Omni Group Pty Ltd T/A Omni v Nathan Brown
[2020] FWCFB 50
•21 JANUARY 2020
| [2020] FWCFB 50 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Omni Group Pty Ltd T/A Omni
v
Nathan Brown
(C2019/6927)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOSTENCNIK | MELBOURNE, 21 JANUARY 2020 |
Appeal against decision [[2019] FWC 7073] of Commissioner Gregory at Melbourne on 14 October 2019 in matter number U2018/12137.
[1] Omni Group Pty Ltd (Omni Group) has lodged an appeal for which permission is required against a decision of Commissioner Gregory issued on 14 October 2019 1 (Decision) in which the Commissioner found that Mr Nathan Brown had been unfairly dismissed and should be awarded compensation of $12,563.00 pursuant to s.392 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). An Order2 to this effect was also issued. The appeal was lodged on 13 November 2019.
[2] Omni Group sought a stay of the Decision and Order pending the hearing of the appeal. The stay application was granted and an Order made on 22 November 2019. 3
[3] Rule 56 of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013 (Rules) states, among other things, that an appeal must be lodged within 21 calendar days after the date of the decision being appealed against. The Appellant filed its notice of appeal some 30 days after the date of the Decision and was therefore lodged 9 days out of time. Rule 56(2)(c) confers a discretion on the Fair Work Commission (Commission) to allow a further period within which the appeal is to be lodged.
[4] There are sound administrative and industrial reasons for setting a limit for the time within which an appeal against a decision may be brought and a further period should only be allowed where there are good reasons for doing so.
[5] The authorities 4 indicate that the following matters are relevant to the exercise of the Commission’s discretion under r.56(2)(c) of the Rules:
• whether there is a satisfactory reason for the delay;
• the length of the delay;
• the nature of the grounds of appeal and the likelihood of one or more of those grounds being upheld if time was extended; and
• any prejudice to the Respondent if time were extended.
[6] In broad terms the issue for the Commission is whether, in all the circumstances and having regard to the matters set out above, the interests of justice favour an extension of the time within which to lodge the appeal.
[7] For the reasons given below we do not consider that we should extend the time within which to lodge the appeal.
The Decision
[8] Mr Brown was employed by the Omni Group as a delivery Driver/Warehouse Hand for most of the period of his employment. In October 2018 Mr Brown took on a new role in the production area. He was dismissed from his employment on 16 November 2018 on grounds of serious misconduct. The termination letter given to Mr Brown stated, in part:
I refer to our discussion meeting on 14/11/2018 where you were present and witnessed by Adrian in the production room. During the meeting we discussed that you were to perform a request to deliver one of our major clients being Playcop [sic], where unacceptable to our values you portrayed
• Wilful or deliberate behaviour that is inconsistent with the continuation of your contract of employment.
• Caused a serious and imminent risk to the reputation, viability or profitability of Omni in that loss of client being Playcorp a major client due to delivery failure.
• Was conduct in the course of your employment that is considered to be unreasonable.
• Was conduct in the course of your employment engaging in a disrespectful manner and in the circumstances unreasonable.
• You refused to carry out reasonable instructions that were consistent with your contract of employment again considered unreasonable.
This is classified as a serious misconduct incident and now communicated to you that your conduct during that incident is unacceptable. We consider that your actions constitute a serious misconduct warranting dismissal.
Your employment is terminated.
[9] It was apparently accepted by Omni Group that the incident referred to in the letter did, in fact, occur on 15 November 2018 and not on 14 November as mentioned in the letter of termination.
[10] In the hearing before the Commissioner Mr Brown took issue with most of the content of the letter and said that he made the delivery on 15 November 2018, producing a copy of the run sheet for that day showing that the delivery was made. He also said that his departure to make the delivery was witnessed by other employees.
[11] Mr Brown said that he was not given an opportunity to respond to the reason for his dismissal.
[12] After considering the evidence given by Mr Brown, and witnesses for Omni Group, including Mr Samartzis, the Commissioner considered whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to Mr Brown’s capacity or conduct.
