Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division)

ONESTEEL MANUFACTURING P/L v WHYALLA RED DUST ACTION GROUP INC

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Debelle

18 April 2006

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW

Standing – environmental legislation – civil enforcement order – statute confers standing on “any person whose interests are affected by the subject matter of the application” – application by incorporated association – whether interests of association are affected –  statute also confers standing on any person who obtains leave – whether association should have leave – effect of legislative change subsequent to initial determination of application – held, association’s interests not affected – not appropriate to grant leave – appeal allowed.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 27; Broken Hill Proprietary Company's Steel Works Indenture Act 1958 (SA) s 15, Sch 3; Broken Hill Proprietary Company's Steel Works Indenture (Environmental Authorisation) Amendment Act 2005 (SA) Part 2; Development Act 1993 (SA) s 53; Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 25, s 84, s 104; Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 (SA) s 30, referred to.
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo AM Luther v James Sagor & Co [1921] 3 KB 532; Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167; Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247; Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109; Byron Environment Centre Inc v Arakwal People (1997) 78 FCR 1; Defence Coalition Against RCD Inc v Minister for Primary Industries and Energy (1997) 74 FCR 142; Executive Council of Australian Jewry v Skully (1998) 79 FCR 537; Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Australian Lock Co Pty Ltd (2005) 216 ALR 652; Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261; North Coast Environmental Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 55 FCR 492; Onus v Alcoa Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27; R v Judge Stevens; Ex parte Tip Top Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd (1986) 43 SASR 1; Re McHattan & Collector of Customs (NSW) (1977) 18 ALR 154; Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Department of Human Services & Health (1995) 56 FCR 50; Shop Distributive & Allied Employees' Association v Minister for Industrial Affairs (SA) (1995) 183 CLR 552, considered.

ONESTEEL MANUFACTURING P/L v WHYALLA RED DUST ACTION GROUP INC
[2006] SASC 114

Land and Valuation Division

  1. DEBELLE J.        This appeal concerns an important question as to the entitlement of persons other than the Environment Protection Authority to bring applications for civil remedies pursuant to the Environment Protection Act 1993.

  2. Section 104 of the Environment Protection Act 1993 (“the Act”) provides that applications may be made to the Environment, Resources and Development Court (“the Environment Court”) for orders to enforce compliance with the Act and for other ancillary…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 114
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd sought judicial review of a decision by the Environment, Resources and Development Court, which dismissed the company's application for a civil enforcement order under the Environment Protection Act 1993. The Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc intervened in the proceedings, asserting their interests were affected by the subject matter of the application. The central legal issues revolved around the statutory criteria for standing and the granting of leave to intervene in judicial review proceedings.

The court had to determine whether the Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc's interests were indeed affected by the subject matter of the application and, if not, whether the group should be granted leave to intervene under the statute. The court examined the legislative provisions conferring standing and the criteria for granting leave, focusing on the requirement that the applicant's interests must be affected and the additional criteria for granting leave. The court also considered the impact of legislative changes made after the initial determination of the application.

The court concluded that the Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc did not meet the statutory criteria for standing as their interests were not affected by the subject matter of the application. Additionally, the court held that it was not appropriate to grant the group leave to intervene, as they failed to satisfy the rigorous test for leave. The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court was set aside. In lieu thereof, the court ordered that Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd's application for a civil enforcement order under section 104 of the Environment Protection Act 1993 be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd, a company involved in steel manufacturing, was subject to a civil enforcement order issued by the Environment, Resources and Development Court under the Environment Protection Act 1993. The Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc, an incorporated association, sought to intervene in the proceedings concerning the order. The association contended that its interests were affected by the subject matter of the application, thereby conferring standing under the statute. The statute provides that standing is conferred on "any person whose interests are affected by the subject matter of the application" and also allows for standing to be granted to any person who obtains leave of the Court. The association did not satisfy the statutory criterion for standing but applied for leave under the alternative provision.

The association argued that its interests were indeed affected by the enforcement order and that granting leave would be in the public interest. The association's primary concern was the impact of dust emissions from Onesteel's operations on the local environment and public health. The association claimed that the enforcement order was necessary to mitigate these adverse effects. However, the court found that the association's interests were not sufficiently affected by the subject matter of the application. Additionally, the court determined that it was not appropriate to grant the association leave to intervene in the proceedings. Consequently, the association's application was dismissed, leading to the association's appeal against this decision.

Subsequent to the initial determination, there was a legislative change that potentially affected the standing and leave provisions of the Environment Protection Act 1993. However, the court held that these changes did not retroactively apply to the association's case. The court further concluded that even under the more rigorous test for granting leave, the association had not established a sufficient case to warrant leave. The association's failure to meet the necessary criteria for standing and leave ultimately led to the dismissal of its application and the allowance of Onesteel's appeal.

