Oosthuizen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 152
•11 February 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Oosthuizen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 152
File number: PEG 273 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 11 February 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal misconstrued reg 1.11A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) and asked itself the wrong question – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 134, 476, 477
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 1.11, 1.11A, Sch 2 cl 132.225
Cases cited: Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55
Wu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 236
Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 140 FCR 126; [2004] FCA 1477
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 12 November 2024 Place: Perth Counsel for the Applicants: Mr T Lettenmaier Solicitor for the Applicants: Kotze Law Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Liu Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
PEG 273 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: WERNER OOSTHUIZEN
First Applicant
CORNELIA OOSTHUIZEN
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
11 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
The applicants applied for Business Skills – Business Talent (Migrant) (Class EA) Business Talent (Subclass 132) visas (visas). A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicants visas and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision. The applicants now seek judicial review of the Tribunal decision in the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)[1] (Migration Act).
[1] Significant amendments have been made to the Migration Act following the commencement of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth). Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Migration Act in this judgment are references to the provisions of the Migration Act in effect at the relevant time of the events described in this judgment. All references to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal are to the Tribunal as it existed at the time the applicant’s matter was before it for review.
By an amended application, the applicants rely on a sole ground asserting that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal misconstrued reg 1.11A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) and therefore asked itself the wrong question.
For the reasons explained below, the applicants have not established that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
VISA APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
On 5 September 2018 the first applicant, having been nominated by the Queensland government, was invited by the Minister to apply for a visa on the basis that he had a significant business history.
The applicants applied for the visas on 10 October 2018. The first applicant was named in the visa application as the primary visa applicant and the second applicant, who is the wife of the first applicant, was included in the visa application as a member of the family unit.
On 12 March 2021 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicants visas. The delegate was not satisfied that the first applicant met the requirements of cl 132.225 in Sch 2 to the Regulations, because the delegate was not satisfied that the first applicant had at least 30% ownership in the claimed main business for two of the four years immediately before the time of the invitation to apply for the visa.
On 23 March 2021 the applicants applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate’s decision.
The applicants attended a hearing convened by the Tribunal on 24 August 2023 to give evidence and present arguments in relation to the issues arising in the review.
On 19 October 2023 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants visas.
SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Tribunal recorded that two businesses that were nominated as being main businesses, both of which were 100% owned by a family trust. The Tribunal identified that the first applicant was required to demonstrate that he had an ownership interest in the main businesses by virtue of his connection to, and role in, the family trust and that he had this ownership interest at, and prior to, the date the invitation to apply for the visa was made.
The Tribunal recorded that the first applicant claimed to hold a 33.33% ownership interest in the main businesses since January 2013 by way of beneficial ownership via the family trust. The Tribunal considered that reg 1.11A applied because of the claim of beneficial ownership.
The Tribunal made the following findings of fact in respect of the family trust:
(a)the trust was established in 1996 by a trust deed which identified three trustees, namely the first applicant’s parents and another person;
(b)the beneficiaries of the trust included the first applicant, his parents, his older brother and other relatives; and
(c)at the time the invitation to apply for the visa was made, and at the time the visa application was lodged, the trust deed was the only document in existence which set out the names of the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust.
The Tribunal referred to evidence of a meeting in January 2013 at which it was decided that from that point on the ownership of the business was to be shared equally between the first applicant, his father and his older brother. The Tribunal noted that there was no written agreement of this made at that time.
The Tribunal recorded that a document titled ‘Deed of Trust’ was drawn up dated 9 December 2020 which named the first applicant and his older brother as two of four trustees, alongside their parents. The 2020 trust deed stated that the 1996 trust deed ‘did not reflect the true intentions, the agreement between the parties, duties, powers, decision-making, administration, distribution of capital and income as from January 2013’ and that it did not include the applicant and one other person as de facto trustees since January 2013. The Tribunal recorded that it was confirmed at the hearing that there were no other relevant documents drawn up between 1996 and 2020.
The Tribunal had regard to further documents provided after the hearing and considered that while the documents corroborated the claim that the first applicant had been part of the business for many years, they did not demonstrate his ownership in the business. The Tribunal also considered that evidence of the movement of funds to the first applicant did not mean that the criteria in reg 1.11A were met.
