Olsen and Ross and Anor
[2008] FamCA 508
•14 May 2008
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| OLSEN & ROSS AND ANOR | [2008] FamCA 508 |
| FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – With whom a child spends time – With whom a child spends time pending decision |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Olsen |
| RESPONDENTS: | Ms Ross and Mr Potter |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Selfridge |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 48 | of | 2007 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 14 May 2008 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Murphy J |
| HEARING DATE: | 14 May 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Crosby |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | Ms Dee |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT | Mr Potter appears on his own behalf |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Selfridge of Counsel |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: |
Orders
UNTIL ORDERS ARE MADE UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL OF THIS MATTER OR EARLIER ORDER, IT IS ORDERED THAT
The orders made by consent on the 17 January 2005 be discharged.
The child J OLSEN (“J”), born … January 2002, live with his father from after school Wednesday until before school the following Friday each alternate week commencing Wednesday 21 May 2008 and continuing each alternate week thereafter.
The child live with his mother from after school Friday until before school the following Wednesday each alternate week commencing Friday 30 May 2008 and each alternate week thereafter.
Each of the mother, the respondent father Mr Potter and respondent father Mr Olsen be restrained, and an injunction is granted restraining each, from bringing the child J into contact with, or from doing any act or facilitating any act, so as to bring the child J into contact with the respondent father Mr Potter.
Each of the mother and father shall do all such things, sign all such documents and comply with all such reasonable requests so as to provide written information as to the progress of J at school or in respect of any important matters relating to him affecting his education and/or health including but not limited to school reports, reports from any counsellor therapist or special education engaged in by the child at school and medical reports and shall appraise the other of any appointments for counselling of any type or description undertaken by J.
Each of the mother and father are restrained and an injunction is granted restraining them from relocating the child to reside at any place other than their current residential addresses.
Each of the mother and father shall do all such things, sign all such documents and pay all such amounts as are necessary to ensure that the child is presented to counselling with Dr L at all such times as are reasonably requested by Dr L.
Each of the mother and father shall do all such things, sign all such documents and pay all such reasonable amounts as are necessary to permit the other to contact, discuss with and consult any medical practitioner, teacher, health care provider, counsellor or other therapist consulted by J.
Each of the mother and father shall keep the other informed of the name of each of J’s treating doctors, teachers, therapists, counsellors or other persons consulted by J.
Each of the mother and father shall notify the other as soon as reasonably practicable in the event that J suffers from any significant illness or injury or in the event that he requires hospitalisation for any reason.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Olsen & Ross and Anor is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
FILE NUMBER: BRC 48 of 2007
| Mr Olsen |
Applicant
And
| Ms Ross and MrPotter |
Respondent
Ex Tempore
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
An Application in a Case was filed by Mr Olsen on 28 April 2008 in a matter in which I am the docketed Judge and in respect of which a first day of trial has occurred.
The matter is set for further hearing before me for seven days commencing 27 August; that is the matter will be finally determined in approximately three months' time.
During the course of argument in respect of the Application in a Case, I pointed out to Mr Potter that one might expect a delay of approximately two or three months until judgment was handed down in respect of the trial to occur at that time. Accordingly, argument in respect of the current application was directed towards the parenting arrangements that might occur for a period of approximately six months until that decision is handed down.
This matter involves the somewhat byzantine interconnection of relationships, conflicts, and disputed facts. At the centre of it are three children, two of whom are the children of Mr Potter: Y and N.
Earlier today, I made orders with respect to N by consent between Mr Potter and N’s mother to the effect that Mr Potter would remove himself from N’s life during the timeframe just referred to so as to provide, as Mr Potter sees it, some freedom and space for N, particularly in light of the fact that he is receiving, or due to receive, counselling from a Dr L, a consultant psychologist.
N, who was born in June 2000, shares a father, Mr Potter, with Y, born in June 2005. Y shares a mother, Ms Ross, with J.[1] J is the subject of the current application. J was born in January 2002. His father is Mr Olsen, the applicant in the proceedings for determination today.
[1]In the original version of these Reasons it was incorrectly stated that N shared a mother, Ms Ross, with N.
