Olovi v Secure Parking Pty Ltd ATF Secure Kings Unit Trust

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL
CITATION:	Olovi v Secure Parking Pty Ltd ATF Secure Kings Unit Trust [2025] NSWPICMP 850
APPELLANT:	Madina Olovi
RESPONDENT:	Secure Parking Pty Ltd ATF Secure Kings Unit Trust
APPEAL PANEL
MEMBER:	Carolyn Rimmer
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Michael Hong
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Ash Takyar
DATE OF DECISION:	4 November 2025
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; review of Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC); assessment of primary psychological injury; appeal on basis of demonstrable error and application of incorrect criteria; Appeal Panel satisfied that two discrepancies relating to date of arrival in Australia and date of injury were typographical not demonstrable errors; Appeal Panel satisfied that there was no demonstrable error in relation to the adequacy of the Medical Assessor’s (MA) reasons; appellant failed to demonstrate that the MA failed to take into account relevant considerations; appeal against all assessments in the psychiatric impairment rating scales (PIRS); Held – Appeal Panel satisfied that there was no error or the application of incorrect criteria in the scales of self-care and personal hygiene, social and recreational activities, social functioning, and employability; Appeal Panel found error in the assessments in the PIRS of travel, and concentration, persistence and pace; MAC revoked.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL

On 9 July 2025 Madina Olovi (the appellant) lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Surabhi Verma, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 17 June 2025.
The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
· the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
· the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4^th ed
1 March 2021 (the Guidelines) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5^th ed (AMA 5).

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The appellant sustained a psychological injury deemed to have occurred on 8 March 2023 in her employment as a customer service with Secure Parking Pty Ltd ATF Secure Kings Unit Trust (the respondent).
The appellant lodged an Application to Resolve a Dispute in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) dated 6 May 2025 in which she claimed lump sum compensation in respect the psychological injury.
The matter was referred to Dr Surabhi Verma, Medical Assessor, for assessment of whole person impairment (WPI) of a psychiatric/psychological disorder as a result of the injury deemed to have occurred on 8 March 2023.
The Medical Assessor examined the appellant on 10 June 2025 via video link and assessed 6% WPI in respect of the psychological injury deemed to have occurred on 8 March 2023.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the worker to undergo a further medical examination because there was sufficient information upon which to make a determination.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

Medical Assessment Certificate

The parts of the medical certificate given by the Medical Assessor that are relevant to the appeal are set out, where relevant, in the body of this decision.

