Oliver v Lake Side Resort Development Pty Ltd

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CITATION:

Oliver v Lake Side Resort Development Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 501

HEARING DATE(S): 17/05/05, 18/05/05, 19/05/05, 20/05/05, 24/05/05, 25/05/05
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 


25 May 2005

JURISDICTION:

Equity

JUDGMENT OF:

Barrett J

DECISION:

Direction that witness's answer be removed from record

CATCHWORDS:

EVIDENCE - admissibility - evidence of settlement negotiations - party under cross-examination gives answer disclosing protected communication between persons in dispute - whether that disclosure represents "offer" to consent in terms of s.131(2)(a), (b) or (c) which other parties may then accept

LEGISLATION CITED:

Evidence Act 1995, s.131

PARTIES:

Christopher John Oliver - First Plaintiff
Janet Patterson - Second Plaintiff
Optima Developments Pty Ltd - Third Plaintiff
Lakeside Property Pty Ltd as trustee for the Lakeside Property Trust - Second Defendant
Lakeside Golf Pty Ltd - Third Defendant
Hun Sun Woo - Fourth Defendant

FILE NUMBER(S):

SC 3260/01

COUNSEL:

Ms J.F. Merkel - Plaintiffs
Mr R.K. Newton - Defendants

SOLICITORS:

Mallesons Stephen Jaques - Plaintiffs
James R. Knowles Lawyers Pty Limited - Defendants

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

BARRETT J

WEDNESDAY 25 MAY 2005

3260/01 - CHRISTOPHER JOHN OLIVER & ORS v LAKESIDE RESORT DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD & ORS

JUDGMENT - On admissibility of answer given by the witness. See p.399 of transcript

1 The witness, who is the fourth defendant, has, in the course of cross-examination, given an answer referring to and disclosing a communication clearly comprehended by s.131(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995. I should make it clear at once that the question to which he was responding was not in any way framed so as to seek to elicit information protected by s.131(1).

2 Now that the answer has been given, however, it is submitted by the plaintiffs that the preclusion under s.131 in relation to the adducing of evidence of the particular communication has been removed by force of a consent within s.131(2)(a), (b) or (c). Counsel for the plaintiffs says, in essence, that the situation is one in which the witness, by giving the answer he gave, offered, as it were, to waive the privilege, which offer the plaintiffs now accept.

3 I do not accept that that analysis holds good. This is not a unilateral privilege of the kind, for example, that one finds in the provisions about lawyer/client privilege. The paragraphs of s.131(2) concerning consent make it clear that the "persons in dispute" alone are capable of removing the s.131(1) embargo; and that all of those persons must consent. Furthermore, consent must be in existence when the otherwise precluded evidence is adduced.

4 When the answer in question was given there had been no consent of anyone other than, perhaps, the fourth defendant from whose mouth the answer came. The consent cannot be retrospectively constructed by regarding the answer itself as being an offer to waive the privilege which offer the other parties then become able to accept.

5 Added to this and insofar as s.131(2)(c) is relied upon, I am not persuaded…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWSC 501
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Oliver v Lake Side Resort Development Pty Ltd, the court was called upon to determine the admissibility of evidence in relation to settlement negotiations between the parties. The primary issue before the court was whether the disclosure of a protected communication during cross-examination could be considered as an "offer" to consent as defined under section 131(2)(a), (b) or (c) of the relevant legislation, which other parties could then accept.

The court considered the nature and context of the communication disclosed during the cross-examination. It examined whether the disclosure amounted to a formal or informal offer to consent to a particular settlement term or condition. The court further assessed the impact of the disclosure on the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, weighing the potential benefits of admitting the evidence against the potential prejudice to the party whose communication was disclosed. Ultimately, the court found that the disclosure did not constitute an "offer" to consent under any of the subsections of section 131(2), and therefore, the evidence was inadmissible.

The court ordered that the evidence of the settlement negotiations and the protected communication disclosed during cross-examination was not to be admitted into evidence in the trial. This decision was based on the court's determination that the disclosure did not meet the criteria for an "offer" to consent under section 131(2) of the relevant legislation. Consequently, the court instructed the parties to proceed with the trial without reference to the inadmissible evidence.

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