It is necessary to observe that this application is heard as an interim application. The Full Court decided in Goode v Goode [2006] FLC 93-286 that the principles enunciated in the earlier Full Court decision of C v C [1998] FLC 92-801 relating to the truncated nature of interim proceedings, and the concomitant restriction on findings which can be made in the course of those interim proceedings, apply to the post Reform Act position which governs this application.
Clearly enough, as I indicated during the course of submissions, I am cognisant of the fact that in three months' time many of the complex facts that are disputed between many parties will be the subject of contested proceedings which will ultimately lead to findings about many if not all of those facts.
Some measure of the complexity of this matter is given by the number of parties. Mr Potter is a party, Ms Ross and Mr Olsen are parties, Mr Olsen’s parents, Mr and Mrs Olsen (snr), are parties, as is Ms Wilson, the mother of N (who is a child of Mr Potter).
In respect of J, it is tolerably clear that he is the product of a short relationship between Mr Olsen and Ms Ross. It seems that they had a relationship between approximately April 2001 and May 2002 and again from February to May 2003.
J is the only child of that relationship. He has lived with his mother since separation; that is he has been living with his mother now for a period of some six years or so.
Those facts alone would indicate, in circumstances where a Court is due to hear a trial within a relatively short timeframe, that even after a consideration of all of those matters mandated to be considered by the Court by s 60CC and other provisions of the Act, there would need to be good reason why that longstanding relationship was changed between now and the trial.
It is necessary to observe that I am cognisant of the provisions of the Act and, in particular, I am cognisant of the statutory presumption, the mandatory considerations, both primary and additional, and the objects and principles within which this determination takes place, albeit within the confines of an interim hearing as earlier indicated.
The overriding consideration is, clearly enough, the best interests of J and, specifically, the best interests of J between now and the trial.
This complex family situation has been the subject of reports by Dr H, who is a psychiatrist and Ms M, who is a social-worker providing a family report to this Court pursuant to Reg 8.
Ms M has most recently prepared a family report dated 30 April 2008. It is a comprehensive document comprising almost some 250 paragraphs. It seems to me that the report contains a careful and thoughtful analysis, although I am mindful of the fact that Ms M has not been cross-examined, and I am also very aware of the fact that Mr Potter has various criticisms to make of Ms M and her process. Issues emanating from those criticisms in and about the preparation of her report are referred to by her within it.
As will be clear from what I have said already, the lives of J and his parents intersect with the lives of his siblings and their parents, the complexities of which are beyond the scope of this current application.
Those complexities are comprehensively dealt with in the report of Ms M, and will, clearly enough, be the subject of examination at the forthcoming trial.
At paragraph 110 of her report Ms M summarises the position with respect to that interrelationship and specifically, in the current context, J’s position:
“Although there have been significant twists and turns in this complicated matter, some essential facts remain clear. Firstly, these children have continued to be exposed to conflict, turmoil, and disruption. The children have also been exposed to domestic violence - particularly to the emotional abuse of this violence. There seems to have been little peace for these three children since the last report. Secondly, the shifting allegiances amongst the adults and the dynamics of the adult relationships remain a significant factor. Thirdly, the adults have demonstrated an inability to work together and an inability to effectively share parental responsibility.”
As I indicated during the course of argument, there can be little doubt on the face of the material, even in the absence of specific findings by me, that these children have continued to be exposed to conflict, turmoil, and disruption.
Similarly, there seems to be little doubt on the material before me, again without the need to make any specific findings, that there has been little peace for these three children since Ms M prepared her previous report some time previously.
Orders were made in this Court on 17 January 2005 which acknowledged, in effect, that J continued to live with his mother, and provided that the father, Mr Olsen, spend time with him from 1 pm Saturday until 1 pm Sunday each alternate weekend, and, once J had commenced prep school, then each alternate weekend from after school Friday to before school Monday.
There have been allegations and counter-allegations with respect to his contact, the resolution of which, again, are beyond the scope of this current application. I note, however, as a relevant matter, the very existence of these allegations and counter-allegations (over what one would have thought was a relatively simple matter of alternate weekend contact).