[13] The Commissioner concluded:
[43] In summary, it is difficult to conclude that these circumstances constituted a valid reason for dismissal, let alone one that was sufficiently serious to constitute serious misconduct warranting instant dismissal. For example, Mr Brown was arguably entitled to seek confirmation of the request made by Mr Keranis, given the earlier direction given to him by Mr Chance. Mr Brown was also not directly involved in the ensuing argument that took place between Mr Keranis and Mr White. In addition, no action was taken in regard to the conduct or behaviour of those employees. In addition, the delivery was made to the customer and there is no evidence of the customer expressing any dissatisfaction with what occurred, or of the Omni Group being adversely affected in any way.
[44] Further confusion arises from the evidence provided by Mr Samartzis. He variously indicated that the conduct, which amounted to serious misconduct and warranted termination, was Mr Brown’s failure to deliver to the customer on time, although he later acknowledged that the goods were delivered, but should have been “done in a more responsive time.” However, he also indicated at a later point in his evidence that Mr Brown was dismissed because his conduct created an argument in the production area.
[45] I am not satisfied, in conclusion, that the Omni Group had a valid reason to dismiss Mr Brown in the sense that the reason can be said to have been “sound, defensible or well founded,” particularly given that it was considered to be sufficient to constitute serious misconduct justifying instant dismissal. It would appear instead from the available evidence that the circumstances involved a misunderstanding on Mr Brown’s part in the context of the earlier instruction given to him by Mr Chance, which resulted in an argument between two other employees for which Mr Brown cannot be held directly responsible.
[14] After considering other matters relevant to the determination of whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable the Commissioner concluded that Mr Brown had been unfairly dismissed.
[15] The Commissioner next considered remedy and, being satisfied that reinstatement was not appropriate considered compensation. In doing so the Commissioner concluded that:
• Mr Brown would have remained employed for a period of 12 months; and
• Mr Brown would have received $58,479.20 over that 12 month period based on a weekly rate of $1,124.60. 5
[16] In relation to efforts to mitigate the loss the Commissioner said:
[62] Mr Brown also indicated in the written materials that he filed that he has been able to find other employment after being dismissed, although he did not want to divulge the name of his new employer. He commenced that employment on 4 December 2018, being around three weeks after he was dismissed from his employment with the Omni Group. He also indicated in his oral evidence that the amount of available work in his new role fluctuated, and his gross weekly earnings were in the order of $800.00 per week. The Omni Group did not take issue with these submissions on future earnings, and they represent annual earnings of $41,600.00. The figure of $2,099.20 should also be added to this amount. This comes to a total of $43, 699.20 This amount is to be deducted from the figure of $58,479.20 indicated above, leaving an amount of $14,780.00.
[17] The Commissioner applied a deduction for contingencies and considered other relevant matters to the determination of compensation and concluded:
[67] I am satisfied, in conclusion that an order for compensation should be made. I am also satisfied that the amount of compensation that is to be ordered is appropriate in all the circumstances of this matter. I accordingly order that a gross amount of compensation in the sum of $12,563.00 is to be paid by the Omni Group to Mr Brown within 28 days of the date of this decision. An order giving effect to this decision is now separately issued.
[18] An Order 6 to this effect was issued on 14 October 2019.
Grounds of Appeal
[19] Omni Group appeals the compensation amount on the basis that the Commissioner “accepted that Nathans earnings were $800.00 per week and this is the basis of which the payout was calculated. There was never any evidence submitted to Omni that this was the actual amount”.
[20] During the hearing Omni Group sought to expand the grounds of appeal to include that the Commissioner erred in the determination of how long Mr Brown would have remained employed by Omni Group and that the Commissioner was in error in relation to Mr Brown’s weekly salary at the time of the termination of his employment.
[21] Omni Group says that it is in the public interest for the Commission to grant permission to appeal as any determination of a calculation based on an assumption needs to be supported by evidence.
Consideration
[22] An appeal under s.604 of the FW Act is an appeal by way of rehearing and the Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary decision-maker.7 There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with the permission of the Commission.