SUBMISSIONS

Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
The appellant’s submissions include the following:
(a)    Ground 1 – the MAC contains a demonstrable error;
(b)    at page 3 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor took a history of the following:
Ms Olavi reported that she was born in Pakistan to parents of Afghani background. She migrated to Australia in 1996 at the age of one. The appellant in her statement dated 2 February 2024 at paragraph 10 stated that she was born in Pakistan and moved to Australia when she was one year old and granted her Australian Citizenship in March1986;
(c)    the Medical Assessor does not account for this discrepancy in the MAC, such that the reader is forced to draw their own conclusions as to how the Medical Assessor made this finding. On the face of the record, the MAC thus contains a demonstrable error;
(d)    further, at page 1 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor records the date of injury as 8 March 2023 and on page 10 of the MAC records the date of injury as
3 March 2023. There is no clear indication as to how or why the Medical Assessor recorded two different dates of injury such that the decision is marked by a demonstrable error on the face of the record;
(e)    in the alternative, the inconsistencies contained on the face of the record of the MAC call into question the credibility of the Medical Assessor’s findings and call for closer scrutiny;
(f)    Ground 2 – failure to provide adequate reasons. In Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak [2013] HCA 43 the majority stated at [47]:
“What is to be set out in the statement of reasons is the actual path of reasoning by which the Medical Panel arrived at the opinion the Medical Panel actually formed for itself;”
(g)    at page 7 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor simply states the following under 10(c):
(i)platinum rehabilitation group vocational assessment report dated
16 February 2024, and
(ii)clinical notes from Merrylands Family Practice, various dates;
(h)    no context is provided in relation to these documents so that the reader is forced to form their own opinion as to what the Medical Assessor intended by referring to these documents. There are no reasons provided in support of the documents and the actual path of reasoning is not disclosed in reliance on those documents, if any. As such, the Medical Assessor erred in failing to provide adequate reasons and fell into demonstrable error;
(i)    Ground 3 – the Medical Assessor failed to take into account relevant considerations. The Medical Assessor does not comment on the issues with the appellant’s weight or address this as a relevant issue. The relevance of the appellant’s weight is relevant to the psychiatric impairment rating scale (PIRS) category of “self care and personal hygiene”;
(j)    the appellant in her statement dated 5 May 2025, relevantly stated at paragraph 15: “…I now suffer from an appetite disturbance and weight gain of approximately 23kg”. The report of Dr Abdal Khan, consultant psychiatrist, dated
6 November 2024. Dr Khan relevantly reported the following at page 9 of his report in respect of the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene: “…Ms Olovi’s neglect to her self-care is evidenced by her appetite disturbance and weight gain of approximately 23kg since the subject injury”. In the report of Associate Professor Gordon Davies, consultant psychiatrist, dated 23 April 2025, Dr Davies took the following history at page 5 of his report: “Ms Olovi said that she had put on a lot of weight ‘since all of this has happened’.” In the report of
Dr Gregory Cameron, occupational physician, dated 25 November 2024,
Dr Cameron took the following history at pages 3 and 4 of his report: “At page 3: …She said she had gained weight and used to be 63kg and was now 79kg”. At page 4: “Appetite/Weight change – about 79-80kg. Please see above. Just eats junk food”;
(k)    it is perplexing as to how the Medical Assessor failed to comment on or completely ignored the available evidence which was referred to in both the appellant’s and respondent’s evidence. The Medical Assessor appears to make no light of the evidence referring to the appellant’s weight gain, which is relevant to the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene;
(l)    further, the Medical Assessor makes no discernible attempt to engage in an active intellectual process directed at the information (see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA at [59];
(m)     the Medical Assessor also appears to make no mention of the appellant’s statement evidence other than providing a blanket response to what evidence was considered at page 6 of the MAC: – Clinical Interview – Mental Status Examination – Documentation received including previous IME. As such, the Medical Assessor failed to take into account relevant considerations clearly available on the evidence and thus fell into demonstrable error;
(n)    Ground 4 – the Medical Assessor did not correctly apply the PIRS. The Medical Assessor will commit legal error in circumstances where the application of the PIRS is inconsistent with the available evidence;
(o)    the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene. The Medical Assessor pays no regard to the appellant’s reported weight gain on the evidence, such that it plays no bearing on the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene when it arguably should have;
(p)    the Medical Assessor should have taken into consideration the appellant’s reported weight gain as a relevant factor. Had the Medical Assessor done so, a Class 3 rating was warranted on the evidence;
(q)    the statutory power must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with fair procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations (see Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81 at paragraph [33]). The appellant was thus denied procedural fairness and the Medical Assessor erred;
(r)    the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of social and recreational activities. It is baffling as to how the Medical Assessor drew the conclusion that the appellant warranted a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of social and recreational activities notwithstanding the appellant’s complaints of having trouble leaving the house and having conversations with others during assessment;
(s)    the Medical Assessor does not grapple with this evidence such that it is difficult to appreciate whether there had been an active intellectual process directed at the information at all (see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA at [59]). A Class 3 rating was warranted on the available evidence;
(t)    the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 1 in respect of the PIRS category of travel. The Medical Assessor conceded that the appellant left the house for medical appointments and was driven by her husband 95% of the time. Further, the Medical Assessor conceded that the appellant was able to drive on her own to the nearby shopping centres and that her husband drove her to see her mother;
(u)    further, the Medical Assessor does not adequately engage with the evidence of Dr Khan, who at page 9 of his report dated 6 November 2024, took a history that the appellant required her husband to be present when leaving her home due to her debilitating anxiety, panic and avoidance of crowds. Similarly, the Medical Assessor does not adequately address or respond to Associate Professor Davies’ evidence who at pages 4 and 5 in his report dated 23 April 2025 took a history that the appellant would go to the shops with her husband wearing her pyjamas but sometimes would panic and just sit in the car. Further, Associate Professor Davies took a history that while the appellant was now able to drive, she did not drive on main roads;
(v)    the failure to adequately address and/or respond to this evidence, tempered the severity of the appellant’s symptoms. On the available evidence, a minimum of a Class 2 rating was warranted, and the Medical Assessor erred;
(w)   the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of social functioning. The Medical Assessor tempers the appellant’s psychological symptoms in respect of her relationships, in particular, her relationship with her husband. On the evidence, the appellant experienced a period of separation from her husband on account of her fragile mental state, evidenced on page 9 of Dr Khan’s report dated 6 November 2024;
(x)    the appellant in her statement dated 5 May 2025 at paragraph 19 indicated that her agitation and irritability had caused tension in her relationships. The appellant would also tend to lose her temper with her husband if she was having a bad day;
(y)    further, Associate Professor Davies in his report dated 23 April 2025, took a history of the following in relation to the appellant’s husband: “…She said that there are however times when she does not want to talk to him and that she ‘just shuts’ herself in her room and isolates herself”;
(z)    it is difficult to appreciate how the Medical Assessor determined that the appellant warranted a Class 2 rating based on the available evidence, which described a period of separation, which is a component of a Class 3 rating as per table 11.4 of the Guidelines, in addition to the existing issues in the relationship. The appellant submits that a Class 3 rating was warranted;
(aa)    the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of concentration, persistence and pace. The appellant takes issue with the Medical Assessor’s opinion at page 11 under the PIRS category of concentration, persistence and pace which states the following: “…Ms Olovi gave crisp replies when answering to the questions and there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence or pace”:
(bb)    the reader is simply forced to accept the Medical Assessor’s opinion at face value, absent adequate reasons to support this rationale. Relevantly, to fulfil a minimum legal standard, the reasons need not be extensive or provide detailed explanation of the criteria applied by medical specialists in reaching a professional judgment. At least, that will be so where the medical science is not controversial, if it is, a more expansive explanation may be required (see Campbelltown City Council v Vegan & Ors [2006] NSWCA 284 at [122]);
(cc)     to a lay person, the words “…there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence or pace” arguably convey no meaning and the Medical Assessor was required to provide further reasons in support of classing the appellant as a Class 2. Particularly so in circumstances where Dr Khan at page 9 of his report dated 9 November 2024 took a history that the appellant was easily distracted and her memory was impaired;
(dd)    the appellant in her statement dated 5 May 2025 at paragraph 20 maintained that her attention and concentration levels had deteriorated dramatically and she could not read a book and remain focused or retain the information she read. A Class 3 rating was warranted on the evidence;
(ee)    the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 4 in respect of the PIRS category of employability. Again, it is difficult to appreciate how the Medical Assessor formed this opinion in circumstances where Dr Khan assessed the appellant as a Class 5 and Associate Professor Davies who also considered that the appellant, as she presented, would be considered unfit for employment, there is a failure to undertake an active intellectual process directed at the information (see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 389 at paragraph [59]);
(ff)    while a clinical assessment is a component of the medical assessment, no regard appears to have been paid to this evidence of two experts qualified in psychiatric injuries. The appellant submits that a Class 5 rating was warranted, and the Medical Assessor thus erred, and the assessment was based on incorrect criteria and/or demonstrable error, and
(gg)    the MAC dated 17 June 2025 should be set aside, and a Medical Assessor of the Appeal Panel re-examine the appellant and reassess WPI.
The respondent’s submissions include the following:
(a)    the appellant received an independent medical assessment of her psychiatric condition in accordance with the role and function of the Medical Assessor. The Medical Assessor had the benefit of both examining the appellant and reviewing the evidence relied upon by both parties;
(b)    there is no evidence the examination by the Medical Assessor was in any way materially defective. The Medical Assessor’s examination amounted to a proper medical examination. There is no evidence to the contrary;
(c)    there has been no demonstrable error nor use of incorrect criteria in the Medical Assessor’s assessment of the appellant’s impairment;
(d)    Ground 1 – in respect of the factual inconsistencies recorded by the Medical Assessor, the difference in the dates in the appellant’s submissions are typographical errors. The typographical errors are appropriately characterised as “obvious errors”, not demonstrable errors as asserted by the appellant;
(e)    the typographical errors identified by the appellant have no impact on the Medical Assessor’s assessment or findings in the MAC. In particular, the typographical errors have no impact on the matters on which a medical assessment certificate is conclusively presumed to be correct (s 326 (1) of the 1998 Act);
(f)    being obvious typographical errors, the respondent rejects the appellant’s submission that errors call into question the credibility of the Medical Assessor’s findings and call for closer scrutiny. This is contrary to the very nature of an obvious error;
(g)    the procedure for the correction of obvious errors is set out in PIC7. An appeal pursuant to s 327 of the 1998 Act is not the appropriate mechanism to correct obvious errors. The appellant’s submissions in this regard do not disclose a demonstrable error;
(h)    Ground 2 - the appellant alleges that the Medical Assessor failed to provide the actual path of reasoning in relation to the Medical Assessor’s intention when referring to the clinical records from Merrylands Family Practice and the vocational assessment from Platinum Rehab Group;
(i)    case law in relation to the provision of sufficient reason by decision makers, including cautioning against a hyper critical approach to the reasons (Bojko v ICM Property Service Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 175 at 36) and affirming that a decision maker’s reasons are not to be over-zealously scrutinized when seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [271-271]). Notably, Basten JA in Campbelltown City Council v Vegan & Ors [2006] NSWCA 284 at 122 stated:
