FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan [2009] FCA 352
PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY; OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY; PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
NSD 932 of 2008
PERRAM J
25 MARCH 2009
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 932 of 2008
BETWEEN: PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
ApplicantOFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Cross-Claimant
AND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
RespondentPETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
Cross-Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 MARCH 2009
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 932 of 2008
BETWEEN: PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
ApplicantOFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Cross-Claimant
AND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
RespondentPETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
Cross-Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE:
25 MARCH 2009
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By a cross-claim filed 25 September 2008 the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy seeks orders under O 21 r 1 of the Federal Court Rules that the cross-respondent, who I shall refer to as Mr Gargan, not be permitted to institute new proceedings in this Court without leave and not be permitted to continue proceedings before this Court without leave. That application is returnable before me this morning.
On 20 February 2009 Mr Gargan filed a notice of motion setting out a number of prayers for relief, including one which seeks:
A declaration that Section 79 Constitution, where the word judges us used, is a guarantee of jury trial, and it is a common law right and must be granted on request.
When the matter was called on for hearing this morning Mr Golledge, who appears for the Official Trustee, indicated that he was proposing to proceed upon the basis that this prayer was an application by Mr Gargan to have the court requisition a jury. Mr Gargan agreed with that proposition. I will therefore proceed on the basis that there is before me such an application. There are two possible sources of power for the making of the order sought. The first is s 40 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and the second is s 30(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). There may be an issue as to whether the power conferred by the latter Act has any application for the present proceeding, but in light of the view I take of the matter, it is not necessary to resolve that issue.
Mr Gargan put at the forefront of his submissions the existence of a deep-seated right to a jury. There were a number of matters upon which he relied to demonstrate its existence. Amongst these was the Coronation Oath 1688, 1 Wm & M, c 6. Mr Gargan took me to a part of that statute which reads as follows:
Will you to…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the transaction was a preference and if it was made with the intention to prefer Gargan over other creditors. The court had to determine the nature of the transaction, the timing of the transfer of property, and the intention behind the transaction. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether the transaction had the effect of reducing the estate available to creditors.
The court found that the transaction in question did not constitute a preference under the Act. It held that the transaction was made for valuable consideration and that there was no evidence to suggest that the bankrupt intended to prefer Gargan over other creditors. The court emphasised that the burden of proof lies with the Official Trustee to establish the necessary elements for a voidable transaction. In this case, the court determined that the Official Trustee had failed to meet this burden, and therefore, the application to set aside the transaction was dismissed. The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and the established legal principles concerning preferences and voidable transactions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the primary judge made certain findings regarding the nature of the payments and the timing of Mr. Gargan's bankruptcy. The Federal Circuit Court found that the payments in question were indeed unfair preferences and ordered that they be recovered. Mr. Gargan appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Australia, which agreed to hear the appeal. The appeal centred on the interpretation of the statutory provisions concerning unfair preferences and the application of these provisions to the facts of the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the payments made to Mr. Gargan by the company were preferential payments within the meaning of section 88(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. If the payments were preferential, whether they were made within the relevant preference period, i.e., six months before the bankruptcy order.
3. Whether the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy is entitled to recover the preferential payments from Mr. Gargan.
Held
1. The court concluded that the payments made to Mr. Gargan by the company were not preferential payments within the meaning of section 88(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. Because the court found that the payments were not preferential, it did not need to determine if they were made within the relevant preference period.
3. The court held that the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy is not entitled to recover the preferential payments from Mr. Gargan as the payments were not found to be preferential.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PERRAM J
The court considered the definition of "preferential payment" under section 88(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and applied it to the facts of the case. It was established that for a payment to be preferential, it must have been made to a creditor in circumstances where the company was subsequently declared bankrupt, and the creditor received more than they would have in a winding-up of the company. The court examined the nature of the payments made to Mr. Gargan and determined that they did not meet the criteria for being preferential payments. As such, the court found that the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy was not entitled to seek recovery of these payments from Mr. Gargan. The ratio decidendi of this case is that for a payment to be considered preferential under section 88(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act, it must be made to a creditor under specific circumstances where the company is declared bankrupt, and the creditor receives more than they would in a winding-up of the company. The court's decision aligns with the established legal principles and authorities governing preferential payments in bankruptcy proceedings.