The Tribunal accepted that there was no absolute rule against retrospective changes of trust deeds. However, based on reg 1.11A(3), the Tribunal considered that the 2020 trust deed could not be used to demonstrate beneficial ownership by the first applicant for any period before 9 December 2020 as that was the date it was signed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the applicants’ submission that the 2020 trust deed was not a new trust deed but an amendment to, or rectification of, the 1996 trust deed, but was not satisfied that the 2020 trust deed was an amendment to the 1996 trust deed rather than a new deed. The Tribunal further considered that reg 1.11A(3) applied in any event and, accordingly, the 2020 trust deed could not evidence beneficial ownership for any period between 2012 and December 2020.
The Tribunal found, based on a declaratory directive issued by the North Gauteng High Court in South Africa, that the 2020 trust deed was registered and/or stamped by the appropriate authority on 18 December 2020. The Tribunal therefore found that the requirements in reg 1.11A to do with evidencing beneficial ownership were not met and it was not satisfied that cl 132.225 in Sch 2 to the Regulations was met.
JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION
The applicants filed their application for judicial review on 17 November 2023. The application was made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision, as required by s 477(1) of the Migration Act.
The applicants filed an amended application on 25 September 2024, which contains the following ground:
1.The Tribunal misconstrued r 1.11A of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) and, therefore, asked itself the wrong question.
Particulars
a.Regulation 1.11A of the Regulations relevantly required the Tribunal to determine when a document has been registered under the law of the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located.
b.The Tribunal erroneously considered that a document could not be “registered” for the purposes of r 1.11A of the Regulations prior to the date it was drawn up and executed. Accordingly, it incorrectly asked when documents has been drawn up and executed, not when they had been “registered”.
The evidence before the Court comprises a court book filed on behalf of the Minister on 6 December 2023.
CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUND OF APPLICATION
Relevant legislation
One of the criteria the first applicant was required to satisfy for the grant of a business skills visa was that in cl 132.225 in Sch 2 to the Regulations. That clause provides:
For at least 2 of the 4 fiscal years immediately before the time of invitation to apply for the visa, the applicant’s main business, or the applicant’s main businesses together, had an annual turnover of at least AUD 3,000,000.
The term ‘main business’ is defined in reg 1.11 of the Regulations and relevantly requires that an applicant has, or has had, an ownership interest in the business: reg 1.11(1)(a).
Pursuant to reg 1.03 of the Regulations ‘ownership interest’ has the meaning given in s 134(10) of the Migration Act. Section 134(10) of the Migration Act defines the term ‘ownership interest’ as follows:
“ownership interest”, in relation to a business, means an interest in the business as:
(a) a shareholder in a company that carries on the business; or
(b) a partner in a partnership that carries on the business; or
(c) the sole proprietor of the business;
including such an interest held indirectly through one or more interposed companies, partnerships or trusts.
The requirements for evidencing beneficial ownership of an ownership interest are set out in reg 1.11A of the Regulations, which relevantly provides:
(1) Subject to subregulation (4), for Parts 132, 188, 888, 890, 891, 892 and 893 of Schedule 2, ownership by an applicant, or the applicant’s spouse or de facto partner, of an asset, an eligible investment or an ownership interest, includes beneficial ownership only if the beneficial ownership is evidenced in accordance with subregulation (2).
(2) To evidence beneficial ownership of an asset, eligible investment or ownership interest, the applicant must show to the Minister:
(a) a trust instrument; or
(b) a contract; or
(c)any other document capable of being used to enforce the rights of the applicant, or the applicant’s spouse or de facto partner, as the case requires, in relation to the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest;
stamped or registered by an appropriate authority under the law of the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located.
(3)A document shown under subregulation (2) does not evidence beneficial ownership, for subregulation (1), for any period earlier than the date of registration or stamping by the appropriate authority.
…
Relevant authorities and principles
Principles relating to statutory construction
The applicants have referred in their submissions to Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55, where the High Court said at [39] (footnote omitted):
“This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the [statutory] text”. So must the task of statutory construction end. The statutory text must be considered in its context. That context includes legislative history and extrinsic materials. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text. Legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text. Nor is their examination an end in itself.