“a. … to fulfil a minimum legal standard, the reasons need not be extensive or provide detailed explanation of the criteria applied by medical specialists in reaching a professional judgment … At least, that will be so where the medical science is not controversial: if it is, a more expansive explanation may be required.”
(j)    the medical sciences grounding the clinical records from Merrylands Family Practice (including specialists reports), the vocational assessment from Platinum Rehab Group and the MAC, as well as the matters addressed in the clinical records, the vocational report and the MAC are essentially and inherently different. There being no overlap in the medical science and matters addressed by the clinical records, vocational report and MAC, there is therefore no controversy between the documents which requires ventilation by the Medical Assessor;
(k)    this is particularly the case where the Medical Assessor has on page 7 (under heading 10c) provided detailed, thought out and considered reasons as to the divergences in opinion with other independent and treating doctors who have specifically addressed the subject injury;
(l)    the appellant’s submissions as to the insufficiency of the Medical Assessor’s reasons in relation to the clinical records and the vocational assessment are hyper critical and overzealous, particularly given the totality of the Medical Assessor’s response in addressing the divergences in opinion with other independent and treating doctors who have specifically addressed the subject injury;
(m)     the respondent submits the appellant’s submissions do not disclose a demonstrable error with respect to the adequacy of the Medical Assessor’s reasons;
(n)    Ground 3 - the appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor failed to consider the appellant’s alleged weight gain, including as set out in her statement, which is a relevant factor to the PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene;
(o)    the appellant’s submissions make no reference to the actual documented evidence of the appellant’s weight since the subject injury on 8 March 2023 (the date of the alleged first injurious event);
(p)    the respondent notes the following documentary evidence with respect to the appellant’s weight since 8 March 2023:
a. the “observations” (pages 127 to 128, Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD)) in the clinical records from Lane Cove Doctors Medical Centre as at 9 May 2024 record the appellant’s weight at various stages. Of note:
(i)the earliest record of the appellant’s weight is on 23 August 2017 at which time she weighed 93.7kg. (The respondent notes there is no other entry prior to the appellant’s bariatric surgery on 14 December 2017 (page 131, ARD)), and
(ii)the latest record of the appellant’s weight is on 28 April 2023 (being around seven weeks after the alleged first injurious event). At that time, the appellant weighed 78kg.
b. the report of Dr Darshika Christie-David dated 17 October 2023 (pages 276-277, ARD) records the appellant’s weight at 75.8kg;
c. the respondent notes the ‘observations’ (page 217, Reply) in the clinical records from Dr Kafiris as at 28 May 2025 record the appellant’s weight at various stages after the aforenoted ‘observations’ contained in the clinical records from Lane Cove Doctors Medical Centre. Of note:
(i)the earliest entry is 5 July 2024, at which time the appellant weighed 77kg;
(ii)the next entry dated 12 November 2024 notes the appellant’s weight at 74kg, and
(iii)the final entry dated 17 April 2025 notes the appellant’s weight at 72kg.
(q)    the evidence demonstrates a continued decrease in the appellant's weight since the initial March 2023 incident. Indeed, in April 2023 (seven weeks after
8 March 2023) she weighed 78kg. By 17 May 2025 (around eight weeks prior to the Medical Assessor’s assessment with Dr Verma), she weighed 72kg;
(r)    despite the appellant’s assertions to various independent practitioners, as well in her statement, there is no documented evidence of weight gain since the subject injury as alleged. Therefore, it was not open to the Medical Assessor to consider the appellant’s alleged weight gain since 8 March 2023 particularly as there is no documented evidence to support the appellant’s allegations in this regard;
(s)    in any event, the Medical Assessor was not required to address the alleged consequential weight gain for the purposes of the PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene, but rather, to consider the cause of the alleged weight gain by way of reviewing the appellant’s eating habits and nutrition;
(t)    in this regard, the descriptors for Class 2 and Class 3 of the PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene (as per the Guidelines) refer to eating habits (such as missing a meal, relying on take-away food and meal preparation) and nutrition. Neither Class 2 nor Class 3, or any of the other Classes under this PIRS Category, direct an assessor to address weight gain or weight loss. Weight gain or weight loss is undoubtedly a consequence related to eating habits and nutrition, which are the causes of weight gains or losses. However, in the Guidelines for self-care and personal hygiene, a Medical Assessor is not directed to consider the consequence (weight gain), but rather, to consider the cause (eating habits and nutrition) when assessing self-care and personal hygiene;
(u)    in the circumstances, it was not open to the Medical Assessor to assess the appellant’s alleged weight gain for the PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene. As per the descriptors for this PIRS Category set out in the Guidelines, the Medical Assessor directed herself to the cause by reference to the appellant’s eating habits and nutrition;
(v)    there is no evidence to support the appellant’s alleged weight gain as a result of the subject injury. The evidence demonstrates she has lost weight since
8 March 2023. The Medical Assessor appropriately considered the factors in relation to the PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene with respect to eating habits and nutrition when assessing the appellant. The appellant failed to demonstrate that the Medical Assessor failed to take into account relevant considerations and that the Medical Assessor fell into a demonstrable error;
(w)   Ground 4 - PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene - The appellant submits the Medical Assessor erred in failing to consider her allegations of weight gain and that the Medical Assessor erred in assessing Class 2. The respondent repeats its submissions in response to Ground 3 above;
(x)    PIRS Category of social and recreational activities - the appellant’s submissions relate to the Medical Assessor’s alleged failure to grapple with the appellant’s “present symptoms” when assessing Class 2 for the PIRS Category of social and recreational activities. The appellant’s submissions do not consider the totality of the evidence with respect to appellant’s social and recreational activities;
(y)    the respondent rejects the submission that the Medical Assessor failed to grapple with the appellant’s reported ‘present symptoms’ in assessing this PIRS Category. On pages 4 and 10 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor noted the appellant reported she socialises regularly with her brother and mother, goes out with her husband, goes on outings to restaurants in Penrith or Kings Langley, attending funerals, a wedding, as well as the Mosque. The Medical Assessor also noted the appellant’s alleged cessation in pre-injury sewing, reading and swimming hobbies;
(z)    the assertion that the appellant experiences trouble leaving her house and has difficulty socialising is inconsistent with the balance of the self-reports from the appellant to the Medical Assessor and is difficult to reconcile with the documented evidence of the appellant being in Bali in June 2024 as noted by the Medical Assessor (desktop investigation report dated 11 November 2024, page 64 Reply);
(aa)    once the totality of the evidence with respect to the appellant’s functioning for the purposes of the PIRS Category of social and recreational activities is considered, there is no support for the contention that the Medical Assessor failed to grapple with all relevant evidence given the Medical Assessor’s assessment for this PIRS Category takes into consideration all of the evidence. The Class 2 assessment from the Medical Assessor for this PIRS Category is warranted once all of the evidence is considered. There is no demonstrable error in the MAC in this regard, nor is the MAC based on incorrect criteria;
(bb)    PIRS Category of travel - the appellant’s submissions do not consider the totality of the evidence with respect to the appellant’s travel as reported by her to the Medical Assessor or the totality of the documentary evidence. The appellant’s ability to travel overseas as noted by the Medical Assessor is not considered in the appellant’s submissions. At page 6, the Medical Assessor notes the inconsistent evidence with respect to the appellant’s travel;
(cc)     the appellant’s submissions imply that the Medical Assessor is required to address each aspect of the reports of Dr Khan and Associate Professor Davies in relation to each independent doctor’s specific comments on travel. Professor Davies’ comments as to travel ultimately did not form part of any PIRS assessment and assessment of impairment. However, the comments from
Dr Khan and Associate Professor Davies as to travel largely align with the comments from the Medical Assessor addressing the appellant’s travel with her husband and ability to travel on her own;
(dd)    as there is no controversy in the medical science in this regard (Vegan) there was no requirement from the Medical Assessor to address or respond the comments from Dr Khan and Associate Professor Davies as to her travel;
(ee)    PIRS Category of social functioning - alleged failure to consider the appellant’s period of separation from her husband and issues in that relationship. The appellant’s submissions in this regard do not consider the totality of the evidence with respect to the appellant’s social functioning as reported by her to the Medical Assessor, including positive relationships with her mother and brother as well as a presently positive relationship with her husband;
(ff)    that the Medical Assessor may have placed weight on certain information and not on other information when forming her opinion was a matter within her clinical judgement. A mere difference in medical opinion between the Medical Assessor and Dr Khan (noting Associate Professor Davies does not undertake a PIRS assessment) and the weight to be placed on the evidence does not amount to a demonstrable error (Merza v Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission [2006] NSWSC 939). The weight of the evidence supports the Medical Assessor’s assessment of Class 2 for this PIRS Category;
(gg)    PIRS Category of concentration, persistence and pace - alleged failure to provide sufficient reasons when assessing the appellant in relation to this PIRS Category, and in particular, to explain the comment that “there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in [the appellant’s] concentration, persistence or pace”;
(hh)    there is a divergence between the earlier assessment from Dr Khan on
6 November 2024 and the Medical Assessor’s findings in relation to this PIRS Category. The fact that another medical professional, such as Dr Khan, made a different assessment based on the history provided to him is of little significance. A mere difference in medical opinion does not amount to a demonstrable error;
(ii)    the Medical Assessor had the benefit of both examining the appellant in person and reviewing the evidence relied on by the parties. Given the Medical Assessor’s own observations as to the appellant’s concentration, persistence and pace during the assessment do not reflect the appellant’s self-assessment of her concentration, persistence and pace as set out in her statement of 5 May 2025, it was within the Medical Assessor’s expertise to form her own views as to the appellant’s concentration, persistence and pace;
(jj)    PIRS Category of employability - alleged failure to address the opinions of
Dr Khan and Associate Professor Davies with respect to the PIRS Category of employability;
(kk)     Associate Professor Davies did not assess employability pursuant to the PIRS and did not assess impairment, ultimately forming the view that the appellant required further treatment. He considered that she had not reached maximum medical improvement. Associate Professor Davies anticipated that with further treatment, the appellant should improve and be able to resume work. Therefore it is not appropriate to refer to Associate Professor Davies’ views as to the appellant’s current capacity for work;
(ll)    the appellant’s submissions only consider one aspect of the Medical Assessor’s findings in relation to this PIRS Category. However, the respondent notes the additional history reported to the Medical Assessor by the worker as to being a director and owner of a car dealership (Prestige Motor House) and that her husband registered a company Z.A.I Couture “as she has a degree”. The evidence indicates the appellant was appointed to the role of director and shareholder of Z.A.I Couture from 12 June 2024. At page 6, the Medical Assessor notes the inconsistent evidence with respect to the appellant’s employment. The history of the appellant’s involvement with Prestige Motor House and Z.A.I Couture was considered by Dr Khan;
(mm) whilst there may be a divergence between the Medical Assessor’s assessment of Class 4 for this PIRS Category and Dr Khan’s assessment of Class 5, the extent to which this divergence is the result of the appellant’s failure to fully disclose her post injury activities is not clear. Therefore the extent to which Dr Khan’s assessment can be relied on to accurately assess this PIRS Category is called into question;
(nn)    in the alternative, the respondent maintains that the fact that another medical professional, such as Dr Khan, made a different assessment based on the incomplete history provided is of little significance as a mere difference in medical opinion does not amount to a demonstrable error (Merza);
(oo)    the appellant has failed to demonstrate that there has been a demonstrable error with this aspect of the MAC or that the MAC is based on incorrect criteria, and
(pp)    the MAC should be confirmed.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.
The Appeal Panel reviewed the history recorded by the Medical Assessor, his findings on examination, and the reasons for his conclusions as well as the evidence referred to above.

