Oliver v Boeing Defence Australia Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Oliver v Boeing Defence Australia Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 1178

File number(s): SYG 1319 of 2023
Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON
Date of judgment: 6 December 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Application for discovery.  
Legislation:

Fair WorkAct 2009 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 176

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 4.03, 4.05, 14.02

Cases cited:

Abrahams v Qantas Airways Ltd (No. 2) (2007) 210 FLR 314

Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd v Whittaker (No 2) [2021] FCA 696

Edgar v Norton Rose Services (2022) 368 FLR 1

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 16
Date of hearing: 6 December 2023
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant: Esser Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr L. Meagher
Solicitor for the Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

ORDERS

SYG 1319 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

STEVEN OLIVER

Applicant

AND:

BOEING DEFENCE AUSTRALIA LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CAMERON

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application in a proceeding filed 29 November 2023 be dismissed.

2.The date for mediation be confirmed.

3.Subject to any contrary order by the Registrar, the applicant’s legal representative may appear at the mediation by videolink.

4.The parties have liberty to apply.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE CAMERON

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant, Mr Oliver, alleges that during his employment with the respondent, Boeing Defence Australia Ltd (“Boeing”), he held and exercised a workplace right to question whether he had been correctly classified as a “Group 1” employee which, under Boeing’s COVID-19 protocol, was an employee who was required to be vaccinated with a COVID-19 vaccination.  Employees described as “Group 2” employees were not required to be vaccinated. Mr Oliver alleged that during his employment he had claimed that he was not a Group 1 employee and therefore not a person to whom the COVID-19 protocol applied. His solicitor, Mr Esser, has deposed:

    The Applicant maintained at all times that he ought to have been classified as a Group 2 employee and thus graded as an employee who did not need to be COVID-vaccinated.

  2. Mr Oliver alleges that in response to his exercise of a workplace right to question whether he was correctly classified as a person who needed to be vaccinated under the COVID-19 requirements, Boeing took various forms of adverse action against him implicitly in contravention of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 1178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Oliver brought an application against Boeing Defence Australia Ltd for discovery of certain documents. The application centred on the issue of whether Oliver had a right or entitlement to be classified in a particular way under Boeing’s COVID-19 vaccination protocols. The court was required to determine whether further discovery was warranted, particularly given that some documents had already been informally provided by Boeing.

The court considered whether the application for discovery was misconceived and whether it would advance the case in a cost-effective manner. The court noted that the matter had not progressed to the allocation of a hearing date and that other parties in the litigation queue were not a primary concern. The court also highlighted that a mediation was scheduled in two days' time, but it did not consider postponing the mediation to be a significant factor against granting discovery. The court further noted that the reply filed by Oliver lacked particularity and was not properly filed as a matter of right.

The court concluded that it was not in the interests of the administration of justice to grant any further discovery beyond what Boeing had already informally provided. The court dismissed the application in a proceeding, finding that the additional documents sought were unlikely to shed light on the issue of Oliver’s entitlement or right.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further in that regard, whether or not a party is able to make a complaint or an inquiry has been the subject of considerable discussion in the cases. For what it is worth, I draw the parties’ attention to what I said in Edgar v Norton Rose Services (2022) 368 FLR 1 at 201 [738] ff. The issue seems to me to be not whether persons other than Mr Oliver were reclassified, or how they came to be reclassified, but whether Mr Oliver had a legal entitlement or some other right or entitlement of the sort considered in Edgar’s case. The remaining documents of which he seeks discovery do not seem to me to be likely to shed any light on that question.CONCLUSION For those reasons, I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant any more discovery than Boeing has already been willing, informally, to provide and so the application in a proceeding will be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“Rules”) relevantly provides: 14.02 Declaration to allow discovery (1)A declaration may be made under subsection 176(2) of the Act to allow discovery on the application of a party or on the Court’s own initiative.(2)If a declaration is made, the Court or a Registrar may make an order for disclosure:(a) generally; or (b) in relation to particular classes of documents; or (c) in relation to particular issues; or (d) by a specified date. CONSIDERATION The matter has come before the Court today for determination of the application in a proceeding. Having heard the arguments of the parties, and having had regard to documents they have filed, I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant discovery in this matter, at least at this point. Without intending any disrespect, I am concerned that the application for discovery of the documents not already discovered informally is misconceived. Depending on the circumstances of the matter, the interests of the administration of justice can comprehend a variety of considerations, including those recited by Lucev FM in Abrahams v Qantas Airways Ltd (No. 2) (2007) 210 FLR 314 at page 321 [25]. In the circumstances of this case, where it has not progressed to the allocation of a hearing date, the interests of other parties in the litigation queue in this Court are not principal amongst my concerns. However, what is, is whether discovery will advance the case, and will do so on a cost-effective manner. I have not ignored the fact that a mediation is listed in two days’ time and that there is benefit in keeping to the timetable that has been set, but were discovery to be appropriate I would not consider the postponement of a mediation a matter of great significance weighing against granting discovery. This is particularly as, in correspondence from the registrar to whom the mediation has been allocated, which is annexed to Mr Esser’s affidavit, it is advised that a rescheduled mediation could take place within a matter of months. General Discovery Mr Oliver has sought general discovery as a preliminary prayer, but it is difficult to see how general discovery could be effectively, efficiently or fairly undertaken, given the lack of particularity as to the basis of the estoppel alleged in the reply. The reply states, amongst other things: 4. In connection with paragraph 13(b) of the Response, the Applicant says the Respondent is estopped from denying that the Applicant held a workplace right to question if he was correctly classefied [sic] as a person who needed to be vaccinated under the Respondent's COVID protocols, since, at the same time and prior to the Applicant exercising that right, similarly situated employees of the Respondent excercised [sic] the very same workplace right and some of that cohort succeeded in being re-classified as a result of having exercised the subject workplace right. Before going further, I should note that a reply is not a document which can necessarily be filed as a matter of right in this Court, vide rr 4.03, 4.05 of the Rules, and the registry erred in permitting Mr Oliver’s to be filed. The proper course would have been for Mr Oliver to have filed an application in a proceeding seeking leave to file the reply, at which point its apparent deficiency could have been highlighted, discussed and perhaps addressed.