[23] This appeal is one to which s.400 of the FW Act applies. Section 400 provides that:
(1) Despite subsection 604(2), the FWC must not grant permission to appeal from a decision made by the FWC under this Part unless the FWC considers that it is in the public interest to do so.
(2) Despite subsection 604(1), an appeal from a decision made by the FWC in relation to a matter arising under this Part can only, to the extent that it is an appeal on a question of fact, be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact.
[24] In Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and Others, 8Buchanan J (with whom Marshall and Cowdroy JJ agreed) characterised the test under s 400 as “a stringent one”9. The task of assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value judgment.10 A Full Bench of the Commission, in GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, identified some of the considerations that may attract the public interest:
“… the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters…” 11
[25] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence of appealable error.12 However, the fact that the Member at first instance made an error is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal.13
[26] An application for permission to appeal is not a de facto or preliminary hearing of the appeal. In determining whether permission to appeal should be granted, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for the Full Bench to conduct a detailed examination of the grounds of appeal. 14 However it is necessary to engage with those grounds to consider whether they raise an arguable case of appealable error.
[27] Omni Group specified one ground in its notice of appeal it says led to an error on the part of the Commissioner in his determination of compensation for Mr Brown. During the hearing Omni Group raised two further errors in relation to the determination of compensation which it says provide grounds for appeal.
[28] First, Omni Group said that the Commissioner erred in accepting that Mr Brown’s earnings in employment following his dismissal was $800 gross per week in circumstances where this figure was put to Commissioner Gregory in “conversation” 15 with Mr Brown while he was not under oath. In this respect Omni Group said that it was denied procedural fairness in not being able to cross-examine Mr Brown in relation to that amount.
[29] Second, Omni Group said the Commissioner should not have used an average weekly wage figure of $1,124.60 in relation to Mr Brown’s wages with Omni Group but should have used an hourly rate of $24.90 (at 38 hours per week) when determining lost earnings.
[30] Third, Omni Group said that the Commissioner made an error in calculating that it had paid Mr Brown two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice of $2,099.20 when the figure should have been $1,992.00.
[31] The evidence and submissions in relation to Mr Brown’s earnings with Omni Group and his earnings post his dismissal arose during various parts of proceedings before the Commissioner.
[32] Mr Samartzis, whilst giving evidence for Omni Group, was questioned by Mr Brown. 16 He said that Mr Brown:
was getting $24.90 per hour?---$24.90 an hour.
[33] Mr Brown’s final payslip 17 from Omni Group was attached to its response to Mr Brown’s application for relief from unfair dismissal.18 That payslip shows an “AL Hourly Rate” of $24.90 and an “Average Weekly Wage” of $1,124.60.
[34] During submissions the following exchange occurred between the Commissioner and Mr Brown:
PN168
Mr Samartzis also stated to this Commission in the witness box that my KPI's were below standard. What Mr Samartzis failed to tell this Commission was that he had chosen random KPI's where I was only given small deliveries to be made, plus giving the impression that my delivery standard had failed. I have seven pages of random KPI forms here showing that my KPI's were good and achieved as well.
PN169
THE COMMISSIONER: I think in regard to that Mr Brown, as far as I understand it, they were the not the reason for your dismissal.
PN170
MR BROWN: Yes, thank you Commissioner.
PN171
THE COMMISSIONER: The dismissal was based on the apparent serious misconduct issues.
PN172
MR BROWN: As per my final pay slip, my average weekly wage worth $1,124.60. I am therefore seeking the six weeks' redundancy pay as my contract of employment, plus the one week owed for two weeks' pay in lieu of notice, which I did not receive. The total amount I am therefore seeking is around $8,220.20. This is the sum I am entitled to for my redundancy plus the two weeks in lieu notice.
…
PN176
THE COMMISSIONER: Just on that figure that you referred to in terms of the amount that you're seeking. I think - am I correct in understanding you were on an hourly rate of $24.90, or something of that order?
PN177
MR BROWN: I was, yes.
PN178
THE COMMISSIONER: I think you'd indicated at some point as well, that you'd been able to obtain other employment at some point.
PN179
MR BROWN: Yes, correct.