Ground 1 - Factual inconsistencies recorded by the Medical Assessor

The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor noted that the appellant reported that she migrated to Australia in 1996 at the age of one, but in her statement dated 2 February 2024 at paragraph 10 relevantly stated she moved to Australia when she was one year old and was granted Australian Citizenship in March 1986. The appellant submitted that at page 1 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor records the date of injury as 8 March 2023 and on page 10 of the MAC records the date of injury as 3 March 2023. The appellant submits that these discrepancies amount to a demonstrable error or in the alternative, the inconsistencies call into question “the credibility of the MA’s findings and call for closer scrutiny.”
On page 1 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor also noted that the appellant’s date of birth was in 1985. The Appeal Panel also noted that the date of injury in Table 2 on page 9 of the MAC was 8 March 2023.
The Appeal Panel is satisfied that these are typographical errors appropriately characterised as “obvious errors”, and not demonstrable errors.
Section 57(6) of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 and the PIC Procedural Direction PIC7 (Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes), examples of obvious error include: an obvious clerical or typographical error, an error arising from an accidental slip or omission, among others. Obvious errors are errors of a kind which do not go to the substance or fairness of a decision, and do not conflict with the actual assessment made (Wang v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Limited [2005] NSWWCCPD 46 at 37; Newell v John Bruce trading as Tarawa Rural Partnership [2006] NSWWCCPD 282 at 35).
The typographical errors identified by the appellant have no impact on the Medical Assessor’s assessment or findings in the MAC. In particular, the typographical errors have no impact on the matters on which a medical assessment certificate is conclusively presumed to be correct s 326 (1) of the 1998 Act.
Being obvious typographical errors, the Appeal Panel rejects the appellant’s submission that errors call into question the credibility of the Medical Assessor’s findings and call for closer scrutiny. The Appeal Panel agrees with the respondent that this is contrary to the very nature of an obvious error.
The procedure for the correction of obvious errors is set out in PIC7. An appeal pursuant to
s 327 of the 1998 Act is not the appropriate mechanism to correct obvious errors. This ground of appeal is not made out.

Ground 2 - Failure to provide adequate reasons

The appellant submits that no context is provided in relation to the vocational assessment report of Platinum Rehabilitation Group dated 16 February 2024 and the notes from Merrylands Family Practice (various dates) at 10 c of the MAC so that “the reader is forced to form their own opinion as to what the Medical Assessor intended by referring to these documents.”
At 10c of the MAC, the Medical Assessor is to provide brief comments regarding the other medical opinions and findings submitted by the parties and, where applicable, the reasons why the Medical Assessor’s opinion differs.
The case law in relation to the provision of sufficient reasons by decision makers, includes cautioning against a hyper critical approach to the reasons (Bojko v ICM Property Service Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 175 at 36) and affirming that a decision maker’s reasons are not to be over-zealously scrutinized when seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [271-271]). Basten JA in Campbelltown City Council v Vegan & Ors [2006] NSWCA 284 at [121]-[122] said:
“…where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary for the Panel to give some explanation for its preference for one conclusion over another. That aspect may have particular significance in circumstances where the medical members of a Panel have made their own assessment of the applicant’s condition and have come to a different conclusion from that reached by other medical practitioners, as set out in reports provided to the Panel.
….
…to fulfil a minimum legal standard, the reasons need not be extensive or provide detailed explanation of the criteria applied by medical specialists in reaching a professional judgment … At least, that will be so where the medical science is not controversial: if it is, a more expansive explanation may be required.”
The appellant has not identified any conclusion in the vocational assessment report of Platinum Rehabilitation Group dated 16 February 2024 or in the notes from Merrylands Family Practice which required explanation for a preference for one conclusion over another.
The Appeal Panel accepts that the clinical records from Merrylands Family Practice (including specialists reports), the vocational assessment from Platinum Rehab Group and the MAC, as well as the matters addressed in the clinical records, the vocational report and the MAC are essentially and inherently different. There being no overlap in the medical science and matters addressed by the clinical records, vocational report and MAC, there is therefore no controversy between the documents which requires ventilation by the Medical Assessor.
The Medical Assessor did on page 7 (under heading 10c) provide detailed, thought out and considered reasons as to the divergences in opinion with other independent and treating doctors who have specifically addressed the subject injury.
The Appeal Panel considers that the appellant’s submissions as to the insufficiency of the Medical Assessor’s reasons in relation to the clinical records and the vocational assessment are hyper critical and overzealous, particularly given the totality of the Medical Assessor’s response in addressing the divergences in opinion with other independent and treating doctors who have specifically addressed the subject injury.
The Appeal Panel is satisfied that the appellant’s submissions do not disclose a demonstrable error with respect to the adequacy of the Medical Assessor’s reasons and this ground of appeal is not made out.

