Olivia Christian v Giuseppe Arnaldo and Sons T/A Cucina Casalinga Italiana Pty Ltd

[2013] FWC 9487

[2013] FWC 9487

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Olivia Christian
v
Giuseppe Arnaldo and Sons T/A Cucina Casalinga Italiana Pty Ltd
(U2013/2771)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY MELBOURNE, 5 DECEMBER 2013

Application for relief from unfair dismissal - voluntary liquidation - application stayed.

[1] On 17 August 2013, Ms Olivia Christian made an application for remedy for unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009. Ms Christian’s employment was terminated by Giuseppe Arnaldo and Sons T/A Cucina Casalinga Italiana Pty Ltd (Cucina Casalinga Italiana) on 8 August 2013.

[2] Conciliation was listed however, it could not take place as the liquidator had been appointed.

[3] On 3 October 2013, the liquidator, Mr David Mansfield of Moore Stephens (the liquidator), filed a response to the application in addition to correspondence which advised that Cucina Casalinga Italiana was placed in voluntary liquidation on 28 August 2013. The liquidator provided the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) with a copy of the ASIC Form 205 - Notification of resolution - voluntary winding up.

[4] On 12 November 2013, the Commission sent correspondence to Ms Christian which advised that the Commission had formed the preliminary view that her claim for unfair dismissal cannot proceed without leave of the Court, in accordance with s.500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act). Ms Christian was requested to advise the Commission by 20 November 2013 if she had a different view and if so, the matter would be set down for a jurisdictional hearing.

[5] Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:

(2) After the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court imposes.

[6] Section 58AA of the Corporations Act provides the following definition in relation to the meaning of “court” and “Court”:

“58AA Meaning of court and Court

(1) Subject to subsection (2), in this Act:

“court” means any court.

“Court” means any of the following courts:

(a) the Federal Court;

(b) the Supreme Court of a State or Territory;

(c) the Family Court of Australia;

(d) a court to which section 41 of the Family Law Act 1975 applies because of a Proclamation made under subsection 41(2) of that Act.

(2) Except where there is a clear expression of a contrary intention (for example, by use of the expression “the Court”), proceedings in relation to a matter under this Act may, subject to Part 9.7, be brought in any court.

Note: The matters dealt with in Part 9.7 include the applicability of limits on the jurisdictional competence of courts.”

[7] Having regard to this provision and of the Full Bench decision of Smith 1, I am satisfied that the Commission is not a “Court” and is therefore unable to grant leave as prescribed in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[8] In Silalahi v CMI Industrial (Forge) 2, the then Commissioner Jones considered relevant authorities and found that an application pursuant to s.394 of the Act falls within the meaning of “civil proceedings” in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[9] As noted earlier, Ms Christian’s application pursuant to s.394 of the Act was filed on 17 August 2013 and the passing of the resolution for winding up occurred on 28 August 2013.

[10] Taking into account the provisions set out in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act, I am satisfied that Ms Christian’s application cannot proceed any further in the Commission except by leave of the Court.

[11] Therefore, Ms Christian’s application under s.394 of the Act is stayed until leave of the Court is granted.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

 1 Smith & Ors v Trollop Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd (2003) 142 IR 137

 2   [2012] FWA 7275 at [11] - [16]

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