IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND No. 2121 of 1999
Brisbane
[One Stop Lighting (Queensland) Pty Ltd & Anor v Lifestyle Property Developments Pty Ltd]
BETWEEN:
ONE STOP LIGHTING (QUEENSLAND) PTY LTD
ACN 085 321 222First Plaintiff
AND:
FIRST LIGHTING FLAGSTAFF PTY LTD
ACN 055 761 32062 878 684Second Plaintiff
AND:
LIFESTYLE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
ACN 062 878 684Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - CHESTERMAN J
Judgment delivered 24 March 1999
1 By its writ of summons issued on 8 March, 1999 the plaintiffs seek specific performance of an agreement to lease made in January 1999 in respect of premises located at Oslen Avenue in Southport. The defendant is the developer of a retail shopping centre in which the premises are located. The second plaintiff carries on business, principally in Victoria, as a retailer and wholesaler of electric light fittings. The dispute concerns about 745 square metres of lettable space in the development which the first plaintiff alleges it agreed to lease from the defendant for the purpose of selling light fittings to the public. The defendant denies that it made a binding agreement to lease. Subject to the outcome of this action the defendant intends to lease the premises to Brightlite Nominees Pty Ltd (“Brightlite”), another retailer of light fittings and a business competitor of the plaintiffs.
2 The premises are presently vacant. Upon learning of the defendant’s intention to lease the premises to its rival, the plaintiffs obtained an interlocutory injunction on 5 March, 1999 restraining the defendant from proceeding with the lease to Brightlite or allowing it to go into possession. That injunction was to expire after seven days. Upon application to a chamber judge for an extension it was thought preferable to have the action tried urgently because the outcome of the application for the interlocutory injunction might practically have determined the action without the merits being ventilated. The matter was sent to the civil list for trial and was heard on 15 and 17 March. The parties require a prompt judgment and I have endeavoured to oblige them. The need for haste must necessarily mean that my reasons will be abbreviated.
3 The agreement which the plaintiffs allege was made between the first plaintiff and the defendant. The first plaintiff has not traded and was incorporated for the purpose of commencing retail business in Queensland. The second plaintiff has traded successfully in Victoria for some years. The plaintiffs rely upon, as a separate cause of action, representations allegedly made on behalf of the defendant to Messrs Berkovitch and Kupshik, representatives of both plaintiffs. It is said, of necessity, that the plaintiffs acted to their detriment in reliance on the representations but because it was the second plaintiff, as the established company, which engaged in the conduct said to amount to detriment, it was a necessary party to the proceedings and was joined when the trial commenced.
4 The view I have come to means that the plaintiffs’ case on estoppel can…
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- Case
- [1999] QSC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The final orders of the court were that the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance be dismissed, and the interlocutory injunction be discharged.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiffs filed a writ of summons on 8 March 1999 to seek specific performance of the alleged lease agreement. An interlocutory injunction was granted on 5 March 1999, restraining the defendant from proceeding with the lease to Brightlite or allowing it to take possession. The injunction was initially set to expire after seven days but was extended upon application. The matter was subsequently sent to the civil list for an urgent trial due to the potential determination of the case without ventilating the merits through the interlocutory application. The trial took place over two days, on 15 and 17 March 1999.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the parties made a concluded agreement for the lease of the premises.
2. Whether the conduct of the parties after the alleged agreement supports the existence of a binding contract.
3. Whether the plaintiffs can enforce the claimed agreement to lease despite the absence of a written contract.
4. Whether the acts of part-performance by the plaintiffs can establish the existence of an oral agreement.
Held
1. Whether the parties made a concluded agreement for the lease of the premises. The court concluded that the parties did not make a concluded agreement for the lease of the premises as the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal lease was executed.
2. Whether the conduct of the parties after the alleged agreement supports the existence of a binding contract. The court concluded that the conduct of the parties after the alleged agreement does not support the existence of a binding contract, as the parties intended to be bound only upon the execution of a formal lease.
3. Whether the plaintiffs can enforce the claimed agreement to lease despite the absence of a written contract. The court concluded that the plaintiffs cannot enforce the claimed agreement to lease despite the absence of a written contract, as there was no binding contract in place.
4. Whether the acts of part-performance by the plaintiffs can establish the existence of an oral agreement. The court concluded that the acts of part-performance by the plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of an oral agreement, as the acts did not unequivocally point to the existence of a contract of the type alleged by the plaintiffs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the communications and conduct between the parties to determine if they had reached a concluded agreement for the lease of the premises. The court found that the parties had not reached a final agreement on 29 January, as the defendant's response to the "Intent to Lease" document suggested equivocation or hesitation rather than unconditional acceptance. The court also noted that the subsequent conduct of the parties, including the exchange of a draft lease and the defendant's insistence on a director's guarantee, indicated that the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal lease was executed. The court relied on Masters v. Cameron to conclude that the case fell into the third category, where the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded bargain unless and until they execute a formal contract.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the conduct of the parties after the alleged agreement supported the existence of a binding contract, as the parties had clearly indicated that they would not be bound until a lease was signed. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' estoppel claim, as they could not rely on a representation that there was a binding agreement when they knew that the defendant was not bound until a lease was signed.
Regarding the enforceability of the claimed agreement despite the absence of a written contract, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not enforce the agreement, as there was no binding contract in place. The court found that the documents provided by the parties did not contain all the terms of a concluded contract, and therefore, did not satisfy the requirement of a sufficient memorandum under the Property Law Act 1974.
Lastly, the court found that the acts of part-performance by the plaintiffs did not establish the existence of an oral agreement, as the acts did not unequivocally point to the existence of a contract of the type alleged by the plaintiffs. The court relied on the principles established in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v. Maher and ANZ Banking Group Ltd v. Widin to conclude that the acts of part-performance were not consistent with the existence of a contract between the parties.