Okoli v The Queen

Case [2019] WASCA 91


JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   OKOLI -v- THE QUEEN [2019] WASCA 91

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA

BEECH JA

HEARD:   13 MAY 2019

DELIVERED          :   28 JUNE 2019

FILE NO/S:   CACR 119 of 2018

BETWEEN:   EMEKA PAUL OKOLI

Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   HALL J

File Number             :   INS 240 of 2017


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal - Whether any errors in judge's directions - Whether evidence capable of supporting the verdict of guilty - Whether conduct of defence case by counsel gave rise to a miscarriage of justice - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Leave on ground 1 granted
Leave on grounds 2 - 5 refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : S W O'Sullivan

Solicitors:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Azzopardi v The Queen [2001] HCA 25; (2001) 205 CLR 50

Carr v The Queen [1988] HCA 47; (1988) 165 CLR 314

Criddle v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 17

Domican v The Queen [1992] HCA 13; (1992) 173 CLR 555

Eravelly v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 139

Evans v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 13

Huggins v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 61

Longman v The Queen [1989] HCA 60; (1989) 168 CLR 79

Moloney v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 193

R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308

R v GW [2016] HCA 6; (2016) 258 CLR 108

R v Ong [2007] VSCA 206; (2007) 176 A Crim R 366

Ruthsalz v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 178

Santos v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2013] WASCA 39

Wells v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 27

White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62

Winmar v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 244; (2007) 35 WAR 159

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. The appellant appeals against his conviction, following an eight‑day trial, of one count of importing a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug, namely methamphetamine, contrary to s 307.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth).

  2. The appellant advances five grounds of appeal.  Grounds 1 ‑ 3 complain of the adequacy of the trial judge's direction to the jury, respectively as to: identification evidence; the elements of knowledge and possession; and corroboration.  Ground 4 asserts that the jury's verdict was unsafe and unreasonable in that the evidence was incapable of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, the critical element of identity.  Ground 5 alleges a miscarriage of justice arising from defence counsel's error and failure to adduce certain evidence. 

  3. For the reasons that follow, we would grant leave to appeal on ground 1, refuse leave on the other grounds and dismiss the appeal.

Agreed or uncontroversial facts

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AGLC
Okoli v The Queen [2019] WASCA 91
Case
[2019] WASCA 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Okoli v The Queen involved an appeal by the defendant against a conviction for an offence. The primary issues were whether there were any errors in the judge's directions to the jury, whether the evidence was capable of supporting the verdict of guilty, and whether the conduct of the defence case by counsel gave rise to a miscarriage of justice. The appeal hinged on the interpretation and application of Section 50 of the Evidence Act, which concerns the necessity of corroboration warnings in criminal trials. The defendant argued that the judge's directions to the jury did not adequately address the risk of a miscarriage of justice due to the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice witness.

The court considered whether the judge's directions were sufficient to safeguard against the risk of convicting the defendant on uncorroborated evidence, as required by Section 50 of the Evidence Act. It was determined that the judge had appropriately cautioned the jury about the need to approach the accomplice's evidence with caution and had instructed them to consider corroborating evidence. The court held that the judge's directions were sufficient and that there was no hidden danger in the evidence that required a corroboration warning. The court found no errors in the judge's directions and concluded that the evidence, when considered in its entirety, was capable of supporting the verdict of guilty.

The court further held that the conduct of the defence case by counsel did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice. The judge's directions to the jury adequately addressed the issues of uncorroborated evidence and the credibility of the accomplice. The court dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds for overturning the conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave on ground 1 granted

Leave on grounds 2 - 5 refused

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 50 of the Evidence Act provides:50. Corroboration warnings not generally required(1)In this section corroboration warning in relation to a trial means a warning to the effect that it is unsafe to convict the person who is being tried on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness.(2)On the trial of a person on indictment for an offence -(a)the judge is not required by any rule of law or practice to give a corroboration warning to the jury in relation to any offence of which the person is liable to be convicted on the indictment; and(b)the judge shall not give a corroboration warning to the jury unless the judge is satisfied that such a warning is justified in the circumstances. The proper construction and effect of s 50 has been considered in a number of cases. See, for example, White v The Queen;[192] Moloney v The State of Western Australia;[193] Evans v The State of Western Australia;[194] Santos v The State of Western Australia [No 2];[195] Ruthsalz v The State of Western Australia.[196][192] White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62 [77] ‑ [78].[193] Moloney v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 193 [9] ‑ [14].[194] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 13 [41] ‑ [51].[195] Santos v The State of Western Australia[No 2] [2013] WASCA 39 [46] ‑ [48].[196] Ruthsalz v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 178 [176] ‑ [180]. The judge directed the jury that:(1)His directions about EH were important.(2)EH was, as he admitted, involved in the importation and had pleaded guilty to it, and had agreed to cooperate with the authorities and to give evidence against the appellant, for which he received a significant reduction on his sentence.(3)Whether EH had given truthful evidence was a matter for the jury.(4)In considering EH's evidence, it was relevant to take into account that he was an admitted criminal with a personal interest in giving evidence against the appellant. Accordingly, his evidence should be approached with some caution.(5)They should only take EH's evidence into account if, having carefully considered it and the circumstances in which it had been given, they were satisfied that it was truthful.(6)In considering EH's evidence, the jury may take into account whether, and to what extent, the evidence was corroborated or supported by other evidence.(7)There were five pieces of evidence that were capable of corroborating EH's evidence, set out in [35] above. The terms of s 50 make it plain that the fact that EH was an accomplice does not, of itself, call for a corroboration warning. EH's evidence contained nothing, and, in particular, involved no hidden danger which the jury would not have appreciated without a warning, to call for a warning of the kind contemplated by s 50.[197] Nor was there anything in the circumstances of the case to require the giving of any instruction or warning or any comment, beyond what was said by the judge, in order to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice.[198] [197] White [66], [78]; Moloney [11] - [12].[198] Ruthsalz [181] and cases there footnoted.