Ground 3 - Failure to take into account relevant considerations

The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor did not comment on the issues with the appellant’s weight or address this as a relevant issue in the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene.
The appellant in her statement dated 5 May 2025, stated at paragraph 15: “…I now suffer from an appetite disturbance and weight gain of approximately 23kg.”
The report of Dr Khan dated 6 November 2024. Dr Khan relevantly reported the following at page 9 of his report in respect of the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene: “…Ms Olovi’s neglect to her self-care is evidenced by her appetite disturbance and weight gain of approximately 23kg since the subject injury”. In the report of Associate Professor Davies, dated 23 April 2025, he took the following history at page 5 of his report: “Ms Olovi said that she had put on a lot of weight ‘since all of this has happened’.”
In a report of Dr Cameron dated 25 November 2024, Dr Cameron took the following history at pages 3 and 4 of his report: At page 3: “…She said she had gained weight and used to be 63kg and was now 79kg”. At page 4: “Appetite/Weight change – about 79-80kg. Please see above. Just eats junk food.”
The Appeal Panel notes that the appellant’s submissions make no reference to the actual documented evidence of the appellant’s weight since the subject injury on 8 March 2023.
In the “observations” (pages 127 to 128, ARD) in the clinical records from Lane Cove Doctors Medical Centre the appellant’s weight is recorded at various dates. The earliest record of the appellant’s weight is on 23 August 2017 at which time she weighed 93.7kg. The Appeal Panel notes that this entry was made prior to the appellant’s bariatric surgery on
14 December 2017 (page 131, ARD). The latest record of the appellant’s weight is on
28 April 2023 (being around seven weeks after the first injurious event). At that time, the appellant weighed 78kg.
The report of Dr Darshika Christie-David dated 17 October 2023 (pages 276-277, ARD) records the appellant’s weight at 75.8kg. Dr Christie-David noted:
“She reached a minimum weight following her weight-loss surgery in 2017 of 63kg from a previous weight of 101kg. Her weight did increase about 10kg during COVID lockdown, although over the last year she has maintained stable weight around 77kg.”
In the “observations” (page 217, Reply) in the clinical records of Dr Kafiris, the appellant’s weight is recorded at various times. The earliest entry is 5 July 2024, at which time the appellant weighed 77kg. The next entry dated 12 November 2024 notes the appellant’s weight at 74kg. The final entry dated 17 April 2025 notes the appellant’s weight at 72kg.
The Appeal Panel considers that the medical evidence demonstrates a continued decrease in the appellant's weight since the initial March 2023 incident. Indeed, in April 2023 (seven weeks after 8 March 2023) she weighed 78kg. By 17 May 2025 (around eight weeks prior to the assessment with the Medical Assessor), she weighed 72kg.
The Appeal Panel is satisfied that despite the appellant’s assertions to various independent practitioners, as well in her statement, there is no documented evidence of weight gain since the subject injury. Therefore, it was not open to the Medical Assessor to consider the appellant’s alleged weight gain since 8 March 2023 as the medical evidence does not support the appellant’s allegations in this regard.
There is no evidence to support the appellant’s alleged weight gain as a result of the subject injury. The evidence demonstrates she has lost weight since 8 March 2023. The Medical Assessor appropriately considered the factors in relation to the PIRS Category of self-care and personal hygiene with respect to eating habits and nutrition when assessing the appellant. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Medical Assessor failed to take into account relevant considerations. This ground of appeal is not made out.

Ground 4 – PIRS scales

Self-care and personal hygiene

The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor pays no regard to the appellant’s reported weight gain on the evidence, such that it plays no bearing on the PIRS category of self-care and personal hygiene when it arguably should have.
The appellant argues that the Medical Assessor should have taken into consideration the appellant’s reported weight gain as a relevant factor and had the Medical Assessor done so, a Class 3 rating was warranted on the evidence.
The examples under Table 11.1 for “Self-care and personal hygiene” in the Guidelines are:
“Class 2 Mild impairment: Able to live independently; looks after self adequately, although may look unkempt occasionally; sometimes misses a meal or relies on take-away food.
Class 3 Moderate impairment: Can't live independently without regular support. Needs prompting to shower daily and wear clean clothes. Does not prepare own meals, frequently misses meals. Family member or community nurse visits (or should visit) 2-3 times per week to ensure minimum level of hygiene and nutrition.”
The Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as Class 2 for self-care and personal hygiene. In the PIRS Rating Form, the Medical Assessor wrote:
“Self care and personal hygiene - Class 2
Ms Olovi reported that she showers in frequently, with the reason that she forgets to shower. She is no longer as concerned about her hygiene and self-care as she used to be before. she relies on her husband to do the household chores like cooking and cleaning, she is however able to wash the dishes, do vacuuming and general tidying up around the house.”
Under “Findings on Physical examination” the Medical Assessor noted that the appellant was wearing pyjamas and a T-shirt with her hair tied back.
In her statement dated 5 May 2025, the appellant stated at paragraph 6 that Dr Khan in his report dated 15 November 2024 referred to appetite disturbance with a weight gain of approximately 23kg. She wrote:
“14. Prior to my injury, I would take pride in my appearance and maintain my self-care and personal hygiene as best I could. I took regular showers, brushed my teeth frequently, and followed my skin and health care routine.
15. Since my injury, I would only shower and brush my teeth one to two times per week when prompted by my husband. Sometimes I keep my distance from my husband due to my lack of self-care which impacts our relationship. I often wear the same clothes for a few days without changing them and now find it difficult to maintain a healthy routine independently without prompting. I do not take pride in my appearance anymore and have lost all motivation. I often find myself isolated in my bedroom. Unfortunately, I now suffer from an appetite disturbance and weight gain of approximately 23kg. My mother has moved closer to provide additional assistance.
16. Prior to my work injury, I regularly cooked for my husband. Now, I do not prepare meals, and struggle to assist my husband with the cooking despite his numerous requests. I often purchase take away food and take comfort in the food I eat resulting in my weight gain. I have also noticed that I now bite my nails, sweat a lot and grind my teeth.”
Dr Abdal Khan, consultant psychiatrist, in a report dated 6 November 2024, reported that the appellant had an appetite disturbance with weight gain of approximately 23kg. He noted that she was dressed in casual attire and appeared unkempt.
In his report dated 6 November 2024, Dr Khan assessed the appellant as Class 3 for
self-care and personal hygiene and provided the following reasons:
“Ms Olovi showers and brushes her teeth less frequently, often only one to two times per week when prompted by her husband. She spends most of her time isolating in her bedroom. Ms Olovi relies on her husband to complete domestic duties. Her mother moved closer to her to provide additional support. Ms Olovi’s neglect to her self-care is evidenced by her appetite disturbance and weight gain of approximately 23kg since the subject injury.”
In a report dated 23 April 2025 Associate Professor Gordon Davies noted under “Medical History” that the appellant reported that she had put on a lot of weight “since all of this has happened”. He wrote:
“She said that she had lost forty kilograms prior to her marriage but since had put on weight as she was eating a work. Ms Olovi said that she had been prescribed the medication Ozempic to help her lose weight and has lost five or six kilograms.”
Associate Professor Gordon Davies noted that the appellant was wearing nightwear.
The appellant submits that Medical Assessor should have taken into consideration the appellant’s reported weight gain as a relevant factor and had the Medical Assessor done so, a Class 3 rating was warranted on the evidence. However, as noted above under “Ground 3”, there was no actual weight gain by the appellant since the work injury. The Appeal Panel is satisfied after looking at the clinical records of the treating general practitioner and the report of Dr Darshika Christie-David that the appellant did not have a weight gain of 23kg as she stated following the work injury.
The appellant submits that the appellant was denied procedural fairness as a result of the failure to take into account the weight gain and that the Medical Assessor erred.
The Appeal Panel rejects that submission. The Appeal Panel is satisfied that there was no weight gain following her work injury and therefore there was no denial of procedural fairness.
The Appeal Panel is not persuaded that there has been a demonstrable error with this aspect of the MAC or that the MAC is based on incorrect criteria.
This ground of appeal is not made out.

Social and recreational activities

The appellant submits that it was “baffling” as to how the Medical Assessor drew the conclusion that the appellant warranted a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of social and recreational activities notwithstanding the appellant’s complaints during the assessment of having trouble leaving the house and having conversations with others.
The appellant argues that the Medical Assessor does not grapple with this evidence such that it is difficult to appreciate whether there had been an active intellectual process directed at the information at all (see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA at [59]) and a Class 3 rating was warranted on the available evidence.
The examples under Table 11.2 for “social and recreational activities” in the Guidelines are:
“Class 2: Mild impairment: occasionally goes out to such events e.g. without needing a support person, but does not become actively involved (e.g. dancing, cheering favourite team).
Class 3: Moderate impairment: rarely goes out to such events, and mostly when prompted by family or close friend. Will not go out without a support person. Not actively involved, remains quiet and withdrawn.”
The Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as Class 2 for social and recreational activities. In the PIRS Rating Form, the Medical Assessor wrote:
“Social and recreational activities - Class 2
Ms Olovi reported she previously enjoyed “sewing, swimming and reading books”. She has now stopped engaging in sewing or reading, as it does not interest her anymore. She no longer goes for swimming as the night shift worker once called her fat when she was swimming. Her mother comes and visits her at least two to three times a week. Her brother too comes and sees her whenever her mother comes. She socialises regularly with her brother and mother. Her husband and herself too would make a movie night and either cook at home or go out.
They usually go out to Penrith or Kings Langley to restaurants in that area. She has too close friends who come over whenever her husband invites them. She has attended funerals as and when required. She also attended her brother's wedding in May 2024. She has been able to go to the mosque after the injury as she finds that helpful and to find her inner peace.”
At page 3 of the MAC, the Medical Assessor takes to the following history under “Present Symptoms”:
“Ms Olovi reported that she continues to have difficulties as before. She experiences trouble leaving her house and having conversations with others. She feels ongoing anxiety about being judged and about people talking about her. She has ‘good days when she is normal.’ She added that she is particularly anxious when she is outside her home, and that people look at her and judge her.”
In her statement dated 2 February 2024, the appellant wrote: “My hobbies include swimming, reading and sewing. I don’t sew anymore, I have not been as creative since the onset of my symptoms, and I have not sewn since.”
In his statement dated 5 May 2025, the appellant wrote:
“Prior to my injury, I often engaged in social activities willingly. I would attend family events, participate in hobbies such as reading and drawing, attend dinners, and family lunch. However, since my psychological injury, I have become socially withdrawn. I no longer engage in any social or recreational activities. I rarely leave my home, and I have no close friends as I constantly believe that someone is always talking about me. I am embarrassed of my situation and do not want anyone seeing me in this state.”