…
PN184
THE COMMISSIONER: So, what do you say that you were earning from this work on average each week?
PN185
MR BROWN: On average, probably about $700 a week. That's average, yes. On a good week I can make more, but I mean, it's around $750 after tax.
PN186
THE COMMISSIONER: What do you say the gross amount is?
PN187
MR BROWN: It would be about $800 I would say. Is that including after tax, or before.
PN188
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, gross, before tax.
PN189
MR BROWN: I would probably about $800, yes. 19
[35] At no stage during the proceedings did Omni Group take issue with any of the information before the Commission in relation to Mr Brown’s wages pre and post dismissal. It did not seek to make any submissions as to Mr Brown’s earnings pre or post dismissal and did not seek that Mr Brown be recalled to give evidence under oath and be cross-examined about his earnings following his dismissal. Further, Omni Group did not seek to clarify any confusion as to Mr Brown’s earnings whilst at Omni Group including the detail of his average weekly earnings. A representative of Omni Group was always present during the exchanges and could have but did not seek to challenge Mr Brown’s answers to the Commissioner’s questions. There was no denial of procedural fairness.
[36] To the extent that Omni Group says that the Commissioner should have provided more assistance to its representative so that these matters could have been explored, the assistance a Member can provide to an unrepresented party (noting that neither party was represented in the proceedings before the Commissioner below or on appeal) is limited. Ultimately, a party retains the responsibility to put all relevant evidence and materials and submissions to support its case before the Commission. It is clear from the transcript that the Commissioner asked several questions designed to elicit information that was relevant to matters the Commissioner might be required to determine, including compensation. To the extent that Omni Group raise this as a ground of appeal we find no appealable error in the approach taken by the Commissioner. The Commissioner provided ample opportunity to both parties to address him on all relevant matters. The Commissioner did not display any reluctance to hear from the parties on relevant matters each sought to raise and properly, in our view, took into account that neither was represented before him.
[37] Omni Group was given an opportunity to put any submissions it considered necessary before the Commissioner. Shortly following the exchange between the Commissioner and Mr Brown set out in paragraph [34] above, Mr Samartzis commenced his final submissions. Mr Samartzis took no issue with the information as to earnings provided by Mr Brown. Mr Samartzis did not seek to explain the average weekly earnings figure in the context of the hourly rate of pay shown on Mr Brown’s payslip. Whilst on appeal Omni Group suggested that the figure of $1,124.60 was an average caused by some change in position of Mr Brown, 20 this was not put during the hearing before the Commissioner. Further, Omni Group could point to no evidence that would have indicated that this was made apparent to the Commissioner at first instance. Omni Group put nothing on appeal to indicate that the conclusion reached by the Commissioner was not reasonably open to him on the evidence and submissions before him as to Mr Brown’s average weekly earnings prior to his dismissal. We can identify no appealable error on the part of the Commissioner in the use of this figure such that we should grant permission to appeal.
[38] As to Mr Brown’s post-dismissal earnings of $800 per week gross Mr Samartzis did not seek to further cross-examine Mr Brown with respect to this figure nor did he put before the Commissioner any concerns as to the figure. Mr Samartzis did not request the provision of payslips to verify Mr Brown’s assertion as to his post-dismissal earnings. To the extent that Omni Group seeks to rely on payslips since provided, these merely serve to confirm that which Mr Brown told the Commissioner - that on average his post-dismissal gross earnings were $800 per week.
[39] The Commission is entitled to rely on uncontested submissions made from the bar table to ground a factual finding. The Commissioner is not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure 21 and the acceptance of uncontested assertions in submissions as to a fact may be accepted as establishing that fact. The Commissioner was entitled, in relation to the application, to inform himself in such manner as he considered appropriate.22 The informality which was adopted by the Commissioner in circumstances where the submissions of Mr Brown as to particular facts were not contested by Mr Samartzis, is consistent with the requirement in the FW Act that the Commission perform its functions and exercise its powers in a manner that is, inter alia, quick, informal and avoids unnecessary technicalities.23 That is what the Commissioner did in this case in accepting that Mr Brown’s post-dismissal earnings were $800 per week. In this respect we identify no appealable error on the part of the Commissioner that would give rise to the grant of permission to appeal.
