Old Digger Pty Ltd (formerly called SDS Digger Tools Pty Ltd) v Azuko Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Old Digger Pty Ltd (formerly called SDS Digger Tools Pty Ltd) v Azuko Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1158

PATENTS – Separate questions of infringement of patents in suit and counterclaim for revocation of patents on the ground of invalidity determined after trial and appeals – unsuccessful respondents by notice of motion seek to re-open cross-claim or to file a second cross-claim seeking revocation of patents in suit – allegation that respondents under a misapprehension at trial as to the extent of remedies being sought rejected – order dismissing the cross-claim held to be a final order or judgment – held no power to re-open the cross-claim – held question of revocation on the ground of invalidity res judicata – whether issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel would otherwise apply – notice of motion dismissed.

Federal Court Rules O5, r 9;  O 35, r 7

Old Digger Pty Ltd v Azuko Pty Ltd (2000) 51 IPR 43 cited
Azuko Pty Ltd v Old Digger Pty Ltd (2001) 52 IPR 75 cited
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 applied
Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146 cited
Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529 cited
Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1984) 54 ALR 767 discussed
National Society for the Distribution of Electricity by Secondary Generators v Gibbs [1900] 2 Ch 280 cited
Crayford Freight Services Ltd v Coral Seatel Navigation Co (1998) 82 FCR 328 cited
Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 cited
Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd(No 6) [1994] FSR 448 followed
Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 406 cited
Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141 cited
Shoe Machinery Company v Cutlan [1886] 1 Ch 667 followed
Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd (No 14) [1996] FSR 701 discussed
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 cited
Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 cited
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287 cited

OLD DIGGER PTY LTD (FORMERLY CALLED SDS DIGGER TOOLS PTY LTD) v AZUKO PTY LTD
SG5 OF 1997

von DOUSSA J
18 SEPTEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SG 5 OF 1997

BETWEEN:

OLD DIGGER PTY LTD (FORMERLY CALLED SDS DIGGER TOOLS PTY LTD)
APPLICANT

AND:

AZUKO PTY LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT

SEISMIC SUPPLY INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 SEPTEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        Paragraphs 3, 3B and 3C of the amended notice of motion be dismissed.

2.        The matter be re-listed for argument on the question of costs.

3.        Balance of the amended notice of motion adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Old Digger Pty Ltd (formerly called SDS Digger Tools Pty Ltd) v Azuko Pty Ltd, the court was tasked with determining the finality of a judgment dismissing a cross-claim for revocation of patents. The trial commenced on 8 March 1999 but was adjourned due to time constraints, with subsequent hearings and amendments to the particulars of objections. Ultimately, the court ruled that the grounds of objection were not substantiated, leading to the dismissal of the cross-claims for revocation. The appeal of this decision was subsequently dismissed. The central issue before the court was whether the judgment dismissing the cross-claim constituted a final judgment.

The court addressed the nature of cross-claims under s 121 of the Patents Act, noting that such proceedings are independent causes of action that merge into the final judgment. It was held that once a final judgment is entered, the court lacks the authority to set it aside, citing Bailey v Marinoff. The respondents argued that the appeal to the Full Court, which required leave, indicated the interlocutory nature of the judgment. However, the court distinguished this from the principles governing appeals, referencing Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc, where it was held that a composite order can contain both final and interlocutory elements. Ultimately, the court concluded that the judgment dismissing the cross-claim was indeed a final judgment as it determined the rights of the parties in relation to the revocation claims.

Consequently, the court dismissed the respondents' motion to set aside the final judgment. The matter was re-listed for argument on the question of costs, while the balance of the amended notice of motion was adjourned pending further determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraphs 3, 3B and 3C of the amended notice of motion be dismissed.

2. The matter be re-listed for argument on the question of costs.

3. Balance of the amended notice of motion adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The trial commenced on 8 March 1999, but was not completed in the allotted time by 25 March 1999. The hearing was adjourned until July 1999. On 27 April 1999 the respondents filed a sixth version of particulars of objections to the SDS patent and a fifth version of the particulars of objections to the Giehl patent. In these amendments certain grounds of objection relating to the s 40 grounds were abandoned. The s 40 grounds, insofar as they were still pressed, were dealt with in the final addresses. A finding was made that none of the grounds of objection, whether under s 40 or otherwise, were made out: see 51 IPR 43 at [209]-[215], [221]-[223] in relation to the grounds which relied on s 40. The formal order of the Court on 28 June 2000 was that the cross-claims for revocation of both patents be dismissed. That judgment was not disturbed on appeal.Is the judgment dismissing the cross-claim a final judgment? In my opinion the judgment that has been entered on the cross-claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim for revocation. The proceedings for revocation were brought by way of cross-claim. This procedure is permitted by s 121 of the Patents Act, which uses the expression “counter-claim” to describe the proceedings for revocation. This is a convenient course to allow proceedings on separate causes of action to be heard together, as the issues likely to arise in a case to which s 121 has application will, to an extent at least, be common. The proceedings brought by way of cross-claim are nonetheless proceedings in their own right, and in that respect are no different to any other cross-claim or counter-claim: see Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 5th ed. 2002 at 207-208. The proceedings by way of cross-claim have been finally concluded by the entry of a judgment, and the cause of action asserted by the cross-claimant in the cross-claim has merged in the judgment. The claim for revocation is at an end between the parties. The Court has no power to set aside a final judgment which has been entered: Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529. For this reason, FCR O 35, r 7(2)(c), which empowers the Court to set aside a judgment after it has been entered where the order is interlocutory, has no application. Counsel for the respondents sought to persuade the Court to a contrary view by pointing out that the appeal to the Full Court was brought by leave, leave being necessary in the case of an interlocutory judgment: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). In reply, counsel for the applicant referred to Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1984) 54 ALR 767. In that case the appellant sought to appeal to the High Court against orders made in the Full Court of the Federal Court which first, restrained the appellants from infringing copyright, and secondly, restrained the appellants from certain acts of importation. Both orders were for permanent injunctions. The Full Court had then ordered that if the respondents wished to pursue claims for damages they should file and serve on the appellants notice to that effect. Other orders were made as to the taking of further evidence and as to the settling of minutes to give effect to the Court’s findings on matters arising under Trade Practice Act claims. Gibbs CJ, with whom Murphy and Wilson JJ agreed, at 767 said:“What is plain is that the judgment of that Court [the Full Court] comprised two orders which, viewed by themselves and apart from the rest of the judgment, were final orders, and one order which was plainly interlocutory. The result of the judgment as a whole was that some of the questions in issue in the case were determined and others were not. The question then is whether a judgment of that kind is a final judgment within the meaning of s 33(4) of the Federal Court of Australia Act, and s 35(3) of the Judiciary Act as they stood at the material time.”Counsel for the applicant sought to rely on this passage as indicating that in a composite order of the kind in the present case, some of the individual orders can be final orders. Counsel suggested that a distinction is to be drawn between rules governing appeals, and rules governing the re-opening of those parts of a composite order that are final. It is to be noted, however, that the appeal to the High Court in Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc was held to be incompetent. Gibbs CJ at 768 said:“… the question in the present case is whether the whole judgment finally determined, in a legal sense, all the rights of the parties that were at issue in these proceedings. And the answer is, plainly, that it did not, because it left undetermined the question whether any, and what, damages were payable …”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.