies to CASA for an AOC, CASA must issue the AOC if, and only if:(a)CASA is satisfied that the applicant has complied with, or is capable of complying with, the provisions of this Act, the regulations and the Civil Aviation Orders, that relate to safety, including provisions about the competence of persons to do anything that would be covered by the AOC; and (b)CASA is satisfied about the following matters in relation to the applicant’s organisation:(i)the organisation is suitable to ensure that the AOC operations can be conducted or carried out safely, having regard to the nature of the AOC operations;(ii)the organisation’s chain of command is appropriate to ensure that the AOC operations can be conducted or carried out safely; (iii)the organisation has a sufficient number of suitably qualified and competent employees to conduct or carry out the AOC operations safely;(iv)key personnel in the organisation have appropriate experience in air operations to conduct or to carry out the AOC operations safely;(v). . .(vi). . .(vii). . .(c). . .(2). . .(3)In this section“AOC operations” means the operations covered by the application;“applicant’s organisation” means the organisation established, or proposed to be established, by the applicant to conduct or carry out the operations covered by the application; “key personnel” means the people (however they are described) that hold, or carry out the duties of, the following positions in the applicant’s organisation: (a) the chief executive officer; (b) the head of the flying operations part of the organisation;(c)the head of the aircraft maintenance part (if any) of the organisation;(d)the head of the training and checking part (if any) of the organisation.(e). . .” To establish this ground the applicant needed to show that the matters listed in Ground 2.1 were irrelevant to the question whether the applicant was capable of complying with those provisions of the civil aviation legislation which related to safety. In my opinion, the fact that there were compliance problems occurring in and since 1995, to the extent that they related directly to safety, cannot in the statutory context, be regarded as irrelevant. The fact that there may have been concerns over compliance with other legislative requirements not relating to safety would also, in my view, not be an irrelevant matter. If an airline operator exhibits a tendency of failing to comply with civil aviation legislative requirements which are not directly related to safety, it would be open to a decision-maker to take that into account when assessing the risk of such an attitude of non-compliance extending over into the area of safety. The respondent, when considering under s 28(1)(a) of the Act whether it was satisfied that the applicant was capable of complying with the provisions of the legislation relating to safety, was, in my view, entitled to consider whether the management of the applicant had really changed or whether the changes were purely formal. If the latter was the case, then in my opinion, it was open to the respondent to infer that there would be continued instances of non-compliance with those parts of the legislation which were concerned with safety.