In his report dated 6 November 2024, Dr Khan assessed the appellant as Class 2 for social and recreational activities and provided the following reasons:
“Ms Olovi previously enjoyed socialising with family and friends, attending outings, reading and drawing. She does not engage in any social and recreational activities. Ms Olovi remains socially withdrawn.”
In his report dated 23 April 2025, Associate Professor Davies noted that when asked about her current activities, the appellant said that she was not doing a lot. He reported that she said she was watching some television and her husband would take her for a walk in the evenings.
Associate Professor Davies noted: “Ms Olovi said that her friends used to come and visit but that they would ask her questions and now do not come anymore. Ms Olovi said that she only answers the phone if it is her mother or her husband.”
The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant socialises regularly with her brother and mother, had movie nights with her husband and either cook at home or go out. The Medical Assessor noted that “they usually go out to Penrith or Kings Langley to restaurants in that area”. The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant has two close friends who come over whenever her husband invites them and has attended funerals as and when required as well as her brother's wedding in May 2024 and is able to go to the mosque.
The Appeal Panel also notes that the appellant went to Bali in 2024 with her husband and her “friend’s friend”. While the travel to and from Bali would be taken into account in assessing the scale of travel, the actual time in Bali is a holiday and clearly involves recreational activity.
The Appeal Panel notes that both Dr Kaplan and Associate Professor Davies obtained rather different histories concerning social and recreational activities compared to the more comprehensive history taken by the Medical Assessor. The Medical Assessor’s history is not challenged.
The Appeal Panel considers that the history taken by the Medical Assessor is consistent with a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of social and recreational activities. Although the appellant told the Medical Assessor that she has trouble leaving the house and having conversations with others, she is able to leave her home and go to restaurants and go on holiday.
The Appeal Panel is satisfied that the Medical Assessor engaged with all of the evidence and there had been an “active intellectual process directed at the information.” The Appeal Panel is not persuaded that there has been a demonstrable error with this aspect of the MAC or that the MAC is based on incorrect criteria.
This ground of appeal is not made out.

Travel

The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 1 in respect of the PIRS category “travel” when the Medical Assessor noted that the appellant left the house for medical appointments and was driven by her husband 95% of the time. Further, the Medical Assessor conceded that the appellant was able to drive on her own to the nearby shopping centres and that her husband drove her to see her mother. The appellant argues that on the available evidence, a minimum of a Class 2 rating was warranted.
The examples under Table 11.3 for “Travel” in the Guidelines are:
“Class 1 No deficit, or minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population: Can travel to new environments without supervision.
Class 2 Mild impairment: Can travel without support person, but only in a familiar area such as local shops, visiting a neighbour.
Class 3 Moderate impairment: Cannot travel away from own residence without support person. Problems may be due to excessive anxiety or cognitive impairment.”
The Medical Assessor assessed Class 1 in relation to travel noting:
“Ms Olovi leaves her house for medical appointments and said that her husband drives her 95% of the time. She is able to drive on her own to the nearby shopping centres. Her husband drives her to see her mother at least once a week, she denied any overseas travel but when I highlighted that the documents mentioned that she went to Bali in June 2024, she said ‘I forgot, I went to Bali.’ I again asked her if she went to Bali with her friends, she denied and said that she only went with her husband, I again highlighted the documents mentioning that she had gone to Bali with her friends to which she said ‘she is not my friend she is my friend’s friend’.”
In her statement dated 5 May 2025, the appellant wrote:
“18. Prior to my injury, I was able to travel outside of my house independently, catch public transport, and drive without feeling stressed or anxious. Since my injury, I find it extremely distressing to leave my house, even when supported by my husband. I rarely travel independently and often do not leave my bedroom for the vast majority of the day.”
In his report dated 6 November 2024, Dr Khan assessed the appellant as Class 2 for travel and provided the following reasons: “Ms Olovi requires her husband to be present as a support person when leaving her home due to her debilitating anxiety, panic and avoidance of crowds.”
Associate Professor Davies, in his report of 23 April 2025, noted that the appellant said that she was able to drive but not on main roads.
The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor did not adequately engage with the appellant’s evidence and that of Dr Khan and Associate Professor Davies. The appellant argues that the Medial Assessor failed to adequately address and/or respond to this evidence.
The Appeal Panel accepts that the appellant leaves her house for medical appointments although her husband drives her 95% of the time, is able to drive on her own to the nearby shopping centres, is driven by her husband to see her mother at least once a week and went to Bali for a holiday in June 2024 with her husband. The Appeal Panel notes that most of the appellant’s travel involves her being driven or accompanied by her husband. She said in her statement dated 5 May 2025 that prior to her injury she was able to travel independently outside her house, catch public transport and drive without being stressed or anxious. The Appeal Panel accepts that the appellant now rarely travels independently.
The Appeal Panel considers that the evidence including the history obtained by the Medical Assessor is inconsistent with a Class 1 rating and is consistent with a Class 2 rating.
Based on the evidence before the Appeal Panel, and for the reasons provided by the Medical Assessor in the MAC, the Appeal Panel considered that the reasoning process was not sufficiently clear in the assessment of travel and the Medical Assessor did not provide in his reasons an adequate explanation of why she determined that the appellant had no deficit, or a minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population. In these circumstances, the Appeal Panel concludes that the Medical Assessor failed to provide sufficient reasons for rating the appellant as Class 2 for travel and such failure was a demonstrable error.
This ground of appeal is made out.