The present matter is significantly complicated by the shifting allegiances - to use Ms M’s words - which mark this case.
I flag that, those shifting allegiances, and ultimate findings made about those shifting allegiances, are likely to be highly relevant to the Act's additional considerations, speaking in particular of capacity of people to provide for their children's intellectual and emotional needs, and the responsibilities of parenthood exhibited by each of the parents.
It is relevant for present purposes to note in that respect that the father, who brings this application, and has within it an application that Mr Potter should have no contact whatsoever with J, or that J should not at all be in his presence, wrote to the mother, Ms Ross, on 22 November 2006. That letter is exhibited to the affidavit of the mother before me.
As part of what was said by the father in that letter he said this:
“For the record, I have never forced [J] to have contact with […] - that is Mr [Potter] - but instead have always consulted with [J] and asked if he would like to see [Mr Potter]. [J] has always responded with a definite yes, and has not hesitated to express his genuine love and admiration for [Mr Potter].”
He goes on in a subsequent part of the letter:
“Given my own observation of [J’s] relationship with [Mr Potter] I do not see it in [J’s] best interests to deny him any type of contact with [Mr Potter]. I only ask that you please put your personal feelings towards [Mr Potter] aside and act only in the best interests of our son.”
That position, then, has changed utterly in respect of the application before me. Again, the circumstances in which that position has changed is likely to be a highly relevant matter in the subsequent trial before me.
In his affidavit before me the father says that he has:
“…always been concerned that [J] not be placed in the predicament of having to live in a household comprising of both [Ms Ross] and [Mr Potter].”
That allegation is made, of course, against a background where, apparently, the father took no steps to remove J from the household, and, in particular, failed to do so after an argument witnessed by him between Mr Potter and the mother, during which he deposes to the children, and J in particular, suffering very significant distress.
Specifically with respect to J and the issue of shifting allegiances, and turmoil already referred to by Ms M, she says in her report:
“ 33. Ms [Ross] has moved three times since August - to [Ms F’s] home (October 2007); to the [H] Resort (February 2008), and recently to [K] (March).”
I am told from the Bar table - and it is not apparently disputed - that consequent upon events which I will refer to in more detail in a moment, the mother is again living back in Ms F’s home.
The precariousness of that situation might be judged by what has occurred in that relationship in the past. Indeed, the apparent catalyst for the resumption of the relationship between the mother and Mr Potter - a man who in the past she has told report-writers and other people is a risk to her children – was, apparently, the relationship between she and her mother breaking down - at least temporarily.
At paragraph 135 of her report Ms M says this:
“Ms [Ross] indicated on 21 April 2008 she had an agreement with Mr [Potter] that if their relationship did not work out, or if [J] became stressed by having Mr [Potter] living with them that Mr [Potter] would leave. "The minute it looks like it's going south, he'll leave. He promised that." Ms [Ross] stated that Mr [Potter] was able to return to live at the [H] Resort.”
I should interpose here that it is submitted that the resumption of the relationship between Ms Ross and Mr Potter, against the background of her expressed antipathy towards him, and her expressed suggestion that he presents a risk to the children, and in circumstances where, on any view of the evidence, a resumption of that relationship would earn the approbation of at least some parties to these proceedings, leads to the submission that a degree of subterfuge - or at worst dishonesty or misrepresentation - on the part of Ms Ross, and perhaps on the part of Mr Potter, has attended the resumption of that relationship.
I am not in a position to make specific findings about that issue in the context of these proceedings. Undoubtedly, it will be an issue to be explored at the trial. However, it does seem passing strange that the mother saw fit to write an email to Ms M, on Christmas Day, in which the mother said, among other things, this:
“I am writing this on Christmas Day because my heart is breaking. My son, [J], is with his father at the moment and has been for the past week and a bit. Mr [Olsen] has not allowed [J] to have any contact with me, his brother, [Y], and all his other family over Christmas, although our Family Court orders state what is to happen.”