The matter of Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc came before the court as an appeal from the decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court, which had previously dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review. The applicant, Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc, an incorporated association, sought to challenge a civil enforcement order issued under the Environment Protection Act 1993. The primary issue before the court was whether the applicant had standing to bring the application for judicial review. The court had to consider whether the interests of the applicant were affected by the subject matter of the application, as required by section 104(7)(b) of the Act, and if not, whether the applicant should be granted leave under section 104(7)(c). The Environment, Resources and Development Court had ruled that the applicant did not have standing because its interests were not directly affected, and it did not grant leave for the application to proceed.

Subsequent to the initial determination, legislative amendments were made to the Act, which altered the criteria for standing and the process for granting leave. These changes were considered by the court in determining whether the applicant should be granted leave to appeal the decision of the lower court. The court found that the applicant’s interests were not affected by the enforcement order and that it was not appropriate to grant leave under the amended statutory provisions. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court was set aside. The court ordered that the applicant’s application for judicial review was dismissed, reflecting the conclusion that the applicant did not meet the criteria for standing or leave as provided by the amended legislation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DEBELLE J
As the applicant is not a person who comes within s 104(7)(b) and seeks leave under s 104(7)(c), it must also satisfy s 104(8). It is convenient to repeat its terms:(8)Before the Court may grant leave for the purposes of subsection (7)(c), the Court must be satisfied that -(a) the proceedings on the application would not be an abuse of the process of the Court; and(b) there is a real or significant likelihood that the requirements for the making of an order under subsection (1) on the application would be satisfied; and(c) it is in the public interest that the proceedings should be brought.Paragraph (b) of sub‑s (8) is expressed in terms which appear to establish a more rigorous test than that expressed in R v Judge Stevens. It is unnecessary to express a final conclusion whether it does. It is sufficient to note that, even on the test in R v Judge Stevens, the applicant fails to establish a case to answer and that it sufficient ground to refuse leave.Conclusion For all of these reasons, the appeal must be allowed. There will be an order setting aside the decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court, and in lieu thereof, there will be an order that the applicant’s application pursuant to s 104 of the Environment Protection Act 1993 is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DEBELLE J

The Court of Appeal, in considering the standing of the Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc to bring an application for a civil enforcement order under s 104(7)(b) of the Environment Protection Act 1993, found that the association’s interests were not adversely affected by the subject matter of the application. The Court relied on the plain language of the statute, which confers standing on "any person whose interests are affected by the subject matter of the application". The Court reasoned that for the applicant to have standing, it must demonstrate that it has suffered or will suffer some form of detriment or harm that is relevant to the application. The Court found that the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate such an adverse effect on its interests, thereby denying it standing under s 104(7)(b).

The Court then turned to consider whether leave should be granted under s 104(7)(c) of the Environment Protection Act 1993. The applicant, lacking standing under s 104(7)(b), needed to satisfy the criteria set out in s 104(8) to be granted leave. The Court examined whether the application would constitute an abuse of process, whether there was a real or significant likelihood that the requirements for the making of an order would be met, and whether it was in the public interest that the proceedings should be brought. The Court noted that even under the more lenient test from R v Judge Stevens, the applicant failed to establish a case to answer, which was sufficient ground to refuse leave.

In addressing the criteria under s 104(8)(b) of the Environment Protection Act 1993, the Court assessed whether there was a real or significant likelihood that the requirements for making an order would be satisfied. The Court concluded that the applicant did not present a sufficiently compelling case to meet this threshold. The evidence provided did not demonstrate a strong probability that the statutory requirements for an enforcement order would be fulfilled, which was a critical element in determining whether leave should be granted.

The Court further examined whether it was in the public interest for the Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc to bring the application, under s 104(8)(c) of the Environment Protection Act 1993. The Court found that while the public interest in environmental protection is significant, the specific circumstances of this case did not weigh sufficiently in favor of granting leave. The Court considered the broader implications of allowing the application, including the potential for unnecessary litigation and the burden on the parties involved, and concluded that the public interest did not support granting leave.

Lastly, the Court addressed the effect of the legislative change subsequent to the initial determination of the application on the standing and leave of the Whyalla Red Dust Action Group Inc. The Court noted that the legislative amendment did not retroactively alter the requirements for standing or leave. As the applicant had not met the criteria for standing or leave under the law as it stood at the time of the application, the subsequent legislative change did not affect the outcome. The Court held that the applicant’s interests were not adversely affected and that it was not in the public interest to grant leave, leading to the dismissal of the application.