Social functioning

The appellant notes that the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of social functioning. The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor “tempers” the appellant’s psychological symptoms in respect of her relationships, in particular, her relationship with her husband and the appellant had experienced a period of separation from her husband on account of her fragile mental state.
The examples under Table 11.4 for “social functioning” in the Guidelines are:
“Class 2: Mild impairment: Existing relationships strained. Tension and arguments with partner or close family member, loss of some friendships.
Class 3: Moderate impairment: Previously established relationships severely strained, evidenced by periods of separation or domestic violence. Spouse, relatives or community services looking after children.”
The Medical Assessor assessed Class 2 in relation to social functioning noting:
“Ms Olovi reported that she has positive relationship with her mother and brother who lives in Kings Langley. Her husband however has been quite supportive and provides additional support. There was a time when he when her husband went to stay with her mother for a month, but they soon sorted their differences out and he has been helping her in day to day chores and emotionally supporting her.”
In her statement dated 2 May 2024, the appellant stated at paragraph 25:
"It has affected my marriage more than anything else. I tend to snap at my husband, and I am picking on little things due to the lack of sleep and bad dreams. I keep thinking about what has happened in the past and taking it out on him, so we start arguing about things that we didn’t really need to argue about.”
In her statement dated 5 May 2025, the appellant wrote:
“Prior to my injury, I had a social lifestyle with many friends and frequently communicated with my husband. Since my injury, I have lost contact with my friends and have become easily agitated and irritable. I tend to lose my temper much quicker with my husband if I am having a bad day. This agitation and irritability have caused tension in my relationships. It has caused me to become withdrawn from my friends and family. There was also a period of time when I had separated from my husband due to my fragile mental state.”
In his report dated 6 November 2024, Dr Khan assessed the appellant as Class 3 for social functioning and provided the following reasons:
“Ms Olovi has experienced strain in her marriage and there was a period of time when she had separated from her husband due to her fragile mental state. During this time,
her mother needed to provide additional support. She remains withdrawn from her extended family and friends.”
In his report dated 23 April 2025, Associate Professor Davies took a history of the following in relation to the appellant’s husband: “…She said that there are however times when she does not want to talk to him and that she ‘just shuts’ herself in her room and isolates herself.”
The appellant submits that it is difficult to appreciate how the Medical Assessor determined that the appellant warranted a Class 2 rating based on the available evidence, which described a period of separation, which is a component of a Class 3 rating in addition to the existing issues in the relationship. The appellant submits that a Class 3 rating was warranted.
The Appeal Panel accepts that the appellant has positive relationship with her mother and brother and her husband is quite supportive. The Appeal Panel accepts that in the past there was a period of about one month when her husband went to stay with her mother, however, the appellant and her husband “soon sorted their differences out” and he has been helping her in day to day chores and emotionally supporting her. Impairment is assessed at the time of the examination by the Medical Assessor. At the time of this examination, the appellant was not separated from her husband. Their separation was historic and transient, and while their current relationship may be described as strained it could not be described as severely strained on the basis of the history obtained by the Medical Assessor. In addition, Dr Khan noted that there was strain in the marriage but did not describe the marriage as severely strained as described in the examples for a Class 3 assessment.
The Appeal Panel considers that the evidence including the history obtained by the Medical Assessor is consistent with a Class 2 rating for social functioning.
Based on the evidence before the Appeal Panel, and for the reasons provided by the Medical Assessor in the MAC, the Appeal Panel considered that the reasoning process was sufficiently clear in the assessment of social functioning and the Medical Assessor provided an adequate explanation of why she assessed the appellant as Class 2. The Appeal Panel is not persuaded that there has been a demonstrable error with this aspect of the MAC or that the MAC is based on incorrect criteria.
This ground of appeal is not made out.

Concentration, persistence and pace

The appellant notes that the Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as a Class 2 in respect of the PIRS category of concentration, persistence and pace. The appellant takes issue with the Medical Assessor’s opinion at page 11 which states the following: “…Ms Olovi gave crisp replies when answering to the questions and there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence or pace.”
The examples under Table 11.5 for “concentration, persistence and pace” in the Guidelines are:
“Class 2: Mild impairment: can undertake a basic retraining course, or a standard course at a slower pace. Can focus on intellectually demanding tasks for periods of up to 30 minutes, then feels fatigued or develops headache.
Class 3: Moderate impairment: unable to read more than newspaper articles. Finds it difficult to follow complex instructions (e.g. operating manuals, building plans), make significant repairs to motor vehicle, type long documents, follow a pattern for making clothes, tapestry or knitting.”
The Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as Class 2 for concentration, persistence and pace. In the PIRS Rating Form, the Medical Assessor wrote:
“Concentration, persistence and pace - Class 2.
Ms Olovi reported that her attention concentration is poor. She added that she had difficulty in reading and retaining the information. She added that she has memory of her “goldfish and difficulty in remembering things, especially needing prompting for
her medical appointments. She also forgets people's name. She uses Instagram but then just “stares at the screen.” She uses Instagram towards spiritual things to help her cope with her situation. Ms Olovi was not distracted and was able to focus during the assessment. She was able to give correct timeline of the incidents. Ms Olovi gave crisp replies when answering to the questions and there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence or pace.”
Under “Social Activities/ADL” the Medical Assessor wrote:
“Concentration, Persistence, and Pace: Ms. Olovi reported that her attention and
concentration are poor. She mentioned difficulties in reading and retaining information. She compared her memory to that of a ‘goldfish’ and indicated that she often forgets things, especially needing reminders for her medical appointments, and she also forgets people's names. She watches TV but mostly ‘stares ot the screen.’ She uses Instagram to share spiritual content, which helps her cope with her situation. During the assessment, Ms Olovi remained focused and was not distracted. She correctly provided a timeline of incidents and answered questions with crisp replies, showing no evidence of significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence, or pace.”
Under “Findings on Mental State Examination” the Medical Assessor wrote:
“I reviewed Ms Olovi via video. She engaged superficially during the assessment and was cooperative. She presented as a young female of Afghanistani background who appeared appropriate for her age. She was wearing her pyjamas and a T-shirt, with her hair tied back. There was no evidence of psychomotor agitation or retardation. No abnormal motor movements, such as tics or mannerisms, were noted. She reported her mood to be low, and her affect was congruent with the mood described. Her speech was spontaneous and normal in volume and tone; her thoughts were logical and goal-directed. Currently, she reported ongoing negative rumination, anhedonia, a lack of interest in activities, and sleep disturbances.
There was no evidence of manic, psychotic, or perceptual abnormalities. I have noted the presence of pseudo hallucinations; however, they were not true hallucinations. She was able to focus and pay attention during the assessment and was not distracted. There were no obvious cognitive deficits noted during the assessment. She had insight into her condition, and her judgement was intact. She denied having any thoughts of harming herself or others, as well as any suicidal ideas, plans, or intent.”
In her statement dated 2 May 2024, the appellant stated: “My current injury has affected my capacity to do anything during the day; I sit on the couch and do nothing, and I cannot focus on everyday duties; it has made me very tired.”
In her statement dated 5 May 2025, the appellant wrote:
“20. Prior to my injury, I had no issues with focusing on activities and I was able to multitask. I used to enjoy watching movies, reading, and discussing various topics with people. Since my injury my attention and concentration levels have deteriorated dramatically. I cannot read a book and remain focused or retain the information I had read. During conversations, I tend to lose my trail of thought, am easily distracted, or unengaged. I struggle to remember what was being discussed or what was previously said. It is difficult for me to watch movies or read books. My memory is poor, and I am now forgetful. I often require instructions to be repeated to me before I can understand what is required of me. There have been occasions previously when I tried to cook but left the stove on or severely burnt the food.”
In his report dated 6 November 2024, Dr Khan assessed the appellant as Class 3 for concentration, persistence and pace and provided the following reasons:
“Ms Olovi struggles with her attention and concentration. She has difficulty focusing on tasks such as reading and retaining the information she reads. Ms Olovi is easily
distracted and her memory is impaired. There have been occasions previously when she tried to cook but left the stove on.”
In his report dated 23 April 2025, Associate Professor Davies noted that the appellant said that she had forgotten her birthday until her husband reminded her and she used to help her husband with his accounts but no longer does so. He noted that she said that she has a television in her room as she had trouble concentrating to read.
As noted above, the appellant took issue with the Medical Assessor’s opinion at page 11 under the PIRS category ‘concentration, persistence and pace’ which states the following:
“…Ms Olovi gave crisp replies when answering to the questions and there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence or pace.”
The appellant argues that the reader is simply forced to accept the Medical Assessor’s opinion at face value, absent adequate reasons to support this rationale. In particular, the appellant submits that to a lay person, the words “…there was no evidence of any significant deterioration in her concentration, persistence or pace” arguably convey no meaning and the Medical Assessor was required to provide further reasons in support of classing the appellant as a Class 2.
The Appeal Panel notes that the observations during the examination are a matter properly taken into account in assessing impairment in this scale. The Medical Assessor also took a history of the appellant reporting that her attention concentration was poor, having difficulty in reading and retaining the information, comparing her memory of that of a goldfish, having difficulty in remembering things, needing prompting for medical appointments and forgetting people's names.
The Appeal Panel accepts that the appellant in her statement dated 5 May 2025 maintained that her attention and concentration levels had deteriorated dramatically and she could not read a book and remain focused or retain the information she read. Dr Khan reported that there had been occasions previously when the appellant tried to cook but left the stove on. Associate Professor Davies noted that the appellant said that she had forgotten her birthday until her husband reminded her and she used to help her husband with his accounts but no longer did so. He also noted that she said that she has a television in her room as she had trouble concentrating to read.