In that same email, however, Ms Ross says:
“Also, I haven't heard anything much from Mr [Potter] in the past month, but did also today on Christmas, he wanted contact with [Y] all of a sudden although he had two months to arrange this with the contact centre. Unfortunately for me I picked the wrong partners to have children with, although I did once love them dearly and I tried to make a bad situation work. They now both think [and I emphasise the word both] it delightful to make me sound like a nutcase and a bad mother. I just wish that they would do the right thing for the children and leave the bitterness alone. However [and again I emphasise this part] I cannot forgive […] [that is Mr Potter] for attacking me in front of the children continuously and hurting [J] when we were together, and now Mr [Olsen] for taking some sort of revenge against myself with Mr [Potter].”
As I said during the course of argument, it seems quite extraordinary to me that a person can make allegations against the father of a child suggesting that he has engaged in child abuse, suggesting that he has been domestically violent, suggesting that he is a problem in the child's life and a problem in her own life, and then, on any view of it, a very short time later apparently resume a relationship with that same person.
I say extraordinary because, as Mr Potter made clear during his submissions before me, he knew, and it seems completely clear to me, even on a preliminary basis in interim proceedings, that the mother must also have known, that the resumption of a relationship between she and Mr Potter would cause significant concern to the Department of Child Safety.
I have gathered from Mr Potter, both today and on the first day of the matter before me, that he will seek to contest many of the "findings" made about him, and allegations about him which have formed the basis of Departmental concerns and interventions.
Whether that is established or not, it is simply a fact, as he himself acknowledged, and as Ms Ross must have known, that the resumption of their relationship, in any form that would see there being significant contact between Mr Potter and the children, and specifically in this context, J, would again cause the Department very significant concerns.
So it came to pass when the Department of Child Safety became aware that Mr Potter and Ms Ross had resumed their relationship. They immediately made it known that, unless Ms Ross terminated the relationship with Mr Potter and prevented him coming into contact with the children, they would take action under the relevant State legislation with respect to those children.
It is abundantly clear - indeed, Mr Potter admitted as much before me - that the sole reason for the previous cessation of their relationship and the non-contact between Mr Potter and the children (which the mother now says she supports and will monitor) is because the Department of Community Services intervened. Both must have known this was almost inevitable given the previous history with that Department of which both were clearly well aware.
It seems to me that I am entitled to take significant regard of those factors when considering the second of the two primary considerations; namely, in broad terms, the degree of risk posed by parenting relationships and the risk of harm to these children, and obviously, in the current context, J in particular.
It was submitted, correctly as it seems to me, that although in interim proceedings it is necessary for me, consistent with what the Full Court determined in Goode v Goode, to make preliminary determinations about each of the primary and additional considerations as might be necessary in the particular circumstances of the case to identify as being particularly relevant each of the two primary considerations, which in cases of this type, frequently come into collision.
Such benefit as J has in having a meaningful relationship with both of his parents between now and the determination of the trial, comes into collision with, and must clearly be balanced against, the need to protect J from physical or psychological harm, or from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect, or family violence.
It is, it seems to me, not to the point that I am unable to make any findings with respect to any specific conduct alleged against Mr Potter, or for that matter alleged against Ms Ross, in terms of what Ms M calls emotional abuse flowing from domestic violence.
The point is that all parties, including Mr Potter and Ms Ross, must have known that a risk was perceived to exist in respect of that harm in the resumption of the relationship between she and Mr Potter, and, more acutely, between Mr Potter and, relevantly, J.
Secondly, it seems that, whatever consideration might be given to allowing people and former partners the capacity to change, I am gravely concerned about the responsibilities of parenthood exhibited by a person who has been prepared to go on oath (and tell Ms M in what might be described as solemn circumstances) and to express concerns in a personal, poignant email and then resumes a relationship with that person. That is particularly so when seen against the background of continual turmoil and conflict that Ms M has otherwise referred to.