[40] With respect to the arithmetical error of the Commissioner in calculating the value of Mr Brown’s payment in lieu of two weeks’ notice of $2,099.20 when the figure should have been $1,992.00, this error is in favour of Omni Group and is not a matter raised by Mr Brown. Whilst, for the reasons given by the Full Bench of the Commission in The Trustee for WKC Trust t/a Curious Grace v Emily O’Brien, 24 this may provide an appealable error that justifies permission to appeal for those same reasons we do not consider, on this point, that it would be in the public interest to grant permission to appeal.25
[41] During the hearing before the Full Bench Omni Group identified a further ground of appeal in that it said the Commissioner erred in assuming that Mr Brown would have remained employed for a further 12 months had his employment not been terminated and that this was not subject to evidence.
[42] With respect to the Commissioner’s assessment that Mr Brown would have remained in employment with Omni Group for a further 12 months had his employment not been terminated we find no error in the Commissioner’s determination. In reaching his conclusion the Commissioner had appropriate regard to findings he made in relation to the valid reason for dismissal which were not challenged on appeal. The assessment of the Commissioner that Mr Brown would have remained employed for a further 12 months was reasonably open to him based on his earlier findings and we identify no appealable error in this regard that would give rise to the grant of permission to appeal.
[43] To the extent that Omni Group suggests the Decision is disharmonious with other decisions of the Commission, the factual circumstances in the case relied on by Omni Group are different to that before the Commissioner. In John Holland Pty Ltd T/A John Holland Aviation Services Pty Ltd v Ronaldo Salazar 26 (Salazar)the Full Bench was hearing an appeal from a decision in which the Commission had accepted the untested assertions of the applicant at first instance and rejected the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses who had given sworn evidence and were subject to cross-examination. In the current matter Omni Group did not seek to cross-examine Mr Brown with respect to his earnings and did not give contrary sworn evidence that was rejected in favour of untested submissions. The decision in Salazar is therefore not relevant to the circumstances in this case.
[44] For the reasons given above we do not consider that Omni Group has established an arguable case of appealable error such that it would be in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. We are not satisfied that there is a diversity of decisions at first instance such that permission to appeal should be granted. Further, we are not satisfied that the decision manifests an injustice or is counter intuitive. In truth, Omni Group has not been able to establish a proper basis upon which permission to appeal might be granted and it merely seeks to run on appeal a better case than it ran before the Commissioner.
Whether a further period should be allowed to lodge the appeal
[45] Omni Group said that the reason for the late lodgement of the notice of appeal is that it was waiting on transcript from the second day of hearing before the Commissioner and it took some time for that to arrive. Omni Group said that it required the transcript to properly assess if there was a basis on which to appeal. We do not consider that this explanation satisfactorily explains the delay so as to weigh in favour of allowing a further period. A cursory review of the notice of appeal shows scant regard was had to the content of the transcript in framing the grounds of appeal. The transcript discloses, amongst other things, that the matters about which Omni Group seek to complain on appeal were not challenged at first instance. In these circumstances the reason for the delay is not satisfactorily explained and so weighs against allowing a further period.
[46] The delay in lodging the notice of appeal was nine days beyond the period allowed by the Rules.
[47] For the reasons given above we do not consider that any appeal would have any reasonable likelihood of success. Moreover, for the reasons given above, permission to appeal would likely not be granted. This weighs strongly against allowing a further period within which to lodge the notice of appeal.
[48] We accept that there would be no prejudice to either party in granting an extension of time and that the period of the delay is relatively short. These matter weigh in favour of allowing a further period, though not heavily so.
[49] Taking all these matters into account we do not consider that Omni Group should be granted a further period within which to lodge its notice of appeal. The absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay together with the very weak case for permission to appeal are much weightier matters than those pointing the other way. In the circumstances and having regard to the matters set out above, the interests of justice do not favour an extension of the time within which to lodge the appeal.