Authorities considering reg 1.11A of the Regulations
Both parties referred to the guidance in Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 140 FCR 126; [2004] FCA 1477 (Yu) as to the operation of reg 1.11A of the Regulations. In that case, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said at [35]:
Regulation 1.11A has the effect of excluding from an applicant’s assets claims to ownership which cannot be substantially proven by reference to authenticated documents. Claims to beneficial ownership are easily made. There may often be little or no documentation of the contract or other arrangement which is said to create the ownership interest, leaving the decision-maker to determine the veracity of a claim based upon an oral arrangement with no objective evidence to assist that determination. And when documentation is provided it may be difficult to assess its authenticity. In the context of migration and visa applications there are added difficulties for the decision-maker in verifying documents put forward, since they may be in a foreign language or reflect aspects of a foreign legal system. It is these difficulties which the regulation addresses.
Her Honour did not expressly address in Yu the meaning of the words ‘stamped or registered’, saying at [46]:
I put to one side any difficulties there may be in what is required by the words ‘stamped or registered by an appropriate authority’, which was not the subject of argument. The latter contention mistakes the purpose and effect of reg 1.11A(2). The regulation acknowledges that a document will be regarded as effective, if it is stamped or registered. What is does deny is the efficacy of a document not the subject of that degree of official recognition.
Her Honour continued at [48] to observe that reg 1.11A ‘denies the effect of oral agreements or unreliable documentation’.
The Minister also referred in his submissions to Wu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 236 (Wu), where Judge Given applied the principles in Yu and said at [35]:
I accept the respondent’s submissions that the delegate was only required to determine whether the SEA met the requirements in reg 1.11A of the Regulations, and was not required to undertake a further analysis of the legality and enforceability of the SEA. The conclusion by the delegate that where a document did not meet the requirements of reg 1.11A of the Regulations, it could not be satisfied as to the applicant's beneficial ownership, and subsequently, could not satisfy itself that the applicant had an ownership interest in the Company, was open to it. I am not satisfied that it was an unreasonable conclusion nor that it gives rise to any other species of error.
The applicants’ submissions
The applicants submitted that the Tribunal misconstrued reg 1.11A of the Regulations, and in particular the word ‘registered’ in reg 1.11A(2). The applicant submitted that reg 1.11A(2) should be construed as providing that, relevantly, a trust instrument must be:
(a)registered;
(b)by an appropriate authority;
(c)under the law of the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located.
The applicants submitted that, for the purposes of reg 1.11A(2) of the Regulations, registration by an appropriate authority under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction of a trust instrument refers to official verification or authentication of rights and obligations it creates and the determination of when those rights and obligations come into existence.
The applicants submitted that regs 1.11A(2) and (3) read together require that the ‘date of registration … by an appropriate authority’ be determined by reference to the law of the relevant jurisdiction. The applicants submitted that the date of registration is the date on which a particular trust instrument creating particular rights and obligations is determined to come into existence by an appropriate authority under the relevant foreign law.
The applicants submitted that this construction should be preferred because:
(a)the terms ‘stamped’ and ‘registered’ are not defined in the Migration Act or the Regulations and should be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary and natural meaning having regard to the purpose of the Migration Act;
(b)the purpose of reg 1.11A of the Regulations is to ensure that claims of beneficial ownership can be verified by reference to authenticated documents or documents that are subject to a degree of official recognition;
(c)reg 1.11A is concerned with commerce and property ownership and, in that context, the concept of registration is, as a basic and broad proposition, associated with the registration of legal interests and is important because it provides for identification of what actions can be done by or against a legal person and when those actions can be done;
(d)registration under reg 1.11A of the Regulations is directed towards the verification of a person’s rights in relation to a going concern by reference to authenticated or official documents, namely, verification of what rights a person has over a particular asset and when they were accrued, the critical issue being whether there is an official authenticated record of an applicant’s beneficial interest;
(e)the date upon which a document is registered is not necessarily the date it was drawn up, executed or stamped and the question to be asked is ‘what rights does a document verify a person had and when was it taken to create those rights under the relevant foreign law?’;
(f)to proceed on the basis that the question is determined by the date of a particular document conflates registration with stamping or execution, and it is well established that each word in the provision should be given separate work to do;
(g)relying on the date a document was drawn up and executed does not advance the purpose of reg 1.11A, and formal registers may be attended by errors that are corrected by subsequent decision; and
(h)the words ‘under the law of the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located’ plainly direct the decision-maker to answer the above questions by reference to the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.