Ms M in her most recent report refers to other matters which I consider to be directly relevant to the determination of these proceedings. At paragraph 140 Ms M says this:
“In terms of relationships Ms [Ross] indicated that she and Mr [Potter] were working on their relationship. She accepted they needed to talk through many issues and indicated they would consider attending counselling. When questioned about her total change in attitude since the last report Ms [Ross] replied that this was not an ideal situation. She explained: "Me and [Mr Potter] have had a lot of fights. I've exaggerated. He's been horrible, but he was the person who helped me." Ms [Ross] asserted that she felt she could rely upon Mr [Potter] to ensure that she and the boys had a home and sufficient food.”
As was submitted by the independent children's lawyer, it is disingenuous for Ms Ross to say that she has exaggerated. If what she tells Ms M is correct, at its worst she has told lies on oath about Mr Potter. At best for her, it indicates that she was prepared to say things about Mr Potter in one set of circumstances to achieve one set of purposes, but is now prepared to say something different about Mr Potter in another set of circumstances to achieve a different purpose.
The concerns I ought have for J in those circumstances are, in my view, manifest.
At paragraph 148 Ms M says:
“The relationship between Ms [Ross] and Mr [Potter] reflects the domestic violence cycle (explosion-remorse-pursuit-honeymoon-build-up-standover-explosion). In this cycle this couple appear to be in the honeymoon phase. It is concerning to note that their relationship also bears the hallmarks of power and control as identified in the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project. Ms [Ross] is isolated from support. She is economically bound to Mr [Potter]. There have been threats and intimidation. Mr [Potter] minimised and denied the abuse occurred. Mr [Potter] has accused Ms [Ross] of suffering mental illness, and refers to her as a liar. Ms [Ross] admits that she has been manipulative and has exaggerated situations. It is extremely concerning to consider that [J] and [Y] are exposed to living in this environment.”
Again, it is not possible for me to make factual findings upon each of the contentions raised in respect of that paragraph. Again, undoubtedly, they will be the subject of examination and findings at the trial.
However, that paragraph, and the other matters that I have referred to from Ms M’s report, are important background matters to understand a submission by each of the father and the independent children's lawyer that I should be sceptical when Ms Ross and Mr Potter each say that I can, as it were, trust their assurances to the Court that they will each seek to ensure that there is no contact between Mr Potter and J pending the hearing of this matter.
I have no direct evidence before me in this application from the Department of Child Safety. Various documents have been subpoenaed from that Department, and again, are likely to ultimately be before me in evidence at the hearing of the matter.
However, it seems to be common ground, and indeed was not disputed by any party at the Bar table, that the potential effect Ms Ross allowing Mr Potter to come into contact with either Y or J is that the Department will intervene to seek orders pursuant to the relevant State legislation. Indeed, Mr Potter told me as much, although, of course, he seeks to make the point that any such intervention by the Department would not, as far as he is concerned, be justified or well-founded.
It will be obvious from what I have said that paramount amongst the matters for me to consider in this interim application is the second of the two primary considerations to which I have made reference. That is not in any sense to suggest that I have ignored the additional considerations that are also relevant.
It will be clear from what I have said that I have also taken into account and thought about, for example, the nature of the relationship that J has with each of his parents, the likely effect of any changes in J’s circumstances, including, relevantly, separation from the person who on any view of the evidence has been his primary carer and primary attachment figure for most of his life, the likely effect of separation from a living environment that has contained his mother for the last six years, and albeit briefly, in the light of the incapacity to make specific factual findings, the capacity of each of the child's parents and the attitude to the child and the responsibilities of parenthood.
Perhaps those considerations, or perhaps the impact of those considerations on my ultimate decision can be, at least in part, summarised by a paragraph of Ms M’s report. At paragraph 244 Ms M says this:
“The combination of all these factors leads to concern as to [J’s] emotional welfare. He presents as needing stability, security, and consistency in his life. Ms [Ross] and Mr [Potter] have exposed him to conflict, domestic violence, and instability. These factors are not evident in Mr [Olsen’s] home. A change in circumstances to living with Mr [Olsen] presents as offering [J] significant benefits.”
It is important that I record that this particular statement, and the earlier quoted statements made by Ms M were made in circumstances where, I gather, Ms M was unaware of material that has been put before me, both by Ms Ross, and to a lesser extent, Mr Potter, that they will each ensure, that Mr Potter has no contact with J in the six-month period previously referred to.