The Appeal Panel accepts that the Medical Assessor made no reference to the appellant’s statements and the evidence in those statements concerning memory, focus and concentration were not addressed by the Medical Assessor in the MAC. The Medical Assessor did not explain why she did not accept this evidence, when it was significantly different to the evidence relied upon in the MAC.
There is no evidence of the appellant’s undertaking, or being able to undertake, a retraining course or a standard course, or evidence of the appellant’s ability to focus on intellectually demanding tasks for periods of up to 30 minutes apart from her participation in the medical examination. However, the Medical Assessor did not provide any details of the time the assessment took or address the total period that the appellant was able to focus.
Garling J in Jenkins v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [2015] NSWSC 633 (Jenkins) at [64] held that the examples given in the tables in the Guidelines were neither the sole, nor the minimum, basis for assessment of a person’s impairment as falling within a particular class. Rather, his Honour held, at [60]:
“Those examples attempt to explore the ways in which a psychiatric condition impacts upon the activities of daily living of an individual, and their capacity to function in the areas described.”
While the Appeal Panel agree that the examples in the PIRS Tables are not the sole, nor the minimum, basis for assessment within a particular scale, the evidence of the appellant in her statement and the reasons provided by Dr Khan in his assessment and the history provided by Associate Professor Davies do not support a finding of a mild impairment in this scale.
Based on the evidence before the Appeal Panel, and for the reasons provided by the Medical Assessor in the MAC, the Appeal Panel considered that the reasoning process was not sufficiently clear in the assessment of concentration, persistence and pace. This ground of appeal is made out.
The Appeal Panel, having reviewed the evidence in this matter, assesses the appellant as Class 3 in the scale of concentration, persistence and pace.

Employability

The appellant submitted the Medical Assessor erred in her assessment of Class 4 in respect of the PIRS category of employability. The appellant argues that it is difficult to appreciate how the Medical Assessor formed this opinion in circumstances where Dr Khan assessed the appellant as a Class 5 and Associate Professor Davies who also considered that the appellant, as she presented, would be considered unfit for employment. The appellant submits that there is a failure to undertake an active intellectual process directed at the information.
The examples under Table 11.6 for “employability” in the Guidelines are:
“Class 4: Severe impairment: cannot work more than one or two days at a time, less than 20 hours per fortnight. Pace is reduced, attendance is erratic.
Class 5: Totally impaired: Cannot work at all.”
The Medical Assessor assessed the appellant as Class 3 for employability. In the PIRS Rating Form, the Medical Assessor wrote:
“Employability - Class 4.
Ms Olovi reported that because of her ongoing difficulties, she does not believe that she could work. I highlighted her, I highlighted the document that she was the director and owner of a car dealership, Prestige Motorhouse to which she said that she was just the director. I then asked her to clarify about the Z.A.I couture to which she said that her husband just ‘registered the company as she has a degree.’ I believe that Ms Olovi cannot work for more than one or two days at a time and less than 20 hours per fortnight. She could work as a designer initially from her home until her anxiety decreases.”
In the MAC under “Consistency of Presentation”, the Medical Assessor noted:
“Ms Olovi denied engaging in any form of work or employment. However, the document suggested that Ms Olovi registered the company and was the director of her company Z.A.I Couture since 12 June 2024. The desktop investigation also mentioned that she had been able to create a fashion portfolio which was published at Whitehouse-design.”
In her statement dated 5 May 2025, the appellant wrote:
“21. Prior to my work injury I was a confident employee with a strong work ethic. I completed my role with no difficulty and was good at what I was doing. I enjoyed going to work and felt that it gave me a strong sense of purpose. Since my psychological injury, I am completely unable to return to work. I experience significant stress, anxiety, and depression with some days being worse than others. I struggle to fall asleep and stay asleep due to my anxiety which means I have a very inconsistent sleep pattern. I constantly feel emotionally distressed and this is draining. I am no longer the same person I used to be as I am no longer able to cope with everyday activities and responsibility.”
Dr Khan noted:
“…from the date of injury to date, Ms Olovi has suffered an incapacity to work. She has been totally incapacitated to work from around July 2023 to date. Ms Olovi’s total incapacity to work is likely to persist for the foreseeable future….
Given Ms Olovi’s injury and illness, it is unlikely that she will ever again engage in gainful employment in a sustainable basis in any occupation for which she is reasonably qualified by education, training and experience. From a psychiatric perspective, she is considered totally and permanently disabled.”
In his report dated 6 November 2024, Dr Khan assessed the appellant as Class 5 for employability and provided the following reasons: “Ms Olovi cannot work at all due to her pervasive mental health and cognitive difficulties.”
Associate Professor Gordon Davies considered that the appellant was, as she presents, unfit for employment but with treatment should improve and be able to resume work. He considered that with adequate treatment and rehabilitation support the appellant should be able to return to work within three months.
The appellant submits that it is difficult to appreciate how the Medical Assessor formed this opinion in circumstances where Dr Khan assessed the appellant as a Class 5 and Associate Professor Davies considered that the appellant, as she presented, would be considered unfit for employment.
The appellant submits that while a clinical assessment is a component of the medical assessment, no regard appears to have been paid to this evidence of two experts qualified in psychiatric injuries and a Class 5 rating is warranted.
The Appeal Panel notes that the appellant’s submissions do not address the additional history reported to the Medical Assessor of the appellant being a director and owner of a car dealership (Prestige Motor House) and that her husband registered a company Z.A.I Couture “as she has a degree.” The Medical Assessor noted that the documents suggested that the appellant registered the company and was the sole director of Z.A.I. Couture and she was appointed to the role of director and shareholder of Z.A.I Couture from 12 June 2024. The history of the appellant’s involvement with Prestige Motor House and Z.A.I Couture was not considered by Dr Khan or by Associate Professor Davies. This difference in the history reported by the Medical Assessor and that taken by Dr Khan and Associate Professor Davies is a factor which explains the difference in the assessments of impairment in this scale.
The Appeal Panel rejects the submission that the Medical Assessor failed to undertake an active intellectual process directed at the information. The Medical Assessor referred to the differences in her assessment and took a more detailed history.
The Appeal Panel is not persuaded that there has been a demonstrable error with this aspect of the MAC or that the MAC is based on incorrect criteria. This ground of appeal is not made out.
The Appeal Panel assesses the appellant as Class 2 for travel and Class 3 for concentration, persistence and pace. The Appeal Panel finds no error, nor the application of incorrect criteria in the assessments of Class 2 for self-care and personal hygiene, Class 2 for social and recreational activities, Class 2 for social functioning, and Class 4 for employability.
The Appeal Panel finds that the PIRS scales score 2 2 2 2 3 4, ascending order 2 2 2 2 3 4, median 2, aggregate 15 so that the WPI = 8%. The Appeal Panel noted that the deduction of one tenth made by the Medical Assessor pursuant to s 323 was not appealed and therefore make a one tenth deduction which results in a total of 7% WPI.
For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 17 June 2025 should be revoked, and a new MAC should be issued. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reason.

WORKERS COMPENSATION DIVISION

APPEAL PANEL

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE

Injuries received after 1 January 2002

Matter number:	W5051/25
Applicant:	Madina Olovi
Respondent:	Secure Parking Pty Ltd ATF Secure Kings Unit Trust

This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998.

The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Surabhi Verma and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the Table below:

Table - whole person impairment (WPI)

Body Part or system

Date of Injury

Chapter, page and paragraph number in NSW workers compensation guidelines

Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides

% WPI

Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition

Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6)

1.Psychological

8 March 2023

Chapter 11 11.1-11.3

11.4 – 11.6

1/10

Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals)

[2025] NSWPICMP 850

4 November 2025