[50] Even if we were minded to allow a further period within which to lodge the notice of appeal, for the reasons stated as to the permission to appeal and the merits of the appeal, we would not grant permission to appeal.
Conclusion
[51] We do not allow a further period within which the notice of appeal may be lodged. As the notice of appeal was lodged outside the time prescribed by r.56 of the Rules, the application for permission to appeal is dismissed. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider whether to allow the grounds of appeal to be varied as sought by Omni Group during the hearing before us. Were it necessary to do so we would not allow the variation as it was made without notice to Mr Brown and to the Full Bench and only raised during oral argument.
[52] The stay Order 27 issued on 22 November 2019 is set aside.
[53] Omni Group is reminded of the undertaking it gave during the hearing of its stay order application on 22 November 2019. The undertaking, which is recorded in the transcript at PN197, PN209, PN245-PN246 and PN247-PN251 was, inter alia, that in the event of its appeal being wholly unsuccessful Omni Group will pay to Mr Brown within 7 days of the date of the Full Bench decision, the amount of $12,563.00 held in an interest bearing bank account established pursuant to the undertaking plus interest earned but less taxation. As the appeal has been wholly unsuccessful, Omni Group must pay to Mr Brown the nett amount by no later than 28 January 2020.
Order
[54] We order as follows:
a. The Order in PR714532 made on 22 November 2019 is set aside; and
b. The application by Omni Group that it be allowed a further period within which to lodge its notice of appeal under Rule 56(2)(c) of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013 is dismissed; and
c. The application for permission to appeal is dismissed.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
T. Salisbury for Omni Group Pty Ltd T/A Omni
N. Brown on his own behalf.
Hearing details:
2019.
Melbourne and Adelaide (video link hearing):
December 12.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR715718>
1 [2019] FWC 7073.
2 PR713315.
3 PR714532.
4 Stevenson-Helmer v Epworth Hospital, Print T2277, 19 October 2000 per Ross VP, Acton SDP and Simmonds C; Dundovich v P&O Ports, Print PR923358, 8 October 2002 per Ross VP, Hamilton DP and Eames C; SPC Ardmona Operations Ltd v Esam and Organ (2005) 141 IR 338; Tokoda v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] FWAFB 3995; Lesic v No. 1 Riverside Quay Pty Ltd T/A BP Australia [2015] FWCFB 395.
5 [2019] FWC 7073 at [60].
6 PR713315.
7 This is so because on appeal the Commission has power to receive further evidence, pursuant to s.607(2); see Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Others [2000] HCA 47, (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ.
8 (2011) 192 FCR 78.
9 Ibid at [43].
10 O’Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61, (1989) 168 CLR 210 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; applied in Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4, (2011) 243 CLR 506, 85 ALJR 398 at [69] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and Others [2011] FCAFC 54, (2011) 192 FCR 78, (2011) 207 IR 177 at [44]-[46].
11 [2010] FWAFB 5343, (2010) 197 IR 266 at [27].
12 Wan v Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Another [2001] FCA 1803, (2001) 116 FCR 481 at [30].
13 Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd t/as Mt Thorley Operations/Warkworth[2010] FWAFB 10089, (2010) 202 IR 388 at [28], affirmed on judicial review in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and Others [2011] FCAFC 54, (2011) 192 FCR 78, (2011) 207 IR 177; NSW Bar Association v Brett McAuliffe; Commonwealth of Australia represented by the Australian Taxation Office[2014] FWCFB 1663, (2014) 241 IR 177 at [28].
14 Trustee for The MTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140 at [82].
15 Transcript of 12 December 2019 at PN134.
16 Transcript dated 12 March 2019 at PN320.
17 Appeal Book at p.122.
18 Form F3 – employer response to unfair dismissal application.
19 Transcript dated 17 April 2019.
20 Transcript dated 12 December 2019 at PN525.
21 See s. 591 FW Act.
22 See s. 590(1) FW Act.
23 See s. 577(b) FW Act.
24 [2019] FWCFB 7796.
25 Ibid at [23].
26 [2014] FWCFB 7813.
27 PR714532.
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16
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