The applicants submitted that, in the present case, the Tribunal did not consider the date on which the 2020 trust deed had been registered by reference to South African law, but instead erroneously proceeded on the basis that reg 1.11A(2)-(3) was answered by reference to the date of a document. Having asked itself the wrong question, the Tribunal fell into error.
In oral submissions, Counsel for the applicants submitted that the Minister’s preferred construction (see below) does not pay regard to the legislative context of reg 1.11A or the natural or ordinary meaning of the language used in that provision. Counsel for the applicants submitted that the purpose of reg 1.15A is not simply to overcome the difficulties and complexities in relation to the effect and content of foreign law, but rather to require authenticated documentary evidence in support of any claimed beneficial interest. Counsel for the applicants submitted that there is an inherent requirement to consider the content of foreign law once you get to consider reg 1.11A, which only applies where an applicant is relying on a beneficial interest, and the proposition that the purpose of reg 1.11A is to avoid an inquiry with the content of foreign law is inconsistent with the words used in the provision, ‘stamped or registered by an appropriate authority under the law of the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located’. The Tribunal was required to determine the date the document was stamped or registered, having regard to foreign law.
Upon the Court seeking clarification of the applicants’ submission, Counsel for the applicants confirmed that the applicants’ focus is on the registration of the beneficial interest (as opposed to the trust deed per se), but in the context of that beneficial interest arising from the 2020 trust deed. Counsel for the applicants maintained that there must be a distinction between registration and stamping, and while stamping may direct attention to the date of the document only, registration entails something more. Counsel for the applicants emphasised that, in the present case, the 2020 trust deed was registered and had retrospective effect.
The Minister’s submissions
The Minister submitted that the applicants’ position overlooks the very thing that the Tribunal correctly emphasised and applied in this case, namely, the application of reg 1.11A(3) of the Regulations. The Minister submitted that the correct application of reg 1.11A(3) means that the relevant inquiry in this case is not as to what was determined under the relevant foreign law. Rather, the provision is specifically designed to overcome the difficulties and complexities of seeking to determine the effect and content of foreign law by focusing the attention of the decision-maker on ‘a document’ and on the date that a specific document is registered or stamped. The sub-regulation is not concerned with how foreign laws might create particular rights and obligations based on the legal determination of an appropriate authority.
The Minister submitted that the applicants’ suggestion that the Tribunal needed to accept a particular interpretation of trust law in South Africa as opposed to the actual date of the 2020 trust deed is inconsistent with the authorities of Yu and Wu. Those cases support a conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision was open to it. The Tribunal observed, based on the applicants’ evidence, that the 2020 trust deed ‘replaced’ the January 2013 trust document and ‘was registered on 18 December 2020’ based on the South African court’s declaration of when the previous trust deed was ‘replaced’. The Minister submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to make this finding rather than undertake a further analysis of the legality and enforceability of the trust deed. Focusing on a ‘document’, and when it was registered or stamped, as the determinative evidence for the purposes of reg 1.11A(3), rather than the purported legal effect of that document in a foreign jurisdiction, is precisely the difficulty which the regulation addresses.
In oral submissions, Counsel for the Minister focused on Yu, noting that Kiefel J explained in relation to reg 1.11A that ‘beneficial ownership could only be included as an ownership interest if certain evidentiary requirements were met’: Yu at [10]. Counsel for the Minister submitted that the effect of reg 1.11A(3) is that it relies on a prescriptive evidentiary requirement to effectively trump what might be the legal effect in a foreign legal system so that the decision-maker does not have to look at or make a decision about the legal effect.
Counsel for the Minister submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to find, on the evidence before it, that the 2020 trust deed was registered on 18 December 2020, and that the Tribunal made an orthodox finding about the evidentiary requirement.
Counsel for the Minister submitted that the word ‘registered’ should have its ordinary meaning and that it is a question of fact. It was open to the Tribunal to find, as a question of fact, that the 2020 trust deed was registered or stamped on the date of the declaratory order made by a provincial High Court in South Africa. The Tribunal’s finding of fact was open to it.
The proper construction of reg 1.11A
Regulation 1.11A is a provision that sets out the evidentiary requirements to establish a beneficial interest in an asset, eligible investment or ownership interest. The regulation is not directed to the circumstances in which a beneficial interest may exist, but rather to the evidence required to establish a beneficial interest for the purposes of meeting the requirements for the grant of the visa.