I am sceptical of those claims. In that respect, I think there is force in the submission made by counsel for the independent children's lawyer. However, it seems to me that I would probably go beyond that which I am entitled to do on an interim basis to make any specific finding about that.
It may be, as Mr Selfridge submitted on behalf of the independent children's lawyer, that I do not need to. It seems to me that the background outlined by me is sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for concern about each and all of the matters that Ms M has identified.
Most importantly of all, as it seems to me, is the expression by Ms M that J needs stability, security, and consistency in his life.
Mr Olsen is not without concerns. His parenting, specifically, is not without concerns.
Mr Potter raises the issue of his use of illicit substances. Mr Olsen is an inexperienced parent in the sense that he has had no week to week parenting of J. However, I note that his parents, Mr and Mrs Olsen (Snr), are likely to play a significant role in J’s day-to-day life, if J was to live with Mr Olsen.
It seems to me that amongst the byzantine confusion created by the interrelationship of these children and parties Mr and Mrs Olsen (Snr) present as offering precisely the sort of stability, security, and consistency that Ms M refers to.
Again, I emphasise I cannot make final findings about that topic, just like any other topic, but on an interim basis I am tolerably satisfied as to that stability, security, and consistency, and each being an ameliorating factor in any upset caused for J by the change in his circumstances.
So far, what I have not mentioned, but which is a profoundly important issue as far as I am concerned, is the fact that J has thus far shared his life with his mother with his sibling, Y. Y is somewhat younger than J, having been born in June 2005. Accordingly, he is not yet 3.
The ramifications of the ages and stages of development of both Y and J are, it seems to me, significant in terms of their separation should J go to live with his father. Amidst the confusion, upset, conflict and change that Ms M talks about I must also consider Y (whose best interests I am also charged with attempting to protect in this mess). The relationship between the two children is important in terms of trying to maintain as much stability as possible and in ameliorating the confusion as much as possible.
As well as that I need to take into account the factor I mentioned earlier; a change for J into the care of his father would involve significant separation from his mother, who has been his primary attachment figure, albeit amidst the changes and confusion already referred to.
It is those changes and that confusion that ultimately persuade me that, although I think that it will be a problematic time for J, and although I think it will not occur without consequences, nevertheless I think it is important that he receive significant care from his father.
The orders sought by each of the parties are contained in their applications. In essence, Mr Olsen sought orders in the event that J live with him that the mother spend time with J each alternate weekend, together with telephone contact. That was, in effect, the reverse position of that which has applied to him now for some time.
On behalf of Ms Ross it was submitted that if - contrary to the submissions made on her behalf - J was to live with the father, that she, too, should receive that form of contact, that amount of time.
In my judgment that amount of time is insufficient for J to spend with his mother, and importantly, his sibling, given the circumstances to which I have previously referred.
Accordingly, although I am satisfied that it is in J’s best interests that he should live with his father, it seems to me that he should also spend substantial time with his mother, pending the finalisation of all of the issues in dispute between these parties. Accordingly, for those reasons I make these orders:
ORDERS DELIVERED
RECORDED : NOT TRANSCRIBED
What I will do, and I will do this for the specific purpose - so that everyone at the Bar table is aware of it - I will not order him to do so, I will note his undertaking to submit to such random urinal blood analyses as might be reasonably requested by the independent children's lawyer. Now, I do that for the specific purpose of not requiring him to do something, but noting his promise to do so. If he chooses not to do so, well, that is an issue we will talk about at the trial.
This is a matter where I have received considerable assistance from those at the Bar table; I apologise for having to deliver the reasons ex tempore. I have done so because I am aware that each of the parties, and some at least of the legal practitioners, live on the Sunshine Coast, so I wanted to give you a decision. I will edit my ex tempore reasons and deliver them - edit them for grammatical atrocities and the like, not for meaning - and deliver them as soon as I reasonably can after today.
I certify that the preceding seventy nine (79) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Murphy
Associate:
Date: 26 May 2008
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
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Civil Procedure
Legal Concepts
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Injunction
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Consent
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Remedies
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Procedural Fairness
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