The issues raised by this case are determined by an analysis of the statutory text of reg 1.11A when considered in its proper context. While the applicants’ submission focuses on the meaning of the term ‘registered’ in the context of reg 1.11A, that term needs to be considered in the context of the provision as a whole.
Pursuant to reg 1.11A(1) ownership by an applicant includes beneficial ownership only if the beneficial ownership is evidenced in accordance with reg 1.11A(2).
Regulation 1.11A(2) relevantly required the applicants to show to the Minister (or the Tribunal on review) a ‘trust instrument … stamped or registered by an appropriate authority under the law of the jurisdiction where the … ownership interest is located’. On a natural and ordinary reading of reg 1.11A(2), it is the ‘trust instrument’, or other document referred to in reg 1.11A(2)(b) or (c), that must be ‘stamped or registered’, not the beneficial interest.
The applicants’ preferred construction would require a decision-maker to determine the date a document, in this case, a trust instrument, was registered based on the date on which it declares that a beneficial interest was recognised, which may be retrospective. However, this construction is properly understood as relating to the recognition of an interest. With respect, it conflates the recognition or declaration of the existence of an interest with the registration of a document. When reg 1.11A is read as a whole, it is apparent that the ‘stamping or registration’ is directed to a document. I accept the Minister’s submission that the focus of reg 1.11A is on documents. This is also consistent with the numerous references to ‘documents’ in Yu.
Understood in this way, reg 1.11A(3) becomes critical in this case. That subregulation provides that a ‘document shown under subregulation (2) does not evidence beneficial ownership … for any period earlier than the date of registration or stamping by the appropriate authority’ (emphasis added).
Once it is understood that reg 1.11A(2) is referring to a document (in this case, a trust instrument), being stamped or registered, it follows that ‘the date of registration or stamping by the appropriate authority’ for the purposes of reg 1.11A(3) must be the date of registration or stamping of the document, not the date from which the interest is recognised to exist.
As the definition of ‘registered’ advanced by the applicants, namely, that registration of a trust instrument refers to the ‘official verification or authentication of rights and obligations it creates and the determination of when those rights and obligations come into existence’ can only meaningfully be understood as referring to the ‘registration’ or recognition of the interest created by a trust instrument and not to the trust instrument (that is, the document) itself, it is not an apt definition for the term ‘registered’ in the context in which it appears in reg 1.11A. The applicants have not established that the Tribunal misconstrued reg 1.11A of the Regulations or misunderstood the term ‘registered’.
I acknowledge that reg 1.11A, as construed by the Court, may operate in a way that excludes from consideration, for the purposes of determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of cl 132.225 in Sch 2 to the Regulations, a beneficial interest that does in fact exist and which is enforceable in a foreign jurisdiction. However, such an outcome is not inconsistent with the text of reg 1.11A, or its purpose, as explained in Yu. In this sense, the present case is similar to the situation in Yu and Wu, where the claimed beneficial interest could not be recognised for the purposes of assessing whether the applicants met the requirements for the grant of the visa, because the beneficial interest either was not, or could not be, registered or stamped by an appropriate authority.
Did the Tribunal misconstrue reg 1.11A?
The Tribunal did not misconstrue reg 1.11A in this matter. It was appropriate for the Tribunal to consider and make a finding on the date on which the 2020 trust deed was registered, as distinct from the interest recognised in that deed.
The finding that the Tribunal made, namely, that the 2020 trust deed was registered on 18 December 2020, was based on the evidence before the Tribunal that the North Gaeteng High Court referred to the date of the 2020 trust deed as 18 December 2020. I accept the Minister’s submission that this finding was open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it.
The Tribunal then reasoned at [51]-[53]:
51.R.1.11A(3) sets out that any such document does not evidence beneficial ownership for a period earlier than the date of stamping or registration by the appropriate authority.
52.The Tribunal has found that the 2020 document was registered on 18 December 2020. No document carrying a date earlier than 2020 has been submitted to evidence the applicant’s legal or beneficial ownership in the nominated main businesses at the date of the visa application.
53.On the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that the requirements set out in r.1.11A to do with evidencing beneficial ownership were not met. That being the case, the Tribunal is not satisfied that cl.132.225 has been met.
This reasoning reflects a proper understanding of reg 1.11A(3) and does not evidence any jurisdictional error.
CONCLUSION
The applicants have not established that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in this matter. It follows that the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams. Associate:
Dated: